by cherishing that intellect and ingenuity, which operates with equal directness and efficiency on all the interests of society, is to conceive of them as neither wise nor plain dealing men; but as little else than a set of political mountebanks, assembled together to delude their constituents, and mystify their own work. For surely, if this clause is to be taken in the sense you ascribe to it, it was drawn up purposely, and with deliberation, with more than Delphic ambiguity. On your own admission, its true meaning and force have lain concealed for nearly forty years; and is now, at length, brought out to show that the whole course of the Government, during this time, has been wrong, both in principle and practice.

Ι say then, and I think I have proved, that even allowing your interpretation of these terms to be correct, which it demonstrably is not→ the encouragement intended to be given by this clause to Agriculture and Manufactures,' is not such as is at all inconsistent with the right of the General Government to foster and cherish them by other means. The power here given, is of a peculiar character, and required a peculiar specification to prescribe its exercise.

In this view of the subject, we perceive an adequate reason for vesting this power in Congress, without the slightest reference to the general protection of Agriculture or Manufactures. This is all that is requisite to the validity of my argument. It were unphilosophical to demand more. It is as good a maxim in logic, as in morals,

"Quod satis est cui contingit, nihil amplius optet."

Had the right of encouraging domestic industry been conferred on the Government, in terms the fullest and most express, there would still have been a propriety in making this particular provision, for this particular class of interests. Your law maxim, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" has, therefore, no pertinency whatever. This, manifestly, is not such an affirmance of power, as implies a prohibition of all others, for the plain reason that the fullest exercise of this does not, and cannot, render the exercise of others, either nugatory or unnecessary; nor would a grant of the general power to protect domestic industry, by the force of the terms, include this. It is quite evident, therefore, that you have mistaken the symptoms, when you speak of this as "an affirmative pregnant." There is no pregnancy in the case.

The particular arguments I have been considering, appear to me to constitute the whole strength of your case. I have shown that they cannot be sustained. The way is now open to an examination of the general question, on its own merits, stripped of all collateral considerations. Have Congress the Constitutional right to legislate for the protection of domestic industry?

This question will naturally present itself in a very different aspect, to him who regards this Union as a mere confederacy of sovereign States, from that in which it appears to him who considers the General Government as emanating directly from the People; as vested with the rights of original sovereignty; as intended to spread its protecting wings over the interests of the nation at large; and infuse its genial energies into the whole mass. He who regards the States as every thing, and the Nation as nothing; who thinks that all our dangers are to be apprehended from the general, and all our safety to be sought from the

local Legislatures, will naturally lean to the opinion, that the less is done by the former; the narrower the sphere of its operations, the better. Still, even such a man cannot hesitate to admit, that the regulation of commerce, in the widest scope of the terms, is committed solely and exclusively to the care of the National Legislature. This admission is sufficient for my purpose. I would not hesitate, were it requisite, to rest the decision of the cause upon it. An exclusive and unlimited power to regulate Commerce, necessarily carries along with it a power to foster and cherish the interests of Agriculture and Manufactures. These interests, in whatever country they co-exist, are so blended and involved together, that they cannot be separated. In such a country as ours, it were the veriest dreaming to think of promoting the interests of any one of these pursuits, and yet leaving those of the others unaffected. Not a law can be passed touching any of the principles of commerce, for example, or materially affecting its course, which will not operate, more or less directly and effectively, on both the other great branches of industry. And this is equally true, with regard to Agriculture and Manufactures. There is a mutual action and re-action between them. They operate upon and sustain each other. I do not understand the political philosophy which undertakes to separate them; and engage them in mutual hostility. It were about as wise to attempt to promote the welfare of the legs by starving the arms; or of the trunk by paralyzing both. The very materials of which our commerce consists, the vital principles of its action, are furnished by the industry and skill of the Agriculturist and Manufacturer. And of these, again, the industry and skill would be far less productive, less adequately remunerated, but for the assistance and co-operation of commercial enterprise and capital. There are truisms, the mere alphabet of political economy. Yet in the ardour of your zeal, you seem to have lost sight of them.

Were commercial regulations abolished throughout the world; were the ports of all nations thrown open to unrestricted competition; then, indeed, the business of the Legislature with regard to either pursuit, were at an end. But this has never been the state of the commercial world; nor is it ever likely to be. Utopian economists may dream of it; but waking and sober legislators will never lend their agency to produce it. And, while the state of the world remains substantially what it now is, the very end and design of regulating commerce, is, to render all these congenial and co-operating interests as productive as possible.

