and 85 New York State Reporter. See, also, Ludlum v. Couch, 10 App. Div. 603, 42 N. Y. Supp. 370; Norton v. Arvernam Co., 14 App. Div. 581, 584, 43 N. Y. Supp. 1099; Halsey v. Hart, 85 Hun, 46, 32 N. Y. Supp. 665. Manifestly, in the case at bar the questions presented were essentially ones for the jury to determine, and our conclusion is that the county court was not justified in reversing its verdict. We do not find any errors in the record of proceedings before the justice which will warrant a reversal of his judgment. There was no error in receiving the amended complaint. The objection to it was withdrawn. Nor can the defendant assign as ground for reversing the judgment that it was not as large against him as the evidence warranted. An examination of the rulings made during the trial does not disclose any reasonable error, and hence we must conclude that the judgment of the county court was erroneous, and should be reversed. Judgment of county court reversed, with costs, and that of the justice affirmed, with costs. All concur. MASON v. CORBIN. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department. May 4, 1898.) ENTRY OF JUDGMENT-NOTICE. Plaintiff served a statement of what purported to be a copy of a judgment entered on the decision of a referee; but the copy was neither signed by the clerk, so as to constitute an entry of the judgment, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1236, nor did it have any amount of costs inserted in it. Held not to be such notice to defendant of the entry of judgment as to warrant the court, after 30 days, in declaring the case and exceptions abandoned. Appeal from special term. Action by Marcus P. Mason against Amasa Corbin, Jr. From an order declaring the case and exceptions on appeal abandoned by defendant, he appeals. Reversed. Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LANDON, HERRICK, PUTNAM, and MERWIN, JJ. E. H. Neary, for appellant. A. E. Kilby and Vasco P. Abbott, for respondent. PARKER, P. J. This case turns upon the question whether notice of the entry of judgment upon the decision of the referee was served upon the defendant's attorney on the 30th of June, 1897. If such notice was served, the special term had authority to declare the case and exceptions abandoned. Gen. Rules 32, 33. If such notice was not served, the defendant was not in default, and the order appealed from was erroneous. The plaintiff's attorney did not content himself with serving a statement, merely, to the effect that judgment upon the report of the referee had been entered; but upon the 30th of June, 1897, he served upon defendant's attorney what purported to be a copy of a judgment, with a notice, thereunder written, that "the foregoing is a copy of a judg ment duly entered in the clerk's office of the county of St. Lawrence, at Canton, N. Y., on the 29th of June, 1897, at 12 o'clock noon." Such a copy was neither signed by the clerk, nor did it have any amount whatever of costs inserted in it. A judgment entered in the form of the copy served would be no judgment whatever. It is prescribed by section 1236 of the Code, as amended in 1897, that a judgment "shall be signed by the clerk and filed in his office, and such signing and filing shall constitute the entry of the judgment." See, also, Good v. Daland, 119 N. Y. 153, 23 N. E. 474. So, also, a judgment entered upon such report should contain the costs awarded in the action against defendant, while in the copy served no costs whatever appeared. Evidently, then, if no judgment had been entered, other than as the copy indicated, no completed judgment had been entered in the action, and the notice given, instead of being a notice of the entry of judgment, was a notice of an attempt to enter it, possibly, but of an utter failure to do so. The paper upon which the plaintiff's attorney relies as a "notice of the entry of judgment" does not in fact give any such notice; and hence it was not sufficient to put the defendant in default, although much more than 30 days had passed since its service. In attempting to deprive defendant of the benefit of his case and exceptions, under the provisions of the rules above cited, plaintiff should show a strict and technical compliance with the statute on his part. Good v. Daland, supra. And clearly the notice on which he relies, upon a strict construction, falls very far short of a statement that judgment on the referee's report had then been entered. Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion denied. All concur. (23 Misc. Rep. 417.) KALFUR v. BROADWAY FERRY & M. AVE. R. CO. (Supreme Court, Trial Term, Kings County. April, 1898.) DAMAGES-EXCESSIVE VERDICT. A boy 18 months old received injuries resulting in the loss of his leg below the knee. Held, that a verdict of $15,000 was not excessive. Action by Frederick Kalfur, an infant, against the Broadway Ferry & Metropolitan Avenue Railroad Company. Motion to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff as excessive. Motion denied. C. J. Patterson, for plaintiff. GAYNOR, J. The plaintiff, a boy eighteen months old at the time. of the injury, lost his leg below the knee. The verdict was for $15,000. If $2,500 be allowed his counsel, and the remaining $12,500 be invested, and the income thereof be invested and accumulated, until the plaintiff come of age, he would then have a sum of about $20,000. This would insure him an income of $800 or $1,000 a year, (which is about as much as we may fairly presume he would earn if whole), and leave the said sum of $20,000 intact at his death. This leaves out of account his earnings; and whether they are to be less for the loss of his foot, depends on the avocation he may select. If he and 85 New York State Reporter. become a lawyer, doctor, clergyman, clerk or merchant, for instance, his earning capacity will not be lessened by the use of an artificial foot. If he is to do certain kinds of manual work, it will be; but the income from the said sum will be as much or more than he could earn in wages if whole. I had an opinion growing out of my own view and discretion, in respect of whether the verdict be excessive. But that is not what must control me. Counsel have furnished me with a list of the cases in which such verdicts have and have not been reduced. Verdicts as large and larger for like injury have been upheld, as a rule, though it is true some have been reduced. Exercising my discretion in the light of precedent, and constrained thereby, I must deny the mo tion to reduce. Trial judges were never so reluctant to exercise any discretion whatever as they are at present, for reasons that are growing obvious to the bar. They do not have things presented to them under the disguise of print, and with academic afterthoughts and refinements, but in their everyday reality, just as they are generally seen and understood. Discretion exercised under these different conditions cannot in the nature of things be the same. Motion denied. (28 App. Div. 396.) DAVIS V. UNITED PORTABLE HOISTING ENGINEERS et al. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. April 22, 1898.) 1. TRADES UNIONS-INJUNCTION-EXCLUSION FROM WORK. In an action by a nonunion engineer against a union, for an injunction, and founded upon averments that plaintiff was the object of a persecution resulting from a determination to exclude him from working at his trade for anybody or under any circumstances, the testimony given on his behalf by his former employer was that the witness had only employed him temporarily from time to time, while unable to secure a union engineer. Held, that the evidence was entirely insufficient to establish plaintiff's case. 2. SAME RIGHTS OF MEMBERS. Members of trades unions, as well as other individuals, have a right to say that they will not work with persons who do not belong to their organization; and whether they say this themselves or through their organized societies makes no difference. They have the right, by pursuing that method, to secure employment for their own members. Rumsey, J., dissenting. Appeal from special term. Action by Benjamin P. Davis against the United Portable Hoisting Engineers and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defend ants appeal. Reversed. Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, MCLAUGHLIN, PATTERSON, and INGRAHAM, JJ. John C. Robinson, for appellants. PATTERSON, J. The judgment appealed from in this case restrained the defendants from interfering with or in any manner preventing the plaintiff from obtaining employment in his trade and occupation of hod-hoisting engineer in the city of New York or elsewhere, and from procuring or coercing, by threats or other wise, the dismissal or discharge of the plaintiff by any employer from his employment, and further directed a money judgment for damages against the defendant the United Portable Hoisting Engineers. There is absolutely no foundation in the evidence for a money judgment, and the only subject now requiring consideration is whether, under that evidence, in any aspect in which it may be viewed, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. It is averred in the complaint that the defendant corporation was formed for the purpose and with the design chiefly to secure employment in said trade for its members, and to prevent other persons of the same trade, but not members of said union, from procuring or retaining such employment; that the defendant Gibbons was an officer and agent of that corporation; that the plaintiff was a skilled hodhoisting engineer by trade and occupation, and depended upon his daily labor therein for the support and maintenance of his family; that in and about the month of June, 1895, the defendant corporation, and its officers and members, with intent to injure the plaintiff, and deprive him of employment in his trade and the means of support, conspired and agreed together, and with one Merrit P. Simpson, and with other persons, not to hire hod-hoisting engineers who were nonunion men, provided union men could