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ABATEMENT.
See DEMURRer, 1, 2.
PLEADING, 3.

STAYING PROceedings.

ABSOLUTE INTEREST.

See DEED, 1.

LIFE ESTATE.
WILL, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9.

ACCOUNT.

The Court refused to open accounts,
though of a general and summary
nature, not containing the items,
and which had been rendered by
a surviving partner to the repre-
sentatives of a deceased partner,
and had remained unquestioned for
twenty-two years, but it decreed
an account limited to the subse-
quent receipts of the surviving
partner which it was admitted had
taken place Scott v. Milne.

Page 215

See DECREE, 3.
TITHES, 1.

ACCUMULATION.

A testator bequeathed leaseholds in
Church Street, having sixty years
unexpired, and as to which there
was no obligation on the part of
the lessor to renew, to A. for life,
with remainder to the children
she should leave, and in default to
B. He bequeathed to trustees
other leaseholds, upon trust to ac-
cumulate the rents, until the leases
of the Church Street property
"should become nearly expired;"
and then to apply such part thereof
as should be necessary in the re-
newal of the Church Street pro-
perty," for the benefit of the
respective persons to whom he
had before, by his will, given the
same;" and the residue, after an-
swering the purpose aforesaid, he

gave to his residuary legatees.
The testator died before the Thel-
lusson Act came into operation.
Held, that the trust for accumu-
lation and renewal was void for
remoteness and uncertainty. Cur-
tis v. Lukin.
Page 147

See TENANT for Life, 1.

ACQUIESCENCE.

1. On the marriage of a female infant,
her reversionary interest in choses
in action were settled under the
Court for her separate use for life,
with remainder to her children.
She afterwards contracted two
subsequent marriages, but no fur-
ther settlement was executed on
those occasions. Part of the re-
versionary interests fell into pos-
session during the first coverture,
and part during the second, and
were transferred to the trustees.
Held, first, that although the deed
made during infancy was not
binding in respect of the rever-
sionary interests, as against the
wife surviving, still she might,
while discovert, adopt it if for her
benefit. Secondly, that the wife
having survived, and not having

called for a transfer of the fund,
must be deemed to have acqui-
esced in and adopted it, as it was
for her interest to do so. Thirdly,
that she must be deemed to have
married her second husband on
the faith that her property was
protected by the settlement, and
that he was bound by it. Fourthly,
that the third husband who had

notice of the settlement previous
to his marriage, and had for
some years after acquiesced in it,
was bound thereby, and had no
interest in the settled property.
Ashton v. M'Dougall. Page 56
2. Distinction between the effect of
acquiescence, upon a motion for
an injunction and on a demurrer.
In the former case, acquiescence
merely prevents the special pro-
tection by injunction, but in the
latter, it must be such as to dis-
entitle the Plaintiff to any relief
whatever. Gordon v. The Chel
tenham Railway Company. 229
3. Consols were settled to the sepa-
rate use of the wife for life, with
a power to appoint it by will, and
the settlement contained a power
for the trustees, with the consent
in writing of the wife, to alter the
securities. The trustees, without
such consent, sold the Consols,
and invested the produce in Long
Annuities, which they afterwards
sold and lent the money on bond,
which was afterwards received by
the husband, who invested it in
leaseholds. The wife received
the Long Annuities until sold, and
afterwards joined her husband in
executing a deed, reciting that the
sale of the Long Annuities and
the subsequent investments had
been with her consent. Held
that the appointees of the fund
under her will were entitled, as
against the husband and trustees,
to have the Consols replaced, and
that the interest over which the
wife had a general power of ap-
pointment

Page 319

pointment was not liable to make
good the breach of trust. Kella-
way v. Johnson.
4. A husband seised in right of his
wife, concurred with the other
tenants in common in a partition
of estate and mines, but no fine
was levied. He died in 1828;
after which his widow acquiesced
in the arrangement, and took
the benefit of it. She and her
lessee afterwards proceeded to get
coal under the land awarded to
other parties, and defended that
proceeding, on the ground that
the husband's acts were invalid,
and that the parties were still
tenants in common of the whole.
The Court restrained her by in-
junction. Maden v. Veevers.

After answer, the original bill was

amended, and the Defendant ob-
tained time to answer it; the
Plaintiff then gave notice of mo-
tion for a special injunction, and
filed affidavits in support of it.
The motion coming on, the De-
fendant obtained time to answer
the affidavits, and then filed both
her answer and affidavits in op-
position. Held, that the second
answer must be treated as an
affidavit, and that the affidavits in
support of the motion might be
used to qualify the second, but
not the first answer. Maden v.
Veevers.

See COSTS, 7.

INJUNCTION, 6.
PRODUCTION OF DOCU-

MENTS, 4.
WITNESS, 1.

ALLEGATION.

See PLEADING, 4.

503

AMEND.

to pay certain legacies, and the
residue to such of three persons,
D., E., and F., as should be living
at A.'s death. The executors
permitted A. to retain possession
of the leasehold during her life,
and D., E., and F. executed a
deed (which was also executed
by B. the husband of D.), and
whereby they agreed to take as
tenants in common: A. died. Held,
that the executors had not as-
sented to the legacies, either by
permitting A. to retain possession
of the leasehold, or by the exe-
cution of the deed by B., and
that the executors could make a
good title to the leasehold. At-
torney-General v. Potter. Page 164

ASSIGNOR.

See PARTIES, 7.

ATTACHMENT.

See IRREGULARITY, 2.

ATTORNEY GENERAL.
See CHARITY, 4.

BANKRUPT.
After a demurrer had been put in
to a bill, the sole Plaintiff became
bankrupt. Upon the motion of
the Defendant who had demurred,
the Court ordered that the as-
signee should remedy the defect
in the suit within a month, or that

the