It seems a favourite idea with some, that the business of the Legislature with regard to commerce, is only to devise the ways and means of making it contribute to the public revenue, and to protect it from external violence. Even these purposes could not be effected without exerting an influence on the other branches of industry. But this is but a part, and an inferior part, of the duty imposed on the Government, in the actual state of things. Had it never extended its views beyond this line, nor adapted its measures to any larger objects, the commerce of the country would not have reached its present degree of developement, or importance. And, that it has done so little but with a reference to this single object of revenue, is the true cause, as I verily believe, of the general embarrassment and distress, which, for some

11

years past, have pervaded the community. Our commercial regulations have not been shaped, as they should have been, to meet the exigencies of the times. While commercial restrictions have shut us out, in a great measure, from the markets of Europe, corresponding restrictions, odious as the word has been rendered by the illuminati of the new school, have not been duly extended in our own code; and the best interests of the whole community have suffered grievously in consequence. Of this hereafter. I have only glanced at the subject now, for the purpose of illustrating my general proposition.

The commercial system of the world, is a system of restriction, and countervailing monopolies; and if we propose to retain any valuable share of the general trade, we must adapt our measures to the existing state of things. The regulation of commerce, in the actual relations. we sustain towards other nations, must, of necessity, consist, in a greater or less degree of restrictive and countervailing measures. These measures cannot fail to operate powerfully on the interests of domestic industry. And it is idle to suppose, that when the framers of the Constitution were arranging and harmonizing its powers, it was their intention that those things should not happen, which, they must have known, would happen. It is doing little credit to their judgment, or fairness, to maintain that in giving to Congress an express power over Commerce, which could not, in the very nature of things, bè exercised without involving the interests of Manufactures, it was still their intention to prohibit them from meddling with the latter. It is a strange solecism, too, to assert, that what is quite correct and constitutional, while covertly and indirectly effected, becomes unconstitutional, the moment it is openly avowed, and honestly pursued. On this principle, truth and plain dealing would seem to be the poisonous infusion, that taint and vitiate the whole mass of legislation on this subject. The absurd position, which the adversaries of the protective system find themselves compelled to maintain, or else abandon their argument is that, the self-same measure is either constitutional, or unconstitutional, not according to its actual and necessary operation, but according to the title given it in the statute-book, or the supposed purpose existing in the mind of the Legislator. So far as the question of constitutionality is concerned, Congress has an unquestioned right to prohibit the importation of cotton goods, for example. An act to this effect could, on this ground, be impugned by no one, provided the terms, Whereas and Therefore, were properly arranged. But a mistake here would be fatal. It would render the act unconstitutional, and void, not in its forms, but in its principles. We have lately seen this very distinction set up by high authority. How it is intended to render it effective in practice, it were vain to inquire. Doctrines of this sort may serve to amuse the speculative; or subserve the purpose of political agitators. But they can never be the guides of practical Statesmen. The measures of the Government must be tried by a test more palpable; or it were as well to let them alone.

"Manufactures," you say, "were judiciously encouraged till 1812." Since that time, their encouragement has been, not "injudicious"— this would have been intelligible and consistent-but "unconstitutional." On what possible principle do you ground this distinction? I thank you, however, for the concession, for it completely oversets your whole

scheme. If "judicious" is the proper term, there is an end to the debate on this topic. Let us try the measures of the Government by this criterion alone, and let them stand or fall accordingly. But it is impossible, that regulations the same in principle, and differing only in degree, should be constitutional in 1812, and unconstitutional in 1824. If it was constitutional, prior to 1812, to give "at one time, a little advantage to the Sugar Planter; and, at another, a little to the Manufacturer; it cannot be unconstitutional, whatever else it may be, in 1827, to give a little further advantage to either the one or the other. Nor will the law be rendered unconstitutional, if it brings a modicum of comfort to the Wheat grower, or the Cotton Planter. General principles must be steady and uniform in their character. They cannot be one thing to-day and another to-morrow; shifting their hues according to the aspects of time and circumstances; or the varying humours and complexions of men.

