appear to be perfectly settled. If he did not thereby expose himself to the territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign, whose dominions he had entered, it would seem to be, because all sovereigns impliedly engage not to avail themselves of a power over their equal, which a romantic confidence in their generosity has placed in their hands (a).

Thus, even Louis 11, was ashamed of having arrested Alphonso, king of Portugal, during his visit to France, and caused vessels to be equipped, wherein he was honourably conveyed to his own kingdom (6). Francis 1, though advised by his council to seize and detain Charles 5, in order to compel the performance of his promise to restore the Duchy of Milan, allowed him to pass through his territories unmolested (c). Charles Emanuel, Duke of Savoy, while he was fomenting faction in France, came on pretence of a visit to the Court of Henry 4, for the purpose of pursuing his intrigues on the spot. Henry 4, against the advice of his council, acting upon his own opinion, which he considered to be more in accordance with the law of nations, dismissed him with impunity (d). The alleged arrest of the Duke of Mecklenburgh in Holland, in the year 1693, is disapproved of by Bynkershoek in point of law, and doubted in point of fact (e). Bynkershoek holds, that the privilege of an independent sovereign, in extreme cases, is identical with that of an ambassador. If a prince in a foreign territory commit acts of violence either in person or by the hands of his attendants, it cannot be doubted that he may be repelled by force. But if he conspire against the sovereign of the territory, or commit any common offence, reason and the law of nations will be

(a) Schooner Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116; Bynk. F. L. iii.; Vatt. iv. 108.

(b) Flass. Dip. Fran. i. 233.

(c) Bynk. F. L. iii.; Flass. Dip. Fran. ii. 3.

(d) Bynk. F. L. iii.; Flass. ii. 203.

(e) Bynk. ibid.

satisfied if he be ordered to leave the country. The same may be said if he should be in debt, for to allow him to be arrested, although perhaps not contrary to strict law, is contrary to the analogy suggested by the rule of the law of nations respecting ambassadors (f).

The private property of foreign sovereigns is not privileged, and is liable to the same jurisdiction and the same burthens as the property of natural subjects (g). But there is a manifest distinction between the private property of a sovereign, and that military force which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and independence of a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may be considered as assuming the character of a private individual, but this he cannot be supposed to do with respect to any portions of that armed force which upholds his crown, and the nation he is entrusted to govern. When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through the territory of another, as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants thereof, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would obviously be inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degrada

(ƒ) Bynk. F. L. iii. Si princeps in alieno imperio manu rem agat, vel per se vel per comites, quin manu repelli possit, non puto dubitandum. Si vero quid machinetur adversus principem hospitem, ejusve imperium, si aliud delictum commune perpetret; satis, puto, fiet rationi et juri gentium, si quod hic jus gentium est, si jubeatur finibus excedere, nec amplius turbare rem publicam nostram. In causâ æris alieni idem dixerim, nam arresto detinere principem ut œs alienum expungat, quamvis forte stricti juris ratio permitteret, non permittit tamen analogia ejus juris, quod de legatis ubique gentium receptum est. Si neges, ubi de jure gentium agitur, ex analogiâ disputari posse, ego negaverim hanc quæstionem expediri posse, cum exempla deficiant, quibus consensus gentium probetur: nec quicquam adeo supersit, quam ut ad legatorum exemplum ipsos reges et principes, et quidem magis, ab arresto dicamus immunes, et in eo a cæteris privatis differre.

(g) Bynk. F. L. iv.

tion, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can their foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing any exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently there are powerful motives for refusing to persons of this description any exemption from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter, can never be construed to grant such exemption. But the situation of a public armed ship is in all respects different. She constitutes a part of the military force of her nation, acts under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign, is employed by him for national objects. He has many and powerful motives for preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference of a foreign state. Such interference cannot take place without affecting his power and his dignity. The implied license, therefore, under which such a vessel enters a foreign port ought to be construed as containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of a sovereign within whose territory she claims the right of hospitality. Upon those principles by the unanimous consent of nations, a foreigner is amenable to the laws of the place; but certainly in practice nations have not asserted their jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a sovereign entering a port open for their reception. The case cited by Bynkershoek of the Spanish vessels seized in Flushing for a debt due from the King of Spain, is the only instance of an attempt made by an individual to assert a claim against a foreign prince by seizing his ships of war. In that case the states general interposed, and there is reason to believe, from the manner in which the transaction is stated, that either by the interference of the government, or by the decision of the Court, the vessels were released. That this proceeding was at once arrested by the government of a nation, that appears

to have asserted the power of proceeding in the same manner against the private property of the prince, would seem to furnish no feeble argument in favour of the exemption claimed for ships of war. National ships of war entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction. Without doubt the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction either by employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals. But until such power is exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having imparted to his ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction which it would be a breach of faith to exercise. Those general statutory provisions, therefore, which are descriptive of the ordinary jurisdiction of judicial tribunals, which give an individual whose property has been wrested from him, a right to claim that property in the Courts of the country in which it is found ought not to be so construed as to give them jurisdiction in a case in which the sovereign power has impliedly consented to wave its jurisdiction. The injuries inseparable from the march of an army through an inhabited country, and the dangers attending it, do not ensue from admitting a ship of war without special license into a friendly port. A different rule, therefore, with respect to this species of military force has been generally adopted. If for reasons of state the ports of a nation generally, or any particular ports be closed against ships of war generally, or against the ships of a particular power, notice is usually given of such exclusion. If there be no prohibition the ports of a nation are considered open to the public ships of all powers with which it is at peace, and they are supposed to enter such ports and to remain in them, while they are allowed to remain, under the protection of the government of the place (h).

(h) Schooner Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116.

No state has any right to intermeddle in the internal affairs of another (i). This rule is a necessary consequence of the legal equality and exclusive jurisdiction of independent states. A right of interference cannot be claimed even by an ally, much less can it be claimed by a stranger. When certain Carthaginians in Rome preferred charges against Hannibal, Scipio declared that the Roman senate would not be justified in intermeddling in the affairs of Carthaginians. Herein, as Aristotle has observed, consists the difference between a confederacy and a state; that is the duty of confederates to protect each other against foreign invasion, but not against domestic disorders (j). Protection does not take away national independence, which cannot exist without sovereign authority (k).

Queen Elizabeth observed this rule, when she refused the sovereignty or protectorate of Holland and Zealand during their insurrection against Philip 2 (7) The rule was violated by Frederick 2, Catherine 2, and Maria Theresa, when they invaded and partitioned Poland under the pretext of suppressing anarchy (m). Louis 16 violated this rule by furnishing clandestine aid in arms, money, clothing, and ammunition to the revolted colonies of Great Britain before they had even declared their independence; and by making a treaty with them, and thus acknowledging their independence

(i) Grot. i. 3, viii. 2; Vatt. i. 37—ii. 7, 54, 55, 57, 83, iv. 14, 68: contra, ii. 56, 62.

Grot. i. 3, xxi. Scipio cum Romæ a Carthaginiensium quibusdam Hannibal accusaretur, dixit non oportere se patres conscriptos reipublicæ Carthaginiensium interponere. Et hoc est, in quo Aristoteles ait, societatem a civitate differre, quod sociis curæ sit, ne in ipsos injuria committatur, non vero ne sociæ civitatis cives inter se injurias committant.

(k) Grot. i. 3, xxi. 3. Patrocinium publicum non tollit libertatem civilem, quæ sine summo imperio interligi nequit.

(1) Camden Eliz. an. 1575.

(m) Flass. Dip. Fran. vii. 88.