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views, in any thing like their original extent, certainly did not prevail in the Convention. They, doubtless, underwent, at an early period, some modifications in his own mind; if not in regard to their correctness in theory, yet in regard to their practicability, in the existing state of things. Yet the opinions of such a man as HAMILTON, could not have been altogether without influence in any assembly of men, in any country. He speaks of the attempt to define the powers of a government, as impracticable. "Something," says he, "will always be wanting." But enough has been said to make it clear, that the Convention must have intended, not, indeed, to annihilate the distinction of States-though some of the members represented even this as desirable-but, at least, to clothe the new Government with efficient powers to provide for, and promote the general welfare of the Statesin the full extent of the terms-and to entrust it with a broad and liberal discretion in the selection of means "" necessary and proper," to effect this purpose. I confess I do not see how it is possible for a fair minded man to peruse the history of those times, without coming to this conclusion. They could not have intended to prescribe, specifically, the means to be employed by the Government, in accomplishing its great objects, in all the multiform emergencies that would present themselves to its view, in all times to come. Nothing less than infinite prescience could have undertaken such a task.

No, they knew full well, that, in the ever-shifting relations, and varying aspects of society in this mutable world, occasions might be expected to occur, when, in the language of BURKE, "the file enlarge and diversify it as they might, would afford no precedent:" and when the Government must either suspend its operations, or adopt, under its solemn responsibility, the best means its discretion, guided by a strict regard to its duty, could suggest.

This, I repeat, is what the Convention might fairly be expected to do; and that they verily did this-or, at least, believed that they had done it-the history of the Government, from its first commencement, will, I am confident, abundantly prove. The principle of constructive legislation, which you characterise as tyranny and usurpation, and represent as a modern innovation, is as old as the Government. It has marked every stage of its progress; it has been resorted to at all times, and on all occasions, when chapter and verse could not be found to warrant, in express terms, any particular measure deemed advisable. And if, as we are told by the alarmists of the day, it be a usurpation— a usurpation so unprincipled and ruinous, that disunion is represented as an eligible alternative-then the measures of our Government from 1790 to 1827, have been a series of usurpations; then usurpation has become the habit of the body politic, and while calling ourselves the freest people on earth, we have, in fact, been suffering all the horrors of a constructive tyranny-as little aware of the alarming fact as was Molier's Frenchman that he had all his life been speaking prose. You must, at least, admit, that we have thriven on this regimen marvellously well.

I have said that "constructive legislation" has, at all periods, been resorted to. I now add, that it is quite impossible it should be otherIn no other way could the business of the Government go on. If no powers can pass by implication; if nothing can be done, for

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which express warrant cannot be adduced, the whole machinery of the Government becomes a mere pageant-a splendid apparatus, if you will, beautifully contrived, and adjusted-but, like the artist's clock, it will not go. So true is this-so evident the necessity of allowing some latitude of interpretation, that no one, so far as I know, has been found to maintain, that nothing could be done for which a specific grant of power could not be found. Where, then, is the line to be drawn? What canon of interpretation shall we adopt? Clearly this: That the Constitution intended to confer all such powers as were requisite to the discharge of the obligations-to the performance of the duties, which it imposed. And what were these? To provide for the defence and security of the country-terms of large import-and to take the sole charge of all matters pertaining to our foreign relations, whether commercial or political. In short, to do every thing requisite to promote the general welfare, which the States, in their individual capacities were, from any cause whatever, inadequate to perform. These are the duties imposed on the General Government; and, on the obvious principle of common equity, and common sense, that duties and powers must be commensurate; the Constitution must have intended to invest it with all powers necessary to accomplish these high purposes. There are indeed, certain limits drawn, which it must not transcend. But within these, I maintain, its discretion is a broad one; and it must use it on its own high responsibility. Whatever measure is deemed requisite for the due discharge of these important duties, Congress may constitutionally enact. Should the validity of the enactment be called in question, the Supreme Court is the appointed tribunal to reconsider the subject; and after their decision is had, the question is to be considered settled, so far as its constitutionality is concerned. Its expediency is a distinct affair. This is, as I conceive, the doctrine of common sense on this point; a doctrine that I cannot consent to abandon, because some adept in political metaphysics may come forth, and by dint of wire-drawing, and splitting hairs-by racking one word, and lopping another--may prove that the doctrine is a dangerous one; that it is liable to abuse; that it leaves us no adequate security against the encroaching spirit of the General Government. Be it so. I am not careful to answer him in this matter." Dangerous! yes; dangerous to sleep, to drink." Security!-'tis a bold word for a being "whose foundation is in the dust." It belongs not to man, nor to his institutions. We must take human nature, and human affairs, as we find them. If we are to enter on no undertakings involving hazard; if we are to confer no powers, and confide no trust, which is not secured against liability to abuse, we have nothing to do but to lay ourselves down in our places; and, in order to avoid the risk of taking cold, or breaking a bone, incur the certainty of perishing from inanition.

