[ 553] 2. After Termination of Homestead. Under the provisions of most homestead laws, the rule is that, after the homestead exemption ceases in favor of survivors, the property reverts to decedent's estate and becomes subject to his debts,92 the property becoming subject to debts accruing before or after the homestead was set apart;' .93 and such a reverter occurs upon abandonment of the homestead, 94 or upon the death of the surviving spouse where there are no minor children,95 or upon the death of the surviving spouse and attaining of majority by the minor children." But a decree finding that the homestead has been abandoned and directing a sale of the premises for payment of debts is erroneous where there was no evidence to show an abandonment." 97 96 [§ 554] 3. Sale Subject to Homestead Rights* -a. Right to Sell Not Recognized. In many jurisdictions where the homestead may be subjected to the claims of the creditors of decedent, the property cannot be sold before the termination of the homestead subject to the homestead rights of the beneficiaries therein, but can be sold only after the premises lose their homestead character, the effect being to suspend the rights of the creditor until the homestead right of the widow and minor chil rison v. Lewisville First Nat. Bank, | Cal. 119, 24 P 852, 21 AmSR 26. (Commn. A.) 238 SW 209), (6) and that judgment liens, existing at the time of abandonment of a homestead. are of equal dignity, and are entitled to equal rank in the distribution of proceeds of sale (Harrison v. Lewisville First Nat. Bank, supra). [a] The unsatisfied claim of creditor of decedent must be pre. sented and allowed as are other claims against the estate. Sanders v. Russell, 86 Cal. 119, 24 P 852, 21 AmSR 26. Debts enforceable and not enforceable see supra §§ 502-504. See infra § 553. 89. 90. See infra § 555. 91. See infra § 554. 92. 322. Ala.-Miller v. Marx, 55 Ala. Ark.-McAndrew v. Hollingsworth, 72 Ark. 446, 81 SW 610. Cal-Raggio v. Palmtag, 155 Cal. 797, 103 P 312. Ga-Fleetwood v. Lord, 87 Ga. 592, 13 SE 574 (semble). See also infra this note [a]. Ill. Fritts v. Fritts, 298 Ill. 314, 131 NE 584; Lewis v. McGraw, 19 Ill. A. 313. Kan.-Postlethwaite v. Edson, 102 Kan. 104, 171 P 769, LRA1918D 983. La-People's Independent Rice Mill Co. v. Benoit, 117 La. 999, 42 S 480. Mich.-Brown v. Keiser, 182 Mich. 432, 148 NW 731. N. C.-Robinson v. McDowell, 133 N. C. 182. 45 SE 545, 98 AmSR 704. Va.-Hanby v. Henritze, 87 Va. 177, 7 SE 204. Sask. Trotter V. National Mfg. Co, Ltd., 5 Sask. L. 244. [a] In Georgia under a statute, a widow, by paying the excess in value of the homestead over two thousand dollars and having the whole property set off to her, secures an interest which reverts to her estate on the determination of the homestead right, and not to the estate of her husband. Groover v. Brown, 118 Ga. 491. 45 SE 310. 93. Hanby v. Henritze, 85 Va. 177, 7 SE 204. 94. Garabaldi v. Jones, 48 Ark. 230, 2 SW 844; Postlethwaite v. Fdson, 102 Kan 104, 171 P 769, LRA 1918D 983: Northrup v. Horville, 62 Kan. 767, 64 P 622 [rev (A.) 62 P 91; Dayton v. Donart, 22 Kan. 256; People's Independent Rice Mill Co., v. Benoit, 117 La. 999, 42 S 480; Chaffe v. McGehee, 38 La. Ann. 278, 95. Raggio v. Palmtag, 155 Cal. 797, 103 P 312; Lewis v. McGraw, 19 Ill. A. 313. 