charge (g). The law of nations, though it be liberal, yet does not give protection to screen persons, who are not bonâ fide servants to public ministers, but only make use of that pretence in order that they may not be liable to pay their just debts (h). Where privilege is claimed for a servant, bonâ fide hiring and actual service must be shewn. Hence protection was refused to a clergyman claiming it as chaplain to a Mahomedan ambassador; to the master of the horse of an ambassador, who had no horse; to the gardener of an ambassador, who had no garden; to the master of the horse, interpreter, and chaplain of ambassadors, where no service was shewn (). So where a publisher and composer of music, making a large income by his business, claimed protection as servant of the Bavarian ambassador and first singer in the Bavarian chapel, receiving a salary of thirty pounds a-year and liable to be called upon to attend at any time; but it appeared, that he had taken the place merely for the sake of the privilege, which he supposed it to confer, and it did not appear that he had ever been called upon to perform any service. The Court held the service to be merely colourable and protection was refused (j). So where the defendant claimed protection as domestic physician to the Bavarian minister and swore, that he had prescribed for some of his servants; but there were circumstances in the case which shewed that the service was not bonâ fide, but a mere scheme to screen him from the payment of his debts, though the application was made on behalf of the minister (k). So where a defendant claimed privilege as valet of the Bavarian minister, but no actual per(g) Wicq. i. 900.

(h) Per Ld. Mansf., Heathfield v. Chilton, 4 Burr. 2016.

(i) Poitier v. Croza, 1 W. Bl. 48, and the cases there cited; Carolino's case, 1 Wilson, 78; Holmes v. Gurdon, cited 1 Wilson, 20; Seacomb v. Boulney, 1 Wilson, 20.

(j) Fisher v. Begrery, 2 M. & W. 240.

(k) Lockwood v. Coysgarne, 3 Burr. 1676.

formance of service was shewn (1). So where a person has any office or employment, which is incompatible with the performance of the duties of the situation which he claims to hold in an ambassador's family. Protection was refused to a purser of a ship of war, who claimed it as English secretary to the Bavarian minister (m). So where a tidewaiter at the Custom House claimed protection as messenger to the same minister (n). So where a person keeping a boarding house on her own account claimed protection as housekeeper to a foreign minister (o). But it is not to be expected, that every particular act of service should be specified. It is enough if bonâ fide service be proved; and if service be sufficiently proved by affidavit, the Court will not, upon bare suspicion only, suppose it to be colourable and collusive (p). The servant of an ambassador is not entitled to an unqualified exemption of all his goods from seizure, for taxes or otherwise. The privilege is conferred by the law of nations, in order that the ambassador may not be prejudiced in his dignity or personal comfort. It is not given for the benefit of the servant. Whatever is necessary for the convenience of an ambassador as connected with his rank, his duties, or his religion, ought to be protected; but an exemption from burthens borne by other subjects, ought not to be granted in a case to which the reason of the exemption does not apply. Thus, where the servant of an ambassador had a house, of which he let part in lodgings, and the furniture thereof was distrained for poor rates, it was held, that the furniture was not privileged. It was not denied, that the servant might have a house fit and convenient for his situation as servant of an

(1) Fontainier v. Heyl, 3 Burr. 1731.
(m) Darling v. Atkins, 3 Wilson, 33.
(n) Masters v. Manby, 1 Burr. 401.
(0) Delvalle v. Plomer, 3 Campb. 47.
(p) Triquet r. Bath, 3 Burr. 1481.

ambassador, and that the furniture of such a house might be privileged. But it was held, that as the servant let part of the house in lodgings, such an house was not necessary for his personal convenience, and, therefore, could not be necessary for that of the ambassador his master; and that the privilege claimed was not at all within the reason, upon which the rights of ambassadors are founded (9). An ambassador cannot waive his own privileges without the consent of his master, for the privilege of an ambassador is the privilege of his sovereign (r). The privilege of a public minister is to have his person sacred and free from arrests, not on his own account, but on account of those whom he represents; and this arises from the necessity of the thing, that nations may have intercourse one with another in the same manner as private persons, by agents, when they cannot meet themselves. And if the foundation of this privilege is for the sake of the prince, by whom an ambassador is sent, and for the sake of the business he is to do, it is impossible that he can renounce such privilege or protection; for by his being thrown into prison the business must inevitably suffer (s). Neither, for the same reason can he waive the privilege of any of his train, who are appointed by his sovereign, as the secretary of legation and the like (†). But he may waive the privilege of his domestic servants, whom he may engage and dismiss at pleasure, for that is a mere personal privilege for the convenience of the ambassador. The privilege is not the privilege of the servant, but the privilege of the ambassador (u). Hence, the ambassadors assembled at Munster and Nimeguen, in order to check the tumultuous insolence of their servants,

(9) Novello v. Toogood, 1 B. & C. 554.

