where there are questions of statutory construction involved which are not clear and unambiguous. The proper remedy is by quo warranto. (Matter of Hardy, 17 Misc. Rep., 667.) The clerk of the police justice is a public officer, is not a confidential employee, and must pass an examination. (People ex rel. v. Tobey, 8 App. Div. Rep., 468.) On application for a mandamus to compel the comptroller to draw a warrant for the salary of clerk to the collector of canal statistics, appointed without examination, held that the appointment was in violation of the constitution and of the civil-service laws of the State. Certification by the civil service commission of appointments to the comptroller under chapter 717, laws of New York, 1894. (People ex rel. v. Roberts, 13 Misc, 448; affd. 148 N. Y., 360.) The provision of the civil-service act (laws of 1884, chapter 410, section 2) amending laws of 1883, chapter 354, so as to make mandatory the employment of suitable persons to conduct the inquiries and make the examinations which are necessary for regulation of the civil service and promotions and employments, implies that compensation is to be made for services rendered by such persons. Persons rendering services to a municipal corporation pursuant to law are entitled to be compensated for the value of such services, although no specific provision of law has been made declaratory of the right, or the extent of the compensation. Under the charter of the city of Buffalo it is proper for the mayor to estimate such expenses and communicate his estimate to the common council, and they can not wholly reject it, although they may alter it. A citizen and taxpayer of the city has a right, by virtue of his interest in the order and maintenance of the government and the enforcement of law, to institute proceedings by mandamus to compel the performance of this duty. It is only where some personal or private redress is sought that the relator must be shown to be interested personally. (People ex rel. Wright v. Common Council of Buffalo, 16 Abb. N. C., 96.) Change of position of bridge tender from one schedule to another—thereafter names to be certified from new schedule. (People ex rel. Carroll v. Civil Service Board, 5 App. Div., 164.) Under the provisions of the State constitution, as amended in 1873 (article 5, section 3), conferring upon the superintendent of public works the power to select and appoint his subordinates, that officer has the exclusive power to determine as to the propriety of such appointments and the sufficiency of the qualifications of proposed appointees. Any legislation, therefore, which relieves the superintendent from the obligation to exercise his judgment and skill in making an appointment, or impose restrictions upon the exercise of the power conferred, is unconstitutional. (People ex rel. Killeen v. Angle, 47 Hun, 183; affd., 109 N. Y., 564; People ex rel. McClellan v. Roberts, 148 N. Y., 360; see, however, United States v. Perkins, 116 U. S., 483, and In re Miller, Decisions of Courts on Civil-Service Laws-Lyon, Albany, N. Y.-1889, p. 107.) Practicability of competitive examinations-how determined by whom-same not determined by the rate of compensation.-The effect of the constitutional provision is to bring the whole civil service of the State of New York under the operation of the civil-service laws. (Matter of Keymer, 89 Hun, 292.) Office and officer-appointment of subordinates-civil-service laws. (In re Gaffney, 20 State Rep., 165; s. c., 3 N. Y., Supp., 664.) A board of civil service examiners appointed by mayor of a city is empowered to promulgate rules requiring verification of all applications for office, and the oath attached to such application by applicant is not extrajudicial, and if false justifies a conviction of perjury. (Forman v. Union Co., 83 Hun, 385.) Practicability of ascertaining merit and fitness of assistant district attorney by examination. (People v. Taylor, 17 Misc. Rep., 504.) Inspector of buildings—qualifications.-Where civil service commission has granted a-certificate of fitness, the board of aldermen can not question the legal qualification of the appointee. (People ex rel. v. The Board of Aldermen of the City of Buffalo, 18 Misc. Rep., N. Y., 533.) (c) REGULATION OF THE POWER OF REMOVAL. Syracuse police commissioners removed without notice.-Held, That the legislature may abridge the term of an office created by it by express words or may specify an event upon the happening of which it shall end. Where a legislature has given authority to appoint to an office created by it, it is within its power to remove incumbent without notice. (People ex rel. Gere et al. v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y., 191.) The legislature (New York) having prescribed the grounds of removal in the act of 1894, left it to the appointing power to determine whether the facts existed which authorized a removal, subject to responsibility for any willful or perverse action, and no notice is required to be given to the person whose removal is contemplated before the power can be exercised. (People ex rel. v. Morton, 148 N. Y., 156.) Held, That a regular clerk whose services are no longer needed may be removed by head of department without trial, hearing, or notice; the provision of the charter declaring that no regular clerk shall be removed except on charges and allowed an opportunity of explanation does not apply to such cases. (Langdon v. Mayor, 92 N. Y., 427.) Second assistant chief fire department removed for an error of judgment in calling out more engines, etc., than were needed—incapacity charged. Held, That the charge rested upon a single act which was no violation of duty, but merely an error of judgment, which did not authorize his removal. (People ex rel. McCabe v. Fire Comrs., 43 Hun, 554.) Removal of regular clerk in New York—requisites of charges assigned.