termining how many representatives the supporters of that list are to elect and that it is to help the candidate marked to obtain a high position on that list. The system provides a means by which at a single election the voters of a large district can form almost perfectly unanimous constituencies each one of which contains approximately the same number of voters that there would be in an entire single member district under our present system. The method of counting is as follows: Each list is entitled to a number of seats proportional to the total vote for all the candidates on the list. In filling these seats the candidates are taken in the order of the number of votes received by each. 1 Compared with the Hare system, the List system has the advantage of being as simple as the ordinary system of election now in use in Massachusetts, and the disadvantage that it requires the voter to help a ready-made list. 3. The Gove or Schedule System. A third scheme is the Gove or Schedule system.2 Under this plan the candidates' names are printed on the ballot in a single column as under the Hare system. But under this plan each candidate really stands for a whole list, the distinguishing feature of the plan being that every ballot that cannot help elect the candidate for whom it is cast — either because he has enough without it or because he is hopelessly out of the running even with it is to be counted to help one of the other candidates in accordance with a schedule of preferences handed in to the electoral officials by the candidate himself and duly published several days before the election. Differing from the List, the Schedule plan lends itself to the Massachusetts form of ballot; it offers the voter many "slates", a different one for every candidate; it allows the candidate's name to be on more than one "slate." As compared with the Hare system, it has the same advantage and disadvantage that the List has. A variant of the List System has recently been suggested in Massachusetts. The independent voter may mark for three candidates regardless of party, thus helping each to attain a high 1 For further details see C. G. Hoag, Effective Voting, in 63d Congress, 2d Session, Senate Doc. 359. * Ibid. 28. place in the list of his respective party; the partisan voter may mark a cross in the party circle of one party and then vote for three candidates of that party. The relative position of the various parties is determined by the party circle votes. All votes above those needed exactly to supply quotas in any given district, and all seats in any district which are not filled by receiving an exact quota are collected and apportioned at large, to the end that the total representation for the whole State shall be exactly proportional to the party votes of the whole State. Provision is also made for writing in names on the ballot. This proposed Massachusetts system is as simple as the ordinary List system, and has the advantage of permitting nonpartisan and independent voting. VII. CONCLUSION. From the foregoing discussion of proportional representation, the following conclusions may be drawn. 1. The outstanding defect of the system of election by plurality is that where a number of officers are to be elected, one political party or other faction among the voters is likely to secure the election of its entire list of candidates, while the minority, even though it be relatively strong, secures no representation at all. 2. In one form or another proportional representation has obtained recognition in many foreign countries. 3. While proportional representation has been seriously considered for adoption by various American States and municipalities, it has been given a fair trial in one community only, namely in Ashtabula, Ohio. (The Illinois system of limited voting in State elections is not considered by the advocates of proportional representation to be a system of proportional representation at all.) 4. There are various systems of proportional representation, of which the Hare system is the best known. This system is used in Ashtabula. 5. In an actual trial of proportional representation at the Ashtabula election in November, 1915, no practical difficulties or complications of any importance were encountered. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ashtabula Plan of Municipal Government. Pamphlet published by the Ashtabula Chamber of Commerce (1916). Boynton, W. E. "Proportional Representation in Ashtabula." National Municipal Review (1917), VI, 87. Commons, J. R. Proportional Representation. New York, 1907. Curtis, R. E. Proportional Representation. Wisconsin Library Commission Bulletin, No. 14 (1908). Dunlop, G. H. "Proportional Representation at Los Angeles." National Municipal Review (1914), III, 93. Equity. Department on Proportional Representation. Quarterly. Published Hatton, A. R. The Ashtabula Plan. American Proportional Representation League Pamphlet, No. 6, January, 1916. Hoag, C. G. Effective Voting: an article on preferential voting and proportional representation. 63d Congress, 2d Session, Senate Doc. 359 (1914). Holcombe, A. N. State Government in the United States. New York, 1916. Humphreys, J. H. Proportional Representation. American Proportional Representation League pamphlet, No. 8, July, 1916. Jones, C. L. Readings in Parties and Elections in the United States. New York (1912). Meyer, E. C. Nominating systems. Madison, 1902. Proportional Representation Review and pamphlets. Published by the American Proportional Representation League, Haverford, Pa. Ray, P. O. Political Parties and Practical Politics. New York, 1913. "Kalamazoo Tries Proportional Representation." National Mu- The Short Ballot in Illinois. Published by the City Club of Chicago, October, 1912. Vincent, J. M. "Proportional Representation." Cyclopedia of American Government, III, 80. Williams, J. F. "Recent Developments of Proportional Representation." Political Science Quarterly (1914), XXIX, III. |