(r) Wicq. i. 900; Bynk. F. L. xxiii.; Vatt. iv. § cxi.

(8) Barbuit's case, C. T. Talbot, 281.

(t) Wicq. i. 143.

(u) Novello v. Toogood, 1 B. & C. 554; per Bayley, J., Fisher v. Begrez, 2 M. & W. 240.

agreed that the local magistrates should be permitted to take cognizance of their offences (v).

Fourthly, With respect to the jurisdiction of an ambassador over his own household, the law of nations does not invest an ambassador with any jurisdiction or authority beyond that which belongs to any head of a family (w). Grotius, indeed, holds, that he may exercise any authority which is permitted by the sovereign in whose territories he is sent to reside. But as such sovereign has no jurisdiction over the family or train of an ambassador, it is difficult to see how he can communicate an authority which he does not possess, unless this permission be sanctioned by the sovereign by whom the ambassador is sent. By the joint consent of both sovereigns, he may exercise any jurisdiction (x). Ambassadors are in the habit of pronouncing judgment in capital cases on persons belonging to their train, where such power is given them by the sovereigns by and to whom they are sent, which obtains only in the two French embassies of Venice and Constantinople (y). When Sully was sent as ambassador extraordinary to compliment James 1 on his accession, one of the persons attached to the embassy killed an Englishman in a quarrel. A great tumult ensued, and the offender was pursued to the house of the ambassador. Sully immediately constituted a tribunal of his own household, convicted him on his own confession, condemned him to death, and applied to the Mayor of London for an executioner. The ordinary ambassador of France procured from James 1 the pardon and discharge of the offender (z). The council of the King of France blamed Sully for allowing the pardon of the King of England; but with little reason, for if he had no jurisdiction over the train of the French ambas

(v) Wicq. i. 893-894; Bynk. F. L. xx.; Vatt. iv. 124.

(w) Grot. ii. 18, viii.; Bynk. F. L. xv. xx.

(x) Bynk. ibid.

(y) Mornac. ad. ff. v. i. § 3.

(z) Wicq. i. 887; Flass. ii. 218.

sador, neither had the King of France any jurisdiction in the realm of England. The pardon of the King of England, who had a right to demand justice of the King of France upon the offender, was to be construed as a release of that right, and a consent to his impunity. Henry 4 sanctioned the whole proceeding, which saved his dignity and the life of his subject, and prevented the exasperation; which such a crime was calculated to provoke.

Bynkershoek maintains, that an ambassador may exercise civil jurisdiction over his train without the consent of the sovereign of the country, as consuls exercise jurisdiction over their own countrymen; but the jurisdiction of consuls is exercised by the permission of the sovereign of the country (a). If the train of an ambassador submit to his decisions, no question can arise, but if not, he has no means of enforcing them; for Bynkershoek admits that he cannot make a private prison of his house (b). If any of the train of an ambassador commit any offence, he may be secured and sent home for trial by order of the ambassador (c); or if he be liable to be dismissed at pleasure, he may be given up, as hath been before stated, to the magistrates of the country. De Lira, the Spanish ambassador at the Hague, sent home in chains one of his Spanish servants who had attempted to commit a serious offence, that he might be punished and sent to the gallies there (d). The usage of nations does not permit ambassadors, since they have neither sovereign authority nor territorial rights, to exercise criminal jurisdiction even within their own walls (e).

Fifthly, Of asylum or sanctuary. The law of nations attaches no privilege of sanctuary to the house of an ambassador (f). Bynkershoek observes, that nothing can be con(a) Valin Ordon. i. 9, xii.; Kent Comm. i. 41.

(b) F. L. xx. p. 177.

(c) Wicq. ii. 890; Bynk. F. L. xx.; Vatt. iv. 124.

(d) Bynk. ibid.

(e) Bynk. F. L. xx. p. 177.

(ƒ) Grot. ii. 18, viii.; Wicq. i. 871, 881; Bynk. F. L. xvi.; Vatt. iv. 118, et seq.