be doubted, when they have been in use without interruption for more than two hundred years. The designation of public ministers shews the inveteracy of the practice, for none are termed extraordinary, but those whose mission is special. The practice of the Romans is nothing to the purpose; for there is no analogy between the unity of the Roman empire with little or no intercourse beyond its boundaries, and the numerous states into which modern Europe is divided. The complicated political and commercial relations of modern states are continually giving rise to international questions, and require all the attention of resident ambassadors to settle disputes and watch over the interests of their sovereigns at each other's courts (g).

Secondly, With respect to the precedence of ambassadors. As the entire independence and perfect equality of separate states is a fundamental principle of the law of nations, it might be supposed that the perfect equality of their representatives would be inferred as a necessary consequence, and that the peace of courts never could be disturbed by disputes respecting precedence amongst equals. Yet such disputes have occurred continually, and have been attended sometimes with ludicrous, but more frequently with fatal consequences. From the period of the abdication of Charles 5, the ambassadors of France and Spain contended for precedence in every Court of Europe, except at Vienna, where precedence was given to the Spanish ambassador from family considerations (h). At the public entry of the Swedish ambassador into London, a contest for precedence took place, which was attended with loss of life on both sides, and probably would have led to war, if the King of Spain, who was interested in maintaining peace with France, had not made such submissions as satisfied the pride of Louis 14 (i). But these disputes were not confined to the

greater powers. The ambassadors of two Italian princes met on a bridge at Prague, and as neither would give way, they stood for the greater part of the day face to face, exposed to the jeers of the crowd collected by the strangeness of the spectacle (j).

However the regulations agreed on by the plenipotentiaries assembled at Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, and inserted in the acts of those congresses, seem calculated to prevent such scandal for the future. These acts provide, that diplomatic persons shall be divided into four orders, of which the first only has a representative character.

First, Ambassadors, legates, and nuncios.

Secondly, Envoys, ministers plenipotentiary, and other diplomatic persons accredited to sovereigns, except ministers resident.

Thirdly, Ministers resident.

Fourthly, Chargès d'affaires accredited to ministers for foreign affairs. These regulations are made with a reservation of the rights of the representatives of the Pope (k).

The rank of diplomatic persons is to be determined by the order to which they belong, and the precedence of those who belong to the same order by seniority, according to the dates of their respective notifications of arrival. No distinction is to be allowed either on account of extraordinary missions, or on account of the domestic relations or political alliances of Courts (1).

In the execution of instruments to which more than two states are parties, the order of nomination and signature is to be determined by lot. It was unnecessary to provide for the case of two contracting parties; for by established usage each state is first named, and the signature of its minister stands first, and its own language is employed in the original to be

(j) Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. ix.

(k) Mart. Man. dip. § 38; vid. Vatt. iv. § 71, et seq.
() Mart. ibid.

deposited in its own archives (m). The minister of a mediating power is usually allowed precedence among ministers of the same rank (n).

Thirdly, With respect to the privileges of ministers. All persons accredited by an independent state are entitled to all the privileges of ambassadors, whether their mission be ordinary or extraordinary. All are equally under the protection of the public faith; and whether a sovereign send an ambassador, or think proper for the purpose of saving expense, or from any other motive, to send a minister of lower degree, whoever is accredited has the same rights and privileges (o).

There seems to be little weight in the objections that have been urged against the privileges of ambassadors. The arguments on both sides are fully discussed by Bynkershoek (p). If it be alleged that it is hard that an ambassador should be allowed to carry off the property of his creditors, and to drive them for their remedy to the Courts of his own country, that he should be allowed to sue and yet not be liable to be sued, it is answered, that creditors are bound to inform themselves of the condition and privileges of those to whom they give credit, and that if they neglect to do so, they have no right to complain of the consequences of their own negligence (q). Albericus Gentilis suggests, that if an ambassador cannot be sued, no one will deal with him; to this it is answered, that others, who are not liable to be sued, have no difficulty in obtaining credit (r), and that it is his business to see that his privilege does not operate to his prejudice, which he may always do by not requiring credit, or by finding sureties (s).

If an ambassador were subject to the jurisdiction of the

(m) Wicq. ii. 70; Mart. Man. dip. §§ 78—87, 3, 4.

(n) Mart. Man. dip. § 38.

(0) Wicq. i. 109, et seq.; Bynk. F. L. i. xiii.; Vatt. iv. § 81.
(p) Bynk. F. L. vii.

(9) Wicq. i. 839; Bynk. F. L. vii.

(r) Grot. ii. 18, x.; Wicq. i. 839.
(s) Bynk. F. L. vii.

country in which he is resident, he must be subject to judgment in all its effects, and amongst others, to imprisonment, to the total obstruction of his functions (t). In regard to criminal jurisdiction, the public benefit which is derived from the security of ambassadors outweighs any mischief that can ensue from their impunity (u). Besides the interest of him who sends, and of him who receives an ambassador, are often different, and frequently hostile; and something might always be alleged against an ambassador that might be construed into an offence. Where any offence has been committed by him, redress may be demanded of his sovereign, and where the matter is of sufficient importance it may be enforced by war (v). It is true that in some cases, as for instance where an ambassador, pursuant to his instructions, has conspired against the sovereign to whom he is accredited, he has nothing to fear from his own sovereign. But such cases are rare, and their mischief is conpensated by the general benefit of the rule (w).

Public ministers are the necessary organs of national intercourse, and the purpose of their ministry could not be obtained, if they were not strengthened by all the prerogatives that are essential to enable them securely to perform their duties with fidelity and freedom. The same law of nations, that requires the reception of public ministers, also requires, that they should be invested with all the privileges that are necessary for the performance of their duties. It is easy to understand, that independence must be one of those privileges, for otherwise, the safety of a minister would be precarious, and he might be annoyed and persecuted, and ill treated on a thousand pretexts. He is often charged with missions that

(t) Bynk. F. L. vii.

(u) Grot. ii. 18, iv.; Bynk. F. L. vii. and xvii.
(v) Grot. and Bynk. ubi supra.

(w) Grot. and Bynk. ubi supra.

are disagreeable to the prince to whom he is accredited; if the prince had any power over him, and especially sovereign authority, he could not be expected to obey the orders of his sovereign with the requisite fidelity, firmness, and freedom. It is essential that he should have no snares to apprehend; that he should not be distracted in the performance of his functions by any chicanery; that he should have nothing to fear from the sovereign to whom he is accredited. It is necessary, therefore, that he should be exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the state in which he is sent to reside (x). But no definite conclusion can be drawn from abstract reasoning upon this subject, because the right is not to be ascertained by reason, but by the will of nations (y). The usage of nations must determine, whether a delinquent ambassador is protected by the law of nations; and whether this protection extends to every kind of offence. The usage is to be collected from precedents, of which there is such abundance, that they furnish the means of settling the question without difficulty (z). In the time of Grotius the precedents were so conflicting, that in his opinion no inference could be drawn from them (a). But in this, as in other matters, the authority of Grotius has had great influence in settling the law. Huber observes, that the privilege of ambassadors had been much controverted, but at length the authority of Grotius prevailed (b). The same remark is made by Blackstone. The custom of nations established by their will, which subjects to the jurisdiction of a state every one who is found within its territory; provides an exception in the case of ambassadors, who by one fiction are taken for the persons of those whom they represent; and by

(x) Vatt. iv. § 92.

(y) Grot. ii. 18, iv. 2.

(z) Bynk. F. L. xvii. p. 172.

(a) Grot. ii. 18, iv. 2.

(b) Apud Bynk. F. L. viii. p. 158; Bla. Comm. i. 253.