native-born white inhabitant of the State, does or can enjoy. Douglass v. Stephens, I Del. Ch. 465.

A person may be a citizen, that is a member of the community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offices. Women and minors who form a part of the political family, can not vote, and when a property qualification is required, to vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the necessary qualification can not vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

A free man of color, born within the United States, is a citizen of the United States. Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299; contra, Amy v. Smith, I Litt. 326; Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509; Hickland v. State, 8 Blackf. 365; State v. Cooper, 5 Blackf. 258; Baptiste v. State, 5 Blackf. 283; Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246.

The privileges and immunities are annexed to the status of citizenship. They are personal, and can not be assigned or imparted to any other person, natural or artificial. Slaughter v. Comm. 13 Gratt. 767.

The term "citizens," applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.

Corporations are not citizens of the State which creates them, and can not be brought within the guaranty so as to entitle the corporations of each State to all privileges and immunities of corporations in the several States. Slaughter v. Comm. 13 Graft. 767; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 172; Comm. v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. 212; Tatem v. Wright, 23 N. J. 429; Fire Department v. Helfevistein, 16 Wis. 136; State v. Lathrop, 10 La. Ann. 398; Warren Manuf. Co. v. Ætna Ins. Co. 2 Paine, 501; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; Phoenix Ins. v. Comm. 5 Bush, 68; F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Hurrah, 47 Ind. 236.

A statute imposing a tax upon foreign corporations, to which domestic corporations are not subjected, is not inconsistent with this clause. Att. Gen. v. Bay State Mining Co. 99 Mass. 148; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 172; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Comm. 5 Bush, 68; Comm. v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. 212; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 554; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Tatem v. Wright, 23 N. J. 429; Slaughter v. Comm. 13 Gratt. 767; Firemen's Association v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511; State v. Lathrop, 10 La. Ann. 398; Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 440; Fire Department v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith, 453.

A statute providing that foreign corporations doing business in the State,

may be sued by service of process on an agent in the State, is valid. If such corporations exercise franchises in the State, they will be deemed to have assented to the mode provided for instituting suits. Warren Manuf. Co. v. Ætna Ins. Co. 2 Paine, 501.

A statute requiring foreign corporations doing business in the State, to obtain a certificate from the State comptroller, is valid. People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68.

Citizens of other States are entitled to all immunity from taxation as respects their property in the State, which is enjoyed by citizens of the State. An act imposing higher taxes upon non-residents than upon citizens, is void. Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 93 Mass. 268; Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299.

The property of a non-resident within the State, may be taxed equally with that of a resident. Duer v. Small, 4 Blatch. 263; Battle v. Corporation, 9 Ala. 234.

A State law imposing a discriminating tax on non-resident traders, is void. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; S. C 31 Md. 279.

A tax upon those who sell goods brought into the State from any other State, and not owned by persons domiciled in the State, is valid. People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46.

A tax upon non-resident traders or transient merchants, is valid where the taxation is the same as that imposed upon resident traders. Mount Pleasant v. Clutch, 6 Iowa, 546.

A State law requiring non-residents to take out a license to vend foreign merchandise, is valid. Sears v. Commissioners, 36 Ind. 267.

A State tax upon the sale of articles manufactured in the State, is valid. Downham v. Alexandria, 10 Wall. 173.

A State law which requires a license from all peddlers, except those who sell articles manufactured by themselves within the limits of the State, is valid. Seymour v. State, 51 Ala. 52.

A statute requiring a residence within the State for a certain number of years, in order to obtain a license to sell spirituous liquors, is valid. Austin v. State, 10 Mo. 591.

A mere difference in the modes of ascertaining the value of the property of residents and non-residents for taxation, where both modes are fair, does not amount to a discrimination between them so as to render the act invalid. Redd v. St. Francis Co. 17 Ark. 416.

The Constitution does not prohibit a discrimination between local freight and that which is extra-territorial when it commences its transit.

Such a discrimination denies to no citizen of another State, any privilege or immunity which it does not deny to the citizens of the State.

Penn. R. R. Co. 47 Penn. 338.

Shipper v.

The object of the Constitution was to secure to the citizens of every State an equal administration of justice, as it regarded their essential rights either of property or person, by the courts of every State, and was not at all intended to interfere with the mode of prosecuting those rights. The States are still left at liberty to prescribe the mode of commencing and conducting suits in their own courts, and if they provide extraordinary remedies for their own citizens, in extraordinary cases, it will not from thence follow that citizens of other States can claim them likewise. Hence the privilege of suing out an attachment may be limited to the citizens of the State. Kincaid v. Francis, Cooke, 49; Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535.

The right to institute actions of any kind, in another State, is one of the privileges and immunities to which the citizens of each State are entitled. Morgan v. Neville, 74 Penn. 52; Davis v. Peirse, 7 Minn. 13; McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Jackson v. Butler, 8 Minn. 117.

