missing the petition in this case, a motion was also made to have the two cases consolidated. Four of the petitioners on the petition last filed had in the meantime withdrawn, leaving only two petitioners thereon. After a hearing the circuit court denied the motions of appellants and allowed the motion of the State's attorney to dismiss the petition in this case because of want of jurisdiction of the court by reason of the withdrawal of names from said original petition. This appeal was prayed by the remaining petitioners.

While a proceeding to contest an election is not an action at law or a suit in equity, (Devous v. Gallatin County, 244 Ill. 40; Shirar v. Elbridge Township, 249 id. 617;) still, under our statute it is to all intents and purposes a chancery proceeding, subject to all chancery rules, except as otherwise provided by the statute. (Conway v. Sexton, 243 Ill. 59; Quartier v. Dowiat, 219 id. 326; Dale v. Irwin, 78 id. 170.) When such election contests are brought in court, as required under the statute, the rules as to jurisdiction must necessarily be the same as in other judicial proceedings, unless the statute on election contests, from its wording, should be construed otherwise. The general rule is, that the jurisdiction of a court over a cause depends on the state of facts at the time the action is brought; that after jurisdiction has once vested it cannot be divested by subsequent events. Change of residence or of the condition of the parties or of the amount in dispute cannot take away jurisdiction that has once attached. (Tindall v. Meeker, 1 Scam. 137; Alley v. McCabe, 147 Ill. 410; Mullen v. Torrance, 22 U. S. 536; Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 id. 163; United States v. Dawson, 56 id. 467; State v. Wilkins, 67 N. H. 164; Hawes on Jurisdiction of Courts, sec. 23.) Under these authorities jurisdiction attached as soon as this petition was filed. Nothing is found in the wording of the statute on election contests that indicates in any way that the question of jurisdiction in such court proceedings should be treated differently from the question of jurisdiction in

any other cause. Obviously, therefore, jurisdiction having vested, it was not divested by the withdrawal of certain of the petitioners, unless, under the statute, they had the right to control and dismiss the petition.

A part of the complainants, if this were an ordinary lawsuit, would have no authority to dismiss this proceeding so as to oust the court from jurisdiction to try the same on behalf of the other complainants. After suit brought, part of the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to withdraw if by so doing the remaining plaintiffs in the suit are injured. (Holkirk v. Holkirk, 4 Madd. 50; Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat, 3 L. J. Ch. [O. S.] 45.) This court has held that one of two plaintiffs has no right to dismiss the action against the objections of the other, even though the person desiring to dismiss is liable to be injured by the further prosecution, provided his co-plaintiff shall indemnify him against the loss. (Winslow v. Newlan, 45 Ill. 145; see, also, Andrews' Stephen's Pl.--2d ed.-sec. 31.) If the argument of counsel for appellee is sound, then why should not death, insanity, conviction of felony or removal from the election district of any one of the petitioners after the filing of the petition operate, in and of itself, as a dismissal of the petition and thus oust the court of its jurisdiction? There appear to be no decisions of this question by courts of last resort, except that of Hawaii by a divided court. The decisions in other jurisdictions could, in any event, be only persuasive and not conclusive. The statutes of other States on this question, so far as they have been called to our attention, are not identical in wording with the Illinois statute. In McCrary on Elections (4th ed. sec. 454) the author says that a contested election, whatever the form of the proceeding may be, is in its essence one in which the people are primarily and principally interested; that “it is not a suit for the adjudication and settlement of private rights, simply. It follows that the parties to the record cannot, by stipulation or otherwise, discontinue or compromise a case

of this character without the consent and approval of the court or tribunal trying it. Nor should such consent ever be given unless the court giving it is sufficiently advised to be able to say that it is for the interest of the public to do so."

