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But what had the jury been instructed was necessary to render the highway reasonably safe? The difficulty is that this general language had been preceded by specific instructions that the defendant was really guilty of negligence in the five instances named, because it was unquestioned that the approach down the hill north of the fill or embankment in question was not made "straight and level"; and that the top of the embankment was not constructed "of a safe width and level." It is equally undisputed that there were no barriers, railings, or structures of any kind at the sides of the fill; and the jury were told, if we can understand the language used, that it was the duty of the defendant to do these things, to wit, make the approach "straight and level" and to erect barriers, railings, or other structures at this point; and the same language would apply to the two other subdivisions.

Counsel have not called our attention to any statutory requirement other than the general statute referred to. It has not been pointed out or claimed that any statutory duty to repair highways in any particular manner has been violated or its performance omitted. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant had entered upon the plan for "permanent improvements" contemplated by section 15, chap. 2, of Act No. 283, Public Acts of 1909. We have held that when conflicting instructions are given, one of which is erroneous, it is presumed that the jury may have followed that which was erroneous. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Monroe, 47 Mich. 152 (10 N. W. 179); Madill v. Currie, 168 Mich. 546 (134 N. W. 1004).

In one of the earlier cases on this subject of highways (that of Malloy v. Walker Township, 77 Mich. 448 [43 N. W. 1012, 6 L. R. A. 695]), the court correctly charged the jury as follows:

"You will first consider and determine the question whether this portion of the highway where the accident occurred was in a condition reasonably safe and fit for public travel, and in this case that question will depend upon your solution of another question, viz., whether or not suitable railings or barriers along the sides and at the top of the embankment in question were necessary to render the highway reasonably safe and fit for travel."

Here the question of the negligence of the defendant, under the charge as given, was made to depend upon the question of the duty of the defendant to erect and maintain these barriers, and, under the circumstances surrounding the case, was left as a question of fact for the determination of the jury. It certainly was a question for the jury to decide under the circumstances, in that case as in this, whether the road was in such condition that it was the duty of the defendant township to erect such guards or barriers in order to render the highway in a condition reasonably safe and convenient for travel.

In Harris v. Clinton Township, 64 Mich. 447, at page 457 (31 N. W. 425, 8 Am. St. Rep. 842), Justice CHAMPLIN, speaking for this court, said:

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"The township is not obliged to keep its highways absolutely safe for travel. The statute only requires that it shall keep them reasonably safe and fit for public travel. The jury were the proper persons to draw all proper inferences from the facts proved; and, from such facts and inferences therefrom, it was their province to determine whether the road was reasonably safe or not."

These cases have been followed by many others. Sebert v. City of Alpena, 78 Mich. 165 (43 N. W. 1098); Ross v. Ionia Township, 104 Mich. 320 (62 N. W. 401). In Gage v. Railroad Co., 105 Mich. 335, at page 341 (63 N. W. 318), it was said:

"It was a question for the jury to determine whether barriers were necessary."

In Shaw v. Saline Township, 113 Mich. 342, at page 345 (71 N. W. 642), we said:

"We think it evident that whether a railing was necessary in order to render the approach to this bridge reasonably safe for public travel was a question for the jury."

In Bigelow v. City of Kalamazoo, 97 Mich. 121 (56 N. W. 339), it was said:

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"Neither streets, sidewalks, nor crosswalks can be constructed upon a dead level. Cities are not required to keep streets in a condition absolutely safe for travel. A crosswalk must be reasonably safe."

Comiskie v. City of Ypsilanti, 116 Mich. 321 (74 N. W. 487); Lauder v. St. Clair Township, 125 Mich. 479-485 (85 N. W. 4); Finch v. Village of Bangor, 133 Mich. 149-151 (94 N. W. 738); Hannon v. City of Gladstone, 136 Mich. 621 (99 N. W. 790); Stanton v. Webster Township, 170 Mich. 428 (136 N. W. 421); Lubbers v. Manlius Township, 172 Mich. 387 (137 N. W. 804).

It was, in our opinion, for the jury to determine whether the highway was in such a condition as to require the erection of barriers. Speck v. Bruce Township, 166 Mich. 550 (132 N. W. 114, 35 L. R. A. [N. S.] 203).

It is undoubtedly the law in this State that, where a highway is built at such a height and so narrow between hills as to require barriers or railings to make it reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, it becomes the duty of the township to erect them, and, failing to do so, the township is liable for injuries resulting from its neglect of duty. But it was error to instruct the jury that it was the absolute duty of the township to erect such barriers. To approve of this charge would to be to lay down and impose a greater duty upon the township than the statute imposes. For the reasons above stated, we are con

strained to reverse the case. We have examined the other assignments of error, and find no other reversible error in the record.

For the error pointed out, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and a new trial granted. STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, KUHN, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.

SCHMAND v. JANDORF.

1. CONTRACTS-SATISFACTION CLAUSE.

Where parties contract for performance of work by one to the satisfaction of the other, reserving to the latter the sole right of determining the sufficiency of the performance, the declaration of his dissatisfaction is conclusive, and is not subject to review by the courts.1

2. MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRACTS-DISCHARGE AS BREACH. Where plaintiff obtained employment as defendant's candymaker for one year, subject to the general control and to the satisfaction of the employer, who, having declared his dissatisfaction with plaintiff's performance of the contract, terminated the employment within a year, it was not competent to inquire into his motives or grounds of dissatisfaction, and a verdict for defendant was rightly directed on the trial.

Error to Kent; McDonald, J. Submitted January 27, 1913. (Docket No. 44.) Decided April 8, 1913.

1 The question of the termination of contracts of employment which contain stipulations permitting rescission by the employer if the work is not satisfactorily performed is treated in notes in 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 403, and 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1003. And as to the rights and remedies of servant discharged for good cause, see note in 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 524.

Assumpsit in justice's court by Albert F. Schmand against Charles S. Jandorf for breach of a contract of employment. From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed to circuit court. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings

error. Affirmed.

Colin P. Campbell, for appellant.

Benn M. Corwin, for appellee.

STONE, J. This suit was begun in justice's court in the city of Grand Rapids. It was appealed to the circuit court, where, at the close of the plaintiff's testimony, a verdict was directed for the defendant. The plaintiff has brought the case here on writ of error. The sole error assigned is that the trial court erred in directing the jury as follows:

"Gentlemen of the jury, I am going to direct a verdict in this case. Plaintiff's right to recovery depends upon a contract that he made with the defendant, in which the defendant reserved the right to discharge the plaintiff at any time when he was dissatisfied. That is a question entirely for the defendant, as the courts have held; and so, under the contract, as I view the case, the only question in issue is: Was the plaintiff discharged because the defendant was dissatisfied? The plaintiff testifies that that was the reason assigned by the defendant at the time, and there is no testimony to the contrary."

Plaintiff was an expert candy maker. On or about June 5, 1911, he noticed in the Confectioner's Journal an advertisement inserted by defendant for a candy maker. Plaintiff was at that time residing at Springfield, Mass. He answered defendant's advertisement by letter, in which he stated, in substance, that he was willing to go to Grand Rapids on a week's trial, provided his transportation was paid, and if he was not satisfactory to defendant the latter was to pay plaintiff whatever he wanted to for that week,

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