low that, because the circumstances are such that plaintiff in error could enforce a claim for compensation for the use of the carriage, the circumstances are also such as would make plaintiff in error liable for injuries sustained through the negligence of the driver. The proof was insufficient to make out a prima facie case, and the peremptory instruction should have been given. (264 III. 305) SCOWN V. CZARNECKI et al. (No. 9296.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 13, 1914. Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1914.) 1. STATUTES (§ 141*)-AMENDMENT-SETTING FORTH PROVISION AS ALTERED OR AMENDED -"AMENDATORY ACT." Act June 26, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 333), known as the Woman Suffrage Act, extending to women the right of suffrage as to certain officers and subjects named therein, though enlarging and changing the qualifications for electors as prescribed by Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 46, § 65, is not an amendatory act within Const. art. 4, § 13, requiring amendatory acts to insert therein the section of the old act amended; the act being complete in itself, and the intention of the Legislature being ascertainable without reference to any prior act, and the only purpose of the constitutional requirement is to enable the meaning of the amendatory act to be ascertained by an examination of such act itself, without the necessity of examining the prior acts amended. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 48, 198, 209; Dec. Dig. § 141.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, p. 370.] 2 ELECTIONS (§ 18*) - QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS-WOMAN SUFFRAGE ACT-CONSTITUTIONALITY. The officers for whom women are granted the right to vote by Act June 26, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 333), known as the Woman's Suffrage Act, extending to women the right to vote for certain officers, being of statutory and not of constitutional origin, the act is not void and unconstitutional because the right to vote is by Const. art. 7, § 1, prescribing the qualifications of electors, limited to male citizens, since such constitutional provision only refers to offices provided for or created by the Constitution and not to offices of statutory origin. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 18.*] Const. art. 7, § 1, providing that every male citizen above the age of 21 years having resided in the state 1 year, in the county 90 days, and in the election district 30 days, next preceding any election therein, shall be entitled to vote therein, the words "any election" do not refer to and embrace every election at which any political office is to be filled, but only to election for such offices as are created by and provided for in the Constitution. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] 8. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 21*)— NATURE-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES. similar instrumentalities for the control of the School districts, boards of education, and education of the people of the state are political agencies of the government and not merely philanthropical. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 39, 40; Dec. Dig. § 21.*] 9. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 21*)— "SCHOOL DISTRICTS"-Nature. "School districts" are involuntary political divisions of the state, each embracing a certain territory, organized for the public advantage and not in the interest of individuals, having for their purpose the exercise within their territory, by their inhabitants and for their benefit, of that part of the governmental functions committed to them. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 39, 40; Dec. Dig. § 21.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6345-6347; vol. 8, p. 7795.] 10. ELECTIONS (§ 18*) -QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS-WOMAN SUFFRAGE ACT-CONSTITUTIONALITY. 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 70*)-JUDICIAL Only electors possessing the qualifications FUNCTIONS-WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE ACT-VA- prescribed by Const. art. 7, § 1, can participate LIDITY-WISDOM OF STATUTE. in the referendums upon various questions and The right to determine who may vote rest-propositions as provided in different sections of ing with the Legislature and not the courts, the court could not, in determining the constitutionality of a woman's suffrage act, give expression to its own individual views as to the justice, wisdom, or policy of extending the right to women. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 129-132, 137; Dec. Dig. § 70.*] 4. ELECTIONS (§ 1*)—QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS-SUFFRAGE. The right of suffrage is not a natural right, but exists only by positive law. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. § 1.*] the Constitution, and hence Act June 26, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 333), known as the Woman's Suffrage Act, in so far as it extends to women the right of suffrage as to such as are provided for by the Constitution, is unconstitutional and void. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 18.*] 11. ELECTIONS (§ 18*) - QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS-WOMAN SUFFRAGE ACT-CONSTRUC TION. Act June 26, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 333), known as the Woman's Suffrage Act, granting to women the right to vote for the officers named therein. "upon all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors of such municipalities or other political divisions of the state, attempts to confer the right of suffrage upon women of all questions or propositions submitted to the electors of a county, since the words "other political divisions of this state" include counties. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 18.*] 12. STATUTES (§ 64*)-PARTIAL INVALIDITY. Where a statute is in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, the constitutional part will be given effect and the unconstitutional part disregarded, unless the unconstitutional part is of such a character that it may be inferred that without it the Legislature would not have passed the act. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. 88 58-66, 195; Dec. Dig. § 64.*] 13. STATUTES (§ 64*)-EFFECT OF PARTIAL INVALIDITY-WOMAN SUFFRAGE ACT. That Act June 26, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 333), known as the Woman's Suffrage Act, extending the right of suffrage to women as to the various officers specified therein, and upon all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors "of the municipalities named therein or other political divisions of the state," was unconstitutional in so far as it attempted to extend the rights to participate in referendums provided for by the Constitution, did not render the whole act void, but the constitutional provisions were valid. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-66, 195; Dec. Dig. § 64.*] 14. COURTS (§ 93*)-PRECEDENTS-PREVIOUS DECISIONS. When the meaning of a constitutional provision has been considered by the court and declared by its decisions, that meaning cannot be afterwards considered open to question or further argument. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 336-339; Dec. Dig. § 93.*] 15. ELECTIONS (§ 60*)-QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS-WOMAN SUFFRAGE ACT-PURPOSE OF ACT. DUNN, J. William J. Scown filed a bill in the superior court of Cook county in be half of all other taxpayers as well as himself to restrain the election commissioners of the city of Chicago and the town of Cicero from expending money for providing separate ballots and ballot boxes for women, and for other purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the act of the Legislature of June 26, 1913, known as the Woman's Suffrage Act (Laws of 1913, p. 333), and the Act of June 30, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 310), amending the primary election laws. A demurrer was sustained to the bill, which was dismissed for want of equity, and the complainant appealed. The ground on which the injunction was asked was that the expenditures complained of were not authorized by law because the Woman's Suffrage Act is unconstitutional, and that is the only question to be considered. The act provides as follows: "Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: That all women, citizens of the United States, above the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the state one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding any election therein, shall be allowed to vote at such elecState Board of Equalization, clerk of the Aption for presidential electors, member of the pellate Court, county collector, county surveyor, members of board of assessors, members of board of review, sanitary district trustees, and for all officers of cities, villages and towns (except police magistrates), and upon all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors of such municipalities or other political divisions of the state. "Sec. 2. All such women may also vote for Supervisor, the following township officers: town clerk, assessor, collector and highway comThe object of the General Assembly in pass-in all annual and special town meetings in the missioner, and may also participate and vote ing Act June 26, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 333), known as the Woman's Suffrage Act, extending to women the right of suffrage as to the various officers named therein and upon all ques tions and propositions submitted to the municipalities named therein or other political divisions of the state, was to confer upon women the right of suffrage to the fullest extent permitted by the limitations of the Constitution. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 56; Dec. Dig. § 60.*] Farmer, Cooke, and Craig, JJ., dissenting. Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Charles M. Foell, Judge. Bill by William J. Scown against Anthony Czarnecki and others. Decree for de fendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, of Chicago (Levy Mayer and Alfred S. Austrian, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant. Charles H. Mitchell, of Chicago (John J. Herrick, Charles S. Cutting, and I. T. Greenacre, all of Chicago, and Joel F. Longenecker, of Lander, Wyo., of counsel), McEwen, Weissenbach, Shrimski & Meloan, of Chicago (Williard McEwen and Israel Shrimski, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees. township in which such election district shall be. shall be provided for women which ballots shall "Sec. 3. Separate ballot boxes and ballots contain the names of the candidates for such offices which are to be voted for and the special questions submitted as aforesaid, and the the other ballots cast for such officers and on ballots cast by women shall be canvassed with such questions. At any such election where registration is required, women shall register in the same manner as male voters." [1] It is first contended that this act is in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, because it amends the general election laws but does not insert in the new act the section amended; reference being made particularly to section 65 of chapter 46 of the Revised Statutes, which is in the identical language of section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution, as