the bank.

The court said: "This case, on the authority of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of United States, Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555; S. C., Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 18, must be reversed. It was there held that usurious interest previously received by a National bank, though taken in the renewals of a series of bills, of which the one in suit was the last, could not be pleaded by way of set-off, and that the only remedy was by an action of debt founded on the penal clause of the act of Congress. This case, of course, overrules Lucas v. The Bank, 78 Penn. St. 228; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 17; Thomp. Nat. Bk. Cas. 872; Overholt v. The Bank, 82 Penn. St. 490; S. C., Thomp. Nat. Bk. Cas. 883; and cases of similar character, at least so far as they hold that illegal interest taken by a National Bank can be used by way of set-off or payment. In a transaction like the one in hand, from the case above cited, it will be found that the defendant's only remedy was by a penal action for double the illegal interest paid, and that the forfeiture of the interest upon the note only occurs where illegal interest has been stipulated for but not paid." The Barnet case seems also to overrule the doctrine of National Bank of Auburn v. Lewis, 75 N. Y. 516; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 484; Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 305; National Bank of Winterset v. Eyre, 52 Iowa, 114; S. C., Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 234; and Hade v. McVey, 31 Ohio St. 231; S. C., Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 353. The principal case accords with First Nat. Bk. of Clarion v. Gruber, 87 Penn. St. 465; S. C., Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 395.

In Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. O'Donnell, 53 Md. 110, the city let repairs of a street to a contractor. The contractor employed C. to superintend it. The street being impassable, C. caused a rope to be stretched across it, and directed a lamp to be suspended from the rope. The person whom he left in charge did suspend such lamp, but it was immediately broken and extinguished by stones thrown by boys. The person in charge took the lamp to his home in the vicinity to repair or replace it, but did not replace it that night. During his absence, the plaintiff, in attempting to pass up the street, driving his hack, came in contact with the rope, of which he had no warning, and received injuries. No officer of the city had notice of the rope being stretched across the street, and C. had no orders on the subject from any one. In an action to recover damages from the city, held, that the city was liable. The court said: "This is a question upon which there is some conflict of authority, and is therefore not entirely free from difficulty. The cases of Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121, and Painter v. Mayor, 46 Penn. St. 213, cited by the appellant, strongly sustain their position, but the weight of authority is the other way, and upon full examination we think that sound reason and proper public policy do not sustain the decisions in Missouri and Pennsylvania on the subject. The case of Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N. Y. 109, is precisely analogous to this case and lays down the law, as we think, in accordance with

sound principle. In that case there was a sewer to be built, and the city let out the contract of building it. In making the sewer an excavation was made in the street which was left open in the nighttime, without guards, lights or warnings of the danger it created. Plaintiff drove into it and was injured. Defense was made that the contractor was liable and not the city; but this defense was not sustained by the court and plaintiff recovered against the city. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed Judge Pratt's ruling, and on further appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the decision. Judge Comstock, in delivering the opinion of the court, puts the decision on the express ground that the obligation rested on the municipal corporation to keep the streets in a safe condition for travel." 66 The same doctrine is maintained by the Supreme Court of the United States in City of Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418, and in Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657. The weight of authority is now so much in favor of this view, that Judge Dillon in his excellent work on Municipal Corporations, §§ 791, 792, 793, states this to be the better doctrine. In Eyler v. County Commissioners of Allegany, 49 Md. 257; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 249, the court had occasion to examine the many cases on this subject, and recognized the authorities to which we have adverted as properly defining the law." The contrary doctrine is held in City of Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Penn. St. 247; S. C., 27 Am. Rep. 642; and the various cases are reviewed in note, page 647. In City of Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 17, it is held that if the work in a public street is intrinsically dangerous, as blasting, the city is liable for an injury resulting from it, although the contractor was duly careful. But contra, Murphy v. Lowell, 128 Mass. 396.

The

In Robinson v. State, 52 Md. 151, R. was indicted for burglary with intent to steal. At the trial he offered to prove that the prosecutrix, whose house he entered, was a lewd woman, and that he had had improper intimacy with her; which evidence the court below refused to admit. Held, error. court said: "According to the common-law definition of a burglar, as given us by Lord Coke (3d Inst., 63), it is he that in the night-time breaketh and entereth into a mansion-house of another, of intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit some other felony within the same, whether his felonious intent be executed or not.' This definition has been adopted by Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone. 1 Hale P. C., 549; Hawk. P. C., b. 1, ch. 38, § 1; 4 Black. Com., 224. One of the elements essential to constitute the crime, according to this definition, is the felonious intent with which the breaking and entry of the house may have been effected. If not with such intent, then the breaking and entry would be, at the common law, nothing more than a trespass. 4 Bl. Com. 227. Therefore the breaking and entry of a dwelling-house at night, with intent to commit a battery, or with an intent to commit adultery, is not a felony. Com. v. New

ell, 7 Mass. 247; State v. Cooper, 16 Vt. 551. It was therefore very material, on the question of intent, to show for what object the prisoner broke and entered the house. If he really entered the house solely for the purpose of having illicit connection with the prosecuting witness, he could not be found guilty of burglary. Proof of the fact of such being his object would be difficult to furnish otherwise than as it might be inferred from the previous relations of the parties, and such circumstances as would be calculated to induce a belief in the mind of the prisoner that he would be readily and willingly received by the witness." "If it be true as offered to be shown, that the prisoner had knowledge, at the time of his entry into the house, of the lewd and lascivious habits and character of the witness, or that he had had improper intimacy or intercourse with her, these were circumstances proper to be left to the jury for their consideration in passing upon the question of intent with which the act was done."

LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF COMMON WORDS.

man

IX.

66 LEEPING with a man" is equivalent to lying SLEEPI awake with a man, and being "in bed with a " is equivalent to sleeping with him. So held in an action of slander for charging a woman with unchastity in "sleeping with a man "not her husband, and where the proof showed the words to have

been that she was "in bed " with the man. Barnett v. Ward, Ohio Supreme Court, January, 1880.

Our valued contemporary, the Irish Law Times, speaking of the case of Gholson v. State, 53 Ala.

519; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 652; 18 Alb. L. J. 365, agrees with our disapproval of the word "traveller" there given, and says: "Be this as it may, however, it appears that there was more to be said about travellers and their classification than occurred to Sterne when he took out his pen and ink in the Desobligeant to write the preface to the Sentimental Journey; nor is it under all circumstances an easy matter to determine, despite the definition in the act of 1874, who will be as clearly a bona fide traveller as he of whom Dryden wrote,

'Three miles he went, nor farther could retreat,
His travels ended at his country seat.'"

"At" " is not equivalent to "in," under a statute requiring the posting of notices "in" certain public places, and where the proof is of posting "at" | such places. Helgers v. Quinney, Wisconsin Supreme Court, January 11, 1881.

"Intemperate habits" is defined in Tatum v. State, 63 Ala. 147. The court said: "What is meant by the expression in the statute, 'intemperate habits?' Habit is defined to be 'Fixed or established custom; ordinary course of conduct.' Webst. Dic. It need not be the uniform or unvarying rule, but to be a habit it must be the ordinary course of conduct the general rule or custom. It may have exceptions. Exceptions do not destroy a rule. But

unless, when occasion offers, there is a disposition, or probable inclination, to drink to excess, intemperate habits cannot be predicated. If sobriety is the rule, and occasional intoxication the exception, then the case is not brought within the statute. On the other hand, if the rule or habit is to drink to intoxication when occasion offers, and sobriety or abstinence is the exception, then the charge of intemperate habits is established. Now, to make out this charge, it is not necessary that this custom shall be an every-day rule. There are persons whose custom is to remain sober while at home, and who, when in company, or visiting the town or village, generally drink to excess, although occasionally they abstain, and remain sober. In such case, drunkenness is shown to be the rule, or ordinary course of conduct; and to sell or give to such person, knowing him to be such, spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors, is a violation of the statute." So one may be of intemperate habits" without being drunk every day, but the court held that getting drunk two or three times a year was not an "intemperate habit."