A law providing for the attachment of the property of non-residents for debt, is valid. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535.

A citizen of one State has the right to sue out an attachment in another State, although the defendant and garnishee are residents of his own State. Morgan v. Neville, 74 Penn. 52.

A statute prohibiting all persons aiding the rebellion against the United States, from prosecuting or defending actions during the continuance of the rebellion, is void. Davis v. Peirse, 7 Minn. 13; McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Jackson v. Butler, 8 Minn. 117.

If a State legislature provides that a citizen, when commencing a suit, need not give security for costs, but that a plaintiff who is a citizen of another State, shall, the provision is not inconsistent with the Constitution. Kincaid v. Francis, Cooke, 49; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Ind. 194; Baker v. Wise, 16 Gratt. 139.

A citizen of one State can not, by virtue of this clause, claim the right to sue in another State, and there impeach an assignment made in his own State, which is valid by its laws but void by the laws of the State where he sues. Burlock v. Taylor, 33 Mass. 335.

A citizen of one State may sue a foreigner in the courts of another State, whether he comes there to embark for a foreign country, or to reside there for purposes of business. Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354.

A corporation itself, and its faculties or privileges as such, and the

right of individuals to be or compose a corporation, and to act in a corporate capacity, are all peculiar privileges, creations of the local law, and can not, by the mere force of that law, exist or be exercised beyond its territorial jurisdiction. It therefore can operate in the territory of another sovereign only by his permission, express or implied. Comm. v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. 212; Slaughter v. Comm. 13 Gratt. 767.

A citizen of one State becoming entitled to property in another State, acquires and must hold it according to the laws of that State; and if the laws of the State prohibit its exportation, he can not export it. Allen v. Sarah, 2 Harring. 434.

Under this provision the citizens of the several States are not permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular State, merely on the ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens. Nor is the legislature in regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of the State bound to extend to the citizens of all the other States the same advantages as are secured to its own citizens. A several fishery, either as the right to it respects running fish or such as are stationary, such as oysters, clams, or the like, is as much the property of the individual to whom it belongs as dry land or land covered with water. Where those private rights do not exist to the exclusion of the common right, that of fishing belongs to all the citizens or subjects of the State. It is the property of all. They may be considered as tenants in common of this property, and they are so exclusively entitled to the use of it that it can not be enjoyed by others without the tacit consent or express permission of the sovereign who has the power to regulate its use. The grant of privileges and immunities to the citizens of other States, does not amount to a grant of a cotenancy in the common property of the State. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371; Bennett v. Boggs, Bald. 60; McCready v. State, 94 U. S. 391; S. C. 27 Gratt. 985; Dunham v. Lamphere, 69 Mass. 268; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138.

A statute passed for the purpose of preventing the escape of slaves may require an inspection of the vessels of non-residents, although the vessels of residents are not inspected. Baker v. Wise, 16 Gratt. 139.

A statute which makes a discrimination between the employment of vessels, but not between the persons owning or navigating them, does not discriminate in favor of citizens of the State, and is valid. The Ann Ryan, 7 Ben. 20.

A State law requiring an executor or administrator to pay the debts due to citizens of the State before paying debts due to citizens of other States, is valid. Douglass v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465.

Congress can not give privileges to citizens of one State over those of another by any measure which it can constitutionally adopt. Chapman v.. Miller, 2 Spears, 769.

A provision in a statute of limitations that it shall not run when the defendant is out of the State, as against a resident, but shall as against a non-resident, is valid. Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S 72.

Pilot laws discriminating between vessels owned by citizens of the State and those owned by citizens of another State, are unconstitutional. Chapman v. Miller, 2 Spears, 769.

Congress can not give to a State the power to do a thing which it can not do itself. Chapman v. Miller, 2 Spears, 769.

A State law requiring a diploma from a regularly chartered medical school in order to practice medicine or surgery, except from those who have practiced within the State for ten years next preceding the passage of the law, is valid, and does not discriminate between citizens of different States. Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323.

The widows of the citizens of other States are not by this clause entitled to the same rights as the widows of persons resident in the State. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591.

2. A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

This clause by its terms applies only to criminals fleeing from one State to another State, and does not, in express terms, apply to those fleeing from a territory to a State. Ex parte James Romaine, 23 Cal. 585.

This clause does not contain a grant of power. It confers no right. It is the regulation of a previously existing right. It makes obligatory upon. every member of the Union the performance of an act which previously was of doubtful obligation. The whole effect of the Constitution is to confer on each member a right to demand from every other member a fugitive, and to make obligatory the surrender which was before discretionary. In re William Fetter, 23 N. J. 311.

The right of one State to claim the surrender of fugitives from justice who have escaped into another State, can be carried into effect only through the medium of laws and the intervention of magistrates. Comm. v. Tracy, 46 Mass. 536.

The purpose of this provision was two-fold: first, to impose an absolute obligation on each State to surrender criminals fleeing from the justice