Ray v. Baker-165 Ind. 74. respective witnesses was presented for the determination of the trial court. In the appeal of Parkison v. Thompson (1905), 164 Ind. 609, the provisions of the section of the statute in question were thoroughly considered, and under the interpretation therein accorded to them we held that in a cause where a question of fact or facts depends on oral testimony for support, and there is a substantial conflict in such testimony, we will not undertake to reconcile the conflict or weigh such evidence. The court in that case on page 626 said: "Were we to attempt, under such circumstances, to reconcile and weigh the evidence and interpose our judgment in the case for that of the lower court, great injustice might result." The same section was again under consideration in Hudelson v. Hudelson (1905), 164 Ind. 694, and the holding in the case of Parkison v. Thompson, supra, was reaffirmed and followed. It is true that this court, in Egbert v. Rush (1856), 7 Ind. 706, said: "As a chancery cause, this court will not feel bound to respect the finding of the circuit court as it would the verdict of a jury or the finding of the court at law. Having all the evidence upon which the court below acted, we will weigh it and draw our own conclusions." This latter case, however, was tried in the lower court in 1848, when the practice in chancery cases and in actions at law was different. Under the practice in force prior to the adoption of our civil code of 1852, a case in chancery was submitted and tried in the lower court upon depositions. taken out of court. Therefore, under the circumstances, the trial court was neither in a better position, nor had it any greater facilities, for testing the credibility of the witnesses whose testimony was introduced through depositions, than were afforded the judges of an appellate court. Consequently a chancery case in the Supreme Court under the old practice was decided de novo upon the evidence therein certified, and a final judgment rendered thereon by the Ray v. Baker-165 Ind. 74. court, without remanding the cause for a new trial. Miller v. Evansville Nat. Bank (1884), 99 Ind. 272. In the latter case this court, in commenting on the old rule of practice under which an appellate court in a chancery proceeding weighed the evidence and gave judgment accordingly, said: "But practice demonstrated that this rule was of uncertain enforcement, and it is a well-known fact that the judge who saw the witnesses, heard them testify, and observed their demeanor on the witness-stand, was much better enabled to weigh the evidence and come to a correct conclusion than this court could possibly be by only seeing the record of the evidence, which is seldom full and frequently imperfect." In Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Griffin (1886), 107 Ind. 464, the court, in referring to the rule asserted in Egbert v. Rush, supra, and to the change in the practice in equity cases as made under our civil code, said: "We know of no reason, therefore, for holding now that we are not bound to give the same respect to the finding of the trial court, in a suit in equity, that we have always given to the verdict of a jury, or the finding of a court, in an action at law." Since the holding in these latter cases it has been generally affirmed by this court, down to Mead v. Burk (1901), 156 Ind. 577, that the rule that we will not weigh the evidence in a case on appeal finds no exception in suits in equity. The proposition with which we have to deal is not as to whether we shall yield obedience to the statute in controversy, but the question raised is one which requires us to discover, by a reasonable interpretation, to what extent the statute in question is intended to abrogate or change the rule, applicable alike in suits in equity and in actions at law, to the effect that we will not disturb the judgment of the trial court on the weight of the evidence. We need not elaborate, however, in this appeal in regard to the construction or interpretation which should be placed upon the statute, for that question was fully determined in Parkison v. Thompson, supra. Ray v. Baker-165 Ind. 74. Upon the interpretation of the law the decision in the appeal of People v. Fish (1891), 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319, may be said to support our holding in Parkison v. Thompson, supra. By a provision of a statute of New York pertaining to criminal procedure, the court of appeals of that state was authorized to order a new trial on an appeal in cases of homicide, wherein the defendant had been sentenced to suffer death, provided that court was satisfied that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence, or against law, or that justice required a new trial. In the case above cited, Earl, J., speaking for the court on the construction of this statute, said: "It does not confer upon the court power arbitrarily to grant a new trial whenever it thinks justice may require it, but its jurisdiction in such a case is to be exercised according to settled rules of law. If there is a conflict in the evidence or different inferences may be