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Nor will it avail you to refer it to the general power of Congress for the regulation of commerce. Your fatal definition will pursue you still. Congress can have no more right to legislate on a local interest under this power, than under any other. The truth is, this precedent and your definition cannot stand together. The admission of the one involves the rejection of the other. It is not the locality of an interest that excludes it from the control of the General Government. It is not a direct participation by each state, that constitutes any interest a proper object to be cherished and fostered by it. Some other criterion than this must be sought. I know none better than this: Every thing necessary to be effected for the welfare of the republic, which for any reason whatever, cannot be done, or so well done, by the States in their individual capacity."

The uniform practice of the Government from the very first, as well as the reason of the thing, shows that any principle substantially different from this, is incapable of being carried into effect. The warmest votaries of the restrictive system have, when called upon to act on their own responsibility, been found in every case to abandon their former ground. This fact is undeniable. You account for it by referring it to an unprincipled love of power. I regard it as a result of the lessons of experience and common sense. It appears to me that, define, limit and prescribe as you may, it results, and will result, from the very nature of our political institutions-from the necessary relations between the General and State Governments that much of debateable land must ever lie between them-that questions of a doubtful, and even difficult character, must be expected to present themselves, in all time to come, about which honest and intelligent men may fairly differ, and which, let them be decided as they may, will call for something of liberality and forbearance, on the one side or the other. If this may not be; if the delegated agents of the people, under their solemn responsibility, may not be trusted with the slightest discretion; then I see but one course for us to pursue. It is, to rid ourselves at once, of a useless and cumbrous pageant, and suffer all power, in name, as well as in fact, to revert to the respective States.

But, neither on your principles, nor on mine, can the question before us be referred to the general power of Congress to regulate commerce, and for this plain reason, already hinted, viz:-that the remedy sought should bear some natural relation, and some fair proportion, to the evil to be removed. In this case it manifestly did not. The former transcends the latter by infinite degrees. There is no assignable proportion between them. The validity of the purchase must rest on other ground than this, or it cannot be sustained.

The question regarding our commercial intercourse with the WestIndies, now at issue, is manifestly a much broader one than that we are considering. All the Atlantic States, at least, have an interest in it direct and immediate. Let us suppose that the President, in order to a settlement of this question, should negociate with Great-Britain a treaty ceding to us all their West-India possessions; and should stipulate to pay for them 100,000,000 of dollars. Would such a treaty, think you, be ratified by the Senate, and the appropriations made by Congress for its execution? And yet, why not? So far as the question of constitutionality is concerned, there is not a shade of difference be

tween, the case supposed, and that under discussion. They rest on the same ground; they touch in every point; and the parallel is so complete, that the subtlest distinction cannot penetrate between them. Any one who should oppose the ratification on this ground, would find his mouth effectually closed by this precedent. This precedent, I maintain, if any in our history, is settled and established. And if it is so, I see not how the inferences deduced from it, touching the constructive and discretionary powers of the government, can be evaded. If there be a fallacy in the argument, I at least, am unable to detect it.

NO. XII.

I have hitherto confined myself, in a great measure, to arguments drawn from the history of the Government-to precedents settled by its practice. I acknowledge that I place far more reliance on arguments of this nature, than on mere general and abstract considerations. They speak, I think, a plainer, more precise, and more forcible language. They address themselves more readily, and more convincingly, to the general comprehension. In discussions pertaining to great questions of Constitutional law, especially, he who reasons from well established precedents, stands, at least, on firm ground. His premises are little liable te be mistaken, and can hardly be called in question. If his inferences are fairly drawn, they must be conclusive. To maintain the opposite doctrine, is to introduce into the social code, a heresy of the most mischievous character. It is to unsettle every principle that gives stability to political relations, and to introduce universal uncertainty and insecurity. For it is a maxim hardly less applicable to this subject than to judicial decisions, that it is more important that the principle be fixed, than that it be abstractly and absolutely correct. You perceive my reasons for dwelling so long on these topics. The instances might be multiplied indefinitely. But it is time to enter on a somewhat different field-I mean, the fundamental principles of our national polity. On this subject your apprehensions appear to me altogether inadequate and erroneous. You are, I think, wrong in fact, and wrong in principle; wrong in your premises, and wrong, of course, in your conclusions. You are incorrect in point of fact-for you alledge that the General Government was instituted solely and expressly for purposes merely external.' For purposes merely external? when it is vested with the exclusive power of regulating all the internal commerce of the States-with all powers pertaining to the regulation of the Post-Office and the Mint-when its judicial tribunals are established in every section of the country, for the decision of causes arising between the citizens of different States, or between one State and another-and when every law it enacts, is proclaimed by the Constitution, to be the supreme law of the land? You are incorrect, too, in affirming that the evils sought to be remedied by the establishment of the Government, were only those pertaining to commerce and defence.' That the state of commerce and that of our foreign relations, under the 'old confederation,' were among the powerful inducements to effect a change, I admit; but that they were the only ones, I utterly deny. The people

