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would have induced him to complete his work as per contract; that advances beyond the terms of the contract are in the nature of parting with securities possessed by the creditor, which should not be done without the knowledge and consent of the surety. In Central Lumber Co. v. Kelter, 201 Ill. 503, this court held the failure of the owner to withhold payments on a building contract did not preclude his resort to a bond given for the faithful performance of the contract, although the contract provided that payments should be made in accordance with the Mechanic's Lien act as amended in 1891, fixed a time for making partial payments and final payment, and recited that the "twenty per cent agreed to be reserved shall be held by the proprietor as security," etc. It was there said: "The contention of counsel is, that if they had strictly complied with the terms as to payments and withholding the twenty per cent they could have protected themselves against loss without resorting to the bond, and that they owed it to the security to do so. That, we think, is hardly a fair construction of the bond and contract. It would render the bond wholly unnecessary and of little or no benefit to the plaintiffs. If they were bound to protect themselves against loss occasioned by Rafferty's failure to perform the contract by withholding payments, then the security conditioned for his faithful performance would avail nothing."

On the whole, we do not think that there was such a departure from the terms of the original contract by appellant, or such a change in its terms, or other action on the part of appellant, as would operate as a release of the surety in this case.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the Appellate Court will be reversed and the judgment of the municipal court will be affirmed. Judgment reversed.

WILLIAM J. SCown, Appellant, vs. ANTHONY CZARNECKI et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed June 16, 1914-Rehearing denied October 7, 1914.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-purpose of section 13 of article 4 of constitution. The purpose of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, requiring an amendatory act to insert the section amended, was to enable the meaning of enactments directly amending prior statutes to be ascertained by an examination of the enactments themselves, without the necessity of examining all prior statutes on the subject to ascertain the effect of the amendment.

2. SAME-rule where act is complete in itself and does not purport to be amendatory. An act which is complete within itself and does not purport, either in its title or in the body thereof, to amend or revive any other act, is valid, though it may by implication modify or repeal prior existing statutes.

3. SAME-Woman's Suffrage act of 1913 does not violate section 13 of article 4 of the constitution. The Woman's Suffrage act of 1913 (Laws of 1913, p. 333,) is not invalid as in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, upon the ground that it amends section 65 of the Election law without inserting that section at length in the act, as the Woman's Suffrage act is complete in itself, does not purport to amend any other act, is intelligible on its face, requires no further legislation to make it effective, and has for its only object the granting to women of the right of suffrage so far as offices and subjects mentioned in it are concerned.

4. SAME-constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. The Illinois constitution is not a grant of power to the legislature but is a limitation on such power, and, except as to such restrictions as the constitution has imposed by express terms or by necessary implication, legislative power of the legislature is unlimited.

5. SAME if constitution has prescribed qualifications of electors the legislature cannot change them. The right of suffrage is not a natural right but exists only by positive law, and if the constitution has prescribed the qualifications of electors such qualifications cannot be changed by the legislature.

6. SAME-Section 1 of article 7 of the constitution, concerning qualifications of electors, construed. The qualifications of electors prescribed by section 1 of article 7 of the constitution apply to the elections provided for in that instrument but do not apply to other elections provided for only by statute, and which are therefore wholly within the control of the legislature.

7. SAME-Woman's Suffrage act of 1913 does not violate section 1 of article 7 of the constitution. The Woman's Suffrage act of 1913 (Laws of 1913, p. 333,) does not violate section 1 of article 7 of the constitution, as all of the offices mentioned in such act are within the control of the legislature, none of them being of constitutional origin, and it is competent for the legislature to declare the manner of filling them and by whom the incumbents shall be elected. (People v. English, 139 Ill. 622, and Plummer v. Yost, 144 id. 68, adhered to.)

8. SAME-School directors, school trustees and boards of education are political officers. School directors, school trustees and boards of education are political officers engaged in administering that portion of the government of the State committed to them, and there is no authority for classifying them as philanthropic or non-political officers, as the public school system was not established as a charity or from philanthropical motives but in the interest of good government, as a part of the government itself.

