ture. Upon this His Majesty refused to receive the French Ambassador again, and sent the aide-de-camp in attendance to tell him that His Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the Ambassador." (Vol. ii., pp. 54, 55.)

This despatch was sent on the night of the 13th-14th to all the Prussian diplomatic agents, and it was also published in an extra sheet in the Nord Deutsche Allge. meine Zeitung. The effect of it in Paris was exasperating, and on July 18 war was declared.

It was believed both in Paris and Vienna that the princes and peoples of south Germany would remain neutral at first, and then after a great victory deemed as inevitable as the Austrian triumphs had been in 1866 would become the allies of France. This belief, however, was quickly annihilated. Three days after the declaration of war, the king of Bavaria placed his army under the command of the king of Prussia, and Würtemberg and the rest of southern Germany followed suit. The folly with which the French government themselves established the casus fœderis and threw all south Germany into the arms of Prussia, is unsurpassed in the history of nations.

man southern States." "We do not want it," he said; "it would embarrass our military operations. We must have the plains of the Palatinate for the extension of armies." When M. Rothan saw him on July 23, he found him so secure of French victories that he disdained all alliance, and beheld in his mind's eye the new weapon, the mitrailleuse, sweeping the Prussian armies off the face of the earth.

Such overweening presumption could not fail to meet with its reward. The successes of Prussia were so sudden and so overwhelming that they took all Europe again by surprise; and as in 1866 France was in such a state of military unreadiness as not to be able to exercise any mediating influence between Austria and Prussia, such was the case in 1870 with respect to the other European powers. England, after the revelation of the intrigues with respect to Belgium and of Benedetti's draught treaty, although written "en quelque sorte sous la dictée" of Count Bismarck, and in the presence of the general condemnation of the declaration of war, could not, in spite of the friendly feeling which existed towards France, be expected to take any active part in coming to her assistance; the more than benevolent neutrality of Russia had been secured by the secret understanding of many years' date between Gortschakoff and Bismarck; and the offensive and defensive alliance with Austria, Italy, and France, which Count Beust had been laboring to bring about since 1869, had been wrecked on the question of the temporal sovereignty of the pope, which with strange pertinacity the French Cabinet insisted on upholding to the very last moment; and it The acts of the King of Prussia had for four may be truly said that to the inflexible years sown in our hearts deep feelings of in-resolve of the French Cabinet to uphold dignation, but your imperious demands have forced us to remember that he is one of the chiefs of the German nation, and that if he submitted to insults on the part of a foreign government it would fall on all the German States. You make our cause a common one with his, you throw us into the arms of Prussia, you cement our alliance. Yesterday I declined Prussian overtures; now I shall be obliged to accept them. I know that it is the same at Munich. Prussia now can count on the alliance of the South.

It was at Stuttgard that the aversion to Prussia's policy of aggrandizement was the deepest; yet four days before the declaration of war, the Comte de Saint Vallier transmitted by telegraph the indignant protest of the Baron von Vahrenbühler against French presumption, a protest which reads like articles of impeachment against the Paris Cabinet.

One of the most striking passages of this despatch ran as follows:

So infatuated, however, was the Duc de Gramont with his confidence in the military strength of France, as reported by Marshal Leboeuf and other generals, that he replied to the Comte de Saint-Vallier "that he was mistaken if he imagined that France desired the neutrality of the Ger

the papal temporal power were really due the loss of Alsace and Lorraine and the payment of five milliards.

The French emperor, indeed, made up his mind at last to abandon the temporal power of the pope, but only after the Prussian successes had declared themselves, and after Austria had received an intimation from Russia that any hostile movement on her part against Prussia would be treated as a cause of war. Even Russia, however, in the presence of the tremendous successes of Prussia, began to have doubts of her policy in emancipating that State from all European control. Nevertheless Russia was able to obtain a compensation by the abolition of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris concerning the Black Sea, and after the

signature of the preliminaries of peace | the last, Count Andrassy, have both given at Versailles the new emperor of Germany explanations to the Austrian and Hunga. telegraphed the expression of his lifelong rian delegations, but it cannot be said that gratitude to the emperor of Russia for his they have thrown much light on what are attitude during the war. the specific obligations undertaken by either party to the treaty, but that a treaty of some sort exists there is no doubt. We know that Bismarck's early sympathies were with Austria, and it appears that these sympathies have never wholly died out, but that his aim is still to es tablish some such sort of union as existed before 1866 between new Germany, only with a Prussian hegemony instead of an Austrian.