follows: "Sec. 1. Every person having resided in this state one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding any election therein, who was an elector in this state on the first day of April, in the year of our Lord 1848, or obtained a certificate of naturalization before any court of record in this state prior to the first day of January, in the year of our Lord 1870, or who shall be a male citizen of the United States, above the •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes age of twenty-one years, shall be entitled to, vote rests with the Legislature and not the vote at such election." It cannot be denied that the act in question changes the qualifications prescribed by said section 65 for voters for the offices mentioned in the act, and, if it is to be regarded only as an amendment of that section, the constitutional requirement has not been complied with and the act is void. Not every enactment, however, which enlarges, stricts, or modifies previous statutes is subject to the constitutional objection made here. courts, and the courts have no authority to interfere with the act of the Legislature unless such act has been clearly prohibited by some provision of the Constitution. It is elementary that the right of suffrage is not a natural right but exists only by positive law; that the Constitution is not a grant of authority so far as the Legislature is concernre-ed but is a limitation of legislative power, and that the legislative power of the General Assembly is unlimited, except by such restrictions as the Constitution has imposed in ex"Any new provision of law may in some press terms or by necessary implication. It sense be said to amend and change the prior is also true that where the Constitution has system of laws, and whenever there is an irreconcilable conflict between two acts the later prescribed the qualifications of the electors one must prevail. To the extent of the conflict they cannot be changed by the Legislature. the later act amends the earlier one by impli- The question presented therefore is whether cation, and if the later act is not amendatory in the qualifications of electors prescribed by form and perfect in itself it is not within the prohibition of the Constitution. It is not nec- section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution apessary, when a new act is passed, that all prior ply to elections for the officers named in the acts modified by it by implication shall be re- act under consideration, and this question enacted and published at length." Hollingsworth v. Chicago & Carterville Coal Co., 243 has been heretofore answered, practically Ill. 98, 90 N. Ē. 276. and in principle, by the decisions of this The requirement of the Constitution was court, in the negative. None of the offices intended to enable the meaning of enact-named in the act in question are mentioned ments directly amending prior statutes to in the Constitution, but all have been created be ascertained by an examination of the by statutory enactments. From the time of enactments themselves, without the necessity the organization of the territory of the Unitof examining all prior statutes on the sub-ed States northwest of the Ohio river under ject to ascertain the effect of the amendment. The purpose of this provision and its meaning have been announced in numerous cases, and in People v. Crossley, 261 Ill. 78, 103 N. E. 537, the whole question was again considered with reference to these cases, and the rule was reiterated that: "An act which is complete in itself and does not purport, either in its title or in the body thereof, to amend or revive any other act, is valid, though it may by implication modify or repeal prior existing statutes." This act does not purport to amend or revive any other act, and it is complete in itself. Its only object is to extend to women the right of suffrage so far as the offices and subjects mentioned in it are concerned. The intention of the Legislature can be ascertained without reference to any prior act. The act is entirely intelligible; its meaning appears clearly on its face; no further legislation is necessary; no machinery other than is provided is required to put it in operation and make it effective; nothing remains to be done other than for the women to vote. The act does not violate section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution. [2-6] It is argued that by section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution, which has already been set out, the power of extending the right of suffrage to women has been denied to the Legislature. This question is one of constitutional construction, purely. We cannot give expression to our own views as to the justice, the wisdom, or the public policy of extending the right of suffrage to women or permit those views to affect the decision of the ordinance of 1787, the right of suffrage tioned in the Constitution, but the inference to be drawn from the opinion was that it was competent. A year later this precise question was presented to the court in the case of Plummer v. Yost, 144 Ill. 68, 33 N. E. 191, 19 L. R. A. 110, in which case two men contested the election of two women as members of the board of education of a school district. The election turned upon the votes of women cast and counted for the women candidates, who would otherwise have been defeated. It was held that as to the two school officers mentioned in the Constitution-the state superintendent of public instruction and the county superintendent of public instruction-the qualifications of electors must be those prescribed in section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution, but that the General Assembly had complete