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Power must be deposited somewhere, and I confess I can see no reason in the world why it may not be as safely entrusted to the National, as to the State Government. What is our security against abuse, in either case? The virtue and intelligence of the people at large-the political, and moral responsibility of the depositories of power-and the perfect sameness of interest that subsists between them. Take away these, and in vain may you multiply checks, and build paper defences round the fortress of your liberties; they will avail nothing. If

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the mass of the people be virtuous and enlightened, their rulers, as a general proposition, must be so too: and virtuous and enlightened men may safely be trusted, whether at Columbia, or at Washington. I am not one of those whose maxim it is, that with the 'sop' of power Satan always enters into him who receives it. I verily believe that a politician may be an honest man; and such are bound from entertaining mischievious designs by a moral responsibility. Political responsibility binds more or less strongly men of whatever character. If, on the contrary, the people be ignorant and vicious, it matters not whether power be lodged in the hands of the General or the State Governments. Divide and subdivide them as you will, they will be ignorant and vicious still; and such a people have no business with free institu tions. They neither can be free, nor deserve to be so. When such becomes the character of our people, it matters little whether destruction comes from the North, or the South. Come it infallibly must, from some quarter. The forms of our political institutions may remain for a season; but the spirit will have fled. The constitution will have crept out of its parchment case as a serpent in spring time, from his skin. When this time arrives, it will be idle to look to a local Legislature for safety. I see no reason to suppose, that the parts will be less corrupt than the whole.

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These remarks may be thought digressive, but they are not impertinent to the subject. You appear to me to lay far too great a stress on certain nicely adjusted proportions, and distinct demarcations, between the powers and duties of the supreme, and local Governments. fess I repose much less faith in the efficacy of these. I rest my hopes for the permanency of our institutions, as I said before, on the virtue and intelligence of the community. If these fail, no constitutional provisions, whether accordant with your views, or with mine, will avail to the preservation of the commonwealth,

NO. V.

"The Government, in the commencement of its career, was as true and as honest to the principles of the Constitution, as could have been desired. But the Constitution was preserved unbroken, only for the first two years of our history."

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Such is your language in the opening of your 21st Number. I am sorry that I cannot accept this tribute to the purity of the national councils, even for this short period. But truth co:npels me to say, that, on your principles, the tribute is unmerited. The course of what you regard as usurpation and corruption, commenced still earlier. "The mystery of inquiry " was evidently at work, even in the very first Session of the National Legislature. The second act ever passed by this body, was introduced by the following preamble :-"Whereas it is necessary for the support of the Government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and for the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid on goods, wares and merchandize, &c.'

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The tariff of duties imposed on foreign goods, adopted at this first Session, was arranged with a distinct and avowed reference to the pro

tection of home manufactures. It is worthy of special attention, too, that, so far as appears from the published debates, no exception was taken to the measure on the ground either of its constitutionality, or general expediency. I shall have occasion to advert to this topic again, and to examine it somewhat more in extenso. At present, I only adduce it as an unequivocal indication of the opinion entertained by the members of this body with regard to the extent of their constitutional powers on this subject.