It must be allowed that, whatever may be said of the policy by which Bismarck raised Prussia to the height of the great military power of Europe, he has used his power for the maintenance of peace and for the maintaining the map of Europe in the state in which it was left at the Treaty of Frankfort. His attitude during the whole of the Russo-Turkish war was irreproachable, his presiding influence at the Congress of Berlin was exercised with consummate tact and judgment, and he used his authority to reconcile the opposing claims of England and Russia in a most masterly way. It is well to read in his own words his notion of the way in which a peace mediator should fulfil his functions.

Dr. Busch reports that the chancellor's way of looking at the situation was as follows:

"Matters standing thus "-in this strain will have run the German Chancellor's thoughts in the presence of these phenomena - -"we must look out for an ally; for, although France ap pears quite peacefully disposed just at present, we cannot be sure that she will not attack us should a favorable opportunity present itself for so doing. England is of but small account for a war on terra firma ; it therefore is obvious

so for

Very shortly after the Congress violent and abusive articles appeared in the Rus sian press, and especially in the Golos, said to be the confidential organ of Prince whose alliance we must seek. Every intelliGortschakoff, attacking Prince Bismarck's domestic and foreign policy, and accusing millions inhabiting the German Empire would gent and unprejudiced person of the forty-two Prussia of the same ingratitude with which wish that we should be on good terms with it accused Austria at the time of the both Russia and Austria at the same time. If, Crimean war. It is impossible, of course, however, we are, as now, compelled to choose to know what verbal engagements did ex-between our two neighbors, there can be no ist between the Russian and Prussian hesitation about our choice. Not alone nachancellors; but at any rate it is clear tional motives point unmistakably to Austrothat Gortschakoff did not consider they Hungary, amongst whose populations may be had been observed, for the relations of reckoned ten millions of Germans; for the the two statesmen were never so cordial Magyars are also on our side, and have been as before, and Bismarck let slip few occa- the least desire to be Russianized, nor have the years past, the Poles of Galicia have not sions for speaking disdainfully of his for Czechs, if we except a dozen or so of Intran mer colleague. sigeants, who make a great deal of noise signifying nothing. And even were Austria altogether Slav, we should have to give her the preference. Russia is strong enough to take care of herself, and we cannot be of much use to her as Allies. On the other hand it is essentially Austria's interest to have us for friends. Per contra, she can materially aid us in carrying out a policy the main object of which is the maintenance of universal peace. If Austro-Hungary and Germany unite with this object in view, and stand back to back with their two millions of soldiers, like a gigantic square in the centre of the Continent, before the eyes of those who desire to break the peace, the more exalted Nihilistic politicians in Muscovy will scarcely venture to attempt the fulfilment of their projects." (Vol. i., pp.

Dr. Busch sums up their relations in these words, which no doubt represent the chancellor's views:

As a matter of fact, Prince Gortschakoff had not been able to make Germany as dependent upon Russia as he had hoped to do; he had not, at the Congress, obtained the support from Prince Bismarck to which he considered him self entitled; he had always cherished a sneaking kindness for France; finally, the contrast between his own mediocre achievements and the greatness of the statesman who had guided Germany's policy with such splendid success, angered and annoyed him. (Vol. ii., p. 138)

The chapter in these volumes relating to Bismarck's relations with Austria has excited much attention in that country, for Dr. Busch asserts in it that a defensive treaty has been drawn between the German Empire and Austria. The pres. ent foreign minister, Count Kalnoki, and

400, 401.)

The secret treaty with Austria was at last concluded at Gastein in September, 1879. In a preliminary discussion with Count Andrassy, who had succeeded

Count Beust in the office of Austrian for- | diplomatist of whom he does not in these eign minister, he succeeded in converting that statesman to his views, after which he proceeded to Vienna, where he was received by the emperor with especial honor. Francis Joseph, at a diplomatic dinner given in the chancellor's honor at Schönbrunn, advanced to the threshold of the drawing-room to receive his guest. The two following days were passed by Andrassy and Haymerle, Andrassy's destined successor, in discussing and settling the details of the treaty with Bismarck.

