nious manner; or by signs; as to fix a gallows, or other reproachful and ignominious signs at a man's door. 5 Co. 125. 7. The mayor of Northampton sent lord Halifax a licence to keep a public house, which the court said was a libel in the case of a person of his quality, and granted an information for it. Str. 422. 8. Or the memory of one that is dead.......For the offence is the same, whether the person libelled be alive or dead. 5 Co. 125. Who are punishable for it. 1. It is certain that not only he who composes a libel, or procures another to compose it, but also he who publishes, or procures another to publish it, are in danger of being punished for it; and it is said not to be material whether he who disperses a libel knew any thing of the contents or effect of it or not, for nothing would be more easy than to publish the most virulent papers, with the greatest security, if the concealin the purport of them from an illiterate publisher would make him safe in dispersing them. 1 Hawk. 195. 2. Also, it hath been said, that if he who hath either read a libel himself or hath heard it read by another, do afterwards maliciously read or repeat any part of it in the presence of others, or lend or show it to another, he is guilty of an unlawful publication of it. lbid. 3. Also, it hath been holden that the copying of a libel shall be a conclusive evidence of the publication of it, unless the party can prove that he copied it for the magistrate to examine it. Ibid. 4. And it hath been ruled, that the finding a libel on a bookseller's shelf, is a publication of it by the bookseller, and that it is no excuse to say, that the servant took it into the shop without the master's knowledge, for the law presumes the master is to be acquainted with what the servant does. 1 Sess. 633. K. vs. Dodd. 5. And it seems to be the better opinion, that he who first writes a libel, dictated by another, is thereby guilty of making it, and consequently punishable for the bare writing, for it was no libel till it was reduced to writing; for the essence of a libel consisteth in the writing of it; since, if a man speaks such words, unless the words be put in writing, it is not a libel. 1 Salk. 419. 6. Also, it hath been resolved that the sending of a letter full of provoking language to another, without publishing it, is highly punishable, as manifestly tending to a disturbance of the peace. 1-Hawk. 195. 7. But it hath been resolved, that he who barely reads a libel in the presence of another, without knowing it before to be a libel, or who is only proved to have had a libel in his custody, shall not, in respect of any such act, be adjudged the publisher of it, But the having in one's custody a written copy of a libel publicly known, is an evidence of the publication of it. 1 Hawk. 196. 8. The way for a man to keep himself out of danger in such case is, if he find a libel, and it be composed against a private person, he either may burn it, or forthwith deliver it to a magistrate; but if it concerns a magistrate, or other public person, he ought immediately to deliver it to a magistrate, to the intent, that by examination and inquiry the author may be found and punished. 5 Co. 125. How punishable. 1. There seemeth to be no doubt but that the offenders may be condemned to pay such fine, and also to suffer such corporal punishment, as to the court in discretion shall seem proper, according to the heinousness of the crime and the circumstances of the offender. 1 Hawk. 196. 2. And it hath been adjudged that libels, as having a direct and immediate tendency to a breach of the peace, are indictable before justices of the peace. 2 Hawk. 40. 3. An indictment setting forth the offence to the effect following had been naught, being vague and useless words, for the court must judge of the words themselves; but the words, according to the tenor, do correct the defect, for they import the very words themselves, for the tenor of a thing is the transcript and true copy of it, to which it may be compared, and therefore of words spoken there can be no tenor, because there is no written original. 2 Salk. 417. 3 Salk. 225. 4. And it must be proved to be written or published in the country laid in the indictment, all matters of crime being local. St. Tr. V.3. 774, 775. Indictment for publishing a scandalous and libellous letter, imputing the crime of theft to the prosecutor. county, to wit. in the county of late of the The jurors for, &c. upon their oath present, that parish of gentleman, being a person of an envious, evil, and wicked mind, and of a most malicious disposition, and wickedly, maliciously, and unlawfully minding, contriving, and intending, as much as in him lay, to injure, oppress, aggrieve, and vilify the good name, fame, credit, and reputation of one gentleman, a good, peaceable, and worthy citizen of this commonwealth, and to bring him into great contempt, hatred, infamy, and disgrace, on the with force and arms, at the pa in the year day of rish aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, a certain false, scandalous, and libellous writing against