control as to what other school offices should be created and the manner in which the incumbents of those offices should be designated, and, if it provided for the choice of such officers by popular vote, it was not necessary that the voters should have the same qualifications as those of electors as defined by the Constitution. These two cases have established this construction of the Constitution and they have been followed without question for many years. Ackerman v. Haenck, 147 Ill. 514, 35 N. E. 381; Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N. E. 303, 42 L. R. A. 809, 69 Am. St. Rep. 228; Collier v. Anlicker, 189 Ill. 34, 59 N. E. 615; Bloome v. Hograeff, 193 Ill. 195, 61 N. E. 1071. The distinction which they indicate between offices of constitutional origin and those created by statutes as to their control by the Legislature has been repeatedly recognized, and the rule has been often announced that an office created by legislative action is wholly within the control of the Legislature. If an office is not of constitutional origin, it is competent for the Legislature to declare the manner of filling it, how, when, and by whom the incumbent shall be elected or appointed, and to change, from time to time, the mode of election or appointment. People v. Morgan, 90 Ill. 558; People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. E. 229, 41 L. R. A. 775; People v. Loeffler, 175 Ill. 585, 51 N. E. 785; People v. Olson, 245 Ill. 288, 92 N. E. 157; People v. Bowman, 247 Ill. 276, 93 N. E. 244. [7] By these decisions the rule is settled that section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution refers only to elections provided for by that instrument. The qualifications of voters at such elections are fixed by the Constitution, and the Legislature cannot change them. Other elections, however, provided for only by statute and not by the Constitution, are wholly within the control of the Legislature. Against this statement of the law it is contended by counsel for the appellant, in the language of their brief: "That the words 'any election,' in section 1, refer to and embrace every election at which any political office is to be filled, whether the political office is created by the Constitution itself or by any law passed by the Legislature under the powers conferred upon it by that Constitution." They then proceed to argue that the case of Plummer v. Yost, supra, and the cases which followed it, are not inconsistent with their argument because those cases involved only "district school elections, i. e., nonpolitical elections," and they lay down the postu late that: "School districts, boards of education and similar instrumentalities for the control of the education of the people of the state are of a exercise no functions of a political or governphilanthropic and nonpolitical character. They mental nature." This proposition is essential to their argument, for if school directors and members of boards of education hold political offices, then it has been the uniform holding of this court for more than 20 years that the words "any election," in section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution, do not embrace every election at which any political office is to be filled and that the Legislature may confer on women the right to vote for political offices. [8, 9] Counsel give no definition of "political," and we know of no division of the agencies of government into those which are political and those which are philanthropic. The terms have no relation to each other, and the division is no more logical than would be a division of articles into those which are red and those which are round. "Political" is thus defined by Webster: "Of or pertaining to polity or politics, or the conduct of government, referring in the widest application to the judicial, executive and legislative branches; of or pertaining to or incidental to the exercise of the functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government; relating to the management of affairs of state." Politics is: "The science and art of government; the science dealing with the organization, regulation and administration of a state in both its internal and external affairs.'" The public school system of the state was not established and has not been maintained as a charity or from philanthropic motives. The first legislative expression in regard to schools in Illinois was in the ordinance of 1787, which declares that: "Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." This declaration grew, not out of philanthropic motives, but out of a consideration of the essentials of good government. The conduct and maintenance of schools by school directors, school trustees, and boards of education is no less an "exercise of the functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government," is no less a part of "the science and art of government," and deals no less with "the organization, regulation and administration of a state" in its internal affairs, than the construction and maintenance of roads by the commissioners of tution, passed an act in 1872 'to establish and maintain a system of free schools.' Rev. St. of public instruction and the county superin1874, p. 947, c. 122. The state superintendent tendents of schools were made component and important parts of the system established by the act, and their duties were therein defined, But notwithstanding this, the requirements of and provisions therein made for their election. sections 3 and 20 of article 5 of the Constitution, in regard to the election of a state superfull force, as also did the provision of the Conintendent of public instruction, still remained in who could vote at an election for such state superintendent, or