The Constitution of Massachusetts originally provided for the election of the Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor and the members of the Senate by a "majority of votes" and established other methods of determining a choice in case no candidate received such majority at the polls. This requirement was abolished in 1855 by the Fourteenth Article of Amendment, which provided that "In all elections of civil officers by the people of this Commonwealth, whose election is provided for by the Constitution, the person having the highest number of votes shall be deemed and declared to be elected." Election by plurality was thus substituted for election by majority.

The practical objection to the system of election by majority is that where there are more than two candidates for an office a failure to elect any one of them at the polls is always a possibility; the practical defect of the system of election by plurality is the obvious fact that where there are more than two candidates for the same office the person elected is frequently the choice of a minority among the voters.

Preferential voting is a plan which aims to overcome both of these objections by providing a ballot upon which the voter may indicate not only his first choice but his second choice and even additional choices among the candidates for any office. Preferential voting should, however, be clearly distinguished from proportional representation (see Bulletin No. 28) which aims to secure representation for minorities and in so doing under some systems uses a ballot upon which the voter indicates his first choice, second choice and additional choices among the candidates. Preferential voting, in a word, aims to provide a plan whereby the will of a majority among the voters may be ascertained and carried into effect, while proportional representation furnishes a scheme whereby the majority is pre

cluded from electing all the officers (where there are several elected) and the minority among the voters is enabled to secure its due share of representation.

Preferential voting, in one form or another, is in use at final elections in Queensland and in Western Australia; in the cities of Cleveland, Denver, Spokane and Grand Junction, as well as in many smaller municipalities (see p. 313); it is in use at primary elections in several States of the Union, including Maryland, Washington, Oregon, Indiana, Idaho, Wisconsin, Minnesota and North Dakota.

The three methods of preferential voting most commonly used are known as the Ware System, the Bucklin System and the Nanson System respectively. A brief description of each will be given.

II. THE WARE SYSTEM.

Under this system, which was devised by Professor W. R. Ware, the voter is allowed to express his preferences among the candidates as many or as few as he pleases - by putting the figure 1 opposite the name of his first choice, the figure 2 opposite the name of his second choice, and so on. The first count is only of the first-choice votes. If no candidate has a majority, the lowest candidate is excluded and his votes only are scrutinized again and added to the votes of the other candidates as the preferences indicate. The candidates are thus successively excluded until only two are left, of whom the higher will have a majority vote (as between the two left), and be elected.

This system is called in Great Britain the "alternative vote", and in Queensland, where it is used in truncated form, the "preferential vote". That it is preferable to the "second ballot" used in Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and other European countries, is generally conceded by those who compare the two. It does at a single election more than the second ballot system does in two, and does it better. It is not, however, a perfect majority system, for, like the second ballot system, on which it is so obviously an improvement, and like our own double election system, on which it is a still greater improvement, it may drop out at some stage of the whole process of election a candidate who is really pre

ferred by a clear majority to any other candidate in the field taken singly.

The preferential voting system used in the primary elections of Wisconsin, Minnesota and some other States is the Ware system modified (1) by the restriction of the voter to the expression of but two preferences to any office, (2) by provision of a first choice and a second choice column, instead of the numerals 1 and 2, for the indication of preferences, and (3) by the adaptation of the rules for counting the votes to the provision that a voter may express only two preferences.

III. THE BUCKLIN SYSTEM.

The preferential system used in the cities of Grand Junction and Denver, Colorado, Spokane, Washington, Portland, Oregon, Cleveland, Ohio, and in the State of North Dakota, was first proposed by Condorcet in 1793. It is said to have been used for a time in Geneva, Switzerland. In recent times, however, it first came into prominence on its adoption in 1909 by Grand Junction, Colorado, under the leadership of Hon. James W. Bucklin of that city.

