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RINAKER & RINAKER, MILLER & MCDAVID, and PAUL MCWILLIAMS, for defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court:

This writ of error brings up the record of a judgment of the county court of Montgomery county sustaining objections and refusing judgment for certain delinquent drainage taxes.

Drainage district No. 2 in the town of Pitman, Montgomery county, was organized in 1882, and included within its boundaries the lands now owned by defendant in error Perrine and part of the lands owned by defendant in error White. The district embraced about four thousand acres of flat prairie land, and the general scheme was to drain the same by one main open ditch extending from the outlet at the south line of the district north-eastwardly near to the north line of the district. The main ditch was something over four miles in length, and had two principal lateral branches, designated on the plat as "B" and “D,” and a sub-lateral emptying into branch "B," which is designated as lateral "C." It appears that the main ditch "A" had been surveyed and partially excavated at some time prior to the organization of the district but the ditch was improved and completed by district No. 2 some time before 1884. After the district had been organized and going for considerable time four sub-districts were organized within district No. 2, known as sub-districts 1, 2, 3 and 4. The taxes involved in the present litigation were levied by the commissioners of the parent district No. 2 for certain improvements to be made on the lower end of the main ditch and by the commissioners of sub-district No. 4 for certain improvements to be made within said sub-district. The objections filed were applied to the taxes levied for both purposes. The court overruled the objections so far as the same related to the application for judgment for the taxes levied by the main district. Defendants in error have as

signed no cross-errors, and the ruling of the court in so far as it applies to the taxes levied for district No. 2 is not involved in this proceeding.

There were a large number of objections interposed to the taxes levied for the improvement in sub-district No. 4. The estimated cost of the improvement in sub-district No. 4 was $22,950 while the cost of the improvement charged to the parent district is $6003. Sub-district No. 4 is in the upper or northern end of district No. 2, and, as formed, a greater portion of the main ditch as the same was located and constructed through the original district is within the limits of sub-district No. 4. The main ditch as originally constructed in district No. 2 was an open ditch. The proposed improvement in district No. 2 consists in converting that portion of the main open ditch within sub-district No. 4 into a tile drain, and a principal portion of the cost of the improvement is the purchase of large tile and installing them in the upper end of this main ditch. While there are numerous objections filed it will not be necessary to consider all of them. If there is one valid objection applicable to all of the taxes levied against defendants in error's lands in sub-district No. 4, that would require the affirmance of the judgment regardless of what might be thought of the other objection.

Among the objections sustained by the court is one that the taxes levied in sub-district No. 4 were, in fact, levied for the improvement of the main ditch of the old district No. 2. This objection is well supported and is conclusive of the whole controversy. While, under section 43 of the Farm Drainage act as amended in 1901, (Laws of 1901, p. 147,) the drainage commissioners may divide the district into as many sub-districts as there are separate areas, for the purpose of making assessments of benefits for the work to be done in such sub-districts, still the formation of subdistricts under this statute cannot be made for the purpose of bearing the burdens incurred by the main district in con

nection with the construction, maintenance or repair of the main ditch. Sub-districts may be created for more minute drainage, with the right to tax such sub-districts for the construction of lateral drains connecting with the main ditch, but the power to divide into sub-districts cannot be used as a means of shifting burdens onto a part of the territory in the district which should be borne by all of the lands in the district according to benefits. This precise question was before this court in the late case of People v. Wilder, 257 Ill. 304, and it was there held that an objection raising the same question as the one now under con-sideration should have been sustained. We regard that case as conclusive, under the facts in this record, of the validity of the tax levied against the lands in sub-district No. 4.

Another objection is, that certain tracts of defendants in error were assessed as entire tracts when, in fact, the drainage district had a right of way twenty feet wide through the same for the main ditch. It is argued by plaintiff in error that the conversion of the open ditch into a tile drain would restore to the land owners the entire surface, and that the tract should thereafter be taxed as an entire tract. The evidence is that the district has deeds to the right of way and has never re-conveyed the same or done any other act that would re-invest the land owners with the title. It may be that the district desires to hold the right of way, to be used in case it becomes necessary to lay additional tiles or return to the open ditch method of drainage.

The above objections being conclusive of the validity of the tax levied, it is not necessary to consider any others. The judgment of the county court of Montgomery county is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

L. B. IRMEGAR et al. Appellants, vs. THE COUNTY OF TazeWELL, Appellee.

Opinion filed June 16, 1914-Rehearing denied October 7, 1914.

1. ELECTIONS-a proceeding to contest an election is subject to chancery rules. While a proceeding to contest an election is not an action at law or a suit in equity, still, under the statute, it is to all intents and purposes a chancery proceeding and subject to chancery rules, except as otherwise provided by statute.

2. SAME-jurisdiction of contest proceeding attaches when the petition is filed. Jurisdiction of a proceeding to contest an election attaches when the petition is filed, and after it is once vested it cannot be divested by subsequent events.

3. SAME-signers of petition to contest election on bond issue not entitled to withdraw names. Signers of a petition to contest an election upon the proposition of issuing bonds have no right to withdraw their names after the time for instituting the contest proceeding has expired and thereby defeat the jurisdiction acquired by the court when the petition was filed.

4. PRACTICE the question whether causes shall be consolidated rests largely in discretion of court. The question whether causes involving the same questions shall be consolidated in the trial court is one resting largely in the sound judicial discretion of that court.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Tazewell county; the Hons. T. N. GREEN and JOHN M. NIEHAUS, Judges, presiding en banc.

WEIL & BARTLEY, GEORGE J. JOCHEM, and FRANK J. QUINN, for appellants.

W. J. REARDON, State's Attorney, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Tazewell county dismissing, on motion of the State's attorney, a petition for contesting a special election held in that county on October 20, 1913, upon the proposition of issuing bonds in the sum of $250,000 to build a court house.

November 19, 1913, appellants, together with certain others, eleven in all,-filed in said circuit court their written petition to contest the said election, in accordance with the provisions of section 117 of the Election law. (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 1062.) It seems to be conceded that the petition was in due form, and signed, as by statute required, by the requisite number of qualified electors. It set forth various reasons for contesting the election which need not be considered here, as the petition was dismissed without consideration as to the merits of the contest. After the thirty-day period allowed by statute for filing contests had elapsed, seven of said petitioners filed in the circuit court their written withdrawals from said petition. Without notice and without the presence of counsel the trial court entered an order permitting the withdrawal of said signers and dismissed the petition as to them, leaving the petition with but four signers while the statute requires five. As soon as counsel for appellants heard of this order they filed a motion to vacate. They also filed a petition, signed by nearly one hundred other qualified petitioners, asking the court for leave to intervene in said petition. L. B. Irmegar, one of the original petitioners whose name had been allowed to be withdrawn from said petition by the court, filed a motion to have his name re-instated, supporting this motion with an affidavit to the effect that he had not authorized anyone to so withdraw his name. The court allowed Irmegar to be re-instated, but in the meantime W. W. Goddard, another petitioner on the original petition, asked leave to withdraw, which was granted by the court, leaving the petition still with but four signers. The State's attorney of Tazewell county filed a motion to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction. The day after the filing of the original petition in this case a similar petition, setting forth the same grounds of contest as to the same election, was filed in said circuit court, signed by six other qualified voters. At the time the motion was made to vacate the order dis

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