Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

253

sentence has been considered prima facie evidence of the *debt, but not conclusive (a). Lord Kenyon, indeed, in the case of Galbraith v. Neville (1), which was an action of debt on a judgment in the supreme court of Jamaica, said he entertained serious doubts concerning the doctrine laid · down in the case of Walker v. Witter (2), that foreign judgments are not binding upon the parties here; and after referring to a case, which might seem to point against his opinion, he added, "that is not an authority for saying that we can revise the judgments of the lowest courts in foreign countries, where they have competent jurisdiction." However, Mr. Just. Buller, in the same case said, "The doctrine which was laid down in the case of Sinclair v. Fraser, has always been considered the true line ever since, namely, that the foreign judgment shall be prima facie evidence of the debt, and conclusive, till it be impeached by the other party." "As to actions of this sort," he continued, "see how far the court would go, if what was said in the case of Walker v. Witter were departed from. It was there held, that the foreign judgment was only taken to be prima facie evidence, that is, we will allow the same force. to a foreign judgment, that we do to those of our own courts not of record (3): but if the matter were carried farther, we should give them more credit; we should give them equal force with those of courts of record here. Now a foreign judgment has never been considered as a record : it cannot be declared on, as such, and a plea of nul tiel record, in such a case, is a mere nullity. How then can it have the same obligatory force? In short, the result is this; that it is prima facie evidence of the justice of the demand in an action of assumpsit, having no more credit than is given to every species of written agreements, name

(1) 1 Doug. Rep. 5. n. (2); and 5 East 475. n. (b). S. C.

(2) 1 Doug. 1.

(3) Acc, Ld. Mansfield in Herbert v. Cook, Willes' Rep. 37. n. (a).

(a) Vide Buttrick & Wife v. Allen, 8 Mass. Rep. 273. 9 Mass:

[blocks in formation]
[ocr errors]

ly, that it shall be considered as good, till it is impeached." And, in the case of Philips v. Hunter (4), Eyre, C. J. said, "It is in one way only that the sentence or judgment of the court of a foreign state is examinable in our courts, and that is, when the party who claims the benefit of it applies to our courts to enforce it. When it is thus voluntarily submitted to our jurisdiction, we treat it not as obligatory to the extent to which it would be obligatory perhaps in the country in which it was pronounced, nor as obligatory to the extent to which, by our law, sentences and judgments are obligatory, not as conclusive, but as matter in pais, as a consideration prima facie sufficient to raise a promise. We examine it, as we do all other considerations of promises, and for that purpose we receive evidence of what the law of the foreign state is, and whether the judgment is warranted by the law (a).”

(4) 2 H. Black. 410., in error.

66

(a) The 1st sect. of the 4th article of the constitution of the United States declares that, Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." By virtue of the power granted them, congress, by an act of May 26, 1790, (Laws U. S. vol. 1. p. 115.) after prescribing the mode of authentication of public acts, &c. declare, that "the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from where the said records are, or shall be taken." What is the construction of this act of congress; what is the effect of a judgment in one state, when produced in evidence in another; whether it is to be received as conclusive evidence of a debt, or to be regarded in the same light as foreign judgments are by the English courts? are questions in the decision of which the courts in different states have essentially varied from each other.

Where an action was brought in the circuit court of the Pennsylvania district on a judgment obtained in New-Jersey, the plea

* 254

SECT. III.

On Judgments in rem in the Exchequer, and by
Commissioners of Excise.

A JUDGMENT of condemnation in the court of Exchequer, where proceedings in rem have been instituted, is conclusive evidence in any other court, as to all the world, that the goods were liable to be seized (1). The jurisdic

(1) Scott v. Shearman, 2 Black. in Geyer v. Aguillar, 7 T. R. 696. Rep. 979. Per Ld. Kenyon, C. J. Bull. N. P. 244.

of ni debet was held bad. If the plea, says Wilson, J. would be bad in the courts of New-Jersey, it is bad here; for whatever doubts there might be on the words of the constitution, the act of congress effectually removes them; declaring in direct terms, that the record shall have the same effect in this court, as in the court from which it was taken. In the courts of New-Jersey no such plea would be sustained: and, therefore, it is inadmissible in any court sitting in Pennsylvania. Armstrong v. Carson's Exrs, 2 Dall. 302.

