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"Six years hence, we may compare these results with those which will be produced by the declarations of the actual jury, the constituent elements of which have been still further increased by lowering the elective requisites, and which does not condemn if the majority be under seven.

"Thus, the preceding table shows us not only that the number of acquittals has not* diminished, but that even the punishments pronounced have been less rigorous; there having been fewer degrading punishments, and more correctional ones. And this observation on the tendency to regard accusations less severely, appears still more probable when we examine the crimes in detail; it is there especially that we may see whether the infliction of punishment has been abstained from on account of its severity. In effect, we find that the condemnations to death have decreased in a very sensible degree. The same observations may also be made, if we distinguish crimes against persons from those against property; a proof of which may be seen in the following table.

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"On both sides we find fewer condemnations, and the condemnations themselves are less severe. It appears, then, that there are causes, whatever be their nature, which have had an influence in France, in slightly diminishing the repression of crime; the sequel will better show us whether one of these causes is to be sought for in the introduction of the law which has changed the basis of the jury, and whether this be the only cause. However it be, it is evident that the causes which have annually modified the repression in general have had less influence than the constant causes which modify the repression according to the nature of the crimes; for, in adhering to the two established periods, the first have only, on an average, occasioned two or three more acquittals on one hundred general accusations, whilst the second have almost invariably occasioned eighteen more acquittals in .accusations of crime against persons than in those of crime against property. But it is only what may have been already seen by comparing the two preceding tables."

* Translator's Note. The omission of this negative in the original must be a typographical error, since not only the sense requires it, but the table alluded to increases the acquittals, and the subsequent one does it in a still greater ratio.

THE HEAVY CAVALRY AT SALAMANCA.

To those whose youth has been spent in eventful scenes, there is a natural pleasure in recalling such passages of their lives as have been most interesting, and upon which, from present retirement, they look back with quiet contemplation; but no one, perhaps, is likely to find more satisfaction in this sort of retrospect than the British officer who shared in the triumphs of the Peninsular war under the Duke of Wellington; and it is not, therefore, matter of surprise that scarcely a number of the United Service Journal appears, without animated discussions upon the events of the Peninsular war; generally with the view of elucidating its details, but occasionally with the object of drawing inferences and deductions, such as may serve for future principles and instructions in the art of war.

The discussions between the officer signing himself J. M., and those who have written in controversion of the argument he is desirous of founding upon various remarkable facts and occurrences which he has with some ability collected, in reference to the actual collision of cavalry and infantry, have attracted much attention and remark from most military readers. It is maintained sturdily by J. M., that the latter are at all times liable to be overthrown by the attack of the former, provided it be executed with determined vigour and resolution. Now it is certain that there is no officer of our cavalry, nor indeed of any other branch of our service, who, during the late war, had opportunities of seeing the charges of British cavalry, but will bear candid and satisfactory witness to the impetuous courage with which their attacks were almost invariably made. That their ardour not unfrequently carried them too far, and led to unfortunate disasters, will not be denied; but it is rather too hard that our cavalry should not be allowed even that merit, from the excess of which their failures, on the very rare occasions when they did fail, may be said to have solely arisen.

Among the many instances of their brilliant attacks, enough stress certainly has never been laid on the conduct of the brigade of heavy cavalry at the battle of Salamanca, on which memorable day they with equal steadiness and impetuosity burst upon the infantry of the French left, and literally swept them from the ground, overthrowing column after column, and sending to the rear above three times their own number as prisoners. The battle of Salamanca formed the closing scene of such a series of able and well-combined manoeuvres, and the turning of the French left by the rapid and admirably concerted march and attack of the Third Division was so prominent a feature, that it is only upon these considerations we can reasonably account for the slight mention made in the Duke of Wellington's despatch of the consecutive attacks of the heavy brigade of cavalry, which are merely noticed as "a successful charge under the orders of Sir S. Cotton (Lord Combermere)." It may be well to give a short and explicit statement of what actually took place as regards the attacks in question, leaving the impartial reader to judge for himself how far the heavy brigade may lay claim to having contributed materially to the successful execution of the bold and splendid manoeuvre by which the left of Marshal Marmont's position was turned, the whole plan of his operations completely checked and reversed, and his army subjected to one of the most signal discom

