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it was with the understanding that he was to loan $5,000 thereof and retain the balance to pay the debts against the estate, and she testified that she did not know he was using the money for his own necessities; that he never told her he was using it. She further testified that in 1906, after frequent attempts to get respondent to pay two notes -one for $600 and the other for $1,600which had been filed and allowed against the estate, she borrowed the money necessary to pay those claims and mortgaged real estate which she owned, as security for the loans. Respondent testified that when Mrs. Cleveland delivered to him the $10,795 she told him to take care of the money and put it in the bank, and use whatever was necessary to take care of the estate, and that this was all that was said about it at that time. Referring to the occasions in 1906 when Mrs. Cleveland called upon him to pay the two notes against the estate he testified:

"These two notes were claims allowed against able out of this fund of $11,000 which was esthe deceased's estate, and were properly paytate money, and a portion of this money-$3,000 or $4,000-at this time still due to the estate and the executrix, Mrs. Cleveland, I had in some chaotic state there; but I could not turn over the money and made some satisfactory explanation to her about it. I do not recollect the nature of that explanation."

in order to help others. It will be observed | cording to Mrs. Cleveland's testimony, when from the commissioner's report that Mrs. the $10,795 was turned over to respondent, Cleveland was the largest subscriber to the fund which it was sought to raise to save the company from financial ruin. The evidence does not disclose that Mrs. Cleveland was advised as to the amounts which the other interested parties would subscribe. It is not shown that she ever saw the subscription list which was signed or the agreement in which it was embodied. The original was not offered in evidence, but a copy thereof was produced, and respondent testified that he did not know whether Mrs. Cleveland signed the document, or whether she authorized him to sign it for her. She testified that she agreed to invest this $1,500, or loan it to the company, upon respondent's representation that the company was unable with its available cash to supply the demand for its products; that it needed more money for that purpose, and that if she would furnish that amount the company would be able to repay the loan which she had theretofore authorized him to make, and which she then believed was $5,000. Respondent in one part of his testimony stated with reference to this transaction, "I represented to her that I wanted this loan of the second $1,500 to increase the volume of the business," although in other parts of his testimony he says the whole matter was fully explained to her. Clark and respondent seem to have been the persons who determined upon the method of raising more money for the company by obtaining subscriptions for preferred stock, and they fixed the amount which each person interested was to be asked to subscribe. Respondent says that these amounts were not fixed with reference to the interest in the company, but with reference to what amount each might be willing and able to take care of, and that he represented Mrs. Cleveland in fixing the amount to be subscribed by her at $1,500-the largest amount to be subscribed by any one. After obtaining these various subscriptions the respondent collected Mrs. Cleveland's subscription by having her sign a note for $1,500, and then obtained the money from a bank upon this note, and instead of collecting the amounts subscribed by the other persons before disbursing the money received from Mrs. Cleveland, he proceeded to pay out the $1,500 upon the company's indebtedness and permitted the other parties to the agreement to escape paying their subscriptions. This conduct is not consistent with the theory that respondent's sole motive in this transaction was to serve the interests of his client, but shows a serious disregard of the duty which he, as her attorney and adviser, owed to her.

Again, referring to the same time, he testified:

"She did not know I was using this money. Nothing was said about that at that time."

He further testified that, after Mrs. Cleveland had delivered the $10,795 to him, he asked her to loan him some money, and that she directed him to use the money in his hands as he needed it and afterwards account for it. Mrs. Cleveland denies this, and says that he said nothing to her about borrowing money from her until after she had been compelled to pay the two notes against the estate in 1906, and that thereafter she did loan him money from time to time, but not out of this fund.

Respondent's account with the Western Trust & Savings Bank was offered by relator, and it appears therefrom that on October 10, 1904, respondent deposited with said bank $10,795; that his balance on November 30, 1904, was $282.37, and on December 31, 1904, $187.78. It thus appears that respondent used all except $282.37 of the balance of the money intrusted to his care by Mrs. Cleveland, after loaning $7,500 thereof to the Search Light Manufacturing Company. within less than two months after he had received it, well knowing that it was estate money and would be needed to pay debts against the estate. Our conclusion from a Only one other matter need be mentioned. consideration of all the evidence upon this Respondent claims that Mrs. Cleveland au- subject is that respondent used this balance thorized him to use the balance of the money without the knowledge or consent of Mrs. remaining in his hands after loaning the Cleveland, and the fact that he may have $7,500, to meet his personal obligations. Ac-afterwards informed her of this fact, and

that the statement rendered to her in 1912 | ant, complainant appeals. Reversed and reshows that he now has none of the funds in manded. his hands and has fully accounted for the same, does not exonerate him from the charge that in using this fund he was guilty of a violation of his duty as an attorney.