Its text [says Dr. Busch] is not yet known to the public, but we are aware that it is a defensive alliance between Germany and Austro-Hungary, stipulating that in case one of those States shall be attacked by two or more Powers, the other contracting party shall come to its assistance vi et armis.

pages speak in terms of depreciation. Is the explanation that in his overweening sense of supremacy he can bear no brother near the throne? Dr. Busch, in his condemnation of what he is pleased to style pathotechnics, or the introduction of sentimentalism into diplomacy, cites with admiration the chancellor's account of Jules Favre it is difficult, however, to believe the chancellor was right in his conjecture that Jules Favre really "made up" and painted his cheeks for the occasion.

After the conferences at Haute-Maison and Ferrières the Chancellor, speaking of Favre, said, "It is quite true that he looked as if he had been crying, and I made some endeavor to console him. But, after inspecting him carefully, I came to the conclusion that he had not squeezed out a single tear. Probably he hoped to work upon me and move me by playacting, as the Paris lawyers are wont to do that he was painted as well-white on his with their audiences. I am firmly convinced cheeks and green round his eyes and nostrils

Rothschild's château, upon which occasion he
had made up' much more grey and infirm, to
play the part of one deeply afflicted and utterly
broken down. His object was to excite my
compassion, and thereby induce me to mod-
erate my demands and make concessions.
he ought to have known that feelings have
nothing to do with politics." (Vol. i., p. 263)
His account of M. Thiers is more favor-
able, though still disparaging enough.

But

Whatever, however, may be the stipula tions of this alliance, we are told they were such that the chancellor had great difficulty in getting it accepted by the emperor William, since it seemed to indicate certainly he was the second time, here in a distrust of the personal friendship which the czar Alexander II. had also shown to his uncle. Since its formation, however, Alexander II. has fallen a victim to the dynamite of Nihilistic assassins. Skobeleff, who was one of the leaders of the anti-German party in Russia, is also dead. Gortschakoff has disappeared from the scene; and though Ignatieff, another of the leaders of the same party, was minister of the interior for a time, he was only a short time in office, and the successor of Gortschakoff, M. de Giers, by his visits to the chancellor at Varzin and at Friedrichsrube, has shown his wish to be on terms of good understanding with his powerful neighbor, and, according to all outward appearances, the Triple Alliance was reformed again last autumn at Skiernivice.

In the discursive chapter headed "Diplomatic Indiscretions," Dr. Busch gives us some of the chancellor's utterances respecting diplomacy in general, and of some of the diplomatists in particular with whom he has been brought in contact. The greater part of these speeches are extremely disparaging. It was not to be expected that the chancellor should show much admiration for his colleagues of the Frankfort Diet, or that he should take too favorable a view of the merits of his adversaries, M. Thiers and M. Jules Favre. But Prince Gortschakoff, to whose support during a long political career he owes so much, comes in for a good share of "the rough side of his tongue," and there is hardly a single Prussian statesman or

Favre, although he once remarked of the forThiers suited the Chancellor better than mer: "There is scarcely a trace of the diplomatist about him; he is far too sentimental for that trade. He is not fit to be a negotiatorscarcely even to be a horse-couper. He allows himself to be 'bluffed' too easily; he betrays his feelings and lets himself be pumped." (Vol. i, p. 264.)

One can hardly wonder at his disdain for the Duc de Gramont and Emile Ollivier.

In certain Bismarckian utterances pronounced shortly before and during the war, Gramont repeatedly figured as a combination of wrong headedness and dulness. The Chancellor also spoke of Ollivier with undisguised scorn. Of these persons he once remarked, "Gramont and Ollivier are pretty fellows! Were I in their place, having brought about such a catastrophe, I would at least enlist in some regiment, or even become a franc-tireur, if I had to be hanged for it. That great strapping fellow, Gramont, would do well enough for a soldier." (Vol. i, p. 266.)

The English diplomatists come in for the largest share of the chancellor's approving judgments.

