. theory on which a decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff in the present suit in the superior court, namely, that the Buena Vista Fruit Company was a trust and not a partnership and that therefore the note was in contemplation of law the note of the trustees. The doctrine of merger is that a cause of action, when reduced to a judgment, has ceased to exist as an independent liability, and has changed its nature and is transmuted into the obligation created by the judgment, | which is different in kind and essential characteristics from the initial cause of action. It has been said that "a judgment is an absolute merger of a debt by simple contract, so that no action can afterwards be maintained upon the original promise." Wells, J., in Wyman v. Fabens, 111 Mass. 77, 80; French v. Neal, 24 Pick. 55, 61; Bangs v. Watson, 9 Gray, 211; Pierce v. Eaton, 11 Gray, 398; Wolcott v. Hodge, 15 Gray, 547, 77 Am. Dec. 381; Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 148; Connors v. Holden, 152 Mass. 598, 26 N. E. 137; Mason v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231, 18 L. Ed. 783; Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S. 506, 509, 7 Sup. Ct. 648, 30 L. Ed. 707; Coles v. McKenna, 80 N. J. Law, 48, 76 Atl. 344. The doctrine of merger, like res judicata, operates only between parties and their privies. It does not affect strangers to the original proceeding and is not available as a bar in their favor. This is the rule stated in the text-books. 2 Black on Judgments, § 673; 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 215; 23 Cyc. 1111-1206; 24 American & English Encyclopedia of Law, 717; 13 Laws of England, by Lord Halsbury, p. 343, § 478. It is support ed by the authorities. School District No. 34 v. Thompson, 51 Neb. 857, 71 N. W. 728; Wolf v. Wyeth, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 149; Atlantic Dock Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of New York, 53 N. Y. 64; Ellis v. State, 2 Ind. 262; United States v. Cushman, 2 Sumn. 426, 437, Fed. Cas. No. 14,908; Cheveront v. Textor, 53 Md. 295, 308; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co., 72 C. C. A. 405, 414, 140 Fed. 385, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314; Randall v. Smith, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 214. See also Low v. Low, 177 Mass. 306, 59 N. E. 57. Apart from authority and on reason this conclusion is sound. It is only in proceedings in rem that the judgment of a court has been regarded as affecting those who are not parties or privies. Merger is a doctrine which has been extended "very far" in this commonwealth, and which “has not received the approval of the Supreme Court of the United States" and of other courts of respectable authority. Attorney General v. American Legion of Honor, 196 Mass. 151, 158, 81 N. E. 966, and cases cited. In the course of the judgment in Beckett v. Ramsdale, 31 Ch. Div. 177, where after full discussion, it was held by the Court of Appeal that recovery of judgment against a surviving partner did not bar an action against the estate of a de ceased partner, the doctrine was referred to by Lord Bowen as one of "fierce severity." It does not affect liabilities collateral or subsidiary to the original cause of action and yet separable from it, for example, like that of surety. As was said by Holmes, J., in Vanuxem v. Burr, 151 Mass. 387, 388, 24 N. E. 773, 21 Am. St. Rep. 458: "Instances are too numerous and familiar to need extended mention, where the mere recovery of a judgment is held no bar to another action, although the satisfaction of it would be. * This principle is applied, not only to actions against different parties such as the maker and indorser of a note, or joint tortfeasors, but to actions against the same individual when he has given different obligations in respect of what is in substance the same debt." Byers v. Franklin Coal Co., 106 Mass. 131, 136, 137; Gilmore v. Carr, 2 Mass. 177; Porter v. Ingraham, 10 Mass. 88; Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 148; Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pick. 62, 11 Am. Dec. 139; New York Land Improvement Co. v. Chapman, 118 N. Y. 288, 296, 23 N. E. 187. A further limitation of the doctrine is that it does not apply unless the action was brought against the party defendant in the same capacity as was the earlier action. In this respect also it is like res judicata. First National Bank v. Shuler, 153 N. Y. 163, 173, 47 N. E. 262, 60 Am. St. Rep. 601; Troxell v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rail road, 227 U. S. 434, 33 Sup. Ct. 274, 57 L. Burnie v. Seaton, 111 Ind. 56, 12 N. E. 101; Ed. 586; Lander v. Arno, 65 Me. 26; McDibert v. D'Arcy, 248 Mo. 617, 661, 154 S. W. 1116. The doctrine of merger, therefore, would not prevent the relief which was granted to the plaintiff in the superior court, if the