Annual Report

Some of the leading decisions of courts upon questions arising under civil-service acts and rules and bearing upon the work of the Federal commission are here noted. Some of these decisions, together with opinions of Attorneys-General and of city attorneys in New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois, will be found in the reports of the commissions for these States. The decisions prior to 1889 are collated in full in a volume entitled "Decisions and Opinions on the Construction of the Civil-Service Laws,” etc., published by James B. Lyon, in 1889, at Albany, N. Y. A number of additional decisions arising under the veteran preference provisions of the New York and Massachusetts laws are omitted here as being peculiar to those States. The syllabuses of decisions given below are not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to indicate general features of interest under the Federal law and to point to the sources of full information. Special attention is invited to the decision of Judge Magruder, of the supreme court of Illinois, in the case of The People ex rel. r. Kipley, wherein the constitutionality of general provisions of the Illinois civil-service act are sustained. The decision is too long to permit of more than brief quotation here, but may be found in full in the Third Report of the Chicago Civil Service Commission.

The publication of these decisions will, it is hoped, tend to elucidate the operations of the act and rules and remove in some degree the difficulties hitherto encountered by the commission in securing compliance with them.

OFFICE A PUBLIC TRUST.

The civil-service laws are constitutional and valid. An appointment or employment in violation of the civil-service laws is illegal, and the authorities have no right to appropriate the public moneys to the payment for services rendered in pursuance of such illegal appointment or employment. Public office can be obtained and exercised only by a duly and legally authorized election or appointment. Contracts for the buying, selling, or procuring public offices are utterly void as contrary to the soundest public policy, and, indeed, as a constructive fraud upon the Government, such contracts being void at common law, whether prohibited and made void by statute or not. The right of appointment is not the property of the appointing officer, and he has no right to barter it or dispose of it, and an agreement to appoint is likewise void. Agreements to procure or control appointments to public office or agreements to aid another in obtaining an appointment, based upon a consideration contingent upon success, or promises to use personal influence to procure an appointment to office, are contrary to public policy and void, without reference to whether improper means are contemplated or used in procuring the appointment. (See American and English Encyclopædia of Law, title "Public officers," and cases there cited.)

(1.) DECISIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS.

(a) POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS.

The evident purpose of Congress in acts regulating in some particulars the conduct of certain officers and employees of the United States has been to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties and to maintain proper discipline in the public service. Clearly such a purpose is within the just scope of legislative power. If contributions for political purposes from those in public employment may be solicited by others in official authority, it is easy to see that what begins as a request may end as a demand, and that a failure to meet the demand may be treated by those having the power of removal as a breach of some supposed duty growing out of the political relations of the parties. Contributions secured under such circumstances will quite as likely be made to avoid the consequences of the personal displeasure of a superior as to promote the political views of the contributor-to avoid a discharge from the service more than to exercise a political privilege. If it was constitutional to prohibit the removal or discharge of a workingman for his political opinions, the kind or degree of punishment to be inflicted for disregarding the prohibition is clearly within the discretion of Congress, provided it be not cruel or unusual.

The sixth section of the act of August 15, 1876, chapter 287, prohibiting, under penalties therein mentioned, certain officers of the United States from requesting, giving to, or receiving from any other officer money or property or other thing of value for political purposes is not unconstitutional. (Opinion by Chief Justice Waite, United States Supreme Court, October term, 1882, in the matter of Newton Martin Curtis; printed in full in Fourth Report United States Civil Service Commission, p. 542; 106 U. S., 371.)

(b) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL-SERVICE ACT-REGULATION OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT, ETC.

The twelfth section of the act of January 16, 1883, to regulate the civil service, is not unconstitutional because of its prohibiting all persons, whether in the employ of the United States or not, from soliciting contributions for political purposes in any of the places mentioned in that section of the act. (United States v. Newton, supreme court District of Columbia, Washington Law Reporter, vol. 19, p. 770.)

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But in deciding the case as we do upon points outside of the statute, it may be as well, to prevent the renewal of the question here in another form, to add that our refusal to decide upon the many objections raised to its validity in no degree arises from any doubts of the constitutionality of the act. We content ourselves with citing the following language of the Supreme Court in United States r. Perkins (116 U. S., p. 483), where the constitutionality of the statute was attacked: "It is further urged that this restriction of the power of removal is an infringement upon the constitutional prerogative of the Executive, and so of no force, but absolutely void. Whether or not Congress can restrict the power of removal incident to the power of appointment of those officers who are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, under the authority of the Constitution (art. 2, sec. 2) does not arise in this case, and need not be considered. "We have no doubt when Congress by law vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed. "The head of a Department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to offices independently of the legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed not only in making appointments, but in all that is incident thereto."

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