of the United States themselves, in a certain document, enumerate the following as the objects which they hoped to effect by this measure, viz: "To form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity." One need go no further than the very vestibule of the Constitution, in order to convince himself, that your statement of the causes that produced it, and of the objects to be effected by it, is totally incorrect. The " regulation of commerce," to which you assign so prominent a place, is not even mentioned in this enumeration of the great purposes, which the new system was to effect. If further proofs were required, the history of the times, the debates of the Convention, and other documents relating to the formation of the Government, abound with them. From these sources, we learn, that one effect expected to ensue from the new modelling of the system, was, the removal of "unmanly jealousies and prejudices," and of a disposition to pursue partial interests;" and another, to provide for "the future good government of the Union." The truth is, that "the times were out of joint" in every respect. The social edifice was evidently tottering to its fall; and it was the anxious wish, and settled purpose, of the illustrious men who then guided the public mind, to rebuild it, on a firm and broad foundation.

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But your account of the origin of the Constitution, is not more incorrect than the view you take of its nature and character. You represent it, throughout your strictures, as little or nothing else, than a mere compact or league, between sovereign and independent States, for the accomplishment of certain definite purposes. This is to be wrong in first principles. It is a misconception which is vital to the whole course of your reasoning. It leads you to represent every exercise of discretion on the part of the Government, however sound and judicious, however plainly conducive to the welfare of the nation, as encroachment and usurpation. It leads you to regard the States as every thing, and the Union as nothing; and it gives birth to the portentous fallacy, occurring at every step of your speculations, that the National Legislature is to be held amenable to those of the respective States, for the due exercise of its powers. It is impossible to read your remarks without perceiving, that in your mind, the idea of inherent and independent sovereignty, is associated with that of the States alone; while the authority of the National Government, is regarded as secondary and delegated secondary and delegated, I mean, in relation to the States, in their corporate and political capacity. This, certainly, is not correct. It is a misconception of the very nature and relations of things, as they exist in our complex system of polity: If there be one thing, in relation to this business, more certain than another, it is, that the Federal Constitution derives its being, not from the States, in the exercise of their ordinary powers as political bodies, but directly from the people, in the exercise of their original, inherent sovereignty; and that its powers were intended to be exercised, not on the States, as such, but directly on the whole people. This is evident, from the language of the instrument. It is sent forth to the world in the name of the people, not of the States. The parties to the covenant, as you regard it, and the only parties, on your construction, are not even named in it. On the contrary, terms aré

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employed, expressing, as strongly as language can express it, the will and purpose of their paramount lord and sovereign-the people in the aggregate.

The same thing is evident from the very name given to the instrument. The old form of Government had been rightly denomina

Confederation. It was so, both in name and in reality. The new one was designated as a Constitution. These words necessarily imply, that the union expressed by each, respectively, was formed on different principles, and was of a different nature. Why did they not call their new work by a name similar to that of the former? Why this change of terms, unless to express a correspondent change of things? States, as such, may confederate, for the better management of certain general concerns; but States, as such, I maintain, are incompetent to form a Constitution, vesting supreme power in a General Government-and yet retain their distinctive sovereignty and independence. Through the medium of their ordinary Legislatures, they are incompetent to form a Constitution at all, either local, or general. I need not stop to prove this. It will be admitted-and is a sufficient answer to those who maintain, that our Constitution is federal in its foundation, because the delegates were appointed by the State Legislatures. For, surely what these Legislatures could not themselves do, they could not authorise others to do for them. The truth is, the Delegates to the Convention acted without any valid authority whatever, and the result of their labours and deliberations, when presented to the people, had nothing to recommend it to their attention, but its own merits. For any circumstantial validity it possessed, it might as well have been the work of a solitary individual in his closet. In ratifying the Constitution, the people acted, indeed, in their respective States. This fact, in itself, I regard as of no importance. It were sufficient to reply, did the argument require it, that it was a matter of convenience alone. But the argument does not require it; nor do I think that the fact, taken in connection with the actual history of the transaction, is to be thus regarded. It was requisite, I conceive, that the States, as such, should give their sanction to the instrument. It was not deemed sufficient, nor would it have been so, that a majority of the people of the United States, in the aggregate, should ratify. Such a majority might have been obtained, though one or more States had unanimously rejected it. Such a majority would not have been sufficient, for a reason that will hereafter appear. It was necessary that it should be accepted by a majority of the people of each State--which must, of course, comprise a majority of the whole-in the exercise of their original sovereignty. The nation did not, as yet exist. It was now, by this very act, to be formed; and the consent of each individual sovereignty concerned, was requisite, in order to constitute it. This consent was sought by a distinct and immediate reference to each of them, as a primary political association, exercising its first and simplest power-the power to organize a Government. All this, certainly, shows that a radical change was to he effected; that the amalgamation under the new, was to be much closer, and more intimate, than under the old form of polity. It shows this, or language has no import, and the most solemn forms of procedure no propriety. The old Confederacy was formed and ratified by the State Legislatures, in the exercise of their or

dinary and acknowledged functions. It derived all its authority, such as it was, from them. It was the mere creature of their will, sustained by them, and amenable to them; and its most solemn and urgent requisitions, unless sanctioned and enforced by them, were utterly nugatory and powerless. Under this system, we hear of no reference to the people on any point. The States were the parties concerned; and of these alone is any mention to be found, in the "Articles of Confederation," in the debates attending their formation, or in the journals or proceedings of the old Congress. When we come to the history of the Constitution, every thing is changed. We meet with new terms, new phraseology, and new forms of procedure, in almost every particular. Not only this --but the Members of the Convention, who had been sent there for the express purpose of amending and improving the old system, are no sooner assembled, than they distinctly declare, that the attempt would be fruitless-that they must abandon the old fabric, and construct another on a new plan. How is all this to be accounted for consistently with the opinions of such as regard the present Constitution as nothing more than a league between Sovereign and Independent States? Why should the ratification of such a compact have been thus studiously referred, not to the ordinary functionaries of Government, but to the primary source of all political power? There is but one answer to be given. The instrument called for a cession, or transfer, which none but the people themselves could make.

NO. XIII.

I have said, that the Constitution could be ratified only by the people of the respective States, in the exercise of their first and simplest political power. And I have assigned the reason-that this act involved a change, or transfer, which the people alone were competent to effect. This change was a virtual but effective abolition, or renunciation, if you please, of distinct and independent State Sovereignty. The proposition may perhaps startle you; but it is true, nevertheless. The states of this Union are no longer sovereign and independent, in any adequate sense of these terms. Sovereign and independent, are magnificent and high sounding words, and calculated to produce an imposing effect, when, marshalled out in tall capitals, along the pages of a political essay; but in simple truth, they are not applicable to the actual position which the States occupy in our system. It is a solecism to talk of sovereign and independent States, that cannot levy a single battalion of armed men, except in case of actual invasion; that cannot coin a copper farthing; that cannot negociate a treaty, nor adopt the minutest regulation with regard to commerce, even with their next door neighbors; that are precluded from holding any other language towards the National Government, than that of memorial or remonstrance, such as may equally be held by the humblest citizen; and all whose most solemn enactments are liable to be set aside, and declared utterly void, when not in accordance with those of the National Legislature; all whose acts are declared to be the supreme law of the land. If all this does not imply inferiority and subordination, then nothing can. The Corporation of the City of

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