note had been signed by the trustees of the Fruit Company. The holder of a personal obligation incurred by trustees in the performance of their duty in the management of trust property may pursue both his rights on the note against the trustees and his right to satisfaction out of the trust estate. But a different situation is presented in the case at bar. It appears from the record that three of the five trustees against whom that judgment was rendered, namely, Thompson, Dunning and Carleton, are shareholders in the association. Whether they were shareholders at the date of the note and of the writ in the action at law and at the time of the rendition of the judgment does not appear on this record. However that may be, the plaintiff has recovered judgment on the note against three who now are shareholders on the ground that they were makers of the note. It is plain from what has been said as to merger that, if none of the trustees against whom the judgment has been rendered had been shareholders, the judgment would not be an obstacle to relief in this suit. But difficulty is presented by the fact that the plaintiff already has secured judgment against three of the shareholders, not on the ground that they are shareholders, but on the ground that they as trustees were case. It is doubtful if a bill in equity lies in such makers of the note. Whether that judgment [2. EQUITY (§ 15*) – SUBJECT-MATTER — ELECobtained on that ground stands in the way TION TO CORPORATE OFFICE. of maintaining a bill, against all the shareholders as partners, or, to reach and apply partnership assets in payment of the note as a partnership debt; and if it does, whether, if at all, and in what manner, it can be removed, are questions which have not been argued and upon which we express no opinion. [8] The earlier action at law against the trustees was not an election to hold them to the exclusion of the trust estate. The two positions are not inconsistent, or, if inconsistent, it is not a defense open to the defendants. Holman v. Updike, 208 Mass. 466, 94 N. E. 689, and like cases, do not apply. The rule of election allows the simultaneous employment of remedies not mutually repugnant, looking toward the satisfaction of a single claim. Connihan v. Thompson, 111 Mass. 270; Snow v. Alley, 156 Mass. 193, 30 N. E. 691; Miller v. Hyde, 161 Mass. 472, 37 N. E. 760, 25 L. R. A. 42, 42 Am. St. Rep. 424; Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 363, 91 N. E. 332, 137 Am. St. Rep. 448. Indeed, the doctrine of election has no appropriate place upon this branch of the case as disclosed upon the record. [9] The property of the association is not so peculiar in its nature that it cannot be sold by the means open to a court of equity. Alexander v. McPeck, 189 Mass. 34, 75 N. E. 88; Biggert v. Straub, 193 Mass. 77, 78 N. E. 770, 118 Am. St. Rep. 449; Clarke v. Fay, 205 Mass. 228, 236, 91 N. E. 328, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454. Sale of the title of the trustees would not affect the rights of purchasers of interests from the trustees. If the plaintiff wishes to amend this bill so as to convert it into a bill to reach and apply in payment of this partnership debt property which cannot be attached at law, or to make other appropriate amendments, he ought to be allowed to do so. If he does not wish to amend this bill, he ought to be at liberty to bring a new bill on that ground or to bring an action or suit to enforce the note as a partnership note of the Buena Vista Fruit Company, and the decree should be made without prejudice to such action on his part. Decree reversed. (219 Mass. 405) LONGYEAR v. HARDMAN et al. (two cases). (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Essex. Dec. 3, 1914.) 1. MANDAMUS (§ 128*)-SUBJECTS OF RELIEF -ELECTION TO CORPORATE OFFICE. Mandamus affords the appropriate relief to test the validity of an election to offices in a Massachusetts business corporation, though it is not the purpose of the court to extend the writ into new fields. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mandamus, Cent. Dig. § 263; Dec. Dig. § 128.*] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. 88 27-36; Dec. Dig. § 15.