specified price. The agreement con-

tained the following provision for

arbitration:

"In case of any dispute which should
arise under this contract, all differences
have to be decided by arbitration of two
arbitrators, one appointed by each
party, who will have to decide with
what allowance the goods are to be
kept. In case these arbitrators cannot
agree, they have to choose an umpire,
whose decision shall be final and binding
for both parties."

In July, 1920, the Anderson Com-
pany brought an action against the
Bauer Company to recover damages
for a shortage of quantity, in the
merchandise delivered under the con-
tract. The defendant answered the
complaint and thereafter both par-
ties served a notice of trial.

The case came on for trial on June
4, 1923. The presiding justice, find-
ing that the complaint required
amendment, offered to arbitrate the
matters in dispute himself. The par-
ties orally agreed to accept his offer,
but when an award was made in
favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
refused to accept it and clected to
continue with the trial.

Thereupon the plaintiff was per-
mitted to serve an amended com-
plaint. Instead of answering the
amended complaint, the defendant
served a written demand on the plain-
tiff that the matters in controversy

be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the contract, and obtained a court order requiring arbitration. This order was reversed upon appeal. In reversing it the court said:

"In the present case the petitioner, the defendant in the original action, interposed an answer, served a notice of trial, and never asserted any intention of standing upon the provision for arbitration during the period of nearly three years while the action was pending awaiting trial. It was not until after subjecting plaintiff to this long delay that it sought to assert, for the first time, its right to arbitration, instead of answering an amended complaint, which in no material particular varied from the first cause of action in the original complaint to which it had served an answer and an amended answer, without setting up any assertion of its right to have the dispute arbitrated.

"I am of the opinion that petitioner, by its course of conduct and long silence, had waived its right to arbitrate, and elected to have the controversy adjudicated by the courts, and that therefore the order requiring arbitration should be reversed."

little over $2,500 to his credit. At about the same time, a person known as "Chester Page" opened an account in the National Bank of Baltimore, the defendant, in which he deposited $500.

On the morning of Saturday, February 25th, at about 11 o'clock, Page presented to the National Bank of Baltimore a check for the sum of $2,500, which he asked to have cashed, and his request was complied with.

The check appeared to be drawn by Hammond on the Drovers & Mechanics Bank. It was payable to the order of Page and indorsed by him. It bore on its face what appeared to be the certification stamp of the Drovers & Mechanics Bank.

The check was sent through the Baltimore Clearing House on Monday, the 27th. The clearing hour at the Baltimore Clearing House is 9.45 A. M. Section 8 of the constitution of the clearing house provides, with reference to the return of checks that are not good or irregular as follows:

BANKING

Payment Through Clearing House of Check Bearing Forged Certification

National Bank of Baltimore v. Drovers & Mechanics National Bank of Baltimore, Court of Appeals of Maryland, 122 Atl. Rep. 12

On February 4, 1922, a person known as "John B. Hammond," opened an account with the Drovers & Mechanics National Bank, the plaintiff, in which he deposited a

"In the case of errors in the exchanges and claims arising from missent items, notice must be given by 12 o'clock noon and adjustment made directly between the banks which are parties thereto, and not through the clearing house. In the case of claims arising from checks that are 'not good' or irregular, or from other causes, notice must likewise be given before 12 o'clock noon, and the adjustment may be made directly between the banks parties thereto, or at the clearing of returned items held in the afternoon of the same day, as next hereinafter provided Upon request made before 12 o'clock noon any bank shall extend until 1 o'clock P. M. the time for returning items on it as not good." "

On the day on which the check went through the clearing house, several clerks of the Drovers & Mechanics Bank were away on account of illness, and the paying teller did not examine that day's that day's certified checks until about 2.15 o'clock. Upon making his examination, he found six other certified checks, similar to the one here involved, which had come in that day through the clearing house from various banks in Baltimore. The certification on each

of these seven checks was a forgery, He also found that on February 24th there had been a valid certification of another similar check for $2,500, drawn by Hammond and indorsed by Page. This check had been returned by Hammond on the 25th, and had been taken up by the bank. The protectograph used on the valid certification was not used on the forged certifications. The valid certification was written in green ink, while the forged ones were written in black ink. At the time the examination was made it was, of course, too late to return the checks within the time prescribed by the clearing-house rule. But the banks from which the forged checks had been received were notified promptly after the discovery was made.

From what has been stated, it is apparent that Hammond and Page were swindlers. The court suggests that the forgery may have been accomplished by one person operating under two names. At any rate, the swindlers or swindler succeeded in getting the sum of $17,500 out of the various Baltimore banks on the morning of Saturday, February 25th, and they, or he, disappeared immediately after collecting.

This case involved only the check presented by the National Bank of Baltimore. It was held. that the Drovers & Mechanics Bank was entitled to recover from the National Bank of Baltimore the amount of the check. The decision is based on the ground that the defendant sustained no loss by reason of the failure of the plaintiff bank to return the check within the time specified under the rule.

By this it meant that notice to the defendant before 12 o'clock on Monday would have done the defendant no good. Both depositor and cash had disappeared two days before. If the defendant had waited until 12 o'clock on Monday and had then paid the check to its depositor, relying on the fact that the check had not then been returned, the defendant would have been in a different position.