In an action of debt brought in Massachusetts, on a judgment recovered in New Hampshire, on a promissory note, the defendant pleaded, that at the time of signing the note and making the promise, he was an infant, and that during all the time between the time of making the note and promise, and the recovery of the judg ment, he was an inhabitant of, and resident in, Massachusetts: the plaintiff demurred to the defendant's pleas, and judgment was given against the demurrer. Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. Rep. 401. But in a subsequent case in the same court, which was an action on a judgment in New Hampshire, in which process had been personally served on the defendant, a majority of the court, (Parsons, C. J. and Parker, J.; contra Sedgwick, J. who relied on the authority of Bartlett v. Knight,) held that the defendant should not be permitted to impeach the judgment. "Judgments, says Parsons, Ch. J. rendered in any other of the United States are not, when produced here as the foundation of actions, to be considered

tion of the court of Exchequer in this case is not only competent, but sole and exclusive and though no formal or express notice is given to the owner of the goods in person, yet he has sufficient notice to try the point of for

as foreign judgments, the merits of which are to be inquired into, as well as the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them. Neither are they to be considered as domestic judgments, rendered in our courts of record, because the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them is a subject of inquiry. But such judgments, so far as the court rendering them had jurisdiction, are to have in our courts full faith and credit. They may therefore be declared upon as evidences of debts or promises, and on the general issue the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them is put in issue, but not the merits of the judgment." Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. Rep. 462.

The law on this subject was settled in the state of New-York, in the case of Hitchcock & Fitch v. Aicken, 1 Caines' Rep. 460; in which it was held by three justices, (Lewis, Ch. J. Kent, and Radcliff, Js.) against two, (Livingston, J. and Thompson, J.) that a judgment in another state, in an action on that judgment, was to be regarded as a foreign judgment; and that the constitution and act of congress merely required that credit should be given to its contents, but that the effect or operation of it remained as at common law. Such a judgment, therefore, is only prima facie evidence of a debt. Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. Rep. 173. An action of assumpsit will lie upon it, and the defendant may plead, whether the action be debt or assumpsit, the statute of limitations. Hubbell v. Coudrey, 5 Johns. Rep. 132.

A judgment obtained in another country or in another state, in a suit commenced without personal service of process on the defendant, is not even prima facie evidence of a debt; on such a judgment no assumpsit can be implied. Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192. Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby 119. Buttrick & Wife v. Allen, 8 Mass, Rep. 273. As where the suit is commenced by attachment on the defendant's goods, who is himself a non-resident. Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. Rep. 37. Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 261. Robinson v. Exrs of Ward, 8 Johns. Rep. 86. And it has been held in the state of New-York that no action would lie upon a judgment obtained in another state against a person resident in New-York, in an action commenced by the service on the defend

*255

feiture, by the seizure of his property, by the proclamations according to the course of the court, and by the writ of appraisement.

Whether a condemnation by the commissioners of excise ought to have the same conclusive operation, as a judgment of condemnation in the court of Exchequer, has not been clearly settled. In the case of Henshaw v. Pleasance, which was an action of trespass, brought against a revenue *officer, for seizing goods supposed to have been irregularly lodged and concealed, a sentence of condemnation by commissioners of excise was offered as conclusive evidence against the plaintiff; but Mr. Just. Blackstone, who tried the cause (1), refused to admit it to that extent, directing the jury that such a sentence was evidence, but not, like a condemnation in the Exchequer, conclusive. On a motion afterwards for a new trial, upon this supposed misdirection, the Court of Common Pleas confirmed the judge's opinion. The reasons and authorities, it was said, relied on in the case of Scott v. Shearman, and other cases of the same kind, extend only to condemnations in the Exchequer, which is the king's supreme court of revenue, but not to the inferior jurisdiction of the boards of excise and

Customs."

From the report of the case of Scott v. Shearman (2), it

(1) Lond. Sitt. 1778, 2 Blac. Rep. 1174.

(2) 2 Blac. Rep. 979.

ant, while in the state of New-York of a rule to show cause, such service being void, as well on general principles, as by the statute to preserve and support the jurisdiction of the state, although the rule to show cause was in the nature of a sci. fa. to charge the defendant de bonis propriis, grounded on a previous judgment obtained against him in a representative capacity. Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. Rep. 1941. But where the defendant pleaded in an action brought in Connecticut on a judgment recovered in Massachusetts, that at the time the former suit was commenced he was not an inhabitant of Massachusetts, or resided or had property there, the plea was held bad because it did not deny notice. Smith v. Rhoades, 1 Day 163,

« AnteriorContinuar »