action under the law of assumed risk, for the reason that all conditions, and whatever dangers there were, were open and obvious to him and therefore were assumed by him. The same is true as regards appellant, which was represented by its superintendent, who was present overseeing and directing the work. What was notice to one would under like conditions be equally notice to the other. No discrimination can be made in this respect between the employer and the employee and preserve that equality of right which it is the policy of the law to preserve and maintain. The object to be attained by this statute was to prevent injuries to persons employed in this dangerous and extrahazardous occupation, so that negligence on their part in the manner of doing their work might not prove fatal. The language of the statute is, that the scaffold "shall be erected and constructed in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated, as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon." No attempt is made to define what shall be considered or shall constitute a safe, suitable and proper scaffold, which, from the very nature of things, could not well be done, for what might be a safe, suitable and proper scaffold for one kind of work under one set of conditions or circumstances would be wholly inadequate, insufficient and unsafe for doing another kind of work under other conditions or circumstances and at a different height from the ground. Consequently the legislature has not attempted to define what shall constitute a safe, suitable and proper scaffold but has cast the burden of constructing safe, suitable and proper scaffolds upon the employer, and he cannot escape liability for injuries sustained by reason of his failing to furnish such scaffolds by pleading ignorance of their dangerous condition when the conditions are known to him. The language of the statute is mandatory and imperative that the scaffold shall be so constructed as to be safe and afford

adequate protection to the persons working thereon, and the employer cannot escape liability for a willful violation of the statute where he constructs an insufficient, unsafe and dangerous scaffold, even though he may have believed the scaffold constructed by him safe and the conditions under which it was being used not dangerous.

The provisions of the statute we are considering are in the same language as section 33 of the Mining act, in force at the time this statute was passed. In the recent case of Piazzi v. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co. supra, this court held that the mine owner or operator is liable for a willful violation of the mining statute even though he had the place examined by a mine examiner, who in good faith believed that the place was not dangerous. It was there said: "If the clod in the roof constituted a dangerous condition it was the duty of the mine examiner to discover that fact and mark the place. It was held in Actitus v. Spring Valley Coal Co. 246 Ill. 32, that if conditions in the mine are in fact dangerous, the owner or operator cannot excuse himself from liability for a willful violation of the Mines and Mining act if he fails to cause the places where the dangerous conditions exist to be marked, even though the mine examiner may have examined those places and in good faith believed that the conditions were not dangerous." And in Actitus v. Spring Valley Coal Co. supra, on page 39 it is said: "When the mine owner or operator is advised of the conditions in the mine, he must place in the mine, if it is dangerous, the statutory marks, and if he fails to do so he acts at his peril, and he cannot excuse himself because he or his examiner or manager may think the mine safe. To so hold would be to permit the mine owner or operator, or his examiner or manager, to usurp the functions of the court and jury, and to pass upon a question which, in every case like this, is a matter of proof and is to be determined as a fact by the jury.-Catlett v. Young, 143 Ill. 74; Odin Coal Co. v. Denman, 185 id. 413; Davis

v. Illinois Collieries Co. 232 id. 284; Eldorado Coal and Coke Co. v. Swan, 227 id. 586; Mertens v. Southern Coal and Mining Co. 235 id. 540; Olson v. Kelly Coal Co. 236 id. 502; McCarthy v. Spring Valley Coal Co. 232 id. 473.”

What was said in the cases cited is equally true and applicable to the situation in the case at bar, and for the reasons there given the same rule of construction should be adopted in construing the provisions of the statute here under consideration. The statute not defining what shall constitute a safe, suitable and proper scaffold, the question then must necessarily be left to the jury for determination as one of fact. In this case the conditions were all before the jury, and this question was submitted to them under instructions much more favorable to appellant than was its right, as the jury were told that appellee could not recover from appellant, under the law, unless he had proven by the evidence that appellant willfully failed to comply with said law and construct a safe, suitable and proper scaffold, proper and adequate to protect the lives and limbs of the persons employed thereon, and that by a willful violation of the statute is meant a reckless disregard of the provisions of the statute. The word "willfully" is synonymous with "knowingly," and to constitute a willful violation of the statute it is not necessary that there should have been "a reckless disregard" of its provisions. The employer is liable not only when the dangerous conditions are known to him, but also when by the exercise of reasonable care the existence of such dangerous conditions could have been discovered and become known to him. Peebles v. O'Gara Coal Co. 239 Ill. 370.