Indorser of Certificates of Deposit Held Liable

Clark v. Holder, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 247 S. W. Rep. 699

A depositor in a bank held three certificates of deposit, each of which stated that a certain sum would be payable to her in current funds in six months from date on return of the certificate properly indorsed. The certificates provided for interest at 4 per cent. if the deposits should be left in the bank for six months.

Before the expiration of six months the certificates were indorsed and delivered to the vendor of a parcel of real estate as consideration for the transfer. The vendor paid to the indorser of the certificates the accumulated interest to the date of the

transfer. Before the maturity of the certificates the bank became insolvent.

It was held that upon the failure of the bank to pay the amount of the certificates, the holder thereof was entitled to recover that amount from the indorser. The court held that the certificates were negotiable instruments and that the indorser thereof had by her indorsement contracted that the certificates would be paid according to their purport upon due presentment or demand. It was held to be no defense that the holder failed to present the certificates for payment before the insolvency of the bank, for the reason that, although the certificates were payable on demand, it was within the contemplation of the indorser and the holder that the deposits should remain in the bank for six months in order to get the interest thereon.

BANKRUPTCY

Cars Purchased Under Conditional Sale Contract Pass to Trustee on Purchaser's Bankruptcy, Though Unpaid For

In re Massachusetts Motor Co., Petition of Federal Finance Corporation, United States District Court (Mass.), 292 Fed. Rep. 766

The Federal Finance Corporation advanced money to the Massachusetts Motors Co., a dealer in automobiles, to pay drafts attached to bills of lading accompanying shipments of motor cars.

As security for these advances the motors company gave documents,

known as leases and referred to by the court as bills of conditional sale, by the terms of which title to the cars was not to pass to the motors company until the cars had been paid for.

There was a demand note for the amount advanced on each car.

The cars were unloaded and taken to the salesroom of the motors company. No notice was given to its customers that the cars did not belong to it. The arrangement between the parties was that the cars should be sold and the loans paid from the proceeds.

The motors company went into bankruptcy and, at that time, several of the cars remained in its salesroom. The cars were claimed by the trustee in bankruptcy and also by the finance corporation, in which the title to the cars was vested by the terms of its agreement with the motors company.

The general rule seems to be that, where the seller reserves title in himself until the property is paid for, the seller will be entitled to reclaim the property against the trustee in bankruptcy, except where there is a state statute requiring such contracts to be filed or recorded and the statute has not been complied with. (7 Corpus Juris 124.) And undoubtedly the object of the finance corporation in reserving title in itself was to protect itself in the event of an emergency such as here arose.

But the court held that the trustee in bankruptcy and not the finance corporation was entitled to the cars. The court said:

"The documents provided for what are commonly called conditional sales of property, i. e., sales where the title is to remain in the vendor until pay

ment, and where such sales relate to property which is the stock in trade of a dealer, and no notice is given to the public that the dealer does not own the

articles offered for sale. The terms of the documents reserving title in the vendor are invalid as against a trustee in bankruptcy."

The rights of one who sells property under a contract of conditional sale, in a case of this kind, depend largely upon the statutes of the state where the question arises dealing with such contracts. This case was decided under the laws of Massachusetts.

BROKERS

Broker Held Entitled to Commissions for Sales of Stock

Williams v. Yellow Pine Box & Lumber Co., Supreme Court of Wash

ington, 218 Pac. Rep. 245 The defendant corporation, the Yellow Pine Box & Lumber Co., agreed in writing to employ the plaintiff, H. C. Williams, to sell the preferred stock of the company, and to pay him "a commission of 15 per cent. of the purchase price so paid to the company for said shares."

Williams sold stock to various persons who agreed to pay for the shares subscribed for by them at such time and in such manner as might be required by the board of trustees of the defendant corporation. Thereafter he brought this action to recover commissions to which he claimed to be entitled by reason of those sales. Most of the stock sold by Williams had not been paid at the time the action was brought.

The defendant corporation contended that as its contract with the

plaintiff provided for the payment of commissions on the purchase price paid to the company for shares of stock and the purchase price for the shares sold by the plaintiff had not been paid, he was not entitled to re

cover.

The court found that it was the fault of the defendant, and not the fault of the plaintiff, that payment for the stock had not been required. The sales were not for cash, but payment was to be made in the manner provided by the company's board of trustees. It, therefore, held that the defendant could not take advantage of its own negligent or dilatory conduct in failing to require the payment so as to defeat the plaintiff's A judgment in right to recover. favor of the plaintiff was affirmed. The court expressed the rule applicable as follows:

"Non-performance of a contract in accordance with its terms is excused if performance is prevented by the conduct of the adverse party. If the impossibility of performance arises directly or even indirectly from the acts

of the promisee, it is a sufficient excuse for non-performance."

CHATTEL MORTGAGES

Fraudulent Resale of Mortgaged Automobile

Graves v. Negy, Supreme Court of Kansas, 219 Pac. Rep. 286

The plaintiff, T. H. Graves, purchased a Haynes automobile from the defendants and in payment of the purchase price, which was $3,250,