96. McAndrew V. Hollingsworth, 72 Ark. 446. 81 SW 610; Barrett v. Durham, 80 Ga. 336, 5 SE 102. 97. Wolf v. Ogden, 66 I 224. 98. See Executors and Administrators §§ 875 et seq, 943 et seq. 99. Nichols v. Shearon. 49 Ark. 75, 4 SW 167; Sanders v. Russell, 86 1. Abramson v. Rogers, 97 Ark. 189, 133 SW 836. 2. Redding v. Anderson, 144 Ga. 100, 86 SE 241; Craddock v. Kelly, 129 Ga. 818, 60 SE 193. 3. Abramson v. Rogers, 97 Ark. 189, 133 SW 836. 4. Sale subject to homestead in general see supra § 439. 5. See supra § 553. Ark.-Abramson v. Rogers, 97 Ark. 189, 133 SW 826: Burel v. Baker, 89 Ark. 168, 116 SW 181; Harris v. Watson, 56 Ark. 574, 20 SW 529; Bond v. Montgomery, 56 Ark. 563, 20 SW 525, 35 AmSR 119; Burgett v. Apperson. 52 Ark. 213, 12 SW 559: Stayton v. Halpern, 50 Ark. 329, 7 SW 304: McCloy v. Arnett, 47 Ark. 445, 2 SW 71. Ga-Redding v. Anderson, 144 Ga. 100. 86 SE 241. Ill-Hanna v. Palmer, 194 II 41, 61 NE 1051, 56 LRA 93; Peo. v. Lanham, 189 Ill. 326 59 NE 610: Mueller v. Conrad, 178 III. 276. 52 NE 1031; Oettinger v. Specht, 162 II. 179, 44 NE 399; Hartman v. Schultz. 101 111. 437; Wolf v. Ogden. 66 111 224; Matter of Brown, 204 Ill. A. 596. Mich.- -Showers V. Robinson, 43 Mich. 502. 5 NW 988. N C.-Hinsdale v. Williams, 75 N. C. 430; Allen v. Shields. 72 N. C. 504. Oh.-Wehrle v. Wehrle, 39 Oh. St. 365. S. C.-McKeown v. Carroll, 5 S. C. 75. "An estate of homestead cannot be severed from the fee of the land. During a continuance of the homestead estate the property is exempt from sale for debts of the deceased owner, and it cannot be sold, subject to the estate of homestead. to pay such debts." Reminger v. Joblonski, 271 Ill. 71, 73. 110 NE 903. 6 protection in their property rights because they are the least able to protect themselves." Armor V. Lewis, 252 Mo. 568. 579, 161 SW 251. [b] A homestead of less than the exemption limit cannot be disposed of at an administrator's sale, either to discharge encumbrances thereon or to pay debts of decedent, and a license purporting to authorize such a sale is absolutely void. Bixby v. Jewell, 72 Nebr. 755, 101 NW 1026; Tindall v. Peterson. 71 Nebr 160, 98 NW 688, 99 NW 659, 8 AnnCas 721. [c] In Illinois; consent to sale. (1) The Administration Act (Hurd Rev. St. [1913] c 3 § 100) enables the court to order a sale of the estate of homestead and fee together and to divide the proceeds of the sale by giving to the person entitled to the homestead the cash value of the same. In this case the widow filed her consent, and the court did not err in decreeing a sale of the premises during the continuance of the homestead estate. Reminger v. Joblonski, 271 111. 71, 110 NE 903. (2) Prior to this statute it was held that the consent of the widow to the sale will not validate it, as the fee in the premises cannot be so severed from the right of occupancy as a homestead. Mueller v. Conrad, 178 Ill. 276. 52 NE 1031. [d] When the homestead is mingled with other lands which the court has jurisdiction to sell, the sole of the whole has been held not void for want of jurisdiction. Burgett v. Apperson, 52 Ark. 213, 12 SW 559. [e] In Missouri (1) the decisions are conflicting, many of them holding that there can be no sale of preises subject to the rights of those having a homestead interest therein. Armor v. Lewis, 252 Mo. 568. 