"Furniture" is defined in Fore v. Hibbard, 63 Ala. 410. It was held that the "furniture" of a but a soda-fountain with its bottles and glasses. drug-shop not only included show-cases and chairs, The court said: "The word relates, ordinarily, to movable personal chattels. It is very general, both in meaning and application; and its meaning changes, so as to take the color of, or be in accord with, the subject to which it is applied. Thus, we hear of the furniture of a parlor, of a bed-chamber, of a kitchen, of shops of various kinds, of a ship, of a horse, of a plantation, etc. The articles, uten

sils, implements, used in these various connections, as also those used in a drug or other store, as the furniture thereof, differ in kinds according to the purposes which they are intended to subserve; yet being put and employed in their several places as the equipment thereof, for ornament, or to promote comfort, or to facilitate the business therein done, and being kept, or intended to be kept, for those or some or one of those purposes, they pertain to such places respectively, and collectively constitute the furniture thereof."

An apothecary, visiting a patient and sending in medicines for his cure, does not "practice physic," unless he charges for the visits as well as the medicines. College of Physicians v. Rose, 6 Mod. 44. Loaning money is "business," within the Sunday Act. Troewert v. Decker, Wisconsin Supreme Court, January 11, 1881.

Door-steps are not "projections" within a statute pertaining to "balustrades or other projections upon the roofs or sides of buildings," in respect to "public safety." Cushing v. City of Boston, 128 Mass. 330. See 22 Alb. L. J. 2.

"Declare" is defined in Knecht v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 90 Penn. St. 118. There an applicant for life insurance "declared" that he had never practiced any pernicious habit tending to shorten life, and that he never would. Afterward he took to

the wine-cup. Held, that his policy was not avoided. The court said he did not covenant, promise, agree or warrant that he would not do so. "He declared that he would not. To declare is to state; to assert; to publish; to utter; to announce clearly some opinion or resolution; while to promise is to agree; 'to pledge one's self; to engage; to assure or make sure; to pledge by contract.' Worcester. The court concluded that this declaration was not "taking the pledge" by contract. The word was too "tender."

The night is night, though ever so light—which is poetry, though not so intended. So, in State v. Morris, 47 Conn., it was held that it will not avail a prisoner on a charge of burglary that there was light enough from the moon, street-lights, and lights of buildings, aided by newly-fallen snow, to enable one person to discern the features of another.

A corporation engaged in the removal of petroleum from place to place by means of pipes or tubes, is a "transportation company." Columbia Conduit Co. v. Commonwealth, 90 Penn. St. 307. The court said: "It is contended that this moving of petroleum by means of pipes is not 'transporting,' and therefore, that this is not a transportation company. The defendant's counsel contends, that to transport is 'to carry,' and that this transit company does not carry, but the petroleum flows we consider this too narrow a construction. If we look into the dictionary for the meaning of the word 'transport,' Webster defines it, 'to carry or convey from one place to another,' again, 'to remove from one place to another,' and throughout all of the derivations from the word transport we find the same part of the definition 'to remove;' as transported is, inter alia, defined 'removed.' This petroleum is certainly removed. To look into the origin of the word, composed of trans, 'over,' 'from one place to another,' and portus, moving or carrying,' and portatus, 'bearing or bringing,' is going into too much refinement, but such was the character of the argument. We must construe words, not according to their original etymology, but by the common parlance of the country. In the present case, we have a much better guide—the words of the charter of incorporation, the third section of which authorizes the company to transport petroleum, and for that purpose, to lay down pipes from the points named, and for the purpose of transportation of petroleum, oil, etc., may lay down pipes or tubing." But would the court say that a drover is a carrier of cattle? Or that a lumberman driving logs down a shoot on a mountain is a carrier of logs? The cattle and the logs transport themselves, and so does the petroleum.

The act of a cripple, in passing along the sidewalk and silently holding out his hand and receiving money from passers, is "begging for alms or soliciting charity." Matter of Haller, 3 Abb. N. C. 65. The court said: "In many instances words are far less effective to accomplish the end than simple acts. The deaf and dumb man, real or pretended, who stands with a placard on the breast, and with extended hat or hand, is as completely a

solicitor for charity as though he spoke to the passers-by. And so is every one where disease or crippled condition appeals to the sympathy, if he places himself in a position to attract attention, or passes along the street, calling attention by sign, act, or look, to his unhappy condition, and receives from those who observe him the charity which he is obviously seeking. Indeed, the class of silent beggars who exhibit deformities, wounds or injuries, which tell plainer than words their needy and helpless condition, are the most successful of solicitors for charity."

"Mail" is defined in Wynen v. Schappert, 6 Daly, 588. It is there held that delivery of a notice of protest, properly addressed, to a government letter-carrier, is good service by mail. The court said: "The word mail, which with some changes in the orthography is found in many languages, means in its original signification a wallet, sack, budget, trunk, or bag, and in connection with the post-office, means the carriage of letters, whether applied to the bag into which they are put, the coach or vehicle by means of which they are transported, or any other means employed for their carriage and delivery by public authority. It came originally into use as referring to the valise which postillions or couriers had behind them, and in which they carried letters, at an early period; and after the establishment of post-offices, post-routes, and post-coaches, it became, as it is now, a general word to express the carriage and delivery of letters by public authority. The carrier in this case carried a bag having two compartments, in one of which letters to be delivered were put, and in the other letters to be sent by mail, the kind of bag such officials were accustomed to carry."

"Worry" is defined in Marshall v. Blackshire, 44 Iowa, 475, when applied to a dog, as “to run after, to chase, to bark at." The court said: "Mr. Webster's definition is general and embraces a worrying by mankind, and other animals besides dogs; while the court, as was right and proper, confined its definition to dogs. It is impossible for us to conceive how a dog can worry chickens in any other way than by running after, chasing, or barking at them. How can a dog harass chickens with 'importunity,' or 'vex,' 'annoy,' 'torment,' 'trouble,' or 'plague,' unless he runs after, chases or barks at them?"

A "fast train" means one that goes more than eight miles an hour. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Peyton, 76 Ill. 340.

66

Gambling" includes playing billiards for beer, oysters, or cigars. State v. Bishel, 39 Iowa, 42. Stump" is defined in Cremer v. Town of Portland, 36 Iowa, 92. This was an allegation of an injury by a defect, to wit, a stump, in a highway, and the objection was taken that it was not alleged that it had been there long enough to convey implied notice; but the court adopted Webster's definition, "the part of the tree or plant remaining in the earth after the stem or trunk is cut off; the stub; " and held that it must be presumed that the word indicated a stump rooted in the soil, and not one cast there.

ENFORCEABILITY OF STATE CONTRACTS.

THERE

are many persons who are very much interested in the question how far the States of this Union are bound to perform the contracts that their Legislatures enter into in their behalf, and what remedies, if any, exist to compel such performance. The very interesting character of the questions themselves, coupled with the very large number of persons who have material interests depending upon them, justifies some consideration of them. I was sole counsel for the holders of the bonds of the State of Virginia in the case of Hartman v. Greenham, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in January, and for the past eight years my attention has been constantly occupied with a consideration of these questions in connection with the debt of the State of Virginia. I hope therefore I may without presumption offer some account of the present state of the law relating to this subject as it is to be gathered from the decisions that have been made by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is to be regretted that a critical examination of all the decisions which this tribunal has made touching this matter leaves the mind in a most painful state of uncertainty in regard to some of the most vital and important bearings of it. I shall endeavor to present an intelligible view of them all.

It is an elementary principle of every jurisprudence that a sovereign power cannot be sued save by its own consent. "By the Revolution the prerogative of the Crown and the transcendent power of Parliament devolved upon the States that form this Union in a plenitude unimpaired by any act, and controllable by no authority" save by the surrender of powers which those States themselves, or the people thereof, have made by the Constitution. Rhode Island v. Massa

chusetts, 12 Pet. 720. By the Constitution they agreed that the judicial power of the Union should extend to themselves in certain cases, and in 1793 the Supreme Court of the United States, upon just consideration, held in the case of Chisholm v. The State of Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419, that it authorized one who was not a citizen of Georgia to sue her in that tribunal to compel payment of a debt due by her. See to same effect Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dallas, 320; Oswald v. New York, 2 id. 415; Hayser v. South Carolina, 3 id. 339.

Thereupon, in 1798 the eleventh amendment to the Constitution was adopted which provided that "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." This leaves a State liable to be sued in admiralty by a citizen for any thing cognizable by the admiralty jurisdiction. Ex parte Madrazzo, 7 Pet. 627. (It is interesting to consider in this connection a resolution drawn by Patrick Henry and passed by the Virginia Legislature in 1784, to be found in Rive's Life and Times of James Madison, vol. 1, p. 564, also Id., vol. 2, p. 41. This resolution was voted for by many of the fathers of the Constitution.) The status of direct proceedings against a State by an individual is therefore very clearly fixed and determined.