9. SAME-legislature had no power to authorize women to vote at referendum elections provided for in constitution. The provision of the Woman's Suffrage act of 1913 permitting women to vote on "all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors of such municipalities or other political divisions of the State" covers every referendum election, including those provided for in the constitution, and in so far as it includes referendum elections provided for in the constitution the act is invalid, but its invalidity is confined to that matter alone, and the act is valid in so far as it applies to elections for offices or on propositions provided for by statute, alone.

10. STARE DECISIS-Supreme Court should not overrule long established decision of constitutional question. A deliberate decision of the Supreme Court upon the constitutional power of the legislature, which has stood unchallenged for many years and under which the highest political rights have been exercised without question, should not be overruled because the judges constituting the Supreme Court at a later period may hold views different from those held by the judges who constituted the court when the decision was made.

FARMER, COOKE and CRAIG, JJ., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. CHARLES M. FOELL, Judge, presiding.

MAYER, MEYER, AUSTRIAN & PLATT, (LEVY MAYER, and ALFRED S. AUSTRIAN, of counsel,) for appellant.

CHARLES H. MITCHELL, (JOHN J. HERRICK, CHARLES S. CUTTING, ISAIAH T. GREENACRE, and Joel F. LongeNECKER, of counsel,) for appellees.

MCEWEN, WEISSENBACH, SHRIMSKI & MELOAN, (WILLARD MCEWEN, and ISRAEL SHRIMSKI, of counsel,) also for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

William J. Scown filed a bill in the superior court of Cook county in behalf of all other tax-payers as well as himself to restrain the election commissioners of the city of Chicago and the town of Cicero from expending money for providing separate ballots and ballot-boxes for women, and for other purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the act of the legislature of June 26, 1913, known as the Woman's Suffrage act, (Laws of 1913, p. 333,) and the act of June 30, 1913, amending the primary election laws. A demurrer was sustained to the bill, which was dismissed for want of equity, and the complainant appealed.

The ground on which the injunction was asked was that the expenditures complained of were not authorized by law because the Woman's Suffrage act is unconstitutional, and that is the only question to be considered. The act provides as follows:

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: That all women, citizens of the United States, above the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding any election therein, shall be allowed to vote at such election for presidential electors, member of the State Board of Equalization, clerk of the Appellate Court, county collector, county surveyor, members of board of assessors, members of board of review, sanitary district trustees, and for all officers of cities, villages and towns,

(except police magistrates,) and upon all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors of such municipalities or other political divisions of the State.

"Sec. 2. All such women may also vote for the following township officers: Supervisor, town clerk, assessor, collector and highway commissioner, and may also participate and vote in all annual and special town meetings in the township in which such election district shall be.

"Sec. 3. Separate ballot-boxes and ballots shall be provided for women, which ballots shall contain the names of the candidates for such offices which are to be voted for and the special questions submitted as aforesaid, and the ballots cast by women shall be canvassed with the other ballots cast for such officers and on such questions. At any such election where registration is required, women shall register in the same manner as male voters."

It is first contended that this act is in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, because it amends the general election laws but does not insert in the new act the section amended, reference being made particularly to section 65 of chapter 46 of the Revised Statutes, which is in the identical language of section 1 of article 7 of the constitution, as follows:

"Sec. 1. Every person having resided in this State one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding any election therein, who was an elector in this State on the first day of April, in the year of our Lord 1848, or obtained a certificate of naturalization before any court of record in this State prior to the first day of January, in the year of our Lord 1870, or who shall be a male citizen of the United States, above the age of twenty-one years, shall be entitled to vote at such election.”

It cannot be denied that the act in question changes the qualifications prescribed by said section 65 for voters for the offices mentioned in the act, and if it is to be regarded only as an amendment of that section, the constitutional re

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