For the reasons above stated, the exceptions to the commissioner's report are sustained, and the respondent is suspended from practice as an attorney for a period of one year and until thereafter permitted to resume practice by order of this court.

Respondent suspended.

FARMER, J. (dissenting). I do not agree with the decision in this case. Suspension of respondent is not justified unless he was influenced by improper motives in the transactions complained of. If his motives were corrupt, he should be disbarred; if they were not, the rule should be discharged. I think the most the proof shows is that respondent's judgment proved to have been bad. He did not profit anything by the loans

made on behalf of his client. In fact, he loaned the same corporation a considerable amount of his own means, without security, and the same was lost. I am convinced respondent acted in good faith, and, much as

the results of his transactions in loaning

the money are to be regretted, I do not think this suspension warranted.

In my opinion the rule should be discharged.

(265 Ill. 106)

CALUMET & CHICAGO CANAL & DOCK
CO. v. O'CONNELL, County Collector.
(No. 9516.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 16, 1914.)
1. TAXATION (§ 120*) — ASSESSMENT - ASSESS-
MENT OF CORPORATE STOCK.

Pringle & Fearing and Bentley, Burling & Swan, all of Chicago, for appellant. Maclay Hoyne, State's Atty., of Chicago (Charles Center Case, Jr., and William H. Duval, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

DUNN, J. The state board of equalization assessed the fair cash value of the capital stock of the appellant, the Calumet & Chicago Canal & Dock Company, over and above the assessed value of its tangible property, for the year 1908 at $100,000, for 1909 at $105,000, for each of the years 1910, 1911, and 1912 at $150,000, and for 1913 at $45,000. the collection of taxes on the assessment, and Each year the appellant filed a bill to enjoin the bill in this case was filed in the superior

court of Cook county to enjoin all the taxes, pursuant to an agreement for the dismissal of the former suits and the uniting of the ob

jections to all the assessments in one bill. The court, having sustained a demurrer, dismissed the bill for want of equity, and the complainant appealed.

It is averred in the bill that the appellant was organized for the purpose of maintaining docks, slips, canals, etc., and acquired a large amount of unimproved land near Lake Calumet, in Chicago, the greater part of which has not been salable, owing to lack of drainage, and the sole business of the appellant for many years has been caring for and attempting to dispose of this vacant real estate. In each of the years from 1908, to 1913, inclusive, its tangible property was assessed and the assessment confirmed by the board of review of Cook county, the amount varying from $3,039,846 in 1908 to $2,036,092 in 1913. In each of these years the appellant filed with the board of assessors a schedule, as required by section 32 of the Revenue Law, and mailed a copy to the state board of equalization. The rules of the state board of equalization for the assessment of the fair cash value of the capital stock of corporations in excess of the equalized valuation of their tangible property provide, in substance, that the fair cash value of the shares of capital stock and the amount of the indebtedness of the corporation, except indebtedness for current expenses, shall be added together and the aggregate amount shall be equalized with other property throughout the state, and from the aggregate amount so equalized shall be deducted the aggregate equalized valuation of all tangible property of the corporation, and one-third (in 1908 one-fifth) of the remainder shall be the assessed value of the capital stock of the corporation over and above its tangible property. At no time during the years in question did the appellant Bill by the Calumet & Chicago Canal & have any indebtedness except for current exDock Company against William L. O'Connell, penses, and at no time did its indebtedness, County Collector. From a decree for defend-except for taxes, exceed $2,000. During all

The tangible property of a corporation consisted of unimproved real estate, and the only business which it carried on was that of attempting to dispose of its real estate. There was no indebtedness to increase the value of its stock, and the market value of the stock at no time exceeded the valuation of its tangible property. Held, that it was improper for the state board of equalization to arbitrarily assess the corporation's stock for an amount in excess of the assessed valuation of its tangible property. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 216-218; Dec. Dig. § 120.*] 2. TAXATION (§ 500*) — ASSESSMENT - POWER OF COURTS TO REVIEW.