*] 3. CORPORATIONS (§ 282*) TRANSFER OF STOCK-RESTRICTIONS-STATUTES AND BY LAWS-OFFICERS. St. 1903, c. 437, makes the first step in the organization of a corporation the signing by the proposed incorporators of a written agreement of association, and by section 8 (e) requires it to state the restrictions, if any, imposed upon the transfer of capital stock, and then requires the election of the directors and other officers, a first meeting for the adoption of by-laws and and articles of association containing a copy of the agreement of association; and section 28 The agreement of association provided that none regulates the transfer of stock as to its form. of the stock should be transferred without the consent of three-fourths of the capital stock, and a by-law required any stockholder before of the proposed purchaser, the number of selling stock to file a writing giving the name shares, and the purchase price, which sale should not be made unless approved by a meeting of stock shall vote to permit the sale. Held, that the stockholders at which three-fourths of the such restrictions were within the legislative intent, becoming a part of the corporate being and entering into each share of stock, and were not inherently unconscionable; and hence that defendants, claiming to hold offices as directors by virtue of shares of stock transferred in violation of such restrictions, were not qualified, and must surrender their offices. Cent. Dig. §§ 1189-1194; Dec. Dig. § 282.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, 4. CORPORATIONS (§ 65*)-"STOCK IN A COR PORATION." "Stock in a corporation" is not merely property, but creates a personal relation analogous, otherwise than technically, to a partnership. Cent. Dig. §§ 165-171; Dec. Dig. § 65.* [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Stock.] Case Reserved from Supreme Judicial Court, Essex County. Suit in equity and petition for writ of mandamus by Howard W. Longyear against Fred H. Hardman and others. Writ of mandamus to issue. Harold S. Davis, of Boston, for plaintiff. Emery B. Gibbs, of Boston, and Hiram E. Miller, of Lynn, for defendants. RUGG, C. J. [1, 2] These are proceedings to test the validity of the election of the defendants to certain offices in the Hardman Button Company, a Massachusetts business corporation. To this end a suit in equity and a petition for a writ of mandamus have been We think mandamus affords the brought. appropriate relief. In American RailwayFrog Co. v. Haven, 101 Mass. 398, 3 Am. Rep 377, the petition was in the name of the corporation, but the substance of the matter there adjudicated is indistinguishable from that here presented. See, also, J. H. Wentworth v. French, 176 Mass. 442, 57 N. E. 789 Mandamus is recognized as the proper rem- | divided, and the restrictions, if any, imposed edy to restore to his corporate rights a mem- upon their transfer." The next step in orber of a corporation excluded therefrom.ganization is the holding of the first meeting Haupt v. Rogers, 170 Mass. 71, 77, 48 N. E. of the incorporators, at which by-laws are 1080, a situation somewhat akin to that here adopted and a board of directors and other at issue. Stackpole v. Seymour, 127 Mass. 104, officers elected. Then a majority of the diis distinguishable, for there it was held that rectors must prepare and sign articles of asthere was an adequate and complete remedy sociation containing, with other information, by an action for damages for whatever wrong a copy of the "agreement of association." the, plaintiff had suffered. It is doubtful if These articles of organization, after receiva bill in equity lies under these circumstanc- ing the approval of the commissioner of corNew England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. porations, must be filed and recorded in the Phillips, 141 Mass. 535, where at pages 545, office of the secretary of the commonwealth. 546, 6 N. E. 534, it seems to be intimated that Thereafter the certificate of incorporation ismandamus is an appropriate remedy. Rec- sues. No attempt was made to conform to ognizing that the use of this writ has been the terms of the articles of association or of carried rather far in this commonwealth and article XIV of the by-laws in transferring that it is not the purpose of the court to ex- shares of stock upon the validity of which tend its employment into new fields (Fowler rest the election in question. The contenv. Brooks, 188 Mass. 64, 74 N. E. 291, 3 Ann. tion of the defendants is that these terms Cas. 173), the case at bar falls within limits constitute unlawful restrictions upon the already established. transfer of stock as being in restraint of trade and hence need not be observed. es. [3] The decision of the case on its merits depends on the legal effect of a clause in the agreement of association by the incorporators of the Hardman Button Company, of this tenor: "None of the shares of the capital stock shall be sold, hypotheticated or transferred without the consent of three-fourths of the capital stock of the corporation." This is supplemented by article XIV of the by-laws, the material portion of which is in the footnote.1 The certificates of stock is sued by the company were in the usual form, with the additional statement that their transfer was "subject to the restrictions set forth in article XIV of the by-laws." This corporation was formed under St. 1903, c. 437. The first step there provided in the organization of a corporation is the signing by those proposing to become incorporators of a written agreement of association. Amongst other details set forth