be obtained; that thereafter, and in or about the month of June, 1895, and in June, August, and December, 1896, and March, 1897, while the plaintiff was employed by and working for said Simpson in his said trade, said defendants, in pursuance of said conspiracy and agreement, and by threatening said Simpson that, if he did not discharge the plaintiff from his employment, they would order and compel other said engineers, union men, then in his employment, to withdraw from such employment, thus hindering and embarrassing him, by stopping his work on buildings then in course of erection, to his great loss and injury, so intimidated and coerced said Simpson that he, yielding to the demands and threats aforesaid of said defendants, and for no other reason whatever, discharged the plaintiff from his employment, to his great damage; that the defendants have continued so to threaten and to combine and conspire together against the plaintiff, and with the like intent and effect, as aforesaid, from the month of June, 1895, until the commencement of this suit; that by reason of such unlawful combination, conspiracy, threats, and intimidations, and in consequence of his said dismissal, the plaintiff has not been able to procure employment of any other kind since the month of August last. The plaintiff prayed for an injunction and a money judgment. No finding was made that any conspiracy existed, the learned judge stating in his opinion that the conspiracy alleged in the com plaint was not proved. That much of the complaint failing. the inquiry is left as to the plaintiff being entitled to an injunction against the defendant corporation or Gibbons, by reason of any act or thing done by Gibbons as directly affecting the plaintiff. All that the proof shows is that the plaintiff was a nonunion hod-hoisting engineer, who worked at various places, and with various persons, at certain times mentioned in his testimony; that he was discharged and 85 New York State Reporter. several times by reason of something done or said by Gibbons to his (the plaintiff's) employers, but what Gibbons said to or did with other employers of the plaintiff than Simpson is not made to appear, and, indeed, the whole case with reference to the plaintiff's relations to employers other than Simpson is so inconclusive and indefinite that it amounts to nothing. We assume for the purposes of this case that no individual or association of individuals has any right wantonly so to interfere with a man in the exercise of his craft, business, or profession as to prevent him from earning his livelihood in that profession, craft, or business, and that if a case is presented in which it is shown that the only motive which impels the interference is to prevent a particular individual from making his living, irrespective of other considerations, a court of equity will interfere where no adequate remedy at law exists. But that is not this case. The only employer the plaintiff ever had who was called as a witness was Simpson, who swore that he employed the plaintiff on several jobs, “until I could get a union engineer to send in his place. I would send for a union engineer, and couldn't get one; and, sooner than have the work stop, I would send for Mr. Davis, and send him. I discharged him five or six times, I guess." The whole drift of Mr. Simpson's testimony is that he employed the plaintiff only temporarily, until he could get union engineers, and therefore the plaintiff failed in establishing that his discharge was the result of a design on the part of the defendants, under any and all circumstances, to exclude him from making his livelihood. It is true that Simpson says that he understood that Gibbons would stop his engineers in case he did not stop Mr. Davis. But there can be no doubt that members of trades unions, as well as other individuals, have a right to say that they will not work with persons who do not belong to their organization; and whether they say it themselves or through their organized societies can make no difference. They have the right by that method to secure employment for their own members. Mr. Simpson's testimony clearly establishes that his employment of Davis was only temporary, and until he could get union men. We think, therefore, that the testimony in this case was entirely inadequate to establish that which it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove under the averments of his complaint, namely, that he was the object of a persecution based upon a determination to exclude him from working at his trade for anybody or under any circumstances. The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. VAN BRUNT, P. J., and MCLAUGHLIN, J., concur. RUMSEY, J. (dissenting). I concur with Mr. Justice PATTERSON in his conclusion that there is no evidence to warrant a judg ment for money damages, and that, so far as that portion of the judgment is concerned, it cannot stand. I also concur in the rule of law suggested in his opinion. I have no doubt that an action |