wife and my mother, I would speak about leaving, and my mother would say then when she would think I was going to leave because I had told them I said if we had any trouble that I wouldn't stay, and as soon as they would have it I would say, 'I will leave; I ain't going to stay here and live if you can't live peaceably together.' She would say, "There is no need of your going. You are going to get the place anyhow. No one else wants it. Why don't you stay?' And then I said, 'Why don't you let us alone so that we can stay if you want us to?" "

His attention being directed to a particular trouble occurring some five years before the cause was tried, complainant testified:

"We had been having quite a little serious trouble then with my mother, five years ago last September. I told my father that I couldn't stand it any longer; that mother and my wife couldn't get along; and that it didn't make it pleasant for us. And that I was going to leave, told him I wanted to settle up and move, and he didn't know what to do. We talked along for three or four days that way, and finally he came to me one day (I was out in the field husking corn), and he says, 'Henry,' he says, 'I can't have you go.' He said, 'If you do, it is going to break up the home. Then,' he said, 'I won't have any.' He said, 'If you are going to go and we have got to divide up, then,' he says, 'you won't have no home and I won't have any. Of course,' he said, 'I can go and live with Louis if I want to, but I don't want to do it. I want to stay here. I want to live and die here.' 'Well,' I said, 'I would like to stay, but,' I said, 'I can't do it.' I said, "The place isn't worth the trouble that I am having over it.' That is, I meant the trouble we was having in the family. I said, 'I would rather lose everything than to have to live this way any longer.' 'Well,' he said, 'you know your mother is crazy, and,' he says, 'I have had to live with her all these years and you ought to stand it a little while.' 'Well,' he said, 'You know she has either got an ugly disposition or else she is crazy, I don't know which.' And I

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said, 'You will have to talk with my wife about it; if

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she won't stay I won't; I can't have this any longer.' So he went and talked with her about it, and he fixed it up with her so that we stayed, on his account principally. After this arrangement was made five years ago, it went worse for a couple of years; that is, with the women, my mother, she didn't like it. She didn't like the arrangement father made with And so she made it pretty warm for him. This second arrangement, you know, she didn't like that very well, and so

"Q. You mean she would rather you had gone?

"A. She would rather we had went at that time. That is what she said, but the fact of the matter was she never wanted us to go, because when we would have trouble and I would speak about leaving-she did after that I told her I wouldn't stay; I would just as soon leave as not anyhow. When she thought I meant it she would say, "There is no need of your going, you are going to get the place anyhow.'

Complainant's last trouble was with his father, who himself left the farm, and, if complainant is to be believed, without any adequate excuse. This testimony of complainant supports, to some extent, the claim of defendant that there was an understanding, or that it was a part of the understanding and arrangement entered into, that complainant was not bound, in any event, to remain upon the land and support defendants. And I think we are required to find that such was the understanding. I am as well convinced, from the testimony, that the reason and only reason for this reservation was the contingency that the parties should not be able to live together in peace, and that there was involved a mutual undertaking to do nothing to disturb the peace. The arrangement was of considerable importance to all of them, and as time passed it became more imperative that amicable relations be maintained. Otherwise complainant might work for years agreeably with the understanding and then find himself ousted by the declaration of defendants that they were dissatisfied. Such a condition

of things is, in my opinion, presented by the record. Complainant has for ten years reasonably performed the agreement. Defendants now attempt to dispossess him, empty-handed, claiming they are dissatisfied. Under such circumstances, may a court of equity grant complainant any relief? The court cannot compel the parties to live together, nor can it harmonize their differences. It can inquire whether defendants are wholly at fault; whether they are honestly and reasonably dissatisfied. If they are at fault and acting from caprice and without reason, it should, if it can, award to complainant some compensation. I am of opinion that defendants are at fault and that it would be inequitable to dismiss complainant without some compensation.

Does the law interpose insuperable obstacles in the way of granting relief? No question of the statute of frauds is involved. The land consists of 200 acres, some of it in a lake, about 147 acres of it dry land. The title, when complainant entered upon the performance of the agreement, and until recently, when defendants attempted to convey it away, was held by defendants jointly, as husband and wife. Both of them understood, were parties to and joined in the contract and agreement with complainant. These facts present no legal obstacle to granting relief.

Defendants had lived on the land for 30 years, and it appears to be admitted they have no other home, and that they have a homestead interest in the land. It does not appear that they have selected and set apart any particular 40 acres as a homestead. Neither the contract nor any rights growing out of it can affect the homestead interest. Lott v. Lott, 146 Mich. 580 (109 N. W. 1126, 8 L. R. A. [N. S.] 748), and cases cited in the opinion. There are 100 acres of land unaffected by the homestead interest.

Upon this record, the decree will be that the decree

of the court below be reversed; that defendants be given leave and opportunity for 30 days to select and designate a homestead in the land; that complainant have a lien upon the remainder of said land and the personal property for his rightful compensation, which may be enforced by a sale or by partition; that the record be remanded to the circuit court for the county of Muskegon, in chancery, to ascertain and determine the value of the premises at the time complainant began performance of his contract and now, and if said land has increased in value to ascertain and determine whether, and to what extent, the increase in value is the result of complainant's work and the improvements he has made upon the same, and how much is due to other causes; that a like ascertainment and determination be made with respect to the personal property; that the court also ascertain and determine what sum and sums, if any, complainant has expended, over and above the sums realized from said land, to maintain defendants, himself and family; that complainant be finally decreed to be entitled to receive of and from defendants the amount of the increased value of real and personal property due to his work and to the improvements he has made, and such sums as he has expended over and above those received from the land in the support of the family, including defendants. The result may or may not appear to give adequate compensation to complainant. However, it will be in addition to all such support and sums as he has derived from the premises during his occupancy thereof. His tenure has at all times been somewhat precarious, and, considering his reserved right to leave when conditions became unsupportable, I can discover, after reflection, no more equitable adjustment of the respective rights of the parties. Neither party as against the other will recover costs of this appeal; but the cost of preparing

and printing the record will be equally divided between complainant and defendants.

A decree will be entered in this court agreeably with this opinion, and the record remanded for further proceedings.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, KUHN, STONE, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.

FLETCHER PAPER CO. v. DETROIT & MACKINAC RAILWAY CO.

1. INJUNCTION-RAILROADS-MICHIGAN RAILROAD COMMISSION. Independently of some express statutory authority, the court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant a preliminary injunction restraining defendant in the bill from tearing up or interfering with a spur track connected with defendant's railway, pending the determination of the Michigan railroad commission in a proceeding before it instituted by the same complainant to secure an order of the commission requiring the railway company to transport logs over the spur track in question: no authority to preserve the status quo being conferred by the act creating the railroad commission (Act No. 300, Pub. Acts 1909, §§ 46, 47 [3 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 6524 et seq.]), a preliminary injunction issued for that purpose was void, and contempt proceedings thereon unwarranted. 2. CONTEMPT-INJUNCTION-VOID INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION.

Contempt

proceedings cannot be based on an interlocutory injunction that the court of equity had no power to issue.

Appeal from Alpena; Emerick, J. Submitted Janu