Charleston, or that of Georgtown, may for ought I can see, assume the style and claim the prerogatives of sovereign and independent communities; for they, too, are invested with the powers of local legislation, with the due exercise of which, no power on earth may interfere.

It was this abolition of State Sovereignty, involved in the adoption of the Constitution, and this alone, that rendered it necessary to obtain the ratification of each individual State, in the way mentioned above. Only in this way, could the act have been made binding, and conclusive in its operation. Only in this way, could a true national system have been, in the actual state of things, established. And I repeat, this provision of the Constitution for its own ratification, shows, convincingly, that it was intended to establish a Sovereignty strictly National, though not unlimited; and not a mere organized commission, for the purpose of executing a specific trust. For, on your principles, there is no reason to be devised why this course should have been pursued. You regard the States as still Sovereign, and the relations subsisting between them as substantially the same they were under the old confederacy. It is quite evident to me, that the framers of the Constitution did not take this view of its character and effects. It is quite evident, that they intended to effect, and believed they had effected, a fundamental change. This is evident, I say, from this very provision for its ratification. It is exactly such a provision as we should suppose, a priori, would be adopted in order to the accomplishment of this object-the establishment of a sovereignty strictly national. In what other way should this object have been effected, in the then existing posture of affairs? Should they have referred the ratification to the people in the aggregate? But such a ratification, unless it had been unanimous, would not, necessarily, have secured the transfer of Sovereignty required, by each individual State. Should they have referred it to the State Governments respectively? These manifestly had not the power to make such a transfer as, on my supposition, was necessary; though they were abundantly competent to the formation of such a Government as you represent that of the Union to be. The course pursued, obviates both objections, satisfies every condition, and would seem to have been instituted for this very reason. Thus, I maintain, the Constitution was accepted by the people, in the full force of the terms, and in the only practicable and adequate method. Whatever powers were invested in the Government-whatever duties were imposed on it--were so vested, and so imposed, directly by the people themselves, to be employed and performed for their immediate benefit; and they involve a direet responsibility to the people, and to the people alone. It is a Government of the people; the creature and agent of their sovereign will. It is a National Government-national in its origin, national in its objects, and national in its powers, though these powers are limited by boundaries, which the people, not the States, have prescri

It is not a compact of independent sovereignties, drawn forcibly together by a temporary exigency, but whose substantial and permanent interests are mutually hostile and repellent, threatening, at every step, to tear asunder the bonds that hold them in unnatural union. It is hard to say, whether such representations are more unfounded or mischievous. They are not supported by a single feature of the system, or a single fact, fairly interpreted, in its history.

The terms employed, and the forms observed, in the proceedings of the Government, likewise, when compared with those of the olden time,' lead to the same conclusions.

Under the Confederation, every thing savours of State sovereignty. All their forms of proceeding were shaped by this ever present consideration. Every thing was done by States. The term meets us. at every step. The Journals inform us, that such and such States were present at any particular debate; and that Virginia voted in the affirmative, or South-Carolina in the negative. The Congress speak of themselves collectively under the phrase, "We, the Delegates of New-Hampshire," &c. They passed resolutions, by States, and then transmitted them to these depositares of all substantial power, to be sanctioned, and carried into effect-I ought, perhaps, to say, to be neglected and disregarded. Under the present system, nothing of all this appears, not even in the Senate, where, at first view, there might seem some colour of reason to expect it. A stranger, unacquainted with our peculiar polity, might read the Congressional Register of a whole session, and still remain ignorant that any such distinction as that of States existed among us. How can you account for these things? Why these striking changes? You will not deny their bearing on the question. Forms of phraseology, modes of speech, derive their "pressure" and colour from the institutions, opinions, and habits of the times; and, in all cases, are of value as indicative of these. "Usus-jus et norma loquendi."

The fact, that the present Government is clothed with powers somewhat more extensive than those of the former, will not account for these changes. The cause is not adequate to the effect. They indicate something more than this. They intimate that a change has taken place in the very principles of the Government-that the elements bear a different relation to each other-that the sovereign power has changed places. In the light of these, we no longer see, in the halls of Congress, an assembly half diplomatic, and half legislative, in its character; each individual, now an Ambassador from a Sovereign State, and now essaying to "enact" the part of a legislator for thirteen such; "halting," at every step, "between two opinions;" suspended between his general devotion to his country, and his special love to this river, or that mountain; anxious that the public welfare should be promoted, but equally so, that his own State should bear as little of the burden as possible. Thank Heaven, we now see little of all this, on the floor of Congress, at least. The change is most obvious; and its cause, to my mind at least, equally so.