While the courts have no authority to supervise the valuation of property by the officers to whom its valuation for taxation has been committed by law, yet, where officials, as the state board of equalization, disregard their own rules and arbitrarily assess the capital stock of a corporation, such assessment may be vacated. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 925-930; Dec. Dig. § 500.*] Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Charles M. Foell, Judge.

ble property of the corporation, the amount of its indebtedness, and the market value of its stock are averred, and it is admitted that in no year did the value of its stock exceed the valuation of its tangible property, and there was no indebtedness of the corporation which, under the rules, could be added to this value. There was therefore no basis for an assessment of capital stock in excess of the valuation of the tangible property. The appellant was engaged in no business except caring for, and attempting to dispose of, this property. In fixing the fair cash value of the shares of capital stock the rules authorized the board to take into consideration, among other things, not only the value of the shares of stock and the quotation of such shares in the market, but also the books of the corporation, the returns made to the auditor of public accounts, and such other information as the board might have or be able to obtain. The assessment is contrary to the market value. The board made no inquiry of the appellant in regard to the value of the stock and no examination of its books, and the returns made to the auditor in the years in question, all of which were attached as exhibits to the bill, furnished no basis for an assessment of the capital stock in excess of the valuation of tangible property. In regard to any other information which the board had or might be able to obtain, it is averred that the board had no such information and made no effort to obtain any, and that, in fact, there were no other facts or information in existence or to be obtained as to the value of the stock, but that the board in each year arbitrarily added a fixed amount to the assessment of tangible property as a capital stock assessment.

these years the appellant's shares of stock | ized valuation of its tangible property. The were listed on the Chicago Stock Exchange, facts in regard to the valuation of the tangian association organized for the purpose of affording a market for the purchase and sale of shares of stock and other securities, particularly those of corporations located in Chicago and its vicinity. This exchange has been the regular market where the appellant's shares have been bought and sold, and there has been no other market for them, and they have not been listed or traded in on any other exchange or market. They have been regularly bought and sold on the Chicago Stock Exchange throughout the years in question and during the preceding ten years, and at no time has there been any speculation in the shares of stock of the appellant, and the record of sales on the stock exchange has not been in any way fictitious, but has at all times represented the fair cash value of the shares. During the years in question, and the ten preceding years, the fair cash value of said shares, as fixed by actual sales on the Stock Exchange, has varied from $40 per share to $82.50 per share, and no share has ever sold at private sale or in any market or exchange for a greater price, and at no time has the actual value of the shares exceeded $82.50. The bill sets out the number of shares sold on the Chicago Stock Exchange from 1898 to 1913, inclusive, together with the highest, lowest, and average price in each year, and makes a comparison with the value of the tangible property of the appellant as assessed, showing that the tangible property assessment exceeded the value of all the shares of capital stock of the appellant, taken at its highest price during each year, from $216,477 to $1,127,113. In 1908 the state board of equalization added to the tangible property assessment $100,000 as a capital stock assessment, in 1909 $105,000, in 1910, 1911, and 1912, each year, $150,000, and in 1913 $45,000. The state board of equalization made no investigation of the facts in regard to the value of the stock, and had no information or facts before it except those stated in the bill and shown by the appellant's schedules, and there were no other facts and no other information as to the value of the stock to be obtained or in existence. The board made no attempt to ascertain the facts and disregarded its rules as to determining the fair cash value of the capital stock, and, in disregard of the real value of the capital stock, arbitrarily fixed the valuation of the capital stock at a lump sum for the purpose of producing the result which was produced, and not in the exercise of honest judgment.

[1] It is apparent from the foregoing statement of the averments of the bill, which are admitted by the demurrer, that in accordance with the rules of the board for the assessment of the capital stock of all corporations there could be no assessment of the capital stock of the appellant in excess of the equal

[2] The rules fixed by the state board of equalization for ascertaining the value of the capital stock of corporations have been approved by this court. In State Board of Equalization v. People, 191 Ill. 528, 61 N. E. 339, 58 L. R. A. 513, an assessment which had been arbitrarily made too low was disregarded, and the state board of equalization was required to make an assessment of the capital stock of the corporations involved there in accordance with the rules of the board substantially the same as those now in force, and in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Cole, 75 Ill, 591, the collection of taxes upon an excessive assessment made in violation of the rules was enjoined, the court saying that the decision of the court sustaining the rules implied that they should be adhered to and faithfully applied in the assessments to which they were applicable.