The cases relied on by counsel for appellee, such as Littell v. Board of Supervisors, 198 Ill. 205, Theurer v. People, 211 id. 296, Kinsloe v. Pogue, 213 id. 302, and Malcomson v. Strong, 245 id. 166, holding that signers upon various kinds of statutory petitions, before the petition is acted upon by the tribunal created by law to determine the matter, may withdraw their names, are not controlling. Every one of the statutes there considered is different in wording from the one now under consideration. In none of the cases was the petition in any sense a pleading in a judicial proceeding in court, and in none of them did the dismissal of the petition operate to dispose finally of the question involved. In each of them a new petition could thereafter be filed for the same purpose, signed by the same or different petitioners. We are in full accord with the reasoning in some of the cases just referred to, where it was said that in a petition involving the removal of a county seat, or other like question, a man might deliberately change his mind and conclude he did not want a change in the county seat, and therefore it was in accordance with common sense, as well as sound public policy, to allow such petitioner to withdraw his name from the petition before it was finally acted upon. Under the statute we are considering the situation is entirely different. A withdrawal of the petitioners' names after the thirty-day limitation for filing the petition, and the dismissal of the petition therefor, would defeat any further investigation as to the illegality of the election. If that be the meaning of the statute, its purpose in authorizing five qualified voters to contest would, in practice, be nullified, and no one would feel certain of giving the court jurisdiction unless many times five

voters signed. All citizens are as much interested in having elections fairly conducted and the results fairly and honestly declared as are the five voters who may file a petition to contest such an election. The interests of the public are paramount to those of any contestant or petitioner. Election contests, where one person files a contest as to an office for which he has been a candidate, have sometimes been stated to be adversary proceedings. (15 Cyc. 402, and cases cited.) This, however, is not that sort of a contest and we are not required to consider or decide that point. The public, alone, is here interested. No voter has any greater interest than any other voter. Statutes should be

so construed as to protect the elective franchise. The intent of the statute is the law. (Sutherland on Stat. Const. sec. 234.) The legislature certainly did not intend, in drafting this statute as to contesting an election upon a subject which may by law be submitted to a vote of the people where only five petitioners are required and the petition must be filed within thirty days after the election, to permit any one of the five petitioners after the thirty days had expired, whether moved by honest motives or otherwise, to defeat an investigation of such election by withdrawing his name from the petition. Such a construction of the statute is contrary to its plain intent and purpose and against sound public policy.

The trial court erred in allowing the petitioners to withdraw their names and in dismissing the petition.

The question whether causes involving the same questions shall be consolidated in the trial court is one resting largely in the sound judicial discretion of that court. We see no reason why these two cases, involving identically the same question, should not have been consolidated. If that, however, had been the only error the decree would not be reversed.

The decree of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded.

JACOB MARTENS, Appellant, vs. JAMES J. BRADY, Auditor of State, et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed June 16, 1914—Rehearing denied October 7, 1914.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-provisions of statute limiting roads which may be State aid roads are not invalid. The provisions of that portion of the Roads and Bridges act of 1913 relating to State aid roads which limit the percentage of road mileage in counties of different classes and limit the designation of such roads to "highways connecting the principal cities and trading points in each county with each other," etc., are not invalid as local or special legislation, as the classification adopted in fixing such mileage and in designating the roads is reasonable and well founded.

2. SAME-State Aid Roads law is not invalid as a special law relating to roads or regulating township affairs. That portion of the Roads and Bridges act of 1913 relating to State aid roads applies to all highways in the State within the description or classes specified in the act, and such law is not invalid as a local or special law relating to laying out highways or regulating county or township affairs.

3. SAME what is not required to make a law a general law. The requirement of the constitution that laws shall be general does not mean that every statute shall affect alike every person and locality in the State.

4. SAME―when classification is not invalid because it applies to only one county. If the conditions existing in any county at the time of the passage of an act furnish a reasonable basis for making it apply only to that county and the classification is reasonably appropriate for the purpose of the legislation, it is not essential to the validity of such classification that the conditions upon which it is based be such that they may at some future time obtain in every other county in the State.

5. SAME proviso to section 15a of an act relating to State aid roads is not invalid. The proviso to section 15a of article 4 of the Roads and Bridges act of 1913, (Laws of 1913, p. 528,) which provides for allowing to a county twenty-five per cent of the amount collected in such county for roads and bridges, provided such county collects more than forty per cent of the total amount appropriated by the General Assembly for building roads, is not invalid because it affects Cook county, alone.

6. SAME-Sections 15a and 15b do not attempt to appropriate money out of State treasury. Sections 15a and 156 of article 4 of