Upon the same occasion he spoke in praise of Russell's compatriot, Lord Napier, formerly British Envoy in Berlin, as a man with whom it was very easy to get on; also of Buchanan, whom he described "as dry but trustworthy." "And now we have got Loftus," he continued. "The position of an English Minister in Berlin is one of special responsibility and difficulty, on account of the family connections existing between the English and Prussian Courts. It exacts the greatest possible tact and attention from its occupant." He then became silent; but his silence spoke. Subsequently, however (no Englishman being present), he expressed, and in very forcible terms, his opinion that Loftus in no way fulfilled the above-mentioned requirements. (Vol i., PP. 226, 267.)

of Czar Alexander, nor is it a Russian policy, but one dictated and guided in the first place by considerations personal to himself, and in the second by his prelilection for France, which his master does not share. His chief characteristic is a highly developed egotism; his chief aim the gratification of his yearning to be esteemed a politician of the first class, which is just what he is not. Hence his chronic disposition to invent scenes in which he can play a part likely to elicit applause from public opinion. The Russian Chancellor has only exhibited any personal activity during the past four years; and no expert will venture to say that his operations have revealed either adroitness or perspicuity." (Vol. i., p. 267.) As to Prussian Excellencies, Dr. Busch says he can only quote such of his reLord Augustus Loftus was succeeded by marks as apply to persons no longer liv. Lord Odo Russell, who filled for fourteen ing. And these remarks deal chiefly with years with consummate ability this impor- Von der Goltz, the Prussian ambassador tant post. No minister of Great Britain at Paris, who so successfully succeeded ever displayed greater tact in dealing within hoodwinking the French emperor and an overbearing power, and one of the re- his minister both before and after the sults of his much-lamented and premature Prusso-Austrian war; Count Harry von death has been the outbreak of direct per- Arnim and Von Savigny - all of whom he sonal aversion and hostility between the suspected of wishing to replace him in the chiefs of the British and German Cabi-direction of Prussian affairs and Count nets, to which Prince Bismarck has mainly Bernstorff. M. de Savigny was of French contributed by his discourteous and un- origin, and descended like Brassier de dignified language. Saint Simon and so many others who have distinguished themselves in the Prussian service - from a French family which had emigrated to Prussia after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. M. de Savigny was a Catholic. He was the brother-in-law of Count Harry von Arnim. He was a man of considerable ability, and had considerable credit at court. He worked harmoniously with Birmarck, and was on cordial terms with him until Bismarck suspected he was aiming at the presidency during a ministerial crisis. The chancellor contrived to exasperate Savigny to such a degree that the latter gave in his resignation, and the king sacrificed him to Bismarck, as he afterwards (and with more reason) sacrificed Von Arnim. Bismarck was reinstated more firmly than ever in the presidency, and on being congratulated he replied, "You can offer me twofold congratulations, for not only do I remain chancellor, but I have besides the good luck to have got rid of Savigny."

We may ascribe the chancellor's unfavorable opinion of Prince Gortschakoff to the incident of the year 1875, when it was publicly reported that the Prussian gov ernment had only been again prevented by the efforts of the czar of Russia and Prince Gortschakoff from declaring war against France, and when the Russian chancellor took occasion to address a circular despatch to his envoys abroad, beginning, "Maintenant la paix est assurée." Bismarck denies that there was any truth in the statement that Prussia was then meditating another war, and declares that the whole alarm was got up between Gortschakoff and Gontaut, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, in order that the former might be gratified with the praises of French newspapers and be styled the saviour of France, and speaks of the Russian chancellor with what little verisimilitude his own relations with him for thirty years testify, as being governed in his policy by a feeling of favor

itism for France.

Upon Gortschakoff the Chancellor pronounced judgment to me as follows, in March, 1879: "Without the least reason, many people take him for a particularly clever and skilful diplomatist. He never has any really great object in view, and therefore cannot point to any remarkable success. His policy is not that

As the chancellor disdains the graces should be no real orator; nevertheless, of eloquence, it is only natural that he his speeches possess a rude, knotted strength, and the frequent occurrence of tortuous, rugged, and involved sentences has caused him to be compared as a speaker to Cromwell. He hits frequently