for any other officer provided for in the Constitution." In distinguishing the case of Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1, 43 N. W. 24 (which counsel for the appellant rely upon here), and the cases of Wheeler v. Brady, 15 Kan. 26, and State v. Cones, 15 Neb. 444, 19 N. W. 682, in which the right of women to vote for district school officers had been sustained, it was further said in the English Case, 139 Ill. 631, 29 N. E. 680, 15 L. R. A. 131: highways; the conduct and maintenance of the charitable institutions of the state by the board of administration; the inspection of factories, and the enforcement of the laws for the protection of workmen and in regard to the employment of women and children, by the factory inspectors; the performance by the industrial board of the duties imposed upon it by law, and the performance of many other duties by public officials which, how ever beneficial to individuals, are not under-stitution which fixed the qualifications of those taken from philanthropic or charitable motives, but for the protection, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state in the interest of good government. School districts are involuntary political divisions of the state, each embracing a certain territory and all the inhabitants thereof, organized for the public advantage and not in the interest of individuals, having for their purpose the exercise within their territory, by their inhabitants and for their benefit, of that part of the governmental function committed to them. There is no higher exercise of the sovereign power than the exaction from the citizen of a part of his property as taxes, in payment of his proportionate share of the expenses of government. When school directors levy taxes, they exercise political power of the highest quality. When they purchase school sites, build and equip schoolhouses, employ teachers, and disburse, in their discretion, public funds for these purposes, their action is political; it pertains to the conduct of government. It differs in no respect, so far as this quality is constitutional officers. cerned, from the acts of highway commissioners with reference to their duties in connection with roads. Neither school directors nor highway commissioners have legislative or judicial powers, but both are administrative officers, engaged in administering that portion of the government of the state committed to them by law. Neither of them exercises any function which is not of a political and governmental character. This same argument was advanced in the case of People v. English, supra, 139 Ill. 630, 29 N. E. 680, 15 L. R. A. 131, in which counsel for the petitioner made the claim that the constitutional clause that voters shall be males does not refer to school elections but only to political offices; that school districts are quasi corporations of a charitable nature and exert no functions of government; that the Constitution refers only to political of fices; and that the article on education (article 8) should be construed by itself. The court did not take this view of the matter, but said: "It is suggested that article 8 of the Constitution, entitled 'Education,' makes it the duty of the General Assembly to provide a system of free schools,' and that therefore the various sections in said article 8 should be construed by themselves and without reference to other provisions contained in the Constitution. The conclusion reached does not seem to follow from the premises stated. The General Assembly, "We do not consider said cases as here in dered in them are in conflict with the conclusion point or that the decisions which were renwhich we have reached in the present controversy. In the Michigan case the question at issue was in regard to the right of the plaintiff, a woman, to vote, under a statute of that state, at an election for school trustees of a school district, and the court, speaking of the Constitution of the state, said: 'But no officer of the school district is mentioned or recognized by that instrument. The reason is that the whole primary school system was confided to the Legislature, and it cannot be said that the officers of school districts, chosen pursuant to the system adopted by the Legislature, are conWhile it must be conceded that no person can vote for the elec tion of any officer mentioned in the Constitution unless he possesses the qualifications of an elecfollow that none but such electors can vote for tor prescribed by that instrument, it does not officers which the Legislature has the right to provide for, to carry out the educational purpose declared in that instrument.' This is a plain intimation that, if the Constitution of Michigan had provided for or mentioned school trustees of school districts, then the decision in that case would have been otherwise." This plainly indicates that the decision of the court was based upon the ground that the county superintendent of schools is a constitutional officer, and further indicates the view of the court that the decisions cited were based upon the power of the Legislature to provide for the election of officers not mentioned in the Constitution by persons having different qualifications from those prescribed by the Constitution, and that the right of women to vote for school directors and other school officers not mentioned in the Constitution could be sustained only by virtue of such power and not by a construction of article 8 of the Constitution, independently of the other provisions of that instrument. Whether such right could be sustained at all was not then decided; but in Plummer v. Yost, supra, the right was sustained, the court citing the case of Belles v. Burr, supra, and again quoting the last |