—The board of commissioners of department of docks served upon a clerk a copy of resolution which stated that they deemed "him incompetent for the creditable performance of duties assigned to and required of him." Held, That the notice did not assign any cause to justify his removal. That it was not specific, as it did not state the nature of his incompetency. (People ex rel. Dickels v. Starks et al., 33 Hun, 384.) (d) CONSTRUCTION OF THE CIVIL-SERVICE STATUTE. The civil-service regulations of a city must be construed in the same manner as a statute, and in conformity with the rule that general words will be restricted in their application to things of the same kind as those particularized in a subsequent clause. (Carmody r. The City of Mount Vernon, 3 App. Div. Rep., 347.) (e) MISCELLANEOUS CASES. People ex rel. Ryan v. Civil-Service Board (41 Hun, 287; affd. 103 N. Y., 657). Rogers v. City of Buffalo (2 N. Y., Supp., 326; Id., 674). The following decisions relate to removals from the service: O'Leary v. Board of Education (93 N. Y., 1). People ex rel. Keech r. Thompson (94 N. Y., 45; followed in 126 N. Y., 183). Bergen r. Powell (94 N. Y., 591; followed in 126 N. Y., 182). Riley r. Mayor (96 N. Y., 331; followed in 108 N. Y., 482, and 142 N. Y., 106). People ex rel. Masterson v. Board of Fire Comrs. (96 N. Y., 644). Same ex rel. Demahaut v. Same (96 N. Y., 672). People ex rel. McCarthy r. Police Comrs. (98 N. Y., 332). People ex rel. Pott v. French (102 N. Y., 583). People ex rel. DuBois v. Mellor (Decisions of Courts on Civil-Service Laws (Lyon). 1889, p. 237). People ex rel. Buckley v. Roosevelt (5 App. Div., 168); People ex rel. Fallon v. Wright, (7 App. Div., 185). See N. Y. Law J., Oct. 28, 1896. People ex rel. McClellan v. Roberts (148 N. Y., 360). See report of New York State commissioners for 1888, in which a number of the above cases are reported in full. 3. DECISIONS OF COURTS IN MASSACHUSETTS. (a) PREFERENCE OF VETERANS. EXTRACTS FROM OPINION OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, BY FIELD, C. J., IN THE CASE OF BROWN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONERS. It is to be noticed that the class of veterans defined by the statutes is not a class which anybody can become qualified to enter by any services which he may perform or by any attainments which he may acquire, but it is a class fixed and determined by services which were rendered a long time before any of the statutes were passed. It is also to be noticed that the fact of having been a veteran within the meaning of the statute in and of itself has little tendency to show that the applicant is specially qualified to perform the duties of many of the offices to which the civil-service statutes and rules relate. The principal purpose of exempting veterans from submitting to an examination must be that veterans sometimes may be appointed to an office or employment who would be found on examination not qualified to perform the duties of the office or employment which they seek. One, and perhaps the chief purpose of the exemption must be to reward veterans for their services in the war of the rebellion. The reward is not in the nature of a pension or payment of money, but of an office or employment, the salary or pay of which the veteran is to receive. The provisions of the statutes exempting veterans are general in their nature, and relate to all the offices or employments that have been or may be included within the civil-service rules. From the earliest times most nations have conferred honors and emoluments upon those persons who have rendered distinguished service to the state, particularly in war. These honors and emoluments have been conferred upon persons voluntarily selected by the legislative body or the sovereign power, and pensions and rewards sometimes have been given to whole classes of persons, of which the statutes of the Commonwealth relating to the "aid to soldiers and sailors and to their families," and the statutes of the United States relating to pensions, are well-known examples; but the statute of 1895 under consideration affords the first instance, so far as we know, in this Commonwealth, where the appointing power has been compelled to appoint persons of a certain class to office in preference to all other persons, whether they are or are not thought to be qualified for the office by the appointing power or by some public officer or by some impartial and disinterested board of officers or persons invested by law with the power and responsibility of determining the qualifications of the persons to be appointed. The legislature, in establishing offices not provided for by the constitution, has often required that the persons or some of the persons to be appointed shall possess certain qualifications, or that some of them shall be women and some men; but in all cases, so far as we are aware, the qualifications required bear such a relation to the duties imposed that they tend to secure that kind and degree of knowledge, experience, and impartiality which are requisite for the satisfactory performance of their duties, and it is open to any person to acquire the qualifications required. When women are to be appointed, there is a satisfactory reason in the nature of the office or employment why this should be done. In every such case some discretion usually has been left to the appointing power in the selection of the particular persons to be appointed. The peculiarity of the civil-service statutes and rules (if Statutes 1895, chapter 501, sections 2 and 6, be enforced) is that very little is left to the discretion of the appointing power in the selection of persons if there are veterans who wish to be appointed. * It is the contention of the petitioner that the privileges given to veterans by Statutes 1895, chapter 501, sections 2 and 6, are in violation of the principles which underlie our system of government implied in the constitution of the Commonwealth, and also are in violation of certain express provisions of the constitution. The civil-service statutes do not relate to elections or to any offices the qualifications for which are established by the constitution, but the article, so far as it extends, does declare the principle that all persons having the requisite qualifications have an equal right to elect and to be elected to public office. Article 7 is as follows: "Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore the people alone have an incontestible, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it." This article is declarative of the end of the institution of government. It may be said to be fairly within the intent of this article that