of half the amount only, but with-
out referring to the particular
fund. Held, that the latter was a
mere substitution for the former;
and the particular fund failing,
that the legatee was not entitled
to be paid out of the general as-
sets. Bristow v. Bristow.

Page 289

2. A testator, by his will, gave two
thirds of his residue to his eldest
son, with a gift over in case he
died under twenty-five and un-
married; and he gave the remain-
ing one third to his second son, in
similar terms. By a codicil, he
revoked so much of his will as re-
lated to the distribution of his re-
sidue, and gave to his second son
20,000l. sterling, in lieu of his one
third of the residue, and he ap-
pointed his eldest son residuary
legatee. Held, that the gift of the
20,000l. was absolute, and not sub-
ject to the same limitations as the
one third of the residue. Alex-
ander v. Alexander.
518

2. A decree was made in 1830

against executors, charging them
personally; in 1838 they obtained
leave to rehear the cause. The
Plaintiff in 1842 presented a peti-
tion for leave to file a supple-
mental bill, putting in issue new
facts to support the personal de-
cree against the executors. The
Court refused the application with
costs, on the ground that the facts
appeared to be either without
proof or to be immaterial, or else
to have been so long known to
the Plaintiff as to preclude him
making them the foundation of the
extraordinary relief prayed. Ac-
land v. Braddick.

486

SUR-

2. The costs of rehearings are not
carried by the words "costs of
suit as between solicitor and
client," but require to be specially
mentioned in the order for tax-
ation. Semble. The same rule ap-
plies to the costs of appeals and
exceptions.
Ibid.
3. The fees of the steward of a manor,
who is a solicitor but acts in the
character of steward only, are not
taxable under the 6 & 7 Vict. c.73.
Allen v. Aldridge.
401
4. This statute does not authorise
the taxation of every pecuniary
demand or bill of a solicitor, for
VOL. V.

every species of employment in
which he may happen to be en-
gaged. Allen v. Aldridge.

Page 401
5. A bill may be taxed though no
part of the business was transacted
in court of law or equity, but
any
such business must be connected
with the profession of an attorney
or solicitor:-business in which the
attorney or solicitor was employed
because he was an attorney or so-
licitor, or in which he would not
have been employed if he had not
been an attorney or solicitor, or if
the relation of attorney or solicitor
and client had not subsisted be-
tween him and his employer. Ibid.
6. After payment of a bill, an order
for taxation is not to be obtained
as of course, even by a party liable
to pay the same. In re Becke and
Flower.
406
Under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73.,
any party entitled to the order
may obtain it, as of course and
without special directions, within
one month after delivery, and
with such special directions as the
Court may order to be imposed,
after the expiration of one month
from the delivery, but not after
verdict, writ of inquiry, or pay-
ment. In those cases a special
order made upon special circum-
stances, to be proved to the satis-
faction of the Court, is required.
Ibid.
8. A mere volunteer, under no pre-
vious liability, does not by paying
a solicitor's bill acquire a right to
tax it.
Ibid.
9. The

7.

Y y

9. The bill of costs of a mortgagee's
solicitor for business done in re-
lation to the mortgage, and the
sale of the mortgaged estate, is
taxable at the instance of the
mortgagor, under the 6 & 7 Vict.
c. 73., though no part of the busi-
ness may have been transacted in
any court of law or equity. In
re Lees.
Page 410
10. The 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73., as regards
taxation, is retrospective with re-
spect to bills previously taxable,
and also as to bills thereby made
taxable, provided the latter re-
mained unpaid at the passing of
the act.
Ibid.
11. Payment before the act came
into operation of a previously tax-
able bill, would not preclude tax-
ation under the act, upon a proper
application made in due time.

Ibid.

12. Payment before the act came
into operation of a bill not pre-
viously taxable, precludes tax-
ation.
Ibid.

13. A petition being presented for
the taxation of a solicitor's bill,
Held, that the application was to
be considered as made at the
latest at the time of answering the
petition, and not at the time of
service of the petition, or the day
appointed for hearing. In cases
of accidental delay in the office,
the period may be carried further
back. Sayer v. Wagstaff. 415
14. Where a debtor delivers to his
creditor his promissory note for
the amount of the debt, the debt
may be considered as actually

paid, if the creditor, at the time
of receiving the note, has agreed
to take it in payment of the debt,
and to take upon himself the risk
of the note being paid; or if, from
the conduct of the creditor, or
the special circumstances of the
case, such an agreement is legally
to be implied. But in the absence
of any special circumstances, the
transaction does not amount to a
discharge of the original debt, but
a mere extended credit. Sayer v.
Wagstaff.
Page 415
15. A solicitor delivered his bill of
costs on the 14th of October 1842,
for which the client, on the 3d of
November 1842, gave his promis-
sory note, which was paid on the
17th of November 1842. On the
15th of November 1843 the client
presented a petition for the tax-
ation of the bill, which was an-
swered on the 16th, and was
served on the 21st. The day ap-
pointed for hearing was the 24th.
Held, first, that the bill must be
considered as paid on the 17th
of November 1842; and, secondly,
that the application for taxation
must be considered as made at
the latest on the 16th of November
1843, and consequently that the
application for taxation had been
made within twelve months, ac-
cording to the forty-first section
of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. Ibid.
16. Application by cestui que trust
for the taxation of a bill of costs
paid by his trustees more than
twelve calendar months, refused.
In re Downes.

425
17. Where

TITHE COMMUTATION ACT.
A confirmed award under the Tithe
Commutation Act is final as be-
tween the tithe owners and tithe
payers, but does not exclude from
further investigation a case be-
tween the tithe owners themselves,
in which there was, before the
award, a just title to tithes, which
by accident and mistake was not
brought forward till after the
award was made.

Thus, by an award, made with
the concurrence of A., the patron,
the whole rent charge was made
payable to B. the rector, A. being
at the time entitled to one half of
the corn tithes, but ignorant of his
rights. Held that A. might have
relief in this Court as against B.
Clarke v. Yonge.
Page 523

TITHES.

1. A. & B. were entitled to tithes
in equal moieties. B., under mis-
take, received the whole, a bill by
A. against B. for his moiety was
dismissed with costs. Clarke v.
Yonge.
523
2. A confirmed award under the
Tithe Commutation Act is final
as between the tithe owners and
tithe payers, but does not exclude
from further investigation a case
between the tithe owners them-
selves, in which there was, before
the award, a just title to tithes,
which by accident and mistake
was not brought forward till after
the award was made.

Thus, by an award, made with
the concurrence of A., the patron,
the whole rent charge was made
payable to B. the rector. A. being
at the time entitled to one half of
the corn tithes, but ignorant of his
rights. Held that A. might have
relief in this Court as against B.
Clarke v. Yonge.
Page 523

3. The right to tithes, as against an
ecclesiastical corporation aggre-
gate, is barred under the 3 &
4 W. 4. c. 27. by non-payment for
twenty years. The Dean and
Chapter of Ely v. Bliss.

See STATUTE, 2, 3.

TITLE DEEDS.

574

F. & W., as solicitors for the te-
nant for life, held the title deeds,
which afterwards passed into the
possession of W. & C. their suc-
cessors. The tenant for life died,
and the estate then stood limited
first to F. & W. for 500 years, to
secure a sum of 2000l. with re-
mainder to trustees for 600 years,
to secure a jointure and portions
with remainder to A. B. in tail.
A. B. being an infant, a suit was
instituted on his behalf, in which
the 2000l. was raised on the se-
curity of the term. Upon that
occasion F. & W. covenated with
the mortgagees to produce the
title deeds from time to time, and
not to part with them; but they
were relievable from the covenant
on certain terms. A receiver
was appointed in the suit, and the

Court directed the costs of the

solicitors