However, section 4 of article 1 of the Constitution provides that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and many cases have arisen and may yet arise in which States have entered into substantially self-executing contracts-contracts which require no judicial proceedings against the State for their enforcement, and the most interesting part of this inquiry concerns these. They arise in the main through proceedings undertaken to have some State law alleged to impair the obligation of a contract declared void. When it was first contended that a State law was void as impairing the obligation of one of her own contracts, it was insisted that this clause in the

Constitution was not intended to take within its protective power the contract of a State, but was intended altogether for the protection of contracts by individuals. This was very much of a party fight between the Democrats and the Republicans of our early politics, the Democrats of that day calling themselves Republicans, and the Republicans of that day calling themselves Federalists. The Supreme Court pronounced against the claim and held a State's contract to be likewise within the inhibition of impairing laws. This was first held in 1810 in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, and soon afterward in Tenett v. Taylor, 9 id. 43; Town of Pawlett v. Clark, id. 300; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 id. 164, and in dozens and dozens of cases since, too numerous and too familiar to be mentioned.

In the famous Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518, Mr. Wirt contended that "it was the individuality of private contracts and private rights acquired under them which was intended to be protected; and not contracts which are in their nature matters of civil policy, nor grants by a State of power and even property to individuals in trust to be administered for purposes merely public." This was in a case where a State had attempted to amend, without its consent, in most material particulars, the charter of a college. The court seemed to concede this proposition in the main (see pp. 629-30), yet it pronounced the act void, and the case has always been accepted by the profession as a final decision, after consideration of all that had gone before, of the proposition that a State's contract, as to its right to impair it where private rights were involved stood upon the same footing as an individual's. In Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S., the court says, p. 816; "The doctrines of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, announced by this court more than sixty years ago, have become so imbedded in the jurisprudence of the United States as to make them to all intents and purposes a part of the Constitution itself." We shall see how this holds with the cases as we go on. The general principle that a State could no more impair the obligation of her own contract than that of an individual, being now established, efforts at once commenced to engraft on it qualifications and exceptions. A State having made a contract to exempt certain land perpetually from taxation, it was insisted that such a contract was void because one Legislature could not make a binding contract which might debar their successors from power to raise revenue to conduct the operations of the government. This was first pronounced against in New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164. The same question has been repeatedly considered since, and the same judgment arrived at. The cases are Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 id. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Company v. Debolt, id. 416; Dodge v. Wolsey, 18 id. 331; Mechanics & Traders' Bank v. Debolt, id. 380; McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 id. 430; Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 id. 264; New Jersey v. Gard, 95 U. S. 104; Farrington v. Tennessee, id. 679.

It is the settled and horn-book law of the Supreme Court that in construing the Constitution and laws of a State, it will follow the latest decision of the highest court of that State construing them. This has been held from the beginning of the government, though several exceptions have been grafted upon this rule, notably that it will not be applied to commercial contracts that is, bills of exchange and negotiable notes. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239, and very many intermediate cases. have been made to evade the provision of the Constitution under the operation of this rule. Thus, when a State has desired to escape the obligation of a contract which her own highest court has held to be a binding one, she has turned out the judges who made this decision and filled their places with others who have held

Efforts

that the alleged contract was not a binding contract. The Supreme Court thereupon engrafted another exception on its rule and held that in determining the validity of a State law which authorizes the making of a contract, it would follow the first instead of the latest decision of the highest court of the State, when that first decision affirmed the validity of the contract. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 176; Lee County v. Rogers, 7 id. 181; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 id. 294; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 id. 270; Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 id. 678; City of Kenosha v. Lawson, 9 id. 477.

States have sought to make the same rule a shelter for other evasions of contracts, and the Supreme Court has made another exception to it, to wit: that the Supreme Court will itself construe a law which it is claimed makes a contract for the State herself, and will pay no attention to the construction which the highest court of the State has put upon it, when such decision holds that the law does not make a contract. The substance of this is that the court will not allow a State to get any money on the faith of an act that appears to bind her to return it and then create her own court to hold that the act does not constitute a contract binding upon her. Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436; Franklin Branch v. Ohio, id. 474; Wright v. Sill, 2 id. 544; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 145; Delmas v. Insurance Co., 14 id. 668; University v. People, 99 U. S. 309; Wright v. Nagle, 101 id. 794.