the said falsely, maliciously, and scan dalously, did frame and make, and in the name of him the said then and there did cause to be written and published, in the form of a letter, directed to him the said the tenor of which said writing These scoundrel (meaning the said is as follows, to wit, To ) it may not be amiss to acquaint you (meaning him the said ) as the time draws near, you (meaning the said ) may be preparing yourself (again meaning the said ) for a trial, for stealing the turkies out of my (meaning his the said ) yard, when I hope to see you (meaning the said ) sing a neck psalm, and perish according to law, you hell-hound (meaning the said subscribed (meaning himself the said with intention to scandalize the said ) and that the said and to bring him into contempt, hatred, infamy, and digrace, the said false, malicious, scandalous, and libellous writing, so as aforesaid framed, written and made, afterwards, to wit, on the said day of in the year aforesaid, and on divers other days and times, as well before as afterwards, at the parish aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, to divers citizens of this commonwealth, then and there present, falsely, maliciously, and scandalously, did openly deliver, and cause to be delivered, to the great scandal, infamy, and damage of the said to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace and dignity of the commomwealth. LIMITATION. 1. ALL actions, suits, bills, indictments, or informations, which shall be had, brought, sued, or exhibited upon any penal law, where the punishment to be inflicted upon the offender, on conviction, shall neither be death nor imprisonment in the jail and penitentiary house, shall be had, brought, sued, exhibited or moved, within one year next after the offence committed, and not after; except where a longer or shorter time for the commencement of such suit, or prosecution, is or shall be fixed by law.' 2 Rev. Code, p. 80, sect. 2. 2. Every indictment or information for perjury, subornation of perjury, or such forgeries or publications thereof as may not be punishable by death, or imprisonment in the jail or penitentiary house shall be exhibited or moved within three years next after the time of committing the offence, and not after.' 2 Rev. Code, p. 80, sect. 3. But in general, the rule is, that no time bars the commonwealth, on the principle of the maxim in England, nullum tempus occurrit regi. See I Bl. Com. 247. 3. Thus, the act of limitations will not bar a motion in behalf of the commonwealth, against a person who has improperly received public monies, and is accountable for it. 1. H. & M. 85. 4. So neither will any lapse of time prevent the commonwealth from suing out execution on a judgment, or put it to the necessity of reviving the judgment by scire facias. (4. Hen, & Munf. Nimmo's ex's. vs. the commonwealth. But this, as it seems, arises from an express provision of an act of Assembly. 5. No officer [of the militia] shall be arrested for any act, of which he may be alledged to have been guilty two years previous to the application for such arrest,' 2 Rev. Code, p. 137, sect. 2. 6. Prosecutions for penalties arising under the law concerning public roads must be commenced within six months. 1 Rev. Code, p. 29, sect. 12. 7. In real actions, the limitation is, 1. Of writs of formedon, in descender, remainder or reverter, twenty years; and of a right of entry, likewise twenty years. (1 Rev. Code, p. 107.) Proviso, in favour of infants, femes covert, non compos mentis, persons imprisoned, or out of the commonwealth, when the right of action or of entry accrued, who have ten years allowed them after their disability removed. (1 Rev. Code, p. 107.) 2. Of writs of right, which may be maintained on the possession or seizen of the ancestor or predecessor, within fifty years; or any other possessory action, on such possession or seizen within forty years; but no person shall maintain a real action upon his own possession or seizen, but within thirty years. 1 Rev. Code, p. 107. 8. In personal actions, the limitation is, 1. Of actions upon the case, other than for slander, and such as concern the trade of merchandize between merchant and merchant, their factors or agents; actions of account, trespass, debt, grounded on a lending or contract without specialty, or for arrears of rent; trover, detinué, replevin for taking away of goods and chattels; and trespass quare clausum fregit, within five years. 2. Of trespass of assault, battery, wounding, imprisonment, or any of them, within three years. 3. Of case for words, within one year. (1 Rev. Code, p. 107, sect. 4.) And persons labouring under such legal disabilities as are above mentioned, are allowed as long time to commence their action, after the disability is removed, as was given in the first instance. Ibid. p. 109, sect. 12. 9. Judgments may be revived by scire facias, or an action of debt (where no execution has been issued) within ten years from the date of the judgment. 1 Rev. Code, p. 108, sect. 5. 