general rule is, that a statement in the nature of an admission or confession, in order to be admissible, must relate to the offense in question. While the fact that such statement may include another offense as well as that charged does not prevent the confession being received and going to the jury with proper instructions when there can be no separation of the relevant from the irrelevant parts, when the relevant parts can be separated from the irrelevant this must be done and that part, only, of the confession admitted which is material to the issues on trial. (1 Elliott on • Evidence, sec. 293; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence,—16th ed.— sec. 218; 3 Ency. of Evidence, 324; 2 Wharton on Crim. Evidence, 10th ed.-688; see, also, Commonwealth v. Wilson, 186 Pa. St. 1, and Gore v. People, 162 Ill. 259.) The part of the confessions as to other matters was readily separable from that part of plaintiff in error's confession bearing on the crime here in question.

Counsel for plaintiff in error further contend that prejudicial error was committed by allowing his picture to be taken while on the witness stand, pointing his finger at the jury. This objection was first urged on the motion to set aside the orders overruling motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment. On the hearing of this question in the court below the trial judge stated positively that he was not present when the picture was taken. The affidavits both for and against this motion, and evidence taken in open court, bear out this statement. There is some controversy in the record as to whether any or all of the jury were present in the room when the picture was taken. The court refused to set aside the orders overruling the motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment on this ground. Even if it be conceded that the picture in question was taken in the presence of all the jury during a recess of the court, we cannot see how plaintiff in error would be prejudiced thereby.

One of the principal contentions of counsel for plaintiff in error is that the evidence tends to show that he was insane and therefore not responsible for the crime. No direct evidence was offered by either side as to the sanity of plaintiff in error. Every man is presumed to be sane, and in the absence of evidence which may raise a reasonable doubt of his sanity no evidence need be introduced. Whenever the question of sanity is put in issue by facts coming from either side which may raise a doubt of the defendant's sanity, it then devolves upon the People to establish his sanity. (Montag v. People, 141 Ill. 75; People v. Casey, 231• id. 261, and cases there cited.) As we have said, no evidence was offered on this question, but counsel for plaintiff in error contend that plaintiff in error's actions and statements during the trial indicate that he was not of sound mind. While practically every witness was testifying for the State plaintiff in error interrupted, saying something in the presence of the jury,-usually some comment on what the witness had said or on the witness' character for truth and veracity. He also made such comments frequently as to the statements of counsel on both sides and the statements of the court made in the rulings. He more than once said to witnesses, "You lie;" "You lie right there;" "You lie from your heart." At other times he made the statement, "Let him tell what I told him." Again, "You don't know anything else; that's the kind of a guy you are; tell your troubles to the jury; come up there and tell them all I told you." Again, to a witness, "Now, you have been dreaming; you have been reading the paper, and what you read in the paper you tell them." Again, "That is all right; I want the jury to know the truth." Frequently he said to witnesses, "You are a bone-head," or "You are a pinhead." He made this same sort of a comment with reference to the State's attorney and to his own attorney. Again, as to a witness who seemed to satisfy him, "That's all right; that young lady knows everything she says; it's

the plain truth; it's the only one that got up and said the plain truth; the rest of them are a pack of liars." Near the close of the introduction of evidence the State's attorney asked if he could have a little time for consultation, and plaintiff in error broke in: "Go out and get a few more guns and a few more shots and it will be all right. Go out to the ladies. You see they have a sign up there, 'Justice.' For two bones they string him up there and you will have a nice necktie party out there next week, and you are all invited out there. I will tell you all about the fifty murders they have got me down for-fifty of them. Drink their blood. Just kill them for their blood-nothing else. You are all right. Every one of these murders was commited for about two dollars, like that guy here. He got two bones for the hammer. They can't prove that she was shot, and yet they want to prove I hit her with a hammer. Anything that anybody says, that is all right; just tell it to the jury."

These are only a few examples of the many interruptions that were made by plaintiff in error during the trial and will serve to illustrate the character of those interruptions. He was treated with great consideration by court, counsel and witnesses. As stated, when he took the stand he answered practically every question asked him by both his own counsel and counsel for the People, "I don't know." When, however, he was asked by the court why sentence should not be pronounced against him he made a long statement, which, while somewhat rambling, shows clearly that he did know and remember all about the various things. he was questioned about on the witness stand. Conceding for the purposes of this case, but without attempting to discuss or decide the question, that his actions during the trial were proper to be taken into consideration by the jury in deciding whether or not he was sane, we can reach no other conclusion from this entire record than that the jury were fully justified in finding, from the evidence, that he was

a sane man. The court gave certain instructions asked by each side on the question of the insanity of the accused. We see no error in these instructions or any conflict, as urged by counsel for plaintiff in error, between two of them. that would in any way tend to mislead the jury. Depravity of character and abandoned habits are not in themselves evidence of insanity. Neither is the commission of an unnatural or atrocious crime necessarily such evidence. Hill v. Hill, 27 N. J. Eq. 214; State v. Stark, 1 Strobh. 479; In re Giteau, 10 Fed. Rep. 161; Wickes v. Walden, 228 Ill. 56; Snell v. Weldon, 239 id. 279.

In this connection counsel for plaintiff in error argue that the court should have required the calling of expert witnesses on the question of the insanity of plaintiff in error, claiming that such experts were present in court during most of the trial. Even if this question were properly preserved in the record, no error was committed in not calling such experts.

Counsel further contend that the court erred in permitting the State's attorney to have another lawyer assist him in the prosecution of the case; that the defense was overmatched in the presentation of the questions to the jury, as plaintiff in error had only one attorney. We agree fully with counsel that it is the duty of the trial court, as well as of this court, to, see to it that every person charged with crime is given a fair trial. It appears from this record that - when plaintiff in error was first arraigned in the trial court and stated that he was without counsel the court appointed two reputable attorneys of DuPage county to defend him; that shortly thereafter Anton Zeman, one of the counsel in this court for plaintiff in error, was made sole counsel on Spencer's own request, the other two attorneys theretofore appointed by the court withdrawing from the case. We find no error in this regard.

We have considered all the questions raised, directly or indirectly, by counsel. The evidence fully justifies the ver

dict, and shows not only that plaintiff in error committed the crime with which he is charged, but that he was sane then and at the time of the trial. He has had a fair trial. No reason is found in this record why the finding of the jury should be set aside. The judgment of the circuit court will therefore be affirmed.

The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order fixing the period between nine o'clock in the forenoon and five o'clock in the afternoon on the 31st day of July, 1914, as the time when the original sentence of death entered in the circuit court of DuPage county shall be executed. A certified copy of that order will be furnished by the clerk to the sheriff of DuPage county.

Judgment affirmed.

JOHN WILSON, Defendant in Error, vs. THE Danville COLLIERIES COAL COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed June 16, 1914-Rehearing denied October 7, 1914.

I. MINES-duty of examining the mine and marking dangerous places exists as to timber-men. The duty of a mine owner to have the mine examined and dangerous conditions marked and reported exists as to timber-men engaged, under general directions of the mine manager, in cleaning up a mine after a shut-down and in making repairs needed to make the mine safe. (Piazzi v. KerensDonnewald Coal Co. 262 Ill. 30, followed.)

2. SAME what instruction is properly refused. An instruction directing a verdict for the defendant mining company if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the injured employee was engaged in timbering the entry under the direction of the defendant's mine manager, is properly refused as misleading, where no attempt is made in such instruction or any other to explain the meaning of the words "under the direction" of the mine manager.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. WILLIAM B. SCHOLFIELD, Judge, presiding.