161 SW 251; Balance v. Gordon, 247 Mo. 119, 152 SW 358; In re Powell, 157 Mo 151, 57 SW 717: Broyles v. Cox, 153 Mo 242, 54 SW 498 77 AmSR 714. (2) Other decisions have reached the contrary conclusion. Wilson v. Wilson, 255 Mo. 528, 164 SW 561; Robbins v. Boulware, 190 33, 88 SW 674. 109 AmSR 746: Keene v. Wyatt, 160 Mo. 1, 60 SW 1037, 63 SW 116: Anthony v. Rice, 110 Mo. 233, 19 SW 423; Hannah v. Hannah, 109 Mo. 236, 19 SW 87: Poland v. Vesper, 67 Mo. 727 (decided under earlier provisions). [a] Reason for this view.-"The vested homestead estate of the chil-Mo. dren may, with exception of the uncertainty of life, be estimated, but that of the widow is wholly in nubibus; for it is darkened by two prime uncertainties of time. to-wit, her death and her remarriage. To sell the fee subject to such uncertain 7. See cases supra note 6. See rights is bad public policy; for it also supra § 553. attains but one certain end, namely, [a] Burden of proof. When a the sacrifice of the property of those homestead right is shown to have very persons the law holds in ten-existed, one who seeks to enforce der regard as its wards. viz., the rights inconsistent therewith must widow and the fatherless. at the show not only the death of the homevery time, too, when they most need steader, but the arrival at full age dren ceases.8 An order of sale prior to the termination of the homestead right is an absolute nullity in some jurisdictions," although it is held that the purchaser at a void sale under such order will be subrogated to the rights of the creditors to the payment of whose claims the purchase money was appropriated. 10 Laches. It has been held that no inflexible rule can be adopted by the courts fixing a time after the expiration of the homestead estate in which an application to sell real estate to pay debts must be made, but each case must be largely controlled by its own circumstances.11 [§ 555] b. Right to Sell Recognized. In some jurisdictions where the homestead may be subjected to the debts of decedent, 12 a sale is permitted, if made subject to the rights of occupancy by survivors, such sale becoming effective when the exemption terminates.13 [§ 556] P. Course of Descent of Homestead.14 Except in so far as the rule may be abrogated or modified by special provisions in the homestead laws themselves, 15 homestead property descends to the heirs of the owner of the property, in which the homestead exists, in the same manner as other real estate, 16 that is, in accordance with the local statutes of descent and distribution,17 under which the heirs usually take the fee,18 subject of course to such rights in the property as may be given by the homestead laws to the surviving spouse or to minor children of the owner of the homestead,19 and to valid claims of creditors of the estate;20 and, where this rule is embodied in the organic law of the state, a statute which assumes to give of his children. Ladd v. Byrd, 113, only to the possessory rights of in- | property vested on the death of one N. C. 466, 18 SE 666. 8. Abramson v. Rogers, 97 Ark. 189, 133 SW 836. 