fitures sustained by the French in the Peninsula. In proceeding to give this narrative, however, it must first be clearly announced and explained, that not the slightest detraction from the well-earned laurels of the Third Division, whose behaviour at Salamanca will be recorded as long as the memory of that celebrated conflict, is either intended or thought of for an instant. The intention of this statement is merely to claim for the brigade of heavy cavalry the tribute to which it is conceived they are justly entitled, for their effective and prominent co-operation with the infantry at that part of the position in the defeat of the left wing of the French. It would be idle to assume that the cavalry could have performed this alone, but they ought to have the full credit of having made the very best advantage of the confusion which arose among the French when they found their flank was turned, by so resolutely following up what the Third Division had begun; because it is well known, that after the first onset at five o'clock, until about seven, when the cavalry halted, that Division advanced with little opposition, securing the prisoners whom the dragoons were sending to the rear by whole battalions.

To proceed to the statement of facts, it will be recollected that in the middle of July, 1812, Marshal Marmont, who was on the right bank of the Douro, after making various demonstrations to deceive Lord Wellington as to the point where he desired to effect his passage across that river, at length executed it on the night of the 17th. As soon as this was known at the British head-quarters, orders were issued for the whole army to march towards their right, in order to counteract the intentions of the French general, whose object had been all along to force back his opponents by threatening their flanks and communications. On the morning of the 18th, the movement of the French towards their left, in order to prosecute that object, was gallantly kept in check by Major Bull's and Ross's troops of horse artillery, with the light dragoons and part of the light division, while a larger force was brought forward near the village of Torrecilla della Orden. There being, however, no position at that place, Lord Wellington caused every thing to fall back upon the heights between Carrigal and Fuente della Peña, which was not executed without some partial fighting, in which three or four hundred men on both sides were either killed or wounded.

On the 19th of July nothing of any moment occurred till towards evening, when, it being discovered that the French were again in motion towards their left, some corresponding movements were made by Lord Wellington, the result of which was, that the two armies appeared opposite to each other in order of battle at daybreak on the morning of the 20th. No engagement, however, ensued; but Marmont continuing his flank march to his left, the British army moved accordingly in the same direction. On the 21st, both armies, still prosecuting their parallel movements, crossed the river Tormes, and next day took up their respective positions on two opposite heights, near the village of Arapiles, about five miles from Salamanca, thus bringing to issue a brilliant and most skilful series of manoeuvres, which had now lasted for several days, without the French having been able to gain their object.

Under cover of a heavy cannonade, (he outnumbered us in artillery,) Marmont followed his former plan of extending towards his left, until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when Lord Wellington, attended by a single aide-de-camp, having from the right of his own position re

connoitred the march of the French columns, determined on turning their left, and instantly causing the Third Division to be brought forward for that purpose, they accordingly came into action on the flank of the French soon after five o'clock. They were received by a brigade of infantry, who, with numerous skirmishers, attempted to check their attack, and give time for bringing up a heavier force to meet it. This resistance was, however, soon overcome, and they drove the French over the crest of the heights at the point of the bayonet.

It was at this critical juncture that the heavy cavalry brigade, 3d and 4th dragoons, and 5th dragoon guards, received from Sir Stapleton Cotton their orders to advance; and, moving rapidly forward between the flank attack of the 3d and the more direct one of the 5th division, which was the right of our infantry line, came first into contact with the 66th (French) regiment, consisting of three battalions, and formed in a sort of column of half-battalions, thus presenting six successive lines, one behind the other. Strange to say, though drawn up in that formidable manner, their fire was so ill-directed, that it is believed scarcely a single dragoon fell from its effects; and no check taking place, the cavalry bore vigorously forward at a gallop, penetrating their columns, nearly the whole of which were killed, wounded, or taken, leaving the broken infantry to be made prisoners by the 3d division as they cleared the ground before them, to assist in which one squadron of the 4th dragoons was for the moment detached. They presently came upon another column, however, of about 600 men, who brought down some men and horses by their fire, but attempted no stand of any consequence, and, falling into confusion, were left as before to be captured by the advancing infantry.