in the statute as to the contents of this agreement, section 8 (e) requires that it shall state "the number of shares into which the capital stock is to be [4] It is a fundamental consideration that our statute contemplates the imposition of restrictions upon the transfer of stock as within the power of the incorporators. That is demonstrated by the clause already quoted from section 8 (e), a clause which for the first time here finds its place in our corporation law. It is significant of the purpose of the Legislature that this express authority is conferred on the incorporators. In general, therefore, restrictions upon such transfer cannot be regarded as contrary to public policy, but must be treated as within the contemplation of the Legislature. The absence of any definite limitation upon the power of the incorporators to impose restrictions must be taken to be a legislative determination that considerable latitude was intended. No such restrictions can be stricken down as unlawful under these circumstances unless palpably unreasonable. A corporation bears some resemblance to a partnership. Plainly no new partner can be introduced into a partnership without the assent of all the partners. Said Chief Justice Holmes in Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, at page 479, 63 N. E. 934, at page 935, when discussing a somewhat similar proposition: "Stock in a corporation is not merely property. It also creates a personal relation analogous otherwise than technically to a partnership. ** There seems to be no greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's associates in a corporation than in a firm." 1 Article XIV: "Any stockholder of this corporation who shall be desirous of selling any of his shares, the executor or administrator of any member deceased, and the grantee or assignee of any shares sold on execution, shall before selling the same file a statement in writing with the clerk of the corporation, giving the name of the proposed purchaser, the number of shares to be sold and the purchase price per share. The secretary shall thereupon call a meeting of the stockholders of the company, giving in substance the information contained The motives for the retention of such right in such statement to each stockholder in the in a small business corporation, where subnotice of the meeting. Such meeting shall take place not more than thirty days after the date stantial changes in ownership of stock well of the filing of such a statement with the clerk. might be accompanied by a change of manIf three-fourths of the stock issued and out-aging officers, are obvious. Subscriptions of standing shall vote in favor of permitting such sale then such stockholder may sell and dispose stock sufficient to organize the corporation of said stock in accordance with such vote; with adequate capital might be difficult to otherwise such stock shall not be sold and the president and treasurer of the corporation shall not be authorized to issue any new shares of stock in exchange for the stock held by such stockholder." obtain unless permanency of management were secured in some way against possible changes arising from mutations in the ownership of a bare majority of the stock. Ele (219 Mass. 374) WOOD v. OLDFIELD et al. 1. CHARITIES (§ 10*)- TRUSTS - CREATION ments of importance both to the subscribers | clusion that the restriction in the agreement of capital stock and to the executive officers of association amplified but not modified in might render some such restriction a valua- substance in the by-law is valid. This deble security to the investment of money and cision, however, is confined strictly to the to the personal devotion of individuals in facts here presented and does not undertake building up the business. The characteristics to lay down principles governing other cirof associated stockholders may be important. cumstances. It finds support in the reasonHarmony of purpose and of business methods ing and result of the following decisions, and ideals among stockholders may be a sig- though none are direct authorities to this nificant element in success. The insertion point. New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, of the restriction upon the right of transfer 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432, 27 L. R. A. 271; of the shares of stock in the agreement of Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N. E. 934; association, the initial act in the organiza- Kingman v. Spurr, 7 Pick. 235; Blue Mountion of the company upon which depends all tain Forest Association v. Borrowe, 71 N. H. that comes after, is a limitation upon the 69, 51 Atl. 670. It follows that the defendcorporation. It becomes a part of its being ants, who claim to hold office as directors and enters into each share of stock as a part by virtue of shares of stock transferred in of its essence. The corporation comes