any law inflicting or establishing slavery or involuntary servitude, but is a positive declaration that slavery shall not exist. It prohibits the thing. In the enforcement of this article, therefore, Congress has to deal with the subject-matter. U. S. v. Cruikshank, I Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542.

That a personal servitude was meant is proved by the use of the word "involuntary," which can only apply to human beings. The exception of servitude as a punishment for crime gives an idea of the class of servitudes that is meant. The word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly understood, and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

This clause does not authorize Congress to pass laws for the punishment of ordinary crimes and offenses against persons of the colored race, or any other race. That belongs to the State government alone. All ordinary murders, robberies, assaults, thefts and offenses whatsoever, are cognizable only in the State courts, unless the State should deny to the class of persons referred to the equal protection of the laws. U. S. v. Cruikshank, I Woods, 308; s. c. 92 U. S. 542.

[By a joint resolution adopted at the first session of the thirty-ninth Congress (two thirds of both houses concurring), the following article was proposed to the legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to become a part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States. 15 Stat. 706.]

ARTICLE XIV.

SEC. 1. All persons born or or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.

SEC. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, rep

resentatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such, male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

SEC. 3. No person shall be a senator or representative in Congress, or elector of President and VicePresident, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof; but Congress may, by a vote of twothirds of each house, remove such disability.

SEC. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States, nor any State, shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims, shall be held illegal and void.

SEC. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Citizenship.

This clause declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and overturns the Dred Scott decision, by making all persons born within the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, citizens of the United States. The phrase

subject to its jurisdiction," was intended to exclude from its operation. children of ministers, consuls and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

No white person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, or born without those limits, and subsequently naturalized under its laws, owes the status of citizenship to this amendment. Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43.

Slaves who escaped to Canada before the adoption of the amendment, where they now reside, are not citizens of the United States. Hedgman v. Board, 26 Mich. 51.

The child of slaves who escaped to Canada, where he was born, is not a citizen of the United States. Hedgman v. Board, 26 Mich. 51.

This clause evidently refers to natural persons. The birth referred to is a natural one, and not artificial nor procuced in some legislative body. People v. C. & A. R. R. Co. 6 C. L. N. 280.

An Indian whose tribe has ceased to maintain its tribal integrity, and who is taxed by the State, is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and a citizen thereof. U. S. v. Elm, 23 I. R. R. 419.

Immunities.

The words "citizen" and "person are synonymous terms, and by the term person is meant a natural person, a citizen of the United States, and of the State in which he may reside. People v. C. & A. R. R. Co. 6 C. L. N. 280.

A corporation is not a citizen of the United States, as that term is used in the amendment. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, I Woods, 85.

A corporation is not a person within the meaning of this amendment. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 1 Woods, 85.

Women may be citizens of the United States. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.

The amendment did not add to the privileges or immunities of a citizen as they existed at the time it was adopted. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.

It is only the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which are placed by this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and the privileges and immunities of citizens of a State, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

The distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizen

ship of a State, is clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; s. C. 92 U. S. 542.

The privileges and immunities are the same as those secured to the citizens of each State by section two of article four. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

This clause includes only such privileges or immunities as are derived from or recognized by the Constitution. State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198.

When political rights and privileges are secured in the Constitution only by a declaration that the State or the United States shall not violate or abridge them, it is at once understood that they are not created or conferred by the Constitution, but that the Constitution only guarantees that they shall not be impaired by the State or the United States, as the case may be. The fulfillment of this duty by the United States, is the only duty with which that Government is charged. The affirmative enforcement of the rights and privileges themselves, unless something more is expressed, does not devolve on it, but belongs to the State government as a part of its residuary sovereignty. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; s. c. 92 U. S. 542; contra, U. S. v. Hall, 13 I. R. R. 181; s. c. 3 C. L. N. 260.

There can be no constitutional legislation of Congress for directly enforcing the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States by original proceedings in the Federal courts, where the State has passed no law adverse to them. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; s. c. 92 U. S. 542.

Each State has the right to regulate the immunities and privileges of its own citizens, provided that in so doing it does not abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

A State law which prohibits persons from practicing medicine or surgery unless they have received a diploma from some regularly chartered medical school, excepting those who have practiced in the State for ten years next preceding the passage of the law, is valid. Ex parte Spinney,

10 Nev. 323.

A statute regulating slaughter houses is a part of the police power of the State, and does not deprive a party of his property without due process of law, or deny him the equal protection of the laws. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; contra, Slaughter House Case, 1 Woods, 21.

A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in the State courts, is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, which the States are forbidden to abridge. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90.

The right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the rights growing out of citizenship of the United States, and is not protected by this provision. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129.

The right to admission to practice law in the State courts, is not one of the privileges or immunities which is protected by this clause. Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130.

A statute prohibiting the intermarriage of the white and colored races is valid, for the right of intermarriage among the races is not one of the privileges or immunities protected by the amendment. Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk. 287; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389; Ex parte Wm. B. Hobbs, I Woods, 537; contra, Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195.

The right of voting, or the privilege of voting, is a right or privilege arising under the Constitution of a State, and not of the United States. If the right belongs to any particular person, it is because such person is entitled to it as a citizen of the State where he offers to exercise it, and not because of citizenship of the United States. U. S. v. Anthony, 11 Blatch. 200; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; s. C. 92 U. S. 542.

A female can not claim the right to vote under the provisions of this amendment, for it is not a privilege or immunity that is protected thereby. Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; U. S. v. Anthony, 11 Blatch. 200; Spencer v. Board, 1 McArthur, 169.

An arrest made by an officer of the State militia, in pursuance of military power granted to him by the governor against persons in insurrection, does not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens. In re Bergen, 2 Hughes, 512.

Congress can not protect a citizen in the right to use a public conveyance for local travel. Cully v. Balt. & O. R. R. Co. 1 Hughes, 536.

Due Process.

Due process of law is process due according to the law of the land. This process in the States is regulated by the law of the State. A party is not deprived of his property without due process of law, although the case is tried without a jury. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90.

The words "due process of law" mean law in its regular course of administration according to the prescribed forms and in accordance with the general rules for the protection of individual rights, and do not prohibit the States from prosecuting for felonies by information instead of by