Aside from certain unessential features this system as thus far actually applied in America differs from the Ware system only in the rules of the count. The Ware rules prescribe, if there is no majority of first choices, the dropping out of the candidate lowest on the poll and the distribution of his ballots only according to the second or next highest available preference marked on them, then the dropping of the next lowest candidate in the same way, and so on until one candidate has a majority of the votes behind him. The Bucklin rules, on the other hand, prescribe, if there is no majority of first choices, the adding together of the first-choice and second-choice votes for each candidate to see whether any candidate has a majority when both are counted; next, if no candidate has such a majority, it prescribes the adding together of the first-choice, second-choice, and third-choice votes for each candidate to see whether any candidate has a majority, counting the three grades of votes together; and so on until some candidate has behind him a majority, counting all the grades of votes thus far taken into account, when that candidate is declared elected.

IV. THE NANSON SYSTEM.

A preferential system that differs from the Ware and the Bucklin plans only in the rules of the count has been devised by Professor E. J. Nanson, of the University of Melbourne, Australia. Under this system a first choice is given more credit than a second throughout the entire count, a second more than a third, and so forth. Then, in accordance with simple rules formulated by Professor Nanson on the basis of a mathematical solution of the problem, those candidates whose total credits show them to be unquestionably inferior to other candidates in the opinion of the voters as indicated on the ballot are successively dropped out as defeated until the candidate preferred to any other is left and declared elected. Following are the complete rules for this system:

1. At the voting precincts transcribe on coördinate paper (ruled to correspond with the spacing of the names of the candidates on the ballot) the figures marked on the ballots by the voters, using a separate column for each ballot and numbering both ballot and column with a distinctive number in order to be able at any time to compare the original ballot with its record. Send the record to the central electoral board, as ordered by that board.

2. On the record, but not on the ballots, let the central electoral board fill in all blank spaces with the figure found by dividing by two the sum of the number of candidates and a number one higher than that indicating the last preference marked on the ballot by the voter. (This is merely finishing the voter's work by giving each unmarked candidate the average to which all unmarked candidates are entitled. It insures the counting of the ballot in the subsequent addition to the disadvantage, and to the equal disadvantage of the unmarked candidates, just as the voter intended. Example: if there were seven candidates, the blank spaces on the ballots showing only three preferences would all be filled in with the number 5; those on ballots showing four preferences, with the number 6; etc.)

3. Add the figures of each candidate.

4. Exclude as defeated every candidate whose total is equal to or more than the average. (This is reasonable because the voter used larger figures to represent lower preferences.)

5. If more than two candidates remain, set down on record sheets figures representing the preferences on all the ballots as among the candidates remaining. Add again, eliminate all candidates whose total is equal to or more than the average.

6. Proceed again, if necessary, as prescribed in rule 5, until only two candidates remain. When only two remain, examine the record to see which of those two was preferred to the other by the voters, and declare him elected.

7. If only one candidate remains after an elimination of candidates, declare him elected.

V. PROVISIONS FOR PREFERENTIAL VOTING IN MASSACHUSETTS

CITIES.

A provision for preferential voting in cities was suggested in the Report of the Joint Special Committee on City Charters of the Massachusetts Legislature in January 1915 (Senate, Doc. No. 254), but this portion of the report was not adopted with the remainder as a part of Chapter 267, Acts of 1915.

Chapter 261, Special Acts of 1916, amended by Chapter 166, Special Acts of 1917, authorized the City of Newton to use preferential voting at municipal elections.

The Legislature of 1917 authorized the city of Gloucester to use preferential voting at its municipal elections (Chapter 254). These acts provide for the nomination by petition of a certain number of qualified voters, the acceptance of the nomination by the candidate, and the filing of petitions and acceptance with the city clerk a certain number of days before election. The ballot shall indicate the number to be elected to each office and shall provide three columns (if more than three candidates) headed respectively "First Choice" (or Choices), "Second Choice" (or Choices), and "Other Choices." Where there are but three candidates for any office, columns for indicating only the first and second choices are provided; where there are less than three candidates all columns but one and all references to second or other choices may be omitted. It is required that the instructions shall appear on the ballot. The ballots bear no party designations.

The sample ballot which accompanies the report of the Joint Special Committee of 1915 is here reproduced: