from philanthropic motives. The first legislative expression in regard to schools in Illinois was in the ordinance of 1787, which declares that "religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." This declaration grew, not out of philanthropic motives, but out of a consideration of the essentials of good government. The conduct and maintenance of schools by school directors, school trustees and boards of education is no less an "exercise of the functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government," is no less a part of "the science and art of government," and deals no less with "the organization, regulation and administration of a State" in its internal affairs, than the construction and maintenance of roads by the commissioners of highways; the conduct and maintenance of the charitable institutions of the State by the board of administration; the inspection of factories, and the enforcement of the laws for the protection of workmen and in regard to the employment of women and children, by the factory inspectors; the performance by the industrial board of the duties imposed upon it by law, and the performance of many other duties by public officials which, however beneficial to individuals, are not undertaken from philanthropic or charitable motives, but for the protection, safety and welfare of the citizens of the State in the interest of good government. School districts are involuntary political divisions of the State, each embracing a certain territory and all the inhabitants thereof, organized for the public advantage and not in the interest of individuals, having for their purpose the exercise within their territory, by their inhabitants and for their benefit, of that part of the governmental function committed to them. There is no higher exercise of the sovereign power than the exaction from the citizen of a part of his property as taxes, in payment of his proportionate share of the expenses of government.

When school directors levy taxes they exercise political power of the highest quality. When they purchase school sites, build and equip school houses, employ teachers, and disburse, in their discretion, public funds for these purposes, their action is political,—it pertains to the conduct of government. It differs in no respect, so far as this quality is concerned, from the acts of highway commissioners with reference to their duties in connection with roads. Neither school directors nor highway commissioners have legislative or judicial powers, but both are administrative officers, engaged in administering that portion of the government of the State committed to them by law. Neither of them exercises any function which is not of a political and governmental character.

This same argument was advanced in the case of People v. English, supra, in which counsel for the petitioner made the claim that the constitutional clause that voters shall be males does not refer to school elections but only to political offices; that school districts are quasi corporations of a charitable nature and exert no functions of government; that the constitution refers only to political offices, and that the article on education (article 8) should be construed by itself. The court did not take this view of the matter, but said (p. 630): "It is suggested that article 8 of the constitution, entitled 'Education,' makes it the duty of the General Assembly to provide a system of free schools,' and that therefore the various sections in said article 8 should be construed by themselves and without reference to other provisions contained in the constitution. The conclusion reached does not seem to follow from the premises stated. The General Assembly, in accordance with the mandate of the constitution, passed an act in 1872 'to establish and maintain a system of free schools.' (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 947.) The State superintendent of public instruction and the county superintendents of schools were made component and important parts of the system established by the

act, and their duties were therein defined and provisions therein made for their election. But notwithstanding this, the requirements of sections 3 and 20 of article 5 of the constitution, in regard to the election of a State superintendent of public instruction, still remained in full force, as also did the provision of the constitution which fixed the qualifications of those who could vote at an election for such State superintendent, or for any other officer provided for in the constitution."

In distinguishing the case of Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1, (which counsel for the appellant rely upon here,) and the cases of Wheeler v. Brady, 15 Kan. 26, and State v. Cones, 15 Neb. 444, in which the right of women to vote for district school officers had been sustained, it was further said in the English case (p. 631): "We do not consider said cases as here in point or that the decisions which were rendered in them are in conflict with the conclusion which we have reached in the present controversy. In the Michigan case the question at issue was in regard to the right of the plaintiff, a woman, to vote, under a statute of that State, at an election for school trustees of a school district, and the court, speaking of the constitution of the State, said: 'But no officer of the school district is mentioned or recognized by that instrument. The reason is, that the whole primary school system was confided to the legislature, and it cannot be said that the officers of school districts, chosen pursuant to the system adopted by the legislature, are constitutional officers. * * * While it must be conceded that no person can vote for the election of any officer mentioned in the constitution unless he possesses the qualifications of an elector prescribed by that instrument, it does not follow that none but such electors can vote for officers which the legislature has the right to provide for, to carry out the educational purpose declared in that instrument.' This is a plain intimation that if the constitution of Michigan had provided for or mentioned school trustees of school

districts, then the decision in that case would have been otherwise."

This plainly indicates that the decision of the court was based upon the ground that the county superintendent of schools is a constitutional officer, and further indicates the view of the court that the decisions cited were based upon the power of the legislature to provide for the election of officers not mentioned in the constitution by persons having different qualifications from those prescribed by the constitution, and that the right of women to vote for school directors and other school officers not mentioned in the constitution could be sustained only by virtue of such power and not by a construction of article 8 of the constitution, independently of the other provisions of that instrument. Whether such right could be sustained at all was not then decided, but in Plummer v. Yost, supra, the right was sustained, the court citing the case of Belles v. Burr, supra, and again quoting the last sentence of the quotation from the opinion in that case given in People v. English, supra. This court said (p. 73): "Section 1 of article 8 of the constitution makes it the duty of the General Assembly to 'provide for a thorough and efficient system of free schools, where all the children of this State may receive a good common school education.' The mode in which the required 'system of free schools' should be organized, and the officers by whom it should be controlled and directed and its affairs administered, is left to the legislative discretion of the General Assembly. The only school officers expressly provided for by the constitution are a county superintendent of schools in each county and a State superintendent of public instruction. At the election of these two officers, as we held in the case above cited, the qualifications of the electors must be those prescribed in section 1 of article 7 of the constitution. But the constitution contains no direction as to what other school offices shall be created or as to the mode in which the incumbents of those offices shall

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be designated and chosen. Those matters are left wholly to the discretion of the General Assembly.'

Counsel for the appellant, in referring to this case, say that it is only upon the theory that school trustees and members of the board of education are not political officers and that they do not exercise political functions and that the school system is governed by a separate and independent article of the constitution that the doctrine of Plummer v. Yost can be upheld. On the contrary, all that was said in that case is just as applicable to the offices of highway commissioners, or to any other township or municipal offices, or to any other offices which the General Assembly has the authority to create, as to school offices. The theory that an educational article in the constitution imposing upon the legislature the duty of establishing a school system authorized the legislature, in selecting officers for the system it might establish, to disregard the constitutional provisions in regard to the qualification of electors, had its origin in the Michigan case. (Belles v. Burr, supra.) Reference was made in that case to the fact that for fifty years before the question arose there, the qualifications of voters at school district meetings, as fixed by statute, had been different from those prescribed by the constitution for electors entitled to vote under that instrument. The first constitution of the State of Michigan provided that the legislature should establish a school system, and under this constitution, from the beginning, the legislature in fact fixed the qualifications of voters at school district meetings without regard to the qualifications prescribed by the constitution for electors at other elections. School districts had preceded the constitution and were recognized by it, but no officer of the school district was recognized or mentioned in the constitution. It was held that the whole primary school system was committed to the legislature, and the court used the language that "the authority granted by the constitution. to the legislature to establish a common or primary school