Indiana Trust Co. v. International, etc., Assn.-165 Ind. 597. While, possibly, it may be said that it was an irregularity on the part of Byram, as treasurer, to have transferred the money in question to Schurmann, nevertheless, when tested by the acts of the latter, he appears to 1. have received it, if not by virtue of his official position as secretary, or in his strict right as such official, he at least received the money from Byram under color of his official position, and so deposited it in the bank. Under the circumstances, the association would have the right to require him, as its official, to account to it for the money had he misapplied it or converted it to his own use. Tyler v. Old Post Bldg. Assn. (1882), 87 Ind. 323, and cases cited. The facts in the case, as herein stated, in effect at least, show that Schurmann was the general manager of the as sociation or corporation. He received all money 2. paid in for the benefit of the association. If the $5,000 in controversy had been turned over to him for the association by any person other than Byram, the treasurer, there would be no room whatever for the contention that the association was not bound by his receipt of the money as its agent. He, by depositing the money in the bank as shown, to the account of "Charles Schurmann, secretary," thereby recognized and gave notice of the character in which he received and held the money. Bundy v. Town of Monticello (1882), 84 Ind. 119; Bank of Northern Liberties v. Jones (1862), 42 Pa. St. 536; National Bank v. Insurance Co. (1881), 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693. If Schurmann's position as secretary had terminated after depositing the $5,000 in the bank, his successor in office would have been entitled to check out the money for and on behalf of the association. Carman v. President, etc. (1883), 61 Md. 467; Gaffney's Estate (1892), 146 Pa. St. 49, 23 Atl. 163. Indiana Trust Co. v. International, etc., Assn.-165 Ind. 597. Under the circumstances the bank would not have been justified in applying any portion of the $5,000 to Schur mann's indebtedness. There is no finding to the 3. effect that Schurmann used for his own individual benefit any part of the money in controversy after he deposited it in the bank, and no presumption to that effect can be indulged. This deposit account, which he as secretary opened in the first instance by means of the proceeds of the check in controversy as previously said, was an official deposit impressed with a trust. If he there4. after mixed or confused his own money with this trust fund, and was unable to distinguish or to furnish the means for separating his money from the trust fund, he must bear the consequences which may result from the confusion of funds. Pearce v. Dill (1897), 149 Ind. 136; National Bank v. Insurance Co., supra. There is nothing to disclose that the associations lost any of the money transferred from Byram to Schurmann, or in any manner have been damaged by the transaction, but on the contrary it is made to appear that these corporations have received the benefit thereof. Under such circumstances they are not in a position successfully to avail themselves of the irregularity of the transfer of the money to Schurmann, the secretary and general manager. Tyler v. Old Post Bldg. Assn., supra; Bass Foundry, etc., Works v. Board, etc. (1888), 115 Ind. 234, 244; Rowe v. Major (1883), 92 Ind. 206; Chicago Bldg. Soc. v. Crowell (1872), 65 Ill. 453; Kilpatrick v. Home, etc., Assn. (1888), 119 Pa. St. 30, 12 Atl. 754; O'Malley v. People's, etc., Sav. Assn. (1895), 35 N. Y. Supp. 14; Peterson v. People's, etc., Sav. Assn. (1900), 124 Mich. 573, 83 N. W. 606; Parsons, Contracts (9th ed.), *139. When all of the facts in the case are considered, it is evident that the associations in question had knowledge, if not actual, at least constructive, relative to the manner in which the affairs were conducted. It appears that the treas Indiana Trust Co. v. International, etc., Assn.-165 Ind. 597. urer had been granted an indefinite leave of absence, consequently it must have been known that when absent he was not receiving funds each day from Schurmann, and was not paying warrants of the associations at the city of Indianapolis, but that these duties were being discharged by Schurmann. It is disclosed that the associations had auditing, finance and examining committees, upon which devolved an examination of the books and the affairs of the concerns. It would be strange indeed if these associations, through the means of these agencies, did not discover that Schurmann had an official bank account, out of which the expenses of the associations and drafts thereon were paid by him as secretary. If the course of the business of the associations in regard to these matters were of such a character as to put them on inquiry, that, in a legal sense, would be sufficient to charge them with notice. Webb v. John Hancock, etc., Ins. Co. (1904), 