10. Or, where execution has issued and no return made, the party in whose favour it issued may obtain other executions within ten years. Ibid. 11. Or, may move against any sheriff or other officer, or his or their security or securities, for not returning an execution within ten years. Ibid. 12. Proviso, in favour of infants, feme coverts, non compos mentis, persons imprisoned, or out of the commonwealth, who shall be allowed five years after the several disabilities are removed. 1 Rev. Code, p. 108, sect. 6. 13. Actions on store accounts must be commenced within one year from the delivery of the respective articles; except, that upon the death of the creditor or debtor, a further time of twelve months shall be allowed. 1 Rev. Code, p 108, sect. 7, 9. 14. The dates of the delivery of the several articles shall be punctually specified; and if any merchant post-date an account, he shall forfeit ten times the amount. 1 Rev. Code, p. 108, sect. 8. 15. When judgment is reversed or arrested, the plaintiff may recommence it within one year thereafter. 1 Rev. Code, p. 108, sect. 10. 16. But where the defendants remove out of the country or county, or abscond and conceal themselves, when the cause of action accrues, they shall not have the benefit of the act of limitations. (1 Rev. Code, p. 109, sect. 14, 17.) Nor shall the act extend to any master of a vessel, for putting a sick or diseased sailor on shore, without providing for him; or for conveying any debtor, servant or slave out of the state. 1 Rev. Code, p. 109, sect. 15. 17. In suits brought against executors, or administrators, for a debt due by open account, it shall be the duty of the court to expunge all items which appear to have been due five years before the death of the testator, or intestate; saving the rights of plaintiffs labouring under legal disabilities, who have three years allowed them after their respective disabilities removed. (1 Rev. Code, p. 167, sect. 56.) But if the court instruct the jury to disregard the items, it is the same thing as if they expunged them themselves. 1 Hen. & Munf 378. 18. Where the testator or intestate acknowledged the account, within less than five years before his death, the limitation shall run from the date of the acknowledgment, and not of the items, notwithstanding the imperative language of the act of Assembly. 4 Hen, & Munf. Brooke's adm❜r v. Shelly. 19. The regular mode for the defendant to avail himself of the statute of limitations, is to plead it in bar. 3 Bl. Com. 308. 20. It has been held, that where there are mutual unsettled accounts and reciprocal demands, the statute of limitation does not attach ; and that the exception in that statute, as to merchants' accounts, is not merely confined to persons of that description. (Peak. Ca. N. P. 121. But where the demand of one party arises long after the demand of the other, that shall not revive the antecedent debt; it must be in the nature of a running and mutual account, to prevent the operation of the act. Ibid. 122, per Lord Kenyon. 21. If there be a mutual account of any sort, between the plaintiff and defendant, for any item of which credit has been given within six years, that is evidence of an acknowledgment of there being such an open account between the parties, and of a promise to pay the balance, so as to take the case out of the statute of limitations. (6 Term. Rep. 189.) But where all the items were on one side, and the last item being within six years, it was held, that it could not draw after it those that were of longer standing. Bull. N. P. 149. 22. If the defendant plead the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff take issue upon it, evidence of a promise by the defendant, within six (five in Virginia) years before the commencement of the action, to pay the debt, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute. (6 Mod. 309. Dean v Crane) And although it be a conditional promise, it is sufficient if the plaintiff performs the condition; as where in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, the defendant denied he bought the goods, but said, 'prove it and I will pay you;' this promise with a proof of the debt was held to take the case out of the statute. (1 Salk, 29. Heyling v. Haskins, 5 Mod 425. Carth. 470. 1 L. Raym. 389, 422. Comy. Rep. 54. S. C.) A distinction was formerly taken between a promise to pay the debt, and a bare acknowledgment of it within that period; the former was sufficient to take it out of the statute; but an acknowledgment did not amount to a promise, but was said to be only evidence of it, and therefore did not of itself take the case out of the statute. (2 Vent. 152. Bland v. Haslerig. 6 Mod. 309, 310. Dean v Crane. Carth. 471. 2 Show. 126, Dickson v. Thompson.) But this distinction is no longer regarded, it being now settled, that an acknowledgment of the debt takes it out of the statute of limitations. Per Price, Baron, Exeter Lent assizes, 1717. 12 Vin. 192. MSS.) even though it be after the commencement of the action. (2 Burr. 1099. Yea v. Fouraker.) And the slightest acknowledgment has been held sufficient, as saying, 'I am ready to account, but nothing is due |