The courts have no authority to supervise the valuation of property by the officers to whom its valuation for taxation has been committed by law, where such officers, acting within the scope of their powers, have made

an assessment by the honest exercise of their it is claimed the ordinance is void as being judgment according to the law. But the state unreasonable and oppressive, and also that board of equalization has no right, in disre- it was defective in several respects. A trial gard of its own rules established for the as- by jury was had upon objections to benesessment of the capital stock of all corpora- fits. The jury found the property would be tions, arbitrarily to assess the capital stock specially benefited by the improvement to of one corporation by an exercise, not of its the amount of its cost. A motion by the objudgment, but of its will, without reference jectors for a new trial was overruled by the to the requirements of those rules. Accord- court and a judgment rendered confirming ing to the averments of the bill, that is what the assessment as made. Certain of the obwas done in this case, and the demurrer jectors have prosecuted this appeal from that should have been overruled. judgment.

The decree will be reversed, and the cause remanded to the superior court, with directions to overrule the demurrer.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(265 Ill. 119)

CITY OF PANA v. BALDWIN et al. (No. 9556.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 16, 1914.)

[1] The objections made to the ordinance are that it "does not sufficiently describe the nature, character, locality and description of the proposed improvement," and does not sufficiently describe the cement to be used in the improvement nor fix any standard for the test of the cement. The ordinance requires the paving of certain "returns" and "approaches," and it is contended it fails to fix their number or location or establish any

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 304*)-PUB-grade therefor; that it requires that at all

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LIC IMPROVEMENTS - ORDINANCES
CIENCY.

- SUFFI

An ordinance providing for the improvement of streets and for returns and approaches sufficiently fixed the grade of such returns and approaches, where it was apparent that they were extensions in street and alley intersections and were described and provided for in the plans and profiles made part of the ordinance. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 811-816; Dec. Dig. § 304.*]

street and alley intersections the paving and curbing shall be carried back to the street lines but does not establish a grade for the work; also, it is contended it does not sufficiently describe an inlet required. We have examined the ordinance and are of opinion It is not open to any of the objections made. It sufficiently describes every detail of the improvement. It is not claimed that the ordinance does not sufficiently fix the grade of all parts of the improvement other than the "returns" and "approaches." It is plain from the ordinance these are the extensions at street and alley intersections to the street lines, and they are sufficiently described and provided for in the ordinance and the plans and profiles which are made part of the Appeal from Christian County Court; C. ordinance. Hutt v. City of Chicago, 132 Ill. A. Prater, Judge.

2. APPEAL AND ERROR ( 1002*)-REVIEWVERDICTS.

A verdict approved by the trial court based on conflicting testimony will not be disturbed on appeal; the question of the credibility of witnesses being for the jury.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3935-3937; Dec. Dig. § 1002.*]

Proceeding by the City of Pana for the confirmation of a special assessment for a local improvement, to which William M. Baldwin and others objected. From an order of confirmation, the objectors appeal. Affirmed.

John E. Hogan, of Taylorville, and E. E. Dowell, of Pana, for appellants. George T. Wallace, of Taylorville, and Ralph J. Monroe, of Decatur, for appellee.

FARMER, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Christian county confirming a special assessment for a local improvement in the city of Pana. The special assessment was levied to pay the cost of paving parts of three streets with brick, at an estimated cost of $47,000. The improvement is in a residence part of the city and the property assessed belonged to a large number of persons, 52 of whom filed objections to the confirmation. All legal objections were overruled and no error is assigned upon that branch of the proceeding, except

352, 23 N. E. 1010; Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 134
Ill. 656, 25 N. E. 962; City of Hillsboro v.
Grassel, 249 Ill. 190, 94 N. E. 48.

[2] The ground mainly relied upon for a reversal of the judgment is that the finding that the property of the objectors would be benefited to the amount it was assessed for the improvement is contrary to the evidence. It was agreed at the commencement of the hearing upon the question of benefits that the witnesses on each side should be limited to 10 and that each objector testifying for himself or herself should be counted as one witness. Appellants called 9 witnesses who testified as to the effect of the proposed improvement upon all of the property of the objectors, and about 40 of the 52 objectors testified as to the effect of the improvement upon the value of their respective properties. Of the 9 witnesses who testified as to the effect of the improvement upon the value of all the property assessed, most of them were objectors. Some of the objectors' witnesses testified their property would not be benefit

security for payments to be made thereon by Where a vendee assigned his contract as the assignee, who thereafter completed the payments and took a deed from the vendor, a suit by the vendee to enforce specific performance against the assignee's heirs did not involve a freehold; and hence an appeal in such suit should be taken to the Appellate Court.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. $$ 539-542, 545-547, 549, 550, 552–573; Dec. Dig. § 219.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pulaski County; A. W. Lewis, Judge.

