who could not get away in time may, here and there, have been killed or wounded with a bayonet, is possible enough; it is also possible that, when Colonel Coulburn's brigade was galloped over at Albuera, some stubborn Englishman may have attempted to defend himself with his ricketty, zig-zag bayonet. But a few isolated cases of this kind, if they did happen, cannot tell against the avowed fact, that no resisting men were ever forced back at bayonet's point; nor can soldiers be expected to close in mortal strife armed only with a weapon that every man who has poised or wielded it feels to be below contempt. Men will run at the enemy, or run after them if they give way; but if the assailed stand fast the assailants invariably halt and begin to fire. The French always did so during the war; and those will read this who know that British troops have done the same. The troops possessing in the highest degree the most essential military qualities, personal strength, courage, energy, and activity, must, of course, be the greatest losers by the change that has taken place from a close to a distant method of fighting; and it might have been expected that the British, who claim. a superiority in these higher qualities, would have attempted to render them as available as possible: but this has not been the case; we have fallen into the system followed by very inferior nations: we wished, perhaps, to show our enemies that we could beat them even with their own arms, and deemed it, no doubt, illiberal to attack them with arms more formidable than those with which they could oppose us. Still there was always a good deal of rhodomontade about the wonders effected, or to be effected, with the bayonet. It was even stated in evidence, on General Whitelock's court-martial, that the second in command directed some of the soldiers to take their flints out of the locks of their muskets, as everything was to be done with the "bayonet. One man was actually killed in obeying this strange order. When charges of cavalry are made in close column, and when generals make the infantry soldiers throw away their flints, we may well be allowed to question the value of a system that has fostered ideas leading to conduct so extraordinary.

(7)" But in a question like that which we are considering, more attention should be paid to facts than to theories, however plausible and however ably supported."

Yes, to facts when duly analysed and placed in a proper light, but not to mere results, unless we know the exact causes that brought them about, and these will as often be found in the very hearts and thoughts of the soldiers as in the circumstances of battle. In military inquiries we must never generalize, or allow ourselves to be imposed upon by sound, or by the authority of lofty names; we must follow truth through the dark mazes of modern war, and bring her out from the hiding-places in which professional pedantry, ignorance, and the efforts of little minds, when placed in high stations, endeavour to conceal her, fearing, perhaps, that the flashes of light reflected from her mirror, might not, like the flashes of lightning, always respect the laurel. Men of high character alone, who know that all sciences must be progressive, aid and encourage such inquiries, fully aware that every ray of light called forth under their auspices will add to their fame by showing the difficulties they had to contend with, as well as by clearing away some of that darkness under which even the best have erred. "Qui

n'a pas fait de fautes à la guerre," said Turenne, "ne la pas fait longtems." It is on the strength of facts and truths thus brought out that we must endeavour to build and carry into effect new theories, unless we intend to remain for ever stationary with all our imperfections on our heads. Henry and Maurice of Orange were both theorists, Gustavus Adolphus was a theorist, and so was Frederic II. All these men, the real founders of the present science of war, rejected the faulty practices of their time, struck out new paths, looked deeply into the means and objects of the profession, and then established those theories that, when carried into effect, rendered their arms victorious and their names immortal.

So much for my reviewers, French, German and English, to all of whom my best thanks are due for the very courteous terms in which they have spoken of the writer of these trifles, even where they have arraigned the opinions he had advanced.

With the few words only that can still be added to this paper, we must, for the present at least, conclude a subject to which three volumes, instead of three feeble essays, could hardly have rendered full justice.

Those only who are unacquainted with history, or incapable of observing the relative position of the arts and sciences towards each other, and towards society in general, can be blind to the fact, that civilization and the arts of peace have only advanced hand in hand, and on the same alignment with what, to superficial observers alone, may seem the destructive art of war; and total folly only could now dream of striking out such a science from the moderate mass of human knowledge, or of founding institutions on the presumption of its non-existence. What, let us ask, would be the result, were all the inhabitants of the earth at once to divest themselves, by universal accord, of every particle of military knowledge? Not, certainly, a total cessation of war, for war results from the evil passions of the human breast, and not from the military science which is intended to repress their baneful influence,no, we should only be forced, on the first outbreaking of national anger, again to take up the science from its earliest and rudest beginning, thus forfeiting all the advantages gained by the torrents of blood that have been shed in raising it even to its present moderate height. And any single state that shall attempt to discard the science of war will only be paving the way for its own destruction, as long as the great powers of Europe continue to cultivate military knowledge, and to honour military virtues. All must, from necessity, therefore, follow the same examples, were they even so unwise as to be desirous of adopting a different line of policy.

We may, no doubt, by giving the reins to imagination, picture to ourselves a state of human civilization so high and perfect, as to render appeals to arms needless and impossible. But as far as the feeble powers of man enable him to look into futurity, such an order of things can yet be considered only as the brilliant dream of generous philanthropy; and till the vision is realised, it must be the duty of every government to encourage military virtues, as well as to cultivate the science of war, in order to secure permanent protection for the honour, property, and independence of the countries over which they are called upon to rule. And let it always be recollected, that property has never long remained where honour had been discarded, and that the virtual

independence of nations has often ceased to exist, long before hostile banners, or the still more dangerous banners of protecting allies, had waved beneath the walls of their capitals.

In what state the science of tactics, the very foundation of the art of war, has, in the face of these truths, been allowed to remain in this country, was shown at length in the foregoing papers. Hundreds of thousands of infantry, the strength of armies, were sent to battle without having been taught the use of arms. These noble soldiers, for so their gallantry, discipline, and high bearing on every occasion well entitle them to be called, possess neither the means of resisting cavalry upon open ground, nor of contending, successfully, in hand-to-hand combat, against bold and energetic enemies; they are not dexterous enough in the use of arms to encounter, on equal terms, adversaries skilful in distant and desultory warfare: and, as far as the development of moral and personal faculties go, the men are as ill prepared for fighting on the day of battle as they were when they left the loom or the plough to enlist in the army. The very weapons placed in the hands of the soldiers are made on principles at variance with good swordmanship, or skilful musket practice.

As a trifling addition to the proofs formerly brought forward to show the value of our system, I may here mention, that the late excellent Mr. Surtees, of the Rifle Brigade, expressly says in his Memoirs, that he did not believe a single shot, out of nearly two hundred which he fired, during the battle of Bergen, took effect; an ignorance in the use of arms, for which, he somewhere else remarks, the Americans very justly laugh at us.

That things have not much mended,—and how indeed should they,may be seen by the following extract from a late Brighton paper: the statement is probably not much exaggerated. "On Saturday week, a certain brigade of fusileers, in the neighbourhood of this town, proceeded to exercise with ball cartridge. An immense quantity of ammunition was expended in the course of the day, at the close of which it was triumphantly announced, that one man (out of sixty) had hit the mark."

If such is your practice in peace, what is it likely to be in war?

The French, whose arming and training is pretty nearly upon a par with our own, expended, by official returns, 3,000,000 of ball cartridges during the operations before Algiers. They estimated the number of Moors killed and wounded at 10,000; so that, without making any allowance for those who fell by the fire of artillery, it requires three hundred musket-shots to put one enemy hors de combat. But we now know that there were not even 5000 Moors killed and wounded; many of those who fell must, of course, have fallen by the fire of artillery; so that it must have taken some six or eight hundred musket-shots to bring down a single enemy! Now, reader, what think you of the system that limits the exertions of bold, active, and energetic men to the use of such an arm?

Perhaps you will appeal against this sweeping condemnation of the system of tactics to the victories achieved, during the war, over some of the bravest nations of the world?-But those nations followed, if any thing, rather a feebler system than your own; and your success may be fairly ascribed to the general knowledge and high character of your

officers, as well as to the stout hearts and strong arms of your men; so that, to render the appeal effectual, you must make it clear that your victories were always gained at the lowest possible expense of blood and treasure; and this will hardly be attempted in the face of the facts stated in the first part of this Essay, that amply prove loss and disaster to have resulted from the system, and from the system alone.