into violation of this restriction inherent in the existence with this inherent qualifying re- nature of the corporation, are not qualified straint. It is agreed to by all the original and must surrender their offices as such. incorporators who in respect of determining Writ to issue. the nature of the corporation speak for future stockholders. It must be approved by the commissioner of corporations as representative of the commonwealth before the charter can issue. A copy of it becomes a part of the public records in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth, where it may be read of all who contemplate becoming stockholders. The certificate of stock contains reference to the by-law enacted in pursuance of the clause in the agreement of association. It becomes in substance and effect a part of its charter. The owners of stock in a corporation thus organized' cannot complain of such a congenital characteristic. Each stockholder takes his stock sub-fund, unless carried beyond the limits of sound A provision for accumulation of a trust ject to this restriction. The establishment public policy, is good in case of a public charof valid restrictions upon sales of pews bears some analogy to the case at bar. Attorney General v. Federal Street Meeting House, 3 Gray, 1, 47; French v. Old South Society in Boston, 106 Mass. 479. That there is nothing inherently unconscionable in such restriction is manifest from the very broad power exercised by organizers of companies under the English acts and in some of our states. Bargate v. Shortridge, 5 H. L. C. 297; Moffatt v. Farquhar, 7 Ch. Div. 591; Borland's Trustee v. Steel Brothers & Co., Limited, [1901] 1 Ch. 279, 288-290; Ripin v. U. S. Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 98 N. E. 855; In re Laun, 146 Wis. 252, 131 N. W. 366; Dempster Mfg. Co. v. Downs, 126 Iowa, 80, 101 N. W. 735, 106 Am. St. Rep. 340, 3 Ann. Cas. 187. See Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N. E. 991, 137 Am. St. Rep. 764, 19 Ann. Cas. 699. The defendants rely upon section 28 of the corporation law as decisive against the restriction. But that section merely regulates the transfer of stock as to form. It does not affect the innate characteristics of the stock which are antecedent to any transfer and follow it into the hands of every purchaser. All these considerations lead to the con A trust to apply the income partly to the care and adornment of a public cemetery, situated in a town and the town's property, and partly to the general expenses of that town, is valid as a trust for public charity. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. § 34; Dec. Dig. § 10.*] 2. PERPETUITIES (§ 9*)-PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST-ACCUMULATION. ity. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Perpetuities, Cent. Dig. §§ 67-73; Dec. Dig. § 9.*] 3. CHARITIES (§ 25*) - CHARITABLE TRUST — ACCUMULATION-CY PRES. Where a trust was created to accumulate the income and apply part of it to the adornment of a town cemetery, and part to the gention is declared invalid, it would be disregarded, eral expenses of the town, and the accumulaand the whole income applied either to the particular charities prescribed by the creator of the trust, or to similar charitable purposes under the cy pres doctrine. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. §§ 11-13; Dec. Dig. § 25.*] 4. TAXATION (§ 245*)-EXEMPT PROPERTY— TRUST FOR PUBLIC USES. A trust fund, left to the officers of a town as trustees, to accumulate the income and apply part to the maintenance of a town cemetery and part to the benefit of the town, was property appropriated to public use, and exempt from taxation. Cent. Dig. § 415; Dec. Dig. § 245.*] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Appeal from Superior Court, Bristol County. Action by Walter C. S. Wood against Charles T. Oldfield and others, as trustees of the Hicks Reserve Fund. Decree for defend- ' ants, and complainant appeals. Affirmed. Plaintiff sued in contract to recover $1,- | disregarded, and the whole of the income 510 as town collector of Norton for taxes as- will be applied either to the particular charsessed for 1912 and 1913 against the defend-ities prescribed by the creator of the trust, ants, as trustees of the Hicks Reserve Fund. or to similar charitable purposes under the This fund was one created in 1883 by Cyrus cy pres doctrine. Ely v. Atty. Gen., 202 Hicks, whereby he gave to the town of Nor- Mass. 545, 89 N. E. 166; Grimke v. Atty. Gen., ton a small sum of money, to be accumulated 206 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 899; Norris v. Loomis, until the income of the principal reached 215 Mass. 344, 102 N. E. 419. In either event $5,000, when $100 from the income was to be it is difficult to say that the fund is liable to used by the town for its general expenses and taxation. $100 from the income