The jury by their verdict have found the issues on the facts against appellant and the Appellate Court has approved the judgment of the trial court entered on this verdict. Under the law this question of fact is conclusively settled for this court by the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court. (Kelly

ville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516; Illinois Steel Co. v. Olste, 214 id. 181.) In Tomasi v. Donk Bros. Coal Co. 257 Ill. 70, it is said: "Conceding that defendant in error wrongfully and unlawfully fired his shot, whether such act on his part was the proximate cause of the injury, or whether it resulted from plaintiff in error's violation of the statute, as charged in the declaration, were questions of fact to be determined by the jury. (Henrietta Coal Co. v. Martin, 221 Ill. 460; Mertens v. Southern Coal Co. 235 id. 540.) * * The jury has found that the injury complained of resulted from the willful violation of the statute, and that finding has been approved by the Appellate Court, and we have no power, under the law, to review that question."

Appellant also insists that the evidence fails to show that the violation of the provisions of the statute was the proximate cause of appellee's injury. What is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be determined from a consideration of all of the attending facts and circumstances. It only becomes a question of law when the facts are not only not disputed, but are also such that there can be no difference in the judgment of reasonable men in the inference to be drawn therefrom. (Nall v. Taylor, 247 Ill. 580; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Siler, 229 id. 390; Waschow v. Kelly Coal Co. 245 id. 516.) The evidence in this case shows that the runway was permitted to become so piled with brick that there was only a space about five feet in width at the place where appellee was required to pass his co-laborers, and that when the empty wheelbarrow was placed as close to the pile of brick as it could be placed there was less than three inches in space between the trays of the wheelbarrows for passing and the wheeler was but about fifteen inches from the unguarded edge of the platform or runway. Under these facts and circumstances as proven it might fairly and reasonably have been found by the jury that the scaf

fold or runway on which appellee was required to work was permitted to become unsafe and of insufficient width to afford adequate protection to the men at work thereon, and that such condition was the proximate cause of appellee's injury.

On the evidence in this case the Appellate Court did not err in refusing to reverse the judgment of the trial court. Finding no reversible error in the record the judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. C. E. Landers, County Collector, Plaintiff in Error, vs. JOHN C. WHITE et al. Defendants in Error.

Opinion filed June 16, 1914—Rehearing denied October 7, 1914.

1. TAXES--tax to improve main ditch of drainage district can not be charged against one sub-district, only. Under section 43 of the Farm Drainage act sub-districts may be created, with the right to tax such sub-districts for the cost of constructing lateral drains in the sub-district connecting with the main ditch, but the cost of improving the main ditch, even though the improvement is within the limits of the sub-district, must be borne by the entire district. (People v. Wilder, 257 Ill. 304, followed.)

2. SAME when land cannot be assessed as entire tract without deducting area of right of way for ditch. Where a drainage district has a deed to a right of way twenty feet wide for a ditch across a tract of land, the fact that the proposed improvement consists of converting the open ditch into a tile drain does not authorize assessing the land as an entire tract, on the theory that the proposed change will enable the land owner to use all the land, including the right of way, where it is not shown that the district has re-conveyed the right of way to the land owner.

WRIT OF ERROR to the County Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. JOHN L. DRYER, Judge, presiding.

J. EARL MAJOR, State's Attorney, and TAYLOR & TAYLOR, (HILL & BULLINGTON, of counsel,) for plaintiff in

error.