drawn therefrom, it is the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the facts, and their determination should not be interfered with unless we can see that such determination was against the clear weight of the evidence or was influenced in some way by passion, prejudice, mistake, perversion or corruption." In Smith v. Kruger (1870), 33 Ind. 86, the court affirmed that it would not interfere with the finding of the trial court unless the same was "clearly against the evidence, and can be considered only as the result of passion, prejudice, or a palpable misapprehension of the facts." Did the case at bar disclose to our satisfaction that the finding of the lower court was clearly against the weight of the evidence, or that such finding "was the result of passion, prejudice, mistake or corruption," then certainly, under such circumstances, it would be our duty, in the interest of justice, to reverse the judgment. As previously said, the evidence, herein is conflicting. The finding of the court may, in the main, be said to be supported by that given on the trial by appellees in their own behalf. Their testimony, Walker v. State, ex rel.-165 Ind. 94. however, when considered together with the reasonable inferences which may be drawn in their favor from the testimony of adverse witnesses, fully sustains the finding of the court on all material points. To sum up the evidence in the case, or to point out the inconsistencies with which a portion of that given on behalf of appellant may be said to be impressed, would unnecessarily extend our opinion and subserve no useful purpose. The question of the credibility and weight to be accorded to the several witnesses who testified before the trial court was one to be determined by that tribunal. It was its province and duty to reconcile the conflicting testimony of the witnesses, if possible, so as to give credit to all. If this could not be done, then it had the right to determine whom it would believe and whom it would discredit. This duty, we may assume, the court discharged. Discovering no available error the judgment is affirmed. Montgomery, J., concurs in the result. 1. WALKER v. STATE, EX REL. LABOYTEAUX. - EVIDENCE. Bastardy. Witnesses.-Admissions.-Impeachment by Contradictory Statements.-The testimony of defendant in a bastardy proceeding is competent to show that a witness called by him had admitted to him, on their return home from a visit to relatrix on the night of the conception of the child, that he, the witness, had intercourse with relatrix on such night, where such witness, on such trial, had denied such intercourse or any opportunity therefor and the making of such admission. p. 96. 2. SAME.-Bastardy.-Impeachment of Relatrix by Specific Acts. -Relatrix, in a bastardy case, can not be impeached by showing her admission of specific acts of intercourse with others than defendant at times remote from the date of conception. p. 97. 3. SAME.-Bastardy.—Impeachment of Relatrix by Showing Opportunity.-Relatrix, in a bastardy case, can not be impeached by showing her admission that she and another than defendant were alone on the night of the conception of such child. p. 98. Walker v. State, ex rel.-165 Ind. 94. 4. EVIDENCE. — Bastardy. —Intercourse with Others.-Impeachment.-Defendant, in a bastardy case, may introduce evidence of the intercourse of relatrix with others upon or near the date of conception, and may compel relatrix to testify to such, and if she deny same, she may be impeached by proof of contradictory statements. p. 98. 5. SAME. Bastardy.-Intercourse with Others. Opportunity.— Question for Jury.-Evidence is competent on behalf of the defendant, in a bastardy case, to show that relatrix had intercourse with another than defendant at times prior to conception, and that she had an opportunity for intercourse with such other person on the night of conception, the inference therefrom being for the jury. p. 98. 6. SAME.-Bastardy.—Admissions of Relatrix.-A letter, written by relatrix in a bastardy case to defendant, admitting intercourse with another at former times and an opportunity therefor on the night of conception, is competent evidence for defendant, where relatrix, on the trial, denies such intercourse and such opportunity. p. 99. From Fayette Circuit Court; Ferdinand S. Swift, Judge. Action by the State of Indiana, on the relation of Pearl Laboyteaux, against Joseph W. Walker. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court under §1337u Burns 1901, Acts 1901, p. 590. Reversed. McKee, Little & Frost, for appellant. Reuben Conner and Barnard & Jeffrey, for appellee. MONTGOMERY, J.-This is a bastardy proceeding. The only error assigned is the overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial. The grounds of the motion urged upon us are refusing to permit appellant as a witness to testify to a statement made to him out of court contradicting the testimony of a witness placed upon the stand by him, and excluding from evidence a letter written by the relatrix to appellant. The relatrix testified that her child was begotten on the night of September 5, 1902. The theory of the defense |