for the care and adorn- [4] This fund is held by officers of the ment of the center cemetery in Norton, a pub- town for public charitable purposes going dilic cemetery owned by the town, in which the rectly to the benefit of the town, and, in so residents of the town had lots free. When far as so applied, relieving its inhabitants Cyrus Hicks died in 1889, he made the fund from the burden of taxation. This comes residuary legatee under his will, and the within the principles of Williston Seminary executors paid over to the trustees $11,318.70 v. County Commissioners, 147 Mass. 427, 18 N. E. 210, Essex v. Brooks, 164 Mass. 79, 41 N. E. 119, Burr v. Boston, 208 Mass. 537, 95 N. E. 208, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143, and Mass. General Hospital v. Boston, 212 Mass. 20, 98 N. E. 583. as the residuary legacy under the declaration of trust. The selectmen of the town and the town treasurer constituted the trustees of the fund, and the various selectmen and treasurers in office since 1883 have had sole care and custody of the fund, and have invested it and reinvested it, so that now it is about $50,000. A greater portion, or practically 95 per cent., of the income was required to accumulate for a period of 100 years, and thereafter that 80 per cent. of the income should forever accumulate. The General Court of Massachusetts, by St. 1884, c. 139, authorized the town to accept the gift as provided by the declaration of trust, and afterwards by St. 1890, c. 349, authorized the town to receive the residuary bequest under the will of Hicks, and these were both accepted by the town at town meeting called for the purpose. P. H. Reilly, of Taunton, for appellant. A. R. White, 2d, of Taunton, for appellees. SHELDON, J. [1] Subject to the provisions for accumulation, this fund is held in It is upon a like principle that the property of a public or quasi public corporation, appropriated to public use, is exempt from taxation. Milford Water Co. v. Hopkinton, 192 Mass. 491, 78 N. E. 451, and cases cited. That the fund is held by the officers of the town as trustees, and not directly by the town itself, is not material. Watson v. Boston, 209 Mass. 18, 95 N. E. 302; Little v. Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 418, 96 N. E. 1032, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 425. The judgment for the defendants was ordered rightly, and must be affirmed. So ordered. (219 Mass. 378) OLDFIELD et al. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Bristol. Nov. 24, 1914.) trust to apply the income, partly to the care 1. CHARITIES (§ 15*) — CHARITABLE TRUST VALIDITY. valid charitable trust. and adornment of a public cemetery situated A declaration creating a trust, part of the in the town of Norton and being the proper- income of which was to be used for the care of ty of that town, and partly to the general ex- the grantor's cemetery lot, and part applied topenses of that town. These are proper ob-viding for an accumulation of income, was a ward the general expenses of the town, and projects of a public charitable trust. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 552, 556; Burbank v. Burbank, 152 Mass. 254, 256, 25 N. E. 427, 9 L. R. A. 748; Morse v. Natick, 176 Mass. 510, 513, 57 N. E. 996; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phill. 185; Nightingale v. Goulburn, 5 Hare, 484; Atty. Gen. v. Lonsdale, 1 Sim. 105. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Charities. Cent. Dig. § 39; Dec. Dig. § 15.*] 2. PERPETUITIES (§ 9*)-CHARITABLE TRUST— ACCUMULATIONS-PUBLIC POLICY. The limits of an accumulation for charity are subject to the order of a court of equity, though such a provision ought not to be inter[2] A provision for accumulation, unless it fered with, unless the accumulation appears to be unreasonable, unnecessary, contrary to pubis carried beyond the limits of a sound pub-lic policy, or creates a public injury. lic policy, is good in the case of a public charitable trust. Hawes Place Congregational Society v. Trustees of Hawes Fund, 5 Cush. 454, 458; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 1; Codman v. Brigham, 187 Mass. 309, 72 N. E. 1008, 105 Am. St. Rep. 394. [3] In this case, if the provision for accumulation is valid, the whole trust remains good; if that provision is invalid, it will be [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Perpetuities, Cent. Dig. §§ 67-73; Dec. Dig. § 9.*] 3. PERPETUITIES (§ 9*) - ACCUMULATIONS LEGISLATIVE SANCTION. Since within the constitutional limits the Legislature may determine all questions of public policy, a trust creating an accumulation would not be set aside by the courts on the the trust had been ratified by legislative enactground that the accumulation was illegal, where ment (St. 1883, c. 246, as amended by St. 1884, For other cases see same pic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes |