EGYPT.

ALEXANDRIA.

(From notes taken on the spot.)-The town, which presents a wide area covered with buildings and tenements of snow-white limestone, lies on the eastern side of the port; and the southerly quarter of it is occupied by ranges of spacious storehouses, public buildings, and a regiment of stone windmills of a circular shape. A number of forts, some of which were erected by the French, command the place; they are raised on an artificial substructure of sandy acclivities, or masonry. The most prominent of these defences is Fort Caffarelli; the most powerful one, that which lies beyond the obelisks, or Cleopatra's Needles. They stand, however, quite isolated from each other; and though they undoubtedly command the town and port, have no pretensions to any formidable character; for they are open in the rear, may be taken either in écharpe or from behind, and could scarcely be defended against a skilful assault even in front. An officer of the name of Ghiandi, though the Turk has sunk it in the more sonorous appellative of Chassim Aga, plays the part of leading engineer; he held a commission formerly in the Neapolitan service, but his performances here afford ample evidence that he has lived without learning even the rudiments of his profession. If Alexandria had not been protected by nature, which has beset the entrance into the port with dangers, its military defences, despite their formidable exterior, would add but little indeed to its tenability. The assailant, who is anxious to avail himself of the chances in his favour, would however select the coast of Aboukir for his place of landing, immediately set about cutting off the communications with the Nile, and then march straight on Alexandria. By this plan he would effectually blockade the town, and compel it to immediate surrender.

AUSTRIA.

THE MAXIMILIAN TOWERS.

This species of fortification consists of a connected series of towers, each of which is eighty feet in diameter, elevated thirty feet above the surface of soil, and contains a vault beneath ten feet in depth, which is designed for the storing away of ammunition, and is provided with a well. The tower itself consists of three floors, all of equal height; the lowest is appropriated to the housing of stores, the second affords lodging for the garrison, and the third contains missiles, shells, &c. The platform is armed with ten 16-pounders, mounted on carriages of so peculiar a construction, that they are not only worked with unusual facility, but are in no way impeded by the limited space allotted to them. The tower is surrounded by a ditch, and beyond it by a screen of earth or glacis, of similar elevation. Its internal arrangement is laid out with much cleverness; and its whole cost, inclusive of every appendage, does not exceed eighteen or nineteen hundred pounds. The first application of these towers was made at Linz, where the Traun falls into the Danube, a situation which the government justly considered as better adapted than any other, for covering the Austrian dominions against any western assailant, defending the entrance into the valley of the Danube, and preserving a secure passage across the latter stream. Those, however, who are acquainted with the locality of Linz, must be aware, that to have fortified it according to the customary forms, would have been attended with very serious difficulties, as well as enormous expense; besides necessitating the maintenance of a very numerous garrison. These obstacles have been obviated by fortifying this position with thirty-two towers, three-and-twenty of which lie on the left, and nine on the right bank of the Danube. The object has thus been effectually attained, at a proportionably trifling expense. Linz is now become an entrenched camp of the first order, and can bring 320 pieces of cannon to bear on any future besieger,

with this additional advantage,-that if its defence be entrusted to intrepid hands, each bulwark will require to be separately carried by the assailant. The towers derive their name from the Archduke Maximilian, who first proposed them.

THE TYROL.

C***

Unterau is beginning to assume the appearance of a regular fortification, for which nature seems to have designed it. The works, which hundreds of hands are employed in raising, command the narrow vale of the Eisack, which forms the entrance into German Tyrol; when completed, a garrison of four thousand men will be enabled to close it for weeks against the stoutest force which can be brought against it.

HESSE-CASSEL.

MILITARY BUDGET.

We learn, from the statement made to the Chambers by the Minister at War, that this electorate is bound to contribute, towards forming the army of the German Confederation, a regular quota of 5679 men, together with a reserve corps of 1893, and a contingent for replacing casualties, of 947 men. The total expenditure for the effective troops of the electorate is fixed at 560,531 dollars, about 79,000l. Add to this sum, the civil expenses of the army, which are 53,895 dollars, and other disbursements for pensions, &c., amounting to 176,382 dollars, and we have a sum total of expenditure on the military force of Hesse-Cassel, of 790,810 dollars, or about 112,0307.

REVIEWS AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

AN APOLOGY FOR THE ENGLISH SHIP-BUILDERS, SHOWING THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE COUNTRY SHOULD LOOK TO THE NAVY FOR NAVAL ARCHITECTS. LONDON, 1833.

THIS is a pamphlet of great ability, and is written with more temper and judgment than some other discourses upon naval architecture which have recently been published, and which are more remarkable for assertion than sound argument or satisfactory proof. As we shall probably have to recur to this subject on a future occasion, we shall merely express our approbation of the "Apology" by recommending it to our readers.

The members of the School of Naval Architecture were naturally surprised at the appointment of a person to the head of their department who was understood to be unacquainted with the details of ship-building; but what made the appointment still more galling, was the coarse insinuations of their own unfitness, and want of hereditary respectability; and the unmerited abuse poured forth upon that old and tried servant of the public, Sir Robert Seppings. Whatever the merits or demerits of the members of the School of Naval Architecture may be, and whether the new principles be right or wrong, we are glad to see the cool and systematic method in which the author of the "Apology" analyses the points of contention; for we perfectly agree in the position of Bailey, that "there is nothing incompatible between esteem for the moral and even intellectual qualities of a person's mind, and a full conviction of the inaccuracy of his views and the unsoundness of his arguments." The defence is drawn up under eight distinct articles, which may be thus enumerated.

1. On the Office of Surveyor of the Navy.

It is shown by a quotation from the "Board of Revision," that the principal duties of a surveyor require his being long experienced in the division of dock-yard labour, and conversant with the practical as well as the theo

retical branch of the science; for which reason the superior class of apprentices were ordered to work a portion of their time with the shipwrights. From this very regulation an unfair inference has been drawn, that too close a connexion would ensue for the subsequent elevation of the embryo surveyors; that they would be too hail-fellow cronies with the other workmen, to be able to exercise any control over them: but the weakness of human nature acts inversely to this position, and has generally led rather to an undue and ungracious share of pride in persons greatly elevated. But the danger is visionary, since the school apprentices are no more confounded with the shipwrights than are midshipmen with the crew. And with regard to the appointment of a head to their department, from another service, the Apologizer very quaintly asks, how would the Navy stomach the placing of a yacht sailor in the command of a fleet?

§ 2. On the Importance of a PRACTICAL Surveyor.

To show how important such a man is in this department, and at the same time to avoid personality, the writer introduces a parallel case, in proof of the evil consequences of neglecting so necessary a point.

History is the argument of experience, and will of course have far more weight than the mere opinions of the writer, whose mind may be suspected to be warped by interested motives; we shall therefore quote the evidence of tradition, to show the evil consequences, in former times, of not having a surveyor of the navy conversant in practical ship-building.

In Pepys "Memoirs touching the Royal Navy," which is rather a scarce little volume, there is an account of the ruinous condition into which the English navy deteriorated in 1684, and the deranged state of the British dock-yards, for want of a practical ship-builder to superintend them. In 1679, when his then Royal Highness the Duke of York (afterwards James II.) was Lord High Admiral, he went abroad, leaving the duties of his office to be executed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. Mr. Pepys (who was previously Secretary of the Admiralty) was at that period confined to the Tower; and Sir Anthony Deane, formerly a practical shipwright, was holding the office of surveyor of the navy; but in 1680 he "industriously flung up the charge of Commissioner of the Navy, from his early prospect of its falling into that condition in which his Majesty afterwards found it, and out of which he was therefore pleased finally to insist upon Sir Anthony Deane's return to his assistance in the rescuing it."

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The opinions and foresight of practical ship-builders are just as valuable in their way as professional opinions in any other department; and we shall find that Sir Anthony Deane was far from being wrong in his prediction; for in the space of less than five years after he quitted office (1684) it was soon discovered, when the Duke of York returned home, that mismanagement and want of due attention to the inglorious duties of ship-carpentry, with its contingent business, had brought the navy into a shamefully neglected state. Accordingly, James and his Majesty King Charles II. set about ameliorating the condition of the British fleet; but at the end of twelve months, after expending 90,000/. (an enormous sum in those days), they found they were making but little progress in their object. Mr. Pepys was a stranger all this time to what was going on. Being, as he says, wholly sequestered from that and all other public affairs, those of the navy became foreign to him, as having no other notices concerning them than what too often occurred in public conversation, touching the effects of inexperience daily discover. ing themselves in the conduct of them into whose hands the civil departments of the navy had fallen." However, in 1684, when James II. came to the throne, he sent for Mr. Pepys, and consulted him respecting the best method of extricating the professional branch of the civil department of the navy from the calamitous situation in which he had found it on his return from abroad. The counsel offered by Mr. Pepys was, to recall Sir Anthony Deane! His Majesty accordingly acted upon that advice, but Sir Anthony Deane " refused even to offence," so solicitous was he of not returning to office; and the ex-surveyor would have prevailed in his entreaty to be excused, had the king known where to find another individual equally practised in the art of ship-building. Mr. Pepys contended, and there are incontrovertible proofs to bear him out in his views, that the civil department of the navy should at least have one surveyor possessing "a practical knowledge in every part of

the works and methods of your navy, both at the board and in your yards, the not discerning of which appears to have cost your royal brother and you, within the fore-mentioned five years, above HALF A MILLION!!"

Sir Anthony Deane was originally a practical shipwright, and an eminent man in his profession. The same may be said of many of our late surveyors, who have distinguished themselves by their intelligence and professional skill, and were all as eminent in their time as Sir Anthony Deane was in his day. But they were all practical men.

§ 3. That the Surveyors of the British Navy have not been found wanting in the necessary qualifications.

The Commissioners of Naval Revision asserted that among the shipbuilders were men of great intelligence and professional skill, considering the means afforded them; and that if they had but little knowledge of the science or theory of naval architecture, the blame must in justice fall upon government, "for not having formed any plan for their instruction."

§4. The School of Naval Architecture has been neglected.

The author reverts to and agrees in the universal assertion that the French have built better ships than ourselves; but the reason is, because the science has been cultivated by them, whilst we have merely looked upon it as an art. It appears that, although the school has been in existence twentytwo years, its members have neither been heard nor tried, for they have never been permitted to assist in putting the English method of construction upon a scientific footing, so that the country cannot judge of the advantages to be derived from such an establishment. And however eligible the present surveyor may be, it seems requisite that the country should provide some regular source from whence to derive her future surveyors.

§ 5. The School of Naval Architecture has been falsely represented. The establishment is, at this very time, suffering under the erroneous impressions which have been conveyed to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and through him to the public, with respect to the length of service of its members, the situations they hold, the number of students unprovided for, and the nature of their qualifications. These are matters of FACT, explained and set at rest by documentary evidence. Far from ascertaining what these gentlemen are equal to, and employing them accordingly, seven are still left to lament their disappointed prospects in life, being turned of thirty years of age, without the means of earning their livelihood. The Commissioners of Naval Revision, in 1806, recommended that the students should be sent to sea, to add practical knowledge to their theoretical; and this was acted upon till the present administration came into office. Why so useful a practice has been discontinued, remains to be explained; but so strong is this conviction that all branches of the requisite knowledge should be united in the Surveyor of the Navy, that when Captain Hayes was reported to be the successful candidate for the situation, the innovation was excused, under the plea of his having once been a shipwright. And here we may remark, in justice to the writer, that the charge of the "Apology" having been published to show that the Surveyor of the Navy ought to be selected from the School of Naval Architecture, is not founded on any passage in the pamphlet.