Let it not be said, that this doctrine tends to throw all power into the hands of the General Government, and leaves the States no barrier against its encroachments. Admit the fact; admit that the discretion I claim for the National Legislature, is liable to abuse; and what then? Is not the danger to be apprehended from a Government inadequate to its legitimate purposes-inadequate to the defence of the country-to the maintenance of its credit-to the advancement of its interests-to the support of its dignity-restricted from shaping its measures to meet the ever-varying course of human affairs, at home and abroad-is not this danger the inevitable alternative, be it remembered, of the other -still more to be dreaded? What, then, is to be done? We cannot have both sides of the alternative. Shall we quarrel with the decrees

of Heaven, which forbid the union of incompatible things? We must make our election; and having made it, must be satisfied to make the best we can of it.

But the admission is not called for. The doctrines I maintain, involve no dangerous consequences to the integrity, or the due influence and importance of the States. They are opposed only to those loose and vague conceptions of State supremacy, that are afloat in the public mind, fruitful only of noisy declamation, and angry invective; inoperative to any possible good effect; but mischievously efficacious in rousing jealousy and dissension, and urging the States to collision with the General Government, in which they have every thing to lose, and nothing to gain. The State Governments occupy a most important sphere in our political system-but a secondary and subordinate one it manifestly is. Let them be contented to move in that sphere, the sphere at once of peace and of usefulness. They have most important duties to perform, and powers to exercise; powers and duties growing out of the relations subsisting between them and their constituents, and reserved to them by the express provisions of the Constitution. These powers and duties, instead of being narrowed and diminished, by the operations of the General Government, are every day assuming increased importance, proportionate to the progress of Society. The idea of encroachment, systematic encroachment, on the part of the General Government, is a bug-bear raised by the designing, to frighten the weak and credulous. The State Governments "in the sober use of their legitimate peculiar powers," are strong-they rest on deep and broad foundations, in the wants, feelings, local attachments and local prejudices of the whole people. They are in no danger. But, independent, and sovereign they are not-high contracting parties to a solemn league and covenant, they are not. "Tis a manifest illusion so to represent them. They are local Legislatures only. The people have not placed them as sentinels over the National Legislature; nor is the latter amenable to them. The supreme power amenable to the inferior? The master to the servant? I trust we have not yet reached that point in our revolutionary progress; notwithstanding one of these is, at this moment, claiming to approach the General Government, reign, and an equal." Where is this to end?

as a sove

NO. XIV.

In my discussion of the question between us hitherto, I have employed the terms "Government and People," in their ordinary acceptation; and have reasoned concerning them as if that acceptation were correct and unobjectionable. This, however, is far from being the case. The terms are in every one's mouth; and yet, in their familiar import, they seem to my mind, to be surrounded with illusions. They convey ideas, when thus linked together, which have no archetypes in our political institutions; and suggest relations, which, among us, at least, have long ceased to exist. I have hinted at this idea already, in my remarks on what I regard as your imaginary apprehensions of corrupruption and usurpation, on the part of the General Government. That

this prevalent misconception has had an influence on your views of the nature and relations of the Government, I cannot doubt. I perceive its traces at every step. But it is not peculiar to you. Its effects are visible in most political writings in our language. There is no difficulty in accounting for its origin, or its prevalence. In most countries, the "Government and People" actually are, separate and distinct classes, having peculiar, and often opposite interests, broadly marked by different habits, opinions, and feelings; and all these, permanent and hereditary. In the country even from which we derive our origin, though verging nearer than its neighbours to a popular character, two branches of the Government, still, are widely distinguished from the mass of the people, by peculiar and hereditary privileges. Where such a civil polity obtains, there is a pertinency in this use of these contrasted terms. There is nothing improper, or erroneous, in exhibiting the "Government and People" as antagonist powers, perpetually struggling for the ascendancy; the one eager to seize what the other is equally tenacious in retaining. There is an adequate motive for these opposite efforts on both sides. In such countries, if popular principles and popular rights have made any progress, it has been in the teeth of vigorous opposition. Every advantage gained has been wrung from the reluctant grasp of prescriptive power. Hence the origin of the phrase in question. Now, it is often the fate of these traditionary modes of speech, long to survive the facts, and relations, to which they owed their birth; and to be still employed, with little reflection, under changed circumstances, to designate facts and relations, which have, at best, a very loose and feeble analogy with the former. In such cases, the old associations, which will continue to cluster round the terms almost inevitably mislead the mind. The imagination is both more susceptible, and more retentive, than the judgment. Thus it is, that these terms, whenever they recur, bring with them the idea of distinct and permanent classes of separate and opposite interests.