If it is unconstitutional to impose a duty of one hundred per cent. on a foreign article, for the purpose of encouraging its production among ourselves, it is equally so, to impose one of two per cent. If the latter be right, the former cannot, on this ground, be wrong.

NO. XXV.

In my last number, I presented some general views of Commerce, Agriculture and Manufactures, tending to show, that, from ther mutual relations and dependencies, a power to regulate and control the one, must necessarily imply a corresponding power, in kind, if not in extent, over the others. It is, I think, too plain to be denied, that an attempt to legislate for the interests of commerce alone, without reference to its connexion with the others, must be either nugatory, or pernicious. We might, indeed, throw open our ports to the ships and products of all nations, without any discriminating laws for the protection of our own industry. But what would be the result of such a measure, in the existing state of things? or rather, what would have been its effects on the wealth and prosperity of the country, had it been adopted at the time the Federal Government went into operation?

It is not going too far to say, that we should have been, at this moment-if it is possible to believe that, under the pressure of such a state of things, the Union could have subsisted until now-in a state of the most abject vassalage-of worse than colonial dependence. We should have been, in a great measure, dependent on foreign skill and industry, for articles of the first necessity. And this, without any of the countervailing advantages—such as they were-which we derived from the colonial state. Our manufactures of iron, of leather, of paper, of cotton and of wool, which now furnish employment and bread to many thousand of industrious citizens, by their direct-and to so many thousand more by their indirect, and collateral operation-would have had no existence. Our mercantile navigation would have consisted of little more than a few coasters and fishing vessels. Our navy might perhaps have reckoned a half a dozen small sloops of war. The proud and flourishing cities along our seaboard, would have been, at

the most, what Boston and Charleston were at the close of the Revolutionary War. Instead of wealth and elegance, arts and improvements of every sort, poverty and decay, with all their train of evils, physical, intellectual and moral, would have met the eye of the observer, wherever it rested.

There is no exaggeration in this picture. There are those still living among us, whose memory retains uneffaced, the strong features of the original. Such was the actual condition of the country in 1789, and from this condition it would hardly have emerged, certainly not with the rapidity we have actually witnessed, without the aid of commercial regulations, operating upon and fostering all the great interests of the community. That the country has not been kept, in a great measure, stationary in wealth and improvement, is owing, probably, more than any other cause, to the adoption by the Government, and steady pursuit of principles, which you denominate unconstitutional and measures which you denounce as usurpation. Our commercial system was formed, at the outset, on the express and avowed principle of encouraging domestic industry. It would have been strange, indeed, had it not been so. It would have been strange, if, at that period of the world, when the imposition of duties on foreign articles, was, perhaps, invariably associated in the mind, with the idea of protection to native products-it would have been strange, if our statesmen had at once unlinked this inveterate association, and separated these ideas so effectually, that the latter was to be regarded as unconstitutional, while the former was to be exercised ad libitum.

They did not so separate them, as is proven by the whole history of our legislation on this subject. Look over the debates on every question pertaining to the tariff, and you will find that the two ideas have ever continued fast bound together. It has always been deemed a valid reason for laying or increasing the impost on any particular article, that it would tend to foster the domestic production of the same article. So plain is this fact, that, though you fix the commencement of the period of encroachment on the part of Congress, subsequently to 1812,yet you are compelled to admit, that prior to that time, manufactures had been encouraged by commercial regulations. You consider this encour

agement as judicious" even, on the ground, apparently, that the encouragement was but small. This consideration is a pertinent and may be an important one, so far as regards the expediency of the thing. With its constitutionality, as already remarked, it has not the slightest concern. Be it that the sins of the Government, during this period, were small; yet they were frequent, and manifested as settled a purpose and as corrupt a habit, as though they had been of greater magnitude. But this "encouragement" grew out of political necessity, you aver. Imposts must be laid for the sake of the revenue; and if they operated slightly in favour of agriculture, or manufactures, "there was no harm in this." This is sound doctrine. There is, indeed, a necessity in the case, which cannot be controlled. Imposts must be laid for the purposes of revenue. Yet they cannot be laid without affecting the interests of agriculture and manufactures. The right to lay imposts, then, involves, ex necessitate rei, a right to cherish manufactures. The argument is conclusive. For, what the Government must do in the discharge of its acknowledged duties, it has surely the right to do,