any change in the form of government of the state, with which it is concluded (h). Every state is entitled to choose its own form of government and to change it at its pleasure; but it cannot discharge itself from its obligations by its own act. Bynkershoek goes yet further, and maintains that a province, that has separated itself from its parent state and established its independence, is entitled to the benefit of treaties concluded by the parent state during their union. Hence he maintains, that the United Provinces, as an independent state, were entitled to the benefit of the treaties of navigation concluded between Austria and England, and Austria and Denmark, while those provinces formed part of the Austrian dominions. Their claims were rejected both by England and Denmark; and it seems with reason, for a treaty is concluded with a state as one entire body; and, if a province separate itself from the state it ceases to be part of that body (i), and consequently ceases to have any interest in the treaty. Besides there would have been a want of reciprocity for the reciprocal stipulations of a treaty are entire and binding upon a state as one body, and cannot be apportioned to its different provinces. So, where a province is conquered and the conquest is consummated by cession, it ceases to be part of the state from which it has been wrested, and becomes a stranger to its treaties. But in that case the conqueror acquires no rights but those of the state, with which he is at war, and takes subject to all absolute or qualified alienations previously made. Thus the King of Prussia, when he acquired Silesia by conquest and cession, bound himself by treaty to pay the debts for which that province had been mortgaged to British merchants. But without such express stipulation Silesia would still have remained subject to the mortgage, for he could conquer no rights, but such as were vested in his enemy. So, where a neutral state has (h) Grot. ii. 9, iii.-viii.-ii. 14, xii. 2-16, xvi.; Puff. viii. 12, i. 11, iii.; Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. xxv. (i) Grot. ii. 9, v.; Vatt. ii. § 203. acquired a right to maintain a permanent garrison in a town, or a right of fishery or the like (j). The lawfulness or unlawfulness of the acts of the chamber of annexation (k) instituted by Louis 14, after the cession of Alsace and the three bishoprics, for the purpose of recovering their dependencies previously alienated, depends upon this principle. If such alienations were invalid, it would seem, that by acquiring a title to the principal he acquired a title to all its accessories, unless a third party had acquired title by prescription. A treaty is an entire contract. All its articles are dependent and have the force of conditions, so that the violation of any one of them is a violation of the whole treaty and renders it voidable at the option of the party injured (1). Hence the United States in 1778 declared their treaties with France to be no longer obligatory, because they had been repeatedly violated on the part of the French, and all just claims to reparation had been refused (m). But a treaty is not avoided by the violation of any of its articles, for a party cannot take advantage of his own wrong, or discharge himself from his obligations by his own act. Even if it be expressly stipulated that such an act shall avoid the treaty, by construction it renders it not void but voidable (n). Yet Louis 14, though he had ratified and twice sworn to observe the treaty of the Pyrenees, contended, that the renunciation of Maria Theresa contained therein was void, because he had not executed jointly with her a separate act of renunciation, and caused it to be registered by the parliament of Paris according to his engagement contained in the same treaty (o). But without such a clause a () Vatt. ii. § 203. (k) Chambre des reunions, Flass. iv. 59, et seq. (1) Grot. ii. 15, xv.; Puff. viii. 9, xi.; Vatt. ii. § 200, 201, 202-iv. $ 47. (m) Kent Comm. i. 164. (n) Grot. iii. 20, xxxviii.; Vatt. ii. 200. (0) Flass. iii. 350. treaty is rendered voidable by the violation of any of its articles, however insignificant, for it is impossible to distinguish stipulations according to their relative degrees of importance; no stipulation of sufficient importance to be inserted in a treaty can be deemed too insignificant to be binding (p). In order to avoid the inconvenience that may arise from the strictness of this rule it is sometimes stipulated, that a treaty shall continue in full force notwithstanding the violation of particular articles, or that the amount of damage sustained thereby shall be submitted to arbitration (q). The fourteenth article of the treaty concluded at Nimeguen, on the 10th of April, 1678, between France and the United Provinces provides, that if by any inadvertence any violation of the treaty should occur, it should nevertheless continue in full force, and reparation should be promptly made, and all private persons concerned in such violation should be punished. The