voluntary transfers of property which could not be taxed under the prior statute. The present statute imposes a tax upon the transfer of property, real, personal or mixed, or of any interest therein or income therefrom, in trust or otherwise, not therein exempted, in the following cases: (1) When the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of the State from any person dying seized or possessed of the property while a resident of this State; (2) when the transfer is by will or intestate laws of property within the State and the decedent was a non-resident of the State at the time of his death; (3) when the transfer is of property made by a resident of the State, or by a non-resident when the property is within the State, by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift made in contemplation of the death of the grantor, vendor or donor or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after such death; when any such person, institution or corporation becomes beneficially entitled, in possession or expectancy, to any property, or the income therefrom, by any such transfer, whether made before or after the passage of this act; (4) when the transfer is made by virtue of a power of appointment derived from the owner of such property, made either before or after the passage of the act, the property thus transferred by virtue of such appointment is taxable in the same manner as though the property to which such appointments relate belonged absolutely to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed or devised by such donee by will.

The transfers in the case at bar, if liable at all, are taxable under the third clause of section 1 of the statute of 1909. This clause of our statute is taken from the transfer tax statute of New York of 1892. There is nothing in the context of our statute that indicates that our legislature, in adopting the language of clause 3 above set out from the New York statute, intended that the adopted statute should have any different construction from that placed upon the same language by the court of appeals

of New York prior to the enactment of the statute in this State. When a statute is adopted from another State or country and such statute has been previously construed by the courts of the State or country from which it is taken, the statute is deemed, as a general rule, to have been adopted together with the construction so given to it. (Sutherland on Stat. Const. sec. 404; ReQua v. Graham, 187 Ill. 67.) This rule has been applied by this court to inheritance tax cases. People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532; People v. Union Trust Co. 255 id. 168.

In 1895 the court of appeals of New York handed down an opinion in In re Seaman's Estate, 147 N. Y. 76; 41 N. E. Rep. 401. In that case Seaman, the testator, made and executed his last will in January, 1876, and died the following October. By the sixth clause of his will he gave all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate to his executors in trust, to apply and pay over the income of onehalf thereof to his adopted daughter and niece, Elizabeth Seaman, during her natural life, and upon her death said undivided half was devised to the children of the testator's nephew, George A. Seaman, who might be living at the death of Elizabeth Seaman, share and share alike. The other half was likewise given to the executors in trust, to apply and pay the income to the testator's adopted son and nephew, George A. Seaman, during his life, and upon his decease said undivided half was devised to the children of George A. Seaman who might be living at his death, share and share alike. Both of the life tenants were living at the death of the testator and both of them died in January, 1893. When the will took effect there were four children of George A. Seaman living, and they were all living at the time the litigation arose. There was no inheritance tax law in New York when the will took effect and when the estate which it created devolved, but the law of 1892 was in force when the life tenants died and the possession of the remainders passed to the four children. The ques

tion presented to the court was whether the vesting of possession, which occurred after 1892, was a transfer or succession then for the first time passing, and, as such, taxable under the act then in force, or if not then first passing, was the succession taxable by the explicit language of the statute, which provided, as does our statute, that such tax shall also be imposed when any such person or corporation becomes beneficially entitled, in possession or expectancy, to any property, or the income thereof, by any such transfer, "whether made before or after the passage of this act." The special term had held that the tax law did not operate retrospectively and subject to taxation rights of succession which accrued before the tax law came into existence, and that the remainders of the four children were not taxable. This judgment of the special term was reversed by the general term and the remainders held subject to the tax. The conclusion apparently was rested upon two grounds: (a) That no interest vested in the children of George Seaman until the death of the life tenants, or that the interest, whatever it was, was not such a beneficial interest in possession or expectancy as was made subject to taxation; (b) that the act by express language operated upon transfers which occurred before the act took effect. The judgment of the general term was reversed by the court of appeals upon both points and that of the special term was affirmed. The court of appeals held that the interest of the four children of George Seaman was a vested interest and took effect at the death of the testator. It was said that the succession passed to the four living children of George Seaman at the death of the testator, subject to be divested by the death of any of said children before the falling in of the life estate and subject to be opened up to let in the shares of any after-born children.

The decision of the New York court in the Seaman case, in so far as it holds that under the will the interests of the children of George Seaman became a vested interest

upon the death of the testator, need not necessarily be approved by following the decision in the construction of the statute. Whether this court would hold the interests of the Seaman children vested or contingent is wholly immaterial. The New York court held the interest vested and construed the transfer law with reference to that character of interest. Under the trust agreements in the case at bar the interests of the decedent's two children were clearly vested upon the execution and delivery of the trust agreements and the securities therein named. There is here an unconditional and irrevocable gift of the securities to Augustus Albert Carpenter, Jr., and Amie C. Newell, in equal shares, subject to no limitation or restriction whatever except the life estate reserved to the donor and to Nellie Clark. The possibility that one or both of the remainder-men may die before the life tenant does not convert the vested interest into a contingent remainder. (Smith v. West, 103 Ill. 332.) The court of appeals of New York held in the Seaman case, supra, that where there was a gift or will so far complete that the donee or devisee became vested with the remainder prior to the taking effect of the transfer tax law such transfer was not subject to the tax unless in case of a gift, deed, bargain or sale made in contemplation of death, or, in other words, the court held in that case that the will having been executed and the testator having died before the statute went into effect the transfer was not subject to the tax, although the right of enjoyment of the remainder-men was postponed to let in a life estate unti! a period after the statute went into force. The decision in the Seaman case up to this point is in accord with the general rule that when the transfer is made, not in contemplation of death and not for the purpose of avoiding the succession tax but with the intention to convey the property absolutely and irrevocably to the transferee, the transfer is not subject to the tax. (Matter of Masury, 159 N. Y. 532; Matter of Baker, 178 id. 575; Matter of Hess, 187 id. 554;

Matter of Keency, 194 id. 281; 202 U. S. 575; Waugh's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 436; Lacey v. State Treasurer, 152 Iowa, 477.) This rule is clearly recognized by this court in People v. Kelley, 218 Ill. 509. The authorities hold that if the transfer is made "in view of death" the liability for the tax is incurred, and is unaffected by the circumstance that the enjoyment is postponed until the death of the transferer or by any uncertainty as to the identity of the ultimate donee. (Rosenthal v. People, 211 Ill. 306; Merrifield v. People, 212 id. 400; In re Estate of Benton, 234 id. 366.) Of course, the words "in contemplation of death," as used in these statutes, do not mean that general expectation of all rational mortals that they will die sometime, but it means an apprehension of death which arises from some existing infirmity or impending peril. (Rosenthal v. People supra; In re Estate of Benton, supra.) There is no claim here that the trust agreements were executed “in view of death," and the decision below does not rest on that ground.

The court below held that the language of the third clause of section 1 of the statute, that such tax shall also be imposed when any such person or corporation becomes beneficially entitled in possession or expectancy to any property or income therefrom by any such transfer, “whether made before or after the passage of this act," expressly authorized the tax in question, and appellee insists such is the proper construction of the statute. The question thus presented is not free from difficulty. Considering the language of the statute literally and construing the same without regard to the consequences, it must be conceded that the decision of the court below is based on a possible meaning of the words found in this clause. By it the tax is imposed when any person becomes beneficially entitled, in possession or expectancy, to such property, whether the transfer was made before or after the passage of the act. If appellee's con