There is another most important series of decisions running in the same direction. The court has held that where a State is under an obligation, if her officers can be reached by the process of the court, suit may be maintained against them even though the State be the party substantially and really interested, and that that fact will not oust the court's jurisdiction. The principle has been carried to great lengths. In Osborne v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, the treasurer of the State of Ohio was required to deliver to the Bank of the United States $98,000 which the State authorities had taken from it in the way of a tax forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, even though the money had actually been covered into the treasury of the State. In Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, the doctrine of the foregoing case was expressly affirmed. A railroad company had been granted certain public lands by the State of Texas before the war. After the war the constitutional convention of Texas undertook to revoke the grants, and provided that settlers upon the land should have a right to a patent and deed in the name of the State, to be executed and granted by the governor. The company prayed the court to enjoin the governor from executing this ordinance, and the governor defended upon the ground that the suit was one against the State of Texas. The court, applying the principles of Osborn v. The Bank, awarded the injunction. (Sed vide Governor of Georgia v. Madrazzo, 1 Pet. 110.) To the same effect are Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 305; Barings v. Danbury, 19 Wall. 1.

These principles have been strikingly applied in other cases. Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 96, was as follows: The Legislature of Arkansas, in chartering the Bank of Arkansas, provided in the charter that the notes of the bank should be receivable in payment of all debts due the State. The State got into financial embarrassments, and passed an act forbidding its officers to receive them. A debtor to the State applied for a mandamus to compel the State's officers to receive the notes in payment of his debt, which he refused to do, relying upon the act aforesaid. The court held the act void and ordered the mandamus to issue. The very same experience for Tennessee is reported in Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44. The facts are identical with those of Woodruff v. Trapnall, and the decision was the

same.

Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454. South Carolina had an experience identical with these two in State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425, and Virginia the same in Hartman v. Greenhow, January Term, 1881.

From a very early period in the history of the court it has been held that the laws providing remedies to enforce contracts, existing when the contracts are made, enter into them and form part of them, and cannot be repealed unless an equally efficient remedy be provided. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 75; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 id. 608; Sturgess v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 id. 314; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595.

In the cases of Woodruff v. Trapnall, 15 How. 96, Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44, State v. Stoll, 17 id. 425, and Hartman v. Greenhow, January Term, 1881, it was held that these principles applied to the contracts of States as well as to the contracts of individuals.

The court has repeatedly declared the following proposition: "One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is that its value has by legislation been diminished. It is not, by the Constitution, to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation, dispensing with any part of its force." Planter's Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 553; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 id. 318; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 683; Edwards v. Kearsey, 96 id. 601.

With these repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, running through the entire history of the government, holding that a State's contract was within the protection of the Constitution; that the remedy existing at the time became part of the contract, which the State could not repeal without affording one just as good; and that one of the tests of this was the effect such a substitution would have on the market value of the contract; together with the repeated and emphatic instances in which it had made its settled principles of practice bend so as to head off attempted evasions of their liabilities to States-with this view of their decisions before him, a counsellor could not have had much difficulty in giving his client advice upon any given case. It is to be regretted, however, that we have seen only one side of the picture, and that it has an obverse side which we must now consider.

Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 62, decided at October term, 1879, puts us at sea upon the question of what contracts a State is bound by. In 1867 the Legislature of Mississippi granted certain persons a charter to conduct a lottery. There was nothing at that time in the Constitution of the State to forbid it to do so. The charter was to last twenty-five years. It required the parties to pay the State $5,000 for the use of the University, and to give bond and security for $1,000 per annum, and for one-half per cent on the amount of their receipts. All these requirements were complied with. In 1868 the constitutional convention of the State repealed this charter, and the authorities of the State proceeded to oust them from their chartered privileges. The Supreme Court held the contract a void one, upon the ground that lotteries are of an immoral and demoralizing nature and that the Legislature of a State cannot part with its control over the subject. To those who know that the "Father of his country" was a devoted friend to lotteries and one of their patrons, it will be a startling announcement to say that they are inherently so immoral and vicious that a contract relating to them is tainted with corruption, and is therefore void. Heretofore, most persons had supposed that they stood much upon the footing of businesses like pawn-brokers' establishments, shaving shops, and such, which some persons think it derogatory to engage in, whilst others do not.