9. Bond v. Montgomery, 56 Ark. 563, 20 SW 525, 35 AmSR 119; Bull v. Coe, 2 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 807, 15 P 123. 10. Harris v. Watson, 56 Ark. 574. 20 SW 529; Bond v. Montgomery, 56 Ark. 563, 20 SW 525, 35 AmSR 119. 11. Nichols v. Shearon, 49 Ark. 75, 4 SW 167; McCloy v. Arnett, 47 Ark. 445, 2 SW 71; Frier v. Lowe, 232 Ill. 622, 83 NE 1083; Graham v. Brock, 212 Ill. 579, 72 NE 825, 103 AmSR 248; Peo. v. Lanham, 189 Ill. 326, 59 NE 610; Bursen v. Goodspeed, 60 Ill. 277. [a] When purchaser not misled. -A long delay after the termination of the homestead right to enforce claims against the real estate is not sufficient to estop the claimants, especially where they had done nothing to mislead the purchasers of the real estate or to lead them into the belief that they did not intend to enforce their claims against the premises. Atherton v. Hughes, 249 Ill. 317, 94 NE 546. 12. See statutory provisions. 13. Kan.-Gatton v. Tolley, 22 Kan. 678. Ky.-Potter v. Potter, 101 SW 905, 31 KvL 137; Holburn v. Pfanmiller, 114 Ky. 831, 71 SW 940, 24 KyL 1613; National Loan, etc., Assoc. v. Maloney, 60 SW 12, 22 KyL 1094; Taylor v. Loller, 3 SW 165, 8 KyL 773; Derr v. Wilson, 84 Ky. 14; McTaggert v. Smith, 14 Bush 414; Lear v. Totten, 14 Bush 101: Evans V. Evans, 13 Bush 587; Phipps v. Acton, 12 Bush 375; Russell v. Russell, 10 Ky. Op. 470. Minn.-McGowan V. Baldwin, 46 Minn. 477. 49 NW 251; McCarthy v. Van Der Mey, 42 Minn. 189, 44 NW 53. Miss.-Morton V. McCanless, 68 Miss. 810. 10 S 72; McCaleb v. Burnett, 55 Miss. 83. Tenn.-Carrigan v. Rowell, 96 Tenn. 185. 34 SW 4. 14. Passing estate to heirs exempt from ancestor's debts see supra § 510. 15. See cases infra this note; and supra §§ 507, 508, 510. fant children during minority and on her death descends to her heirs. Linville v. Hartley, 130 Mo. 252, 32 SW 652. 16. Ala.-Miles v. Lee, 180 Ala. 439, 61 S 915; Gilbert v. Pinkston, 167 Ala. 490, 52 S 442, 140 AmSR 89. Ark. Armistead V. Bishop, 110 Ark. 172. 161 SW 182. Cal.-Mawson v. Mawson, 50 Cal. 539. Ga.-McArthur v. Bridges, 150 Ga. 345, 103 SE 795. But compare supra note 15 [a]. Ill-Gillam v. Wright, 246 Ill. 398, 92 NE 906. 138 AmSR 243. Iowa.-Johnson V. Gaylord, 41 Iowa 362; Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa 43: Burns v. Keas, 21 Iowa 257. Kan.-Newby Anderson, 106 Kan. 477, 188 P 438: Mitchell v. Mitchell. 69 Kan. 441. 77 P 98. V. Ky.-Morgan v. Wooton, 189 Ky. 145. 224 SW 665. Miss. Meacham v. Edmondson, 54 Miss. 746: Birmingham v. Birmingham, 53 Miss. 610. Nebr.-Shearon v. Goff, 95 Nebr. 417. 145 NW 855. S. C.-Beaty v. Richardson, 56 S. C. 173, 34 SE 73, 46 LRA 517: Chalmers v. Turnipseed, 21 S. C. 126; Ex p. Ray, 20 S. C. 246. Tex.-Ford v. Sims, 93 Tex. 586, 57 SW 20: Zwernemann V. Von Rosenberg. 76 Tex. 522, 13 SW 485; Bell v. Schwarz, 37 Tex 572: Carey v. Texas Pac. Coal, etc., Co., (Civ. A.) 237 SW 309; Allen v Ramey. (Civ. A.) 226 SW 489; Wilkins v. Briggs. 48 Tex. Civ. A. 596, 107 SW 135: Simms v Hixon, (Civ. A.) 65 SW 36 [aff 65 SW 35]. See also infra this note [b]. Wis. Bailey v. Etna Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 336 46 NW 440. [a] In Louisiana under a statute. providing that, if the will of husband or wife shall not make any provision for the other, the survivor may share in the estate of the deceased husband or wife as in case of unsatisfactory provision in the will without the necessity of a renunciation of the will. where the husband did not possess a separate estate on the death of his wife who devised land constituting the exempt homestead of both, the husband is entitled to an undivided interest in the land devised where there is no provision in her will for him. Caine v. Barnwell, 82 S 65. [a] In Georgia, a widow, who was an applicant for a homestead under the act of 1870, which authorized the applicant in cases where the property was worth more than two thousand dollars to pay the excess and have the whole property set apart [b] In Texas (1) the right of as a homestead, and who exercised the survivor of a community to octhe option to pay the excess, secured cupy the community homestead is thereby an interest in the property a personal right, and not an estate by such payment, which, although to in land which can be assigned or be treated as a part of the home- conveyed so as to vest the right to stead estate during its continuance, such use and occupancy in the asreverted to the estate of the widow signee; and, where the surviving wife at the termination of the homestead, sells her interest in the community and not to the estate of her husband. homestead, the homestead right terGroover v. Brown, 118 Ga. 491, 45 minates, and the heirs of the deSE 310. ceased husband are entitled to possession of their interest in the property. York v. Hutcheson. 37 Tex. Civ. A. 367, 83 SW 895. (2) Under the constitution of 1848, community [b] In Missouri, under the Homestead Act of 1865, on the death of the husband the fee of the homestead vests in the widow subject of the spouses, one half in the survivor and the other half in the children of the marriage. Childers v. Henderson, 76 Tex. 664, 13 SW 481; Zwernemann V. Von Rosenberg, 76 Tex. 522. 13 SW 485: Watson V. Rainey, 69 Tex. 319, 6 SW 840; Hair v. Wood. 58 Tex. 77; Johnson v. Harrison, 48 Tex. 257; Clark v. Nolan, 38 Tex. 416. (3) Where the homestead was community property, the title of the children vested at once on the death of the husband and was not dependent on the continued use of the property as a homestead by the widow and minor children, and their abandonment of it was not a defense to a suit to recover their undivided interest therein after an unauthorized sale for the purpose of paying an allowance to the widow and minor children. Allen v. Ramey. (Tex. Civ. A.) 226 SW 489. 17. See Descent and Distribution 18 C. J. p 795. 18. Gillam v. Wright, 246 Ill. 398, 92 NE 906, 138 AmSR 243: Roberson v. Tippie. 209 Ill. 38, 70 NE 584, 101 AmSR 217; Dinsmoor v. Rowse, 200 Ill. 555, 65 NE 1079; Johnson v. Gaylord, 41 Iowa 362. See also cases supra note 17: and infra this section. 19. Cal.-Mawson v. Mawson, 50 Cal. 539. Iowa.-Johnson v. Gaylord. 41 Iowa 362: Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa 43; Nicholas v. Purczell, 21 Iowa 265. 89 AmD 572; Burns v. Keas, 21 Iowa 257. Kan. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 69 Kan. 441. 77 P 98. Ky. Morgan v. Wooton, 189 Ky. 145. 224 SW 665. Miss Birmingham V. Birmingham. 53 Miss. 610. Nebr.-Shearon v. Goff, 95 Nebr. 417, 145 NW 855. S. C.-Chalmers v. Turnipseed, 21 S. C. 126. V. Tex-Ford v. Sims, 93 Tex. 586. 57 SW 20; Roots v. Robertson. 93 Tex. 365. 55 SW 308; Wright Doherty, 50 Tex. 34; Clark v. Noland, 38 Tex. 416; Bell v. Schwarz, 37 Tex. 572; Magee v. Rice, 37 Tex. 483; Allen v. Ramey. (Civ. A.) 226 SW 489; Wilkins v. Briggs. 48 Tex. Civ. A. 596, 107 SW 135; Crocker v. Crocker, 19 Tex. Civ. A. 296. 46 SW 870. Wash.-Austin v. Clifford, 24 Wash. 172, 64 P 155. [al Thus the widow who, during the life and at the death of her husband, occupied with him a homestead on a tract of land which belonged, as community property, to the deceased husband and the wife of a former marriage, is entitled, on partition with the heirs of the first marriage, to have her deceased husband's interest set aside, and to retain on it a homestead so long as she may choose to occupy it as such. Gilliam v. Null, 58 Tex. 298, 299. Rights of surviving spouse and children see supra $8 470-4972, 508. 20. Eatman V. Eatman, 83 Ala. 478. 3 S 850: Stratton v. McCandliss, 32 Kan. 512, 4 P 1018; Wilkins v. Briggs, 48 Tex. Civ. A. 596, 107 SW the homestead of deceased absolutely to his widow and minor children or constituents of his family in case deceased was insolvent is unconstitutional and void. 21 Preference in favor of children of whole blood. It has been held that a statute giving a qualified preference to children of the whole blood over those of the half blood does not apply to a homestead allotted to a widow out of her deceased husband's estate, so as to exclude her children by a former marriage from sharing in it on her subsequent death intestate.22 HOMICIDA. In Spanish law, one guilty of homi cide.1 135. Civ. A.) 144 SW 1054; Dorman v. Claims enforceable see supra §§ Grace, 57 Tex. Civ. A. 386, 122 SW 503, 504. 401. 21. Roots V. Robertson, 93 Tex. 22. Eatman v. Eatman, 83 Ala, 478, 365, 55 SW 308; Hays v. Moore, (Tex. 3 S 850. HOMICIDE [Matters not in this Title, treated elsewhere in this Work, see Cross References infra p 1048] ANALYSIS I. HOMICIDE IN GENERAL [sub-analysis p 1045] II. MURDER [sub-analysis p 1046] III. MANSLAUGHTER [sub-analysis p 1047] IV. ATTEMPTS, SOLICITATIONS, AND THREATS [see 30 C. J.] V. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER OR KILL [see 30 C. J.] VII. INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION [see 30 C. J.] VIII. EVIDENCE [see 30 C. J.] IX. TRIAL [see 30 C. J.] X. NEW TRIAL [see 30 C. J.] XI. APPEAL AND ERROR [see 30 C. J.] XII. SENTENCE AND PUNISHMENT [see 30 C.J.] SUB-ANALYSIS I. HOMICIDE IN GENERAL [§§ 1-58] p 1049 2. Nonfelonious Homicide [§ 2] p 1049 3. Felonious Homicide [3] p 1049 B. Victim [ 4-7] p 1049 1. In General [§ 4] p 1049 2. Unborn Child [§ 5] p 1050 3. Person Already Mortally Wounded or Dead [§ 6] p 1050 4. Person Incurably Diseased [§ 7] p 1050 C. Perpetrator [§§ 8-53] p 1050 1. Capacity and Responsibility [§§ 8-29] p 1050 a. Infancy and Coverture [8] p 1050 b. Insanity [66 9-19] p 1050 (1) In General [§ 9] p 1050 (2) Time of Insanity [§ 10] p 1051 (3) Degree of Capacity and Tests of Responsibility [§§ 11-17] p 1051 (a) In General [§ 11] p 1051 (b) New Hampshire Rule [12] p 1051 (c) Knowledge of Right and Wrong [§ 13] p 1052 (d) Irresistible Impulse [§ 14] p 1053 (e) Insane Delusions and Partial Insanity [§ 15] p 