If these, our own disasters, have not yet been so overwhelming as others quoted in the second part of the Essay, to show how often a tenacious adherence to faulty and superannuated practices had occasioned the loss of empires, provinces, and entire armies, they have, nevertheless, been sufficiently marked, clearly to lay bare the causes from whence they sprung. And is not this enough? Must military improvement be constantly purchased by a boundless waste of human blood, instead of resulting from the power of human thought and reflection? Let us hope for the better things that are within our reach; for those who remember the war, and know the materials of which our army is composed, can well picture to themselves a band of British soldiers proudly advancing to battle with the step of victory and glance of defiance, their bodies erect, heads high, and confident in themselves, their leaders, and their arms, already looking upon every inch of ground marched over as so much conquered territory; still counting, like the army of Alexander at the Issus*, more than nine-tenths of the entire number effective in the ranks after years of triumphant progress.

But under the present system, we can look only for a repetition of what the same system produced before. When the war, already raging in the hearts of men, shall break out into open hostility, we must again expect to behold melancholy trains of exhausted stragglers in the rear of every line of march, crowded hospitals, a boundless waste of ammunition, and small results produced; sanguinary combats fought, and few advantages gained; protracted campaigns, and many more thousands destroyed by sickness and suffering than by the weapons of the foe. We shall again see armies raised, fleets assembled, seas traversed, and mountains crossed, in order that we may confront our enemies, not, indeed, to spring upon them as springs the lion in his wrath upon the foe, nor to dart upon them as the eagle in his pride darts down upon the prey; no, but just according to prescribed rule,-to pull a trigger at

them!

The system is now, divested of false glitter and in its naked feebleness, brought fairly, I hope, to the bar of professional opinion. Let the officers of the army, who take an interest in the service, compare what skilful and well-armed men have done, and may therefore do again, with all that a tactical soldier is enabled to perform by the aid of his present arming and training having made this comparison, let them decide accordingly on the value of modern tactics.

J. M.

* Polybius, book xii.

STRICTURES ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMY AND NAVY APPOINTMENTS.

"There is now a Bill in this House appointing a rigid inquisition into the minutest detail of our offices at home. And for what is all this apparatus of bustle and terror? Is it because anything substantial is expected from it? No. The stir and bustle itself is the end proposed. Great difficulties have given a just value to economy, and our minister must be an economist whatever it may cost us. If he does not obtain any public benefit, he may at least make regulations without end. Those are sure to pay in present expectation, whilst the effect is at a distance, and will be the concern of other times and other men." BURKE'S Speeches.

THE Committee of the House of Commons appointed to investigate the general question of naval and military appointments, with all other concerns connected with the expenses of the army, assembled in the month of May last, and proceeded to divide their subject into four separate heads:

1. The Garrison Establishments.

2. The Pay and Allowances of General Officers having regiments. 3. The Pay and Allowances of other General and Staff Officers. 4. The honorary emoluments of officers of high rank in the Navy. Now the first of these heads, the Garrison Establishments, being a matter but little understood by the public, had long furnished an extensive field for every empty and mischievous popular declaimer to utter all imaginable falsehoods and absurdities concerning it, starting always upon principle, by designating the garrison appointments as total sinecures, conferred either by gross misapplication of royal favour, or obtained by intrigue and party management.

The principal evidence before the Committee was in the first instance given by the Military Secretary in person; but as its substance was all recapitulated in a return enumerating every garrison appointment, with columns showing the pay and allowances of each situation itself, and also any other emolument held under government by the same individual, the Committee contented themselves with entering that return upon their proceedings, instead of the whole of the evidence. One thing is very striking on looking through this document, namely, that in order to show the nature and amount of the emoluments above alluded to, it has actually been necessary to introduce into that return in question one column exclusively set apart for pensions for wounds,— wounds received by those men who have, in so malignant and scandalous a manner, been held up to reproach as the undeserving plunderers of an impoverished country, and as the idle sinecurists who ought at once to be deprived of their ill-gotten places.

One could almost wish it were possible to make such vile calumniators exchange places with some of these veterans, and let them discover how they would themselves enjoy dragging on an old age of suffering with the renewed pain of some shattered limb at every change of weather, or the often-recurring torture of a musket-ball shifting about among the sensitive nerves and muscles of an exhausted frame. And, for the most part, the sort of men who occupy the subordinate grades of the garrison appointments are sufferers of this description, while the

U.S. JOURN. No. 61. DEC. 1833.

2 G