public offices which are the instrumentalities of government ought not to be created or filled for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men, but only for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people, and for the common good. Article 6 is as follows: "No man, or corporation, or association of men has any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendants, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, lawgiver, or judge is absurd and unnatural." In our opinion, the meaning of these words in this article, so far as they are applicable to public officers, is that only in consideration of services to be rendered to the public therefor can a man, corporation, or association of men obtain advantages or particular and exclusive privileges distinct from those of the community. A person may obtain the advantages or privileges attached to a public office in consideration of his performing the duties of the office. It is for the purpose of rendering service to the public in a public office that advantages and privileges distinct from those of the community may be obtained. The principal question of law in this case, broadly stated, is therefore as follows: Can the legislature constitutionally provide that certain public offices and employments which it has created shall be filled by veterans in preferment to all other persons, whether the veterans are or are not found or thought to be actually qualified to perform the duties of the offices and employments by some impartial and competent officer or board charged with some public duty in making the appointments? If such legislation is not constitutional as regards public offices, the question incidentally may arise whether a distinction can be made between public offices and employments by the public which are not offices. Public offices are created for the purpose of effecting the ends for which government has been instituted, which are the common good, and not the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men. In our form of government it is fundamental that public offices are a public trust, and that the persons to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welfare. In offices which are created by the legislature, where the method of appointment is not prescribed by the constitution, the legislature can take upon itself the responsibility of selecting the persons to be appointed, or can confer the power of appointment upon public officers or boards or upon the inhabitants of cities, towns, or districts; but we think that it is inconsistent with the nature of our government, and particu larly with articles 6 and 7 of our declaration of rights, that the appointing power should be compelled by legislation to appoint to public offices persons of a certain class in preference to all others, without the exercise on its part of any discretion, and without the favorable judgment of some legally constituted officer or board designated by law to inquire and determine whether the persons to be appointed are actually qualified to perform the duties which pertain to the offices. We are of the opinion that sections 2 and 6 of Statutes 1895, chapter 501, so far as they purport absolutely to give to veterans particular and exclusive privileges distinct from those of the community in obtaining public office, can not be upheld as enactments within the constitutional power of the general court. (b) REGULATION OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT. Petition filed by attorney-general at relation of civil-service commission for writ of certiorari to quash proceedings of respondents in matter of appointment of police officer in alleged violation of rules. Held, That certiorari would not lie to quash proceedings, as the appointment was an administrative and not a judicial act. (Attorney-General v. Mayor and Aldermen of Northampton, 143 Mass., 589.) (c) REGULATION OF THE POWER OF REMOVAL. Under Statutes of 1885 city police board can not remove an officer without assigning a cause and giving officer opportunity to be heard thereon. Ham was ordered removed by the board without charges in writing, it being orally stated to him that he was not considered efficient. Held, That the board exceeded its jurisdiction and that he was improperly removed, no hearing being accorded him. (Ham v. Boston Board of Police, 142 Mass., 90.) (4.) DECISIONS IN THE COURTS OF ILLINOIS. (a) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATE CIVIL-SERVICE ACT. EXTRACTS FROM OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, MAGRUDER, J., IN PEOPLE EX REL. ". KIPLEY, 157 ILL. [The opinion will be found in full in the Third Report of the Chicago Civil Service Commission, p. 177.] The civil-service act passed by the legislature of this State on March 20, 1895, is not the first law of its kind which has appeared in this country. Such a law has been passed by the Congress of the United States to be applied to the civil service under the Federal Government. Statutes of the same kind have also been adopted in the States of Massachusetts and New York. The civil-service law which was in force in the State of New York for more than ten years before the year 1894 has so commended itself to popular approval and had been so beneficent in its results that its underlying principle was embodied in the new or amended and revised constitution of that State, adopted by the people in 1894, and which went into effect on January 1, 1895. The provision upon this subject in the New York constitution of 1894 is as follows: "Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the State and in all the civil divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained, so far as practicable, by examinations, which, so far as practicable, shall be competitive. Laws shall be made to provide for the enforcement of this section." * * * The evils sought to be remedied by legislation of this character are well known and well understood. These evils are such as grow out of what is generally called "the spoils system" in the matter of appointments to public office. This system rests upon what Mr. Justice Peckham, now of the Supreme Court of the United States, then a member of the court of appeals of the State of New York, speaking for the |