ernment of the people. In form and substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them and for their benefit. M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316; Comm. v. Morrison, 2 A. K. Marsh. 75; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; S. C. 4 Munf. I.

Although the powers of the Federal Government are limited, yet within those limits it is a perfect government, as any other, having all the faculties and properties belonging to a government, with a perfect right to use them freely in order to accomplish the objects of its institution. U. S. v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

The General Government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme as to those objects. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

The powers of sovereignty are divided between the Federal Government and the governments of the States. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other. M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316.

Within its limits the Government is sovereign and independent, and any interference by the State governments tending to the interruption of the full legitimate exercise of the powers granted to it is in conflict with that clause of the Constitution which makes the Constitution and the laws of the United States passed in pursuance thereof, "the supreme law of the land." The result of this doctrine is that the exercise of any authority by a State government, trenching upon any of the powers granted to the General Government, is to the extent of the interference, an attempt to resume the grant in defiance of constitutional obligation. Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black, 620; S. C. 23 N. Y. 192; 32 Barb. 509.

State Powers Superseded.

The powers of Government may be divided into four classes: 1. Those which belong exclusively to the States. 2. Those which belong exclusively to the United States. 3. Those which may be exercised concurrently and independently by both. 4. Those which may be exercised by the States, but only with the consent, express or implied, of Congress. Farmers' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29.

There are but three cases in which the several States have no power to legislate: 1. Where they are expressly prohibited. 2. Where exclusive power is expressly vested in the United States. 3. Where the power

vested in the United States is in its nature exclusive. Farmers' Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; S. C. 3 S. & R. 63; Adams v. Storey, 1 Paine, 79; Cox v. State, 3 Blackf. 193; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282; Prigg v. Comm. 16 Pet. 539: Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311; S. C. 14 Wend. 509; People v. Naglee, I Cal. 231.

The mere grant of a power to Congress does not imply a prohibition on the States to exercise the same power. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122.

Where an authority is granted to the Federal Government, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant, there the authority of the Federal Government is necessarily exclusive, and the same power can not be constitutionally exercised by the States. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540.

No legislation by Congress is wanted to make more binding upon the States what they have bound themselves in absolute terms not to do. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331.

It does not always follow that the States have relinquished their own powers because they have granted similar powers to the United States. They retain their powers unless they are expressly deprived of them, or they have vested such powers in Congress as are in their own nature incompatible with the exercise of the same powers by themselves. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. I; S. C. 3 S. & R. 169; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1; Farmers' Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; S. C. 3 S. & R. 63; Weaver v. Fegley, 29 Penn. 27.

When the prohibition is express, all power of the State ceased immediately on the adoption of the Constitution. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. I; S. C. 3 S. & R. 169.

Where the authority of the States is taken away by implication, they may continue to act until the United States exercise their power, because until such exercise there can be no incompatibility. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. I; S. C. 3 S. & R. 169; Cooley . Philadelphia, 12 How. 299; Freeman v. Robinson, 7 Ind. 321.

This concurrent power of legislation does not extend to every possible case in which its exercise by the States has not been expressly prohibited. The confusion resulting from such a practice would be endless. Whenever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power, require that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the State legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to act on it. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540.

All State authority on a subject over which Congress may assume exclusive power does not cease when Congress has exercised the power only partially. The power of the States exists over such cases as the laws of the Union may not reach. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; s. C. 3 S. & R. 169; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Eells v. People, 4 Scam. 498; Fitch v. Livingston, 4 Sandf. 492; Moore v. People, 14 How. 13; S. C. 5 Ill. 298; Nelson v. People, 33 III. 390.

Where Congress has exercised a power over a particular subject given to it by the Constitution, it is not competent for State legislation to add to the provisions of Congress upon that subject, for the will of Congress upon the whole subject is as clearly established by what it has not declared as by what it has expressed. The State legislatures have no right, by way of complement to the legislation of Congress, to prescribe additional regulations, and what they may deem auxiliary provisions for the same purpose. Prigg v. Comm. 16 Pet. 539; Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311; S. C. 14 Wend. 509; People v. Brooks, 4 Denio, 469; Graves v. State, I Smith (Ind.) 258; Thornton's Case, II Ill. 32; In re George Kirk, 1 Parker Cr. Cas. 67; Henry v. Lowell, 16 Barb. 268; Donnell v. State, 3 Ind. 480; Degant v. Michael, 2 Ind. 396.

A State may pass a law to aid in accomplishing the purpose intended by an act of Congress. Robinson v. Flanders, 29 Ind. 10.

While a State is acting within the legitimate scope of its power as to the end to be attained, it may use whatsoever means, being appropriate to that end, it may think fit, although they may be the same, or so nearly the same as scarcely to be distinguishable from those adopted by Congress, acting under a different power, subject only to this limitation that, in the event of collision, the law of the State must yield to the law of Congress. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150; Mayor. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; S. C. 2 Paine, 429; Charleston v. Rogers, 2 McC. 495; Norris v. Boston, 45 Mass. 282.