162 Ind. 616, 66 L. R. A. 632; Thompson, Corporations, §§5222, 5224, 5237. We are fully satisfied that Byram's estate, under the facts found by the court, is liable for the payment of the $6,000 borrowed by the decedent from the association. We conclude that the judgment of the Appellate Court, reversing in part the judgment of the Marion Circuit Court, is right, and it is therefore affirmed. The judgment of the Marion Circuit Court is therefore reversed in part, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to that court to restate its conclusions of law to the effect that Byram's estate, as represented by the appellant herein, is entitled to a credit of $5,000 on the amount found to be due on the general claim presented against said estate in this action and to render its judgment accordingly. The judgment of said court in all other respects is affirmed. Barton v. Kimmerley-165 Ind. 609. BARTON ET AL. v. KIMMERLEY. [No. 20,061. Filed December 12, 1905.] 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-Fifth Amendment.-Application.—The fifth amendment of the federal Constitution limits federal power only and does not apply to state legislation. p. 610. 2. SAME.-Administration upon Estates of Absentees.-Due Process of Law. - Fourteenth Amendment. - The fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution does not prohibit a state from providing by statute for administration upon the estates of absentees. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, distinguished. p. 610. 3. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.-Statutes.-Estates.-Sales to Pay Debts.-Recovery of Real Estate Sold.-The five-year statute of limitations is a complete defense to a suit to quiet title to real estate sold by the administrator of an absentee to pay debts under $$2385, 2387-2390 Burns 1901, §§2232-2236 R. S. 1881 and $2386 Burns 1901, Acts 1883, p. 209, though the description in the deed from the administrator renders such deed void. p. 611. From Superior Court of Vigo County; Samuel C. Stimson, Judge. Suit by Elizabeth G. Barton and others against Katherine Kimmerley. From a decree for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. David N. Taylor and George I. Kisner, for appellants. MONKS, J.-This suit was brought by appellants against appellee to quiet title to certain real estate in Vigo county, Indiana, sold under the provisions of an act for the administration of the estates of absentees, being $$2385, 23872390 Burns 1901, §§2232-2236 R. S. 1881 and Horner 1901, and $2386 Burns 1901, Acts 1883, p. 209. Appellee filed an answer and cross-complaint to quiet title to said real estate, claiming title thereto by virtue of an administrator's sale under said act. A trial of said cause resulted in a finding and decree in favor of appellee, quieting her title to said real estate. VOL. 165-39 Barton v. Kimmerley-165 Ind. 609. Appellants insist that the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution of the United States deprive the legislature of this State of the power to enact any 1. law for the administration of the estates of ab sentees; that any such law authorizes the administration of the estates of living persons, which is a violation of said amendments, because it deprives persons, whose estates are so administered, of their property without due process of law; citing Scott v. McNeal (1894), 154 U. S. 34, 14 Sup. Ct. 1108, 38 L. Ed. 896. The fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States applies only to legislation by congress and not to state legislation. Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit (1901), 181 U. S. 396, 398, 21 Sup. Ct. 644, 45 L. Ed. 914; French v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. (1901), 181 U. S. 324, 21 Sup. Ct. 625, 45. L. Ed. 879; Detroit v. Parker (1901), 181 U. S. 399, 401, 21 Sup. Ct. 624, 45 L. Ed. 916. Said fifth amendment can not, therefore, be invoked to affect state legislation. In the case of Scott v. McNeal, supra, the probate court in the state of Washington had, under an act for the settlement of decedents' estates, issued letters of adminis2. tration upon the estate of a person who had disappeared, and proceeded to administer his estate as that of a dead person, upon the presumption of death which said court assumed had arisen from his absence. There was no law in that state providing for the administration of the estate of an absentee as such. It was held in said case that, under a law giving jurisdiction to a court to administer estates of deceased persons, the issuance of letters of administration upon the estate of a person who is in fact alive was void and of no effect as against him. It is evident that said case and all cases to the same effect, under laws for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, are inapplicable here. In the case of Cunnius v. Reading School District (1903), 206 Pa. St. 469, 56 Atl. 16, 98 Am. St. 790, the supreme court of Pennsylvania |