But, it is most obvious, that there is nothing in our systems to warrant this idea. Gnvernment with us, in the sense thus traditionally imparted to the term, has no existence. Ours is in fact, as well as in theory, a government of the people. For the individuals who today fill offices of honour and profit, to-morrow "the wind" of popular opinion " passes over them and they are gone." Law alone reigns among us. Nothing else has any permanent authority or existence. There is, therefore, none of that opposition between the government and the people, of which we hear so much; there is no foundation for the distinction thus perpetually put forward. It is utterly chimerical. That dragon-like vigilance, to which we are exhorted so earnestly, lest the Government, as such, should swallow up the liberties and privileges of the people, is utterly gratuitous. The Government is an abstract term, a nonentity. It is incapable of being influenced by cupidity or ambition; and the individual incumbents of office are mere ephemeræ who, unless intrusted with public money, neither have, nor can have, any possible inducement to be dishonest. They cannot, by possibility, make any encroachment, which can enure to their own benefit. And for corruption-who is there to corrupt them? It is in vain to go to market with what no one will buy; and for venality there exists no demand. I do not suppose our official agents to be possessed of greater

purity of character, or a higher sense of integrity, than other men. I regard them as equally liable to be swayed by selfish considerations, and drawn from the promotion of the public to the pursuit of individual interests, as their constituents. Show me how, in any case, the sacrifice of the public good can be made conducive to the personal advantage of A. or B. a being of real flesh and blood, endowed with the attributes of humanity; and I will allow, that to this point your vigilance may be well directed. But I really see no occasion to be frightened at shadows and abstractions, merely because you choose to give them formidable and gigantic names. I cannot admit that there is any magic poison in the term 'government,' even if the terrible epithet national' be thrown in to aid the spell, that, like the cup of CIRCE, should transform all who taste it into brutes, rendering them at once unprincipled and insensate. These remarks are applicable to the relations subsisting between the General and State Governments, and the prevalent apprehensions of danger from the former. In a general view, and in regard to the Government merely as national, these apprehensions do appear to me wild as a maniac's dream. Remember, the question has reference to individual men, assembled together, from time to time, from every State in the Union-men with all their native partialities warm and vigorous at their hearts. Not the abstract 'Lord Mayor' divested of his gown and bands;' his coach and custard; but the Lord Mayor' with all his attributes and predicaments upon him.

Why should these men enter into an unhallowed combination to usurp the rights, and curtail the powers, of the States, of their own States; back to the legislative halls, perchance, or executive chairs, of which they are in a few days, to return, to combat the principles, and resist the operation of measures, which they have themselves contributed to establish? The supposition is not only unreasonable; it is a downright absurdity. It contradicts the first principles of human na

ture.

But, it seems, you expect encroachments on the part of Congress, from the mere influence of a busy and meddlesome spirit. There is, you think, a scarcity of constitutional subjects to spend their activity upon. They must have game; and not finding it on their own ground, they will poach upon those of their neighbours. They must spin out the session, too, for the purpose of' feeding,' as JOHN RANDOLPH says, 'out of the public crib;' and this consideration urges them to extend, as widely as possible, the sphere of their operations. It is difficult to read such representations, and retain one's gravity. Who has ever yet witnessed any symptoms of this alarming scarcity? Who is there, on the contrary, that has not seen, from session to session, the public business suffering from mere want of time to accomplish it? A scarcity of subjects? Did mortal man ever hear of a Legislative body of any sort, breaking up, and dispersing from a want of stock? And with regard to prolonging their sessions for the sake of the pay; is it not notorious to every one, that the difficulty is, to retain members in their places till such time as the adjournment can, with any propriety, take place? Left to their voluntary movements, they would be on the wing for home, before the first swallow.'

But your principal apprehensions, you will say, have reference to a combination of a majority of the States to promote, by means of the