doctrine, that every treaty implies a condition of defeasance on any material change of circumstances, which is usually called the rule de rebus sic stantibus, is rejected by Grotius and Bynkershoek as calculated to destroy the obligation of all compacts (r). The obligations of a treaty cannot be affected by change of circumstances, unless it be such as involves the breach of a condition or renders the performance of it impossible (s). It is said that treaties are perishable things, and their obligations are dissipated by the first hostility (t). But this is to be understood of treaties that have reference only to the pacific relations of the contracting parties, and even in respect of such treaties the expression is inaccurate. It is true, that (p) Grot. iii. 20, xxxv.; Vatt. iv. § 48. (9) Grot. ibid. and iii. 19, xiv.; Puff. viii. 9, xi.; Vatt. ii. § 202. (t) Le Louis, 2 Dod. 258. their covenants co-exist only with a state of amity among the confederate states; and that they are necessarily suspended during war, because a state of war is inconsistent with pacific relations, and leaves nothing for such treaties to operate upon during its continuance. But since a treaty of peace operates as an act of oblivion in respect of the differences, wherein war originated, and of all grievances committed or suffered in the prosecution thereof; it necessarily follows, that all engagements subsisting between belligerents at the commencement of hostilities are revived by a treaty of peace, so far as they are consistent with its provisions (u). For greater caution, however, in a treaty of peace it is usual expressly to renew aud confirm previous treaties, so far as such treaty is not in derogation of their provisions. Thus, the third article of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, confirms and incorporates, so far as they are consistent with its provisions; the treaties of Westphalia, Madrid, Nimeguen, Ryswick, Utrecht, &c. The like provision is made by the second article of the treaty of Versailles in 1783. But treaties that have reference to the belligerent relations of the contracting parties, are suspended during peace, and are brought into operation during war, otherwise they would be wholly insensible and inoperative (v). Of this kind, are treaties of sovereigns with regard to the treatment of the persons and property of the subjects of either in the territories of the other at the commencement of hostilities; to the exchange of prisoners, the regulation of cartel ships, fishing truces, and the like. So where money is lent to a sovereign prince or state, on condition that it should not be seized in case of war. Treaties limited to a certain period determine at the expiration of the period assigned; and a renewal cannot be (u) Puff. viii. 9, viii. Per cur. Society for Propagating the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheaton, 494-cf. Vatt. iv. § 42. (v) Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. x.; Vatt. ii. § 175; Kent Comm. i. 165. implied, except from reciprocal acts that admit of no other construction (w). Vattel puts the case of a treaty, whereby a state binds itself to furnish a certain number of troops annually, upon payment of an annual sum. If after the expiration of the period such sum be paid by one party, and received by the other, a renewal of the engagement is implied upon the terms contained in the treaty. But it is rather to be considered as a renewal of the engagement, than a renewal of the treaty (x). III. Of the construction of treaties. Treaties are to be construed according to the intention of the contracting parties, to be collected from their language. If the intention of the contracting parties were always clearly defined, and expressed in distinct, precise, and unequivocal language, rules of construction would still be required. Treaties like laws are framed on general views, and it is impossible to foresee and provide for every particular case. No distinctness of expression could prevent the difficulty of applying general provisions to unforeseen emergencies. But the language, in which treaties are expressed, is generally far removed from faultless accuracy; and rules of construction are required to explain ambiguities, to reconcile apparent repugnancy, and to defeat chicanery (y). First. The principal rule is, that treaties are to be construed according to the grammatical meaning of their language in its popular signification, unless it involve an absurdity; in which case it is to be extended or restricted, so far only as is necessary to avoid the absurdity (z). The purpose of construction is to expound treaties, not to frame them (a); and their words are not to be varied by construction, except where an absurdity is involved in their natural signification, or a different meaning (u) Grot. ii. 15, xiv.; Vatt. ii. § 199. (z) Vatt. ibid. (y) Vatt. ii. § 262. (z) Grot. ii. 16, ii. xii. xx. xxii.—iii. 23, xi.; Puff. v. 12, iii. viii. xix. Vatt. ii. § 271, 282. (a) The Jonge Josias, 1 Edw. 131. N |