In considering whether it is competent for a State to pass any particular law, the courts look rather to the ends to be attained than to the particular enactments by which they are to be reached. Norris v. Boston, 45 Mass. 287.

Some State constitutions were formed before, some since that of the United States. Their relation to each other is not in any degree dependent on this circumstance. Their respective powers must be precisely the same as if they had been formed at the same time. McCulloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316.

The Constitution was made by and for the protection of the people of the United States. The restraints imposed by that instrument upon the legislative powers of the several States can affect them only after they become States of the Union under the provisions of the Constitution, and consent to be bound by it. League v. De Young, 11 How. 185; Herman v. Phalen, 14 How. 79.

Congress can not in any manner regrant or reconvey to the States a power of which they have been divested by the Constitution. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299; City v. Churchill, 43 Barb. 550; S. C. 31 N. Y. 161; Homestead Cases, 23 Gratt. 266.

The States, or rather the people forming them, though sovereign as to the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, or prohibited by it to the States, are not independent of each other in respect to the powers ceded in the Constitution. Their union by the Constitution was made by each of them conceding portions of their equal sovereignties for all of them, and it acts upon the States conjunctively and separately, and in the same manner upon their citizens, aggregately in some things and in others individually, in many of their relations of business, and also upon their civil conduct, so far as their obedience to the laws of Congress is concerned. In such a union the States are bound by all of those principles of justice which bind individuals to their contracts. They are bound by their mutual acquiescence in the powers of the Constitution, that neither of them shall be the judge, or shall be allowed to be the final judge, of the powers of the Constitution, or of the interpretation of the laws of Congress. This is not so because their sovereignty is impaired, but the exercise of it is diminished in quantity, because they have in certain respects put restraints upon that exercise in virtue of voluntary engagements. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331.

To determine whether there is a conflict with the powers of the General Government, the alleged power must be considered with reference to its consequences; for its effects, when carriedout, are the only criterion by which a judgment can be formed. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534.

The States are not to be divested of their powers by inferences, unless the inferences are inevitable. Farmers' Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; S. C. 3 S. & R. 63; Weaver v. Fegley, 29 Penn. 27.

If a State law and an act of Congress relate to the same thing, and are different in their character, there is no necessary conflict between them if the intention of both acts can be fully carried out and practically applied; but if the intention of both can not be fully carried out, then there is a necessary conflict, and one or the other must yield. Mitchell v. Steelman, 8 Cal. 363.

Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of either. That either or both may, if they see fit, punish the offender, can not be doubted. Yet it can not be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense, but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly punishable. He can not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other. Moore v. People, 14 How. 13; S. C. 5 Ill. 298; Fox v. State, 5 How. 410; People v. Sheriff, 1 Parker Cr. Cas. 659; State v. Moore, 6 Ind. 436; Territory v. Coleman, I Oregon,

191.

In order to render a State statute unconstitutional because of its collision with the powers granted to the General Government, there must be some conflict or repugnancy or incompatibility. It must, either in its actual exercise or in its nature, be of a character to control, defeat, limit or impair some power of the General Government, or interfere with its action so that if admitted, that power could no longer be efficacious and adequate to accomplish the object for which it was given. If it merely operates upon the same subject-matter, but not in such a manner as to show a plain incompatibility, a direct repugnancy or an extreme practical inconvenience, it is not unconstitutional, because there may be a possible or potential inconvenience. Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 336; s. c. 5 How. 504; U. S. v. Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M. 401; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How.

227.

If, in a specified case, the people have thought proper to bestow certain powers on Congress as the safest depositary of them, and Congress has legislated within the scope of them, the people have reason to complain that the same powers should be exercised at the same time by the State legislatures. To subject them to the operation of two laws upon the same subject, dictated by distinct wills, particularly in a case inflicting pains and penalties, is something very much like oppression if not worse. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; S. C. 3 S. & R. 169.

Police Powers.

A State has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution. By virtue of this, it not only is the right but the bounden and solemn duty of a State to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to these ends where the power over the particular subject or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained. All those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may perhaps more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained, and consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a State is complete, unqualified and exclusive. Mayor v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; S. C. 2 Paine, 429; License Cases, 5 How. 504; S. C. 13 N. H. 536; Fitch v. Livingston, 4 Sandf. 492; Ex parte Perkins, 2 Cal. 424.

The powers necessary to the regulation of the police, morals, health, internal commerce and general prosperity of the community, are subject to State regulation, and the objects to be accomplished by them are to be reached and effected by any appropriate means which do not interfere with the exercise of any of the powers vested in the General Government. Nelson v. People, 33 Ill. 390; Eells v. People, 5 Ill. 498; Fitch v. Living