The nature of the ground, which was an open wood of evergreen oaks, and which grew more obstructed as they advanced, had caused the men of the three regiments of Cavalry to become a good deal mixed in each other's ranks; and the front being at the same time constantly changing as the right was brought forward, the whole had now crowded into a solid line, without any intervals. In this order, but without any confusion, they pressed rapidly forward upon another French brigade, which, taking advantage of the trees, had formed a colonne serrée, and stood awaiting their charge. These men reserved their fire with much coolness till the Cavalry came within twenty yards, when they poured it in upon the concentrated mass of men and horses with a deadly and tremendous effect. The gallant General Le Marchant, with Captain White, of his staff, were killed; Colonel Elley was wounded; and it is thought that nearly one-third of the dragoons came to the ground; but as the remainder retained sufficient command of their horses to dash forward, they succeeded in breaking the French ranks, and dispersing them in utter confusion over the field. At this moment Colonel Lord Edward Somerset, discovering five guns upon the left, separated from the brigade with one squadron, charged, and took them all.

Here terminated the series of attacks we have endeavoured to describe; for by this time, (about forty minutes after the first charge, which took place soon after five o'clock,) it was with difficulty that three squadrons could be collected and formed out of the whole brigade, and any further advance would have been unnecessary as well as imprudent. The spot where Lord Edward captured the guns was about three miles from where the first shot was fired by the Third Division, U.S. JOURN., No. 60, Nov. 1833.

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Meantime the British attack along the whole front was in progress; the infantry went gallantly on to the attack of the heights with general success; and by seven o'clock the French were entirely driven from their position, nor could anything but the approach of night have enabled Marshal Marmont in any degree to rally his dispersed and discouraged troops.

The circumstances we have detailed speak for themselves; and it is hardly necessary to disclaim again any idea of detracting from the glory so gallantly gained by the British infantry in general, and especially by the 3d division, at Salamanca. But what unprejudiced man can talk of our cavalry being deficient in impetuosity or resolution after what we have recalled to the recollection of the military reader? It may certainly be argued that the French did not prepare for receiving the attacks of our heavy Cavalry brigade, by forming squares; and possibly if they had, a better stand might have been made by them: but whatever suppositions we may make, or whatever conditional results we may imagine, one thing is perfectly obvious, namely, that if nothing but their actual annihilation could have stopped the career of the heavy brigade of cavalry on this occasion, the serious loss they suffered at the time General Le Marchant fell would, in all common probability, have done so. Indeed, if other proof were wanting to controvert the arguments of J. M., where can a stronger fact be found than this? A body of cavalry, advancing with great rapidity, in excellent order, and with all the excitement of success, fall upon a mass of infantry in close column, a formation by no means so defensive as the square; and though they charge them home, and utterly scatter and disperse them, yet do not effect this without the fall of nearly a third of their own number from a single volley of musketry, not only quite unsustained, but followed by complete rout and disorder. If, under circumstances like these, the condensed fire of infantry be able to create such havoc, what must be its comparative effect when delivered from a square in a state of perfect preparation, with every man animated by the consciousness of the formidable attitude of that imposing array of which he forms a part?

When J. M. so confidently asserts that if cavalry will only persist in dashing onwards, after receiving the fire of a square, they have every certainty of success, he should recollect that the sudden fall of men and horses, when it exceeds a certain proportion, entirely annuls the physical force of the squadron, and makes its continuing to dash forward, not a matter of will or courage, but a question of possibility. Let him then found his theories on some better basis than the notion of the courage of the British cavalry soldier failing in the hour of need, or the vague supposition that the age of chivalry could boast of more heroism than was so often displayed by our squadrons during the eventful scenes of the Peninsular war.

In conclusion, the writer of this paper entirely disclaims any controversial disposition; and if any part of this statement be illustrated or corrected by eye-witnesses, it is not his intention again to take up his pen, his object having been merely to vindicate from comparative oblivion what must always be considered a brilliant day for the British Cavalry.

A. Z.

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