Suit by John Henry against Charles Britt for specific performance. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals. Case transferred to Appellate Court.

C. S. Miller and L. M. Bradley, both of Mound City, for appellant. Chas. L. Rice, of Mound City, for appellee.

ed in value by the improvement, but most | 2. COURTS (§ 219*)-SUPREME COURT-JURISof them testified the property in the district DICTION-FREEHOLD. would be increased in value to some extent. The majority of those who named an amount the property would be increased in value fixed the increase at about one-half the cost of the improvement. Of the 10 witnesses called by appellee, 9 of them, as we understand, were not owners of property assessed, but most of them were property owners in other parts of the city and some of them owned property abutting streets that had been paved by special assessment. One of appellee's witnesses owned property in the district assessed for the proposed improvement, and his property was assessed about $900. The testimony of the 10 witnesses was that the property assessed for the improvement would be benefited in value to the amount of the assessment. There is nothing in the record indicating that the witnesses for appellee were not as competent to tesCARTWRIGHT, C. J. John Henry, aptify upon the question as those of appellants pellee, by his amended bill in equity filed in nor that they were not as credible and worthe circuit court of Pulaski county against thy of belief. If their testimony was re- Charles Britt, appellant, Margaret A. Brown, garded as more satisfactory by the court and executrix of the will of A. W. Brown, dejury than the testimony of appellants' wit- ceased, and Burton Bagby, guardian of said nesses, then the verdict and judgment were Charles Britt, alleged that on August 1, 1904, warranted. If they had regarded the tes- J. B. Mathis, being the owner of the southtimony of appellants' witnesses as more sat-west quarter of the southeast quarter of secisfactory than that of appellee's witnesses, tion 29, in township 14 south, range 1, west the verdict and judgment should, and no of the third principal meridian, in the said doubt would, have been the other way. It was in the first instance peculiarly the prov-county, made and delivered to the complainince of the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given to the testimony, and in the state of the evidence, after the finding has been approved by the trial court, it cannot be disturbed by a reviewing court on the ground that it is contrary to and not sustained by the evidence. And this would be just as true if the verdict and judgment had been in favor of appellants.

Complaint is made of a number of instructions given for appellee, but we are of opinion there was no substantial error committed in the giving of instructions. It is true there were some unnecessary repetitions of some propositions, but they were not such as would justify a reversal of the judgment. The judgment of the county court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

ant a bond, also signed by his wife, Nellie I. Mathis, conditioned for the conveyance of said tract of land to the complainant for the sum of $850, payable $173 cash in hand and

the remainder in annual payments of $135 each, with interest at 7 per cent.; that complainant made the cash payment and entered into possession of the premises, and has ever since been in possession thereof; that on May 1, 1905, said J. B. Mathis and Nellie I. Mathis, his wife, executed a quitclaim deed of said premises to A. W. Brown, subject to the terms and conditions of the bond for a deed, which were assumed by A. W. Brown; that in the year 1906 the complainant entered into an agreement with Grant Britt by which Britt agreed to pay to A. W. Brown the amount remaining due and unpaid by the terms of the bond, and, upon complainant repaying to him the amount so paid, convey the premises to the complainant, and in pursuance of said agreement the complainant assigned to Grant Britt the bond for a deed; that on October 25, 1906, A. W. Brown died, and afterward the defendant Margaret A. Brown was appointed executrix of his will; Where a vendee of land assigns his contract that on December 14, 1906, Grant Britt died, to a third person as security for payments to leaving the defendant Charles Britt, a minor, be made on the contract, and the assignee, his son and only heir at law; that on Octoon completing the payments, takes from the ber 15, 1907, Margaret A. Brown, as execuvendor an absolute deed, the deed will stand as trix of the will of A. W. Brown, conveyed a mere security for the moneys advanced. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, the premises to Charles Britt; that on OctoCent. Dig. §§ 60-66, 84-94; Dec. Dig. § 32.*1 ber 19, 1908, H. M. Britt was appointed •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

(265 III. 131)

HENRY v. BRITT. (No. 9352.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 16, 1914.) 1. MORTGAGES (§ 32*)-ABSOLUTE DEED AS MORTGAGE-CONVEYANCE TO VENDEE'S AS

SIGNEE.

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