But since the interest of the states trading with such areas is involved in their obtaining "open door" privileges, the number of such signatories as do conclude treaties conferring such rights tends to be large, and the larger their number the more difficult is it to cause any alteration in the contents of the treaty system.

The treaties inaugurating the régime may be of two kinds (1) Treaties concluded by the state itself with each co-contractant separately. This is the position in China and Siam.

(2) Treaties concluded among the trading nations themselves, regulating the conditions under which one or more of them shall be given the right of territorial overlordship over the area in question.

The distinction just drawn points to a grouping of the open-door areas into two classes

(1) The “older" open-door areas. Turkey, China, Siam, (Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli, as well as Japan, were at one time in this position), with settled, even if backward, governments of their own.

(2) The "newer open-door areas, representing either (a) areas taken over for colonisation or exploitation purposes by the Powers, such as the great belt of Equatorial Africa dealt with by the great Berlin Act of 1886, and the subsequent Act of Brussels of 1890.1

(b) Areas which, though in the past subject to full open-door rights, are on the way to being pure colonies, in which the open door now simply temporarily limits the rights of the possessing power for a determinate period (as, for instance, Egypt under the Anglo-French agreement 2 until 1934).

(c) Areas with settled governments of their own, but in which one or more of the Great Powers possess special political interests, such as Persia and Afganistan, the trading

cluded, and the revised convention removes the necessity for uniformity of rates throughout the area, upon which the original Act insisted, to the extent of proclaiming the right of each state to regulate these matters as it thinks fit. (See B.T.J., 20/1/20, p. 155.) Cmd. 477 (Treaty Series, No. 18).

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1 Hertslet," Commercial Treaties," vol. xvii., p. 65; vol. xix., pp. 304-5. 2 Bernhard," Handbook of Commercial Treaties," p. 338, et seq. Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco." Art. IV. The declaration to remain in force for thirty years and, unless denounced one year in advance, for five years at a time thereafter.

rights to which areas were part of the settlement between the United Kingdom and Russia before the War.1

The whole position of open-door areas is essentially unstable. They may cease to be open to the trade of all nations in consequence of their becoming strong enough to throw off the shackles formerly pressing on them, or because they are taken over by a colonising power which gradually emancipates itself from the obligations it has formerly incurred. With the intensification of imperialist claims in the last few decades this process of absorption went on on a large scale. The series of treaties which are liquidating the results of the Great War will, when they are completed, have parcelled out the whole available territory, with the. exception of China and Siam, and possibly Abyssinia.3

1 Treaty Series, No. 34, of 1907. As to Persia, preamble to Art. I.; as to Afghanistan, Art. IV. of appropriate portion of Convention. The position in Persia was distinctly equivocal, since the two Powers reserved for themselves distinct spheres of "economic penetration." For another instance of a similar attempt to reconcile the principle of special financial concessions with the open door, see the Agreement between the United Kingdom, France, and Italy respecting Abyssinia (T.S., 1907, No. 1), Arts. 6 and 7, by which concessions to French railway companies are made subject to equality of treatment of the subjects of the three Powers in the first instance, with a subsequent stipulation that "the three signatory powers agree to extend to the nationals of all other countries the benefit of the provisions . relating to equality of treatment as regards trade

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and transit." The whole conception of the open door is, in fact, difficult to maintain in view of the newer relations between "advanced" and "new" countries, which take the form primarily of financial, and only secondarily of trade intercourse. This economic fact is gradually leading-e.g., in China-to the principle of a right of entry" into any financial syndicate formed for specific purposes. Mr. H. N. Brailsford is entitled to the credit for the first thorough examination of the implications of these changing economic relations. v." The War of Steel and Gold" and the "League of Nations," passim. On China, see Overlach, “Financial Control in China."

2 This development has taken place in the case of Japan, and also in the case of those Balkan States which separated from the Turkish Empire by the Berlin Treaty of 1878 (Mowat, op. cit., p. 332, et seq.; "State Papers, Domestic and Foreign," vol. Ixix., p. 749); Bulgaria, Art. 8; Eastern Rumelia, Art. 20; Servia, Art. 37; Roumania, Art. 48; taking over, nevertheless, the open-door obligations resting on the Turkish territory, of which they were the heirs, whilst Greece had obtained full autonomy on the other hand. § of the protocol of the Conference of London of 1830, op. cit., p. 120.

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The position under the Covenant of the League is such as to add nothing to the body of principle already existing on the subject of the open door. By Art. 22, Mandatory States" are to secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the league," whilst a general obligation on the members is that they will "make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the league." Presumably this also applies to the colonies of members, but no definition is given as to what meaning is to be given to the term " equitable."

The question, therefore, arises whether the privileges conferred on trading nations by the régime of the open door are so great that a determined attempt should be made to prevent the gradual extinction of this régime altogether. This question was asked by Schilder and answered in the negative by him. It will be desirable to investigate this matter somewhat more closely.

Schilder's argument, briefly put, is that the open door) is not worth having, because it is the price paid by the West for a continuance of inefficient government. It is only the backward states of the world that will consent to a continuance of the open door in their areas; as soon as they reach a higher stage of economic and political power, they cast the shackles off, as Japan and the Balkan States have done. It is true that the consequence is that these states thereupon attempt to protect their own industries, and to pursue an autonomous tariff policy, which will result in their favouring those states which are prepared to concede advantages to them. Similarly, when European Powers take over such areas as colonies, they try, as far as possible, to abandon the open door, and to favour their own nationals. But though, in both cases, the result is the introduction of inequality, there is still a net gain. This gain arises from the fact that these renovated states are, in the long run, much ⚫ more valuable markets, owing to the increased productivity which results from the order, science, and stability of the new régime. Since an increase of productivity increases the purchasing power of the area in question, it is difficult to suppose that, indirectly at any rate, the whole body of trading nations will not gain.

This argument is only valid on the assumption that it is impossible to obtain the advantages of better government without abandoning the open door. It is, of course, perfectly true that modern and scientific methods are capable of increasing the resources of the areas in question, and that the result will be an increase of purchasing power. It is probably also the case that the advantages of stimulating productivity will outweigh the direct economic disadvantages of inequality in the terms on which various traders can compete. But this does not prove that it would not still be better to reorganise the productive conditions, without abandoning that feature of the open door which looms largest in the popular mindthe equality of all nations in the trade with the area.

It is impossible, within the limits of this work, to discuss whether the state of public opinion is such as to allow the continuance of open-door arrangements in areas which have assumed full rights of self-government, or which have fallen into the administrative sphere of a colonising power. In order to answer the question, it would be necessary to investigate the validity of the whole theory of protection, and a further investigation would be necessary into the political forces which at any moment determine the policy of Govern

ments.

Discussion of the open-door areas has brought us to the point at which it becomes necessary to say a word as to another class of non-autonomous tariff areas, viz. :

(b) Dependent Non-open-door Colonies.-" Colony is a concept of political science, and there is, therefore, nothing in the status of a colony which necessarily implies that its tariff making powers must be subordinate, or even nonexistent. But, though there is not this necessary logical filiation, there is the practical fact that in the overwhelming number of cases the colonial empire is not free to frame its own tariffs. The practical question is the degree to which a colony should be subordinate to the metropolitan power, and this is a question which is answered differently by different colonial powers at the same time, and differently at different times by all of them, and in different ways within one and the same system. The subject of the colonial régimes of the powers possessing colonies is dealt with in a later section, here it is only necessary to point out that the variety of type is greater than is usually supposed. In addition to the cases in which the colony has no autonomy at all, and those in which it possesses complete, or almost complete, freedom, there are the cases in which the tariff régime is jointly determined, so that the question here is as to the division of power. The wishes of the colony may as a rule be the decisive factor, or the wishes of the metropolitan area may come first, but the wishes of the colony in some degree be given satisfaction. Hence the possible grades of dependence are numerous.1

1 See below, Chap. viii., p. 250, et seq., for a further treatment of colonial problems.

NOTE I. TO CHAPTER I.

It may be well to describe in some detail the growth of the South African Customs Union and the present South African position, which is complicated.

The first convention was one concluded between Cape Colony and the Orange Free State in 1889. To this arrangement British Bechuanaland adhered as from June 1st, 1890, and Basutoland after July 1st, 1891. An abortive conference between various South African territories was held in 1896: the Transvaal and Portuguese Governments were not included, and Natal refused unless all the South African Governments were included. A new conference was held in 1898. A new convention, coming into force on 1st January, 1899, was concluded between the Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, as from 1st January, 1899. After the War a new convention was concluded in May, 1903-this time between the Cape Colony, Natal, Orange River Colony, Transvaal, and S. Rhodesia. Provision was made in this convention for the admission of any state or colony in South Africa or Central Africa having a civilised government. To this convention Swaziland adhered, 11th October, 1904, and Northern Rhodesia, Ist December, 1905. In March, 1906, a new conference was held at Pietermaritzburg, and a new convention concluded, coming into force on 1st July, 1906. The Transvaal notified her intention of leaving after 30th June, 1908, and a Pretoria conference was held in May, 1908. The Transvaal agreed to withdraw notice, and a new protocol to convention was added, coming into force on 15th August, 1908. After the formation of the South African Union, which absorbed the Cape, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange River Colony, new arrangements were concluded with the non-union territories by the South African Government. By an agreement with Bechuanaland (Col. Reports Annual, No. 696), dated 29th June, 1910, "it was arranged that in future all revenue in customs duty accruing to the protectorate should be paid into the union treasury, while the protectorate became entitled to receive annually a fraction of the total customs revenue of the union equalling that which the average customs receipts of this territory for the last three years bore to the