But this is not all. The bill, as it passed the House, and was sent up to the Senate, contained provisions for laying an impost on tonnage, &c. ; and one distinct feature of it was, to make a discrimination in these respects, in favour of France, and prejudicial to Great Britain. This was the open and undisguised object of the advocates of the measure; and among these advocates were reckoned such Southern names as those of MADISON, BALDWIN, and JACKSON. Thus early, and by our own statesmen, too, was the principle avowed of changing by legislative interference, the natural and voluntary course of commercial pursuits, and forcing them into a new channel. And this, too, for the accomplishment in part, at least, of political purposes. Now, what, I ask, is the difference between the spirit of this measure, and those now proposed, for the protection of domestic industry? If the one be honest and pure, why should the other be denounced as tyrannical and corrupt? I leave you to answer.

Again-Mr. HAMILTON'S celebrated report on the subject of manufactures, purports to have been made in obedience to an order of the House, of January 15, 1790. With the principles of this report, I have, at present, no concern. You say "it was never acted upon."

Be it so. But how can you account for the fact, that the subject was ever entertained by Congress at all, in these days of purity? How happens it, that they did not perceive, in the full blaze of light, in which they then acted, that they were precluded from touching it?-that it lay on the other side of a line, which to pass, was usurpation? They, surely, did not agree with you in interpreting their Constitutional powers and duties. This is undeniable. Whether your interpretation, or theirs, be the sounder, is another question.

But still further, in the speech of the President, delivered to both Houses on the 8th of January, 1790, he urges earnestly upon Congress, the duty of bestowing their "patronage for the promotion of science and literature." These are his closing words: "Whether this will be best promoted by affording aids to Seminaries of learning already established, by the institution of a National University, or by any other expedients, will be well worthy of a place in the deliberations of the Legislature." This language shows, incontestibly, what were the views of Gen. WASHINGTON on this point. He never seems to have entertained a doubt, or to have imagined that any one else could entertain a doubt, that such encouragement of science and literature was within the sphere which the Constitution had prescribed to Congress. How can you fairly explain this fact? WASHINGTON had attended all the Debates of the Convention. He was the common centre of their respect, their affections, and their hopes. He must have been intimately acquainted with the opinions, the views and wishes of the members. Is it possible he should have misunderstood them? Surely

he must have known whether it was the intention of this body to invest the government with this power, or whether it was not. Did he then solemnly urge on the attention of Congress, a subject with which he was well aware, they had no right to meddle? He, the most modest and unassuming of men? for whom power had no charms-who was so remarkable for no one quality as for a cautious moderation--whose plain, practical sagacity was never deluded by splendid visions of possible good?

But, allow that he was mistaken-allow that he did not understand the movements of that machine, which he had had so principal an agency in constructing--allow that the journals of the Convention have given you a deeper insight into their designs than they themselves possessed-one thing, at least, is undeniable; that WASHINGTON entered on the discharge of his public duties the advocate of those principles of constructive legislation'--of discretionary powers, which you denounce as the poisonous infusion, the "leperous distilment" of modern times, that is curdling up the life-blood of the Constitution. This is all I am now concerned to prove.

We come next to a transaction of a still stronger and less equivocal character. I allude to the assumption, by Congress, of the debts of the individual States. I will consider this in my next number.

NO. VI.

Early in the session of Congress, 1790, the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the subject of the national debt, was taken up in the House. This Report, among other measures, recommended the assumption, by the United States, of the debts of the individual States. The resolution offered in accordance with this recommendation, met. with a warm and vigorous opposition. Its natural operation, it was said, would be to strengthen the General Government, at the expense of those of the States. Influence, it was correctly maintained, is power; and no influence is more direct and efficient, than that which grows out of the relations between the Government and its creditors.

But what is more material to my present purpose, is the fact, that this assumption was resisted on the ground, then taken for the first time, that it was not within the constitutional powers of the government, to assume these debts. These powers, it was affirmed, were specified— and this was not to be found in the number. Had your principles of construction prevailed in the minds of the majority of Congress, it is quite certain the measure must have been defeated. Whether this would have been for the interest of the Southern States, I leave you to judge. They did not prevail. The constitutionality of the act was defended, expressly and distinctly, on the principle that the power to assume these debts, was included and implied in the general appropriating power; and on this principle, a majority of both Houses of Congress, as well as the President, gave it their high and solemn sanction. With the soundness of this principle I have, at present, no concern; but the fact, that it was thus early adopted in the practice of the Government, is undeniable. It is clear, beyond the possibility of contra

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