1054 (f) Anger and Emotional Insanity [§ 16] p 1056 (g) Mental Depravity or Moral Insanity [§ 17] p 1056 (4) Unconsciousness [§ 18]p 1056 (5) Somnambulism [19] p 1056 c. Intoxication [§§ 20-28] p 1056 (1) Voluntary Intoxication [§§ 20-24] p 1056 (a) General Rule [§ 20] p 1056 For later cases, developments and changes in the law see cumulative Annotations, same title, page and note number. (b) Where Specific Intent or Other Mental Element Is Required [§ 21] p 1058 (c) Self-Defense [22] p 1061 (d) Aiding and Abetting [§ 23] p 1061 (e) Conspiracy to Murder [§ 24] p 1062 (2) Involuntary Intoxication [§ 25] p 1062 (3) Insanity Resulting from Intoxication; Delirium Tremens [§ 26] p 1062 (4) Drinking by Insane Person [§ 27] p 1063 (5) Aggravation and Mitigation [§ 28] p 1063 d. Narcosis and Hypnosis [§ 29] p 1063 2. Principals and Accessaries [§§ 30-53] p 1063 a. In General [§ 30] p_1063 b. Principals in First Degree [§ 31] p 1064 c. Principals in Second Degree and Accessaries before the Fact [§§ 32-49] p 1064 (1) Definitions and Distinctions [§§ 32-39] p 1064 (a) Principals in Second Degree [§§ 32-35] p 1064 aa: Definition [§ 32] p 1064 bb. Presence [§ 33-34] p 1065 (aa) In General [§ 33] p 1065 (bb) Constructive Presence [§ 34] p 1065 cc. Principals in Second Degree to Manslaughter [§ 35] p 1066 (b) Accessaries before the Fact [§§ 36-39] p 1066 aa. Definition [§ 36] p 1066 bb. Absence [§ 37] p 1066 cc. Accessaries before the Fact to Manslaughter [38] p 1066 dd. Accessaries before the Fact to Murder in Second and Third Degrees [§ 39] p 1067 (2) What Constitutes Participation [§§ 40-43] p 1067 (a) In General [§ 40] p 1067 (b) Approval and Consent [§ 41] p 1069 (c) Presence as Participation [§ 42] p 1069 (d) Concealment of Intended Homicide [§ 43] p 1070 (3) Intent [§§ 44-49] p 1070 a) In General [§§ 44-48] p 1070 aa. Common Design Essential [§ 44] p 1070 bb. Scope of Liability [§§ 45-48] p 1072 (aa) Common Design to Kill [§ 45] p 1072 (bb) Common Design to Commit Some Other Unlawful Act [§ 46] p 1073 (cc) Lawful Common Design [§ 47] p 1076 (dd) Withdrawal from Common Design [§ 48] p 1076 (b) As Affecting Grade or Degree of Offense [§ 49] p 1076 d. Accessaries after the Fact [§§ 50-53] p 1077 (1) Definition [§ 50] p 1077 (2) Homicide [§ 51] p 1077 (3) Knowledge of Homicide [§ 52] p 1077 (4) Accessaries after the Fact to Manslaughter [§ 53] p 1077 D. Cause of Death [§§ 54-58] p 1077 1. In General [§ 54] p 1077 2. Death Resulting from Disease Caused by Injury [§ 55] p 1080 3. Death Resulting from Treatment of Injury [§ 56] p 1081 4. Prior Causes [§ 57] p 1082 5. Time of Death [§ 58] p 1083 II. MURDER [§§ 59-109] p 1083 B. Malice [§ 60-77] p 1084 1. In General [§ 60] p 1084 2. Definitions and Distinctions [§§ 61-65] p 1084 a. Malice [§ 61] p 1084 b. Malice Aforethought: Premeditated Design [§ 62] p 1087 c. Express or Implied Malice [§§ 63-65] p 1089 (1) In General [§ 63] p 1089 (2) Express Malice [§ 64] p 1089 (3) Implied Malice [§ 65] p 1091 3. Intentional Killing [§6 66-681 p 1091 a. In General [§ 66] p 1091 b. Intent to Kill One Person and Killing Another [§ 67] p 1092 c. Killing Officers and Others in Discharge of Public Duty [§ 68] p 1092 4. Unintentional Killing [§§ 69-71] p 1095 a. In General [§ 69] p 1095 |