§ 6. That Captain Symonds' theory, as published in the " United Service Journal for July, 1832, is incompatible with the principles of science. We hardly know how this section will be replied to, as the charge is countenanced by analytical demonstration; but we must suppose the writer of the paper on Naval Architecture, in the 15th number of the Metropolitan Magazine," has some grounds for his positive assertion that Captain Symonds is a " thorough mathematician, and a good algebraist." The first four principles of the new theory, upon which the rest depend, are

minutely discussed, and with fairness; but, in the present stage of this discussion, we refer our readers to the pamphlet for the conclusions. It is asserted that Captain Symonds is himself gradually abandoning, or at least softening off in his later ships, those peculiarities which formed the "distinct features" of his earlier productions, such as that the protrusion or swell of a ship's side should be from six to thirty-six inches above the water's edge, an unusual tumbling home, or falling in, of the top sides, extending even to the bows,-and a remarkably lean after-body, causing a great flatness in the buttocks.

§ 7. The Naval Architectural Department are quite competent to explain, upon scientific principles, why LARGE ships ought to possess advantages over smaller ones.

The great advantages that large ships possess over small ones is no new discovery; the records of experience show that the conviction has successfully been acted upon from time to time. But as British men-of-war have hitherto been restricted to a certain tonnage, according to their armament, the builders have been crippled to scale. The unprecedented tonnage now given to our ships is not, therefore, the development of a new principle, but the application of an old one, in the adoption of which we are imitating the Americans. Our fifty-gun ships were gradually increased from 704 tons to 968; and so far back as 1610, a beam of 44 feet was given to a ship only 114 feet in length. The reason of this principle not being acted on in later times, is the great difficulty of procuring large timber, and the rigid economy exerted by the Admiralty, till all at once they ordered a frigate of 2083 tons! Professor Inman's earliest efforts in naval construction aimed at increased dimensions; that is, additional tonnage for such classes of ships as he was called upon to construct. In the lines which he proposed for the Volage, he carried them to 529 tons; and the drawing was rejected because the tonnage was too great, the Professor having been ordered to construct a ship of 500 tons only!

Captain Symonds is said to have developed some important features in shipbuilding, in having told the world that BREADTH gives stability; but it happens that the very ship (Vernon) which has been the subject of so much remark of late retains the same proportion of length to breadth, within the hundredth place of decimals, that 50-gun ships had 87 years ago. Mr. Phineas Pett, the first scientific ship-builder in the service of this country, constructed" that goodly ship the Prince Royal," in 1610, with a beam of 44 feet, although only 114 feet long, making the proportion of length to breadth in the ratio of 2·58: 1, which is rather more than twice and a half as long as she was broad. Sir Walter Raleigh says, that 35 feet broad and 100 feet long is a good proportion for a large ship. This is rather more than twice and three-quarters as long as she is broad. And Mr. Pepys states, that "the builders of England before 1673 had not well considered that breadth only will make a stiff ship." This is going 160 years back.

We anticipate the question-" Then why have not the well-known principles of building large ships been boldly acted up to before, instead of cautiously creeping in with a little more length and a little more breadth, as if the advantages of increased dimensions were doubtful ?"

Our reply is simply this; that it has hitherto been the policy of the Admiralty of England to confine the dimensions of men-of-war within the smallest possible limits, upon a principle of ECONOMY; for "it is well known that this country does not produce a quantity of timber sufficient to answer the demand for it; that the stock is gradually diminishing, while the consumption increases; and that our navy must soon depend upon distant countries for a considerable part of the supply.' This was part of the Report of the Commissioners of Naval Inquiry in 1806, since which time our dock-yards have been, and still are, filled with foreign timber. But although the ports are now open, peace will not last for ever; the ports may again be closed against the importation of foreign timber, and the alarm so often felt about the scarcity of oak in the event of a war, though forgotten for a time, may be fearfully renewed.

In the Quarterly Review for April, 1814, we find the following passage on this