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ritory is composed of parts of four townships. It also appears from the plea that the election was called with only one polling place designated within the territory. It also appears that there is not within said proposed territory any single school district that contains more than one thousand inhabitants and less than one hundred thousand, as provided in section I of the Township High School law of 1911.

Appellants' contentions are, that to legally organize a township high school district composed of contiguous territory, parts of which are in different townships, it is necessary to have a separate petition presented for that portion of the territory taken from each township, and that a separate polling place in the several townships from which territory is taken to form the high school district must be provided for in calling the election; and the further contention is made that a township high school district cannot be created, under the law of 1911, unless there is within the territory a school district containing at least one thousand and less than one hundred thousand inhabitants. These contentions go to the merits of this controversy.

Appellants present some formal objections to the plea which merely go to the phraseology of the pleading and in no way involve the real contentions between the parties. These special causes of demurrer we do not regard as of sufficient importance to require special discussion. Suffice it to say that the answer is sufficiently certain in its averments and sets forth the title of appellees to the offices which they hold.

The Township High School law of 1911 was considered by this court in People v. Crossley, 261 Ill. 78, and the validity of the act was sustained. In the Crossley case, while the construction of the act was only incidentally involved, we found it necessary to set out the substance of the entire act and to some extent determine its construction. We pointed out in that case that there were two different situations provided in said law under which town

ship high schools could be organized: First, a single township might be created into a township high school district under section I of said act, provided there was in said township a single school district having a population of one thousand or more and not exceeding one hundred thousand; and second, a township high school could be organized under said act under section 6, which provides that the inhabitants of any contiguous and compact territory, whether in the same or different townships, may establish a township high school for the benefit of the inhabitants of said territory, "upon a petition signed by at least fifty legal voters and an affirmative vote in such territory, * * in the manner provided by this act," etc. The population requirement referred to in section I has no application to the organization of a township high school district out of "contiguous and compact territory in different townships" provided for in section 6 of said act, nor is it necessary, in holding an election under said section 6, to provide for a different polling place for each township, or fraction thereof, included within said territory. The language, "an affirmative vote in such territory," contemplates but one polling place in the territory to be erected into a township high school district. Nor is it required, under said section 6, that more than one petition should be presented in order to authorize the county superintendent to call an election to vote upon the question of organizing a high school district.

Appellants rely upon People v. Dunlap, 248 Ill. 154. That case was decided under the law of 1909, section 87 of which required a petition from each of the townships proposed to be erected into a high school district, and required an affirmative vote in each of such townships or districts at an election to be held pursuant to the provisions of section 85 of said act. That authority does not apply to the situation in the case at bar, which is a proceeding to organize a township high school district under section 6 of the act of 1911.

The court below properly construed the statute of 1911 in overruling the demurrer and in holding that the plea showed a good title to the offices held by appellees.

The judgment of the circuit court of Macoupin county is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

WILLIAM C. DAVIS, JR., Plaintiff in Error, vs. E. R. HINCKE et al. Defendants in Error.

Opinion filed June 16, 1914.

1. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-what does not raise estoppel to deny agent's title to funds. The fact that a mother entrusts her funds to her son for investment, relying on his discretion, does not estop her, as against creditors of the son, from denying the son's title to funds which he loaned in his name, where she had no knowledge that he was loaning the money in his own name or knowingly consented to his doing so, or knew, or had reason to suppose, that he was deceiving any person as to his financial means or was deriving false credit from the fact of his controlling her property.

2. SAME-Section 7 of the Statute of Frauds does not apply to money in hands of agent for investment. The object of section 7 of the Statute of Frauds, relating to five years' possession by one person of the goods and chattels of another, was to prevent the frauds which may arise from the long continued possession of visible, tangible, movable property, the mere possession of which constitutes evidence of ownership in the person having the custody; and said section does not apply to money in the hands of an agent for investment, or to choses in action in which such money has been invested.

3. SAME when creditor cannot interfere with debtor's settlement with another creditor. Even though a debtor may have had possession for more than five years of the goods and chattels covered by section 7 of the Statute of Frauds, yet his ownership of such goods and chattels does not become absolute under said section, except as to creditors; and hence if he returns the goods and chattels to the real owner in satisfaction of his debt to her before any other creditor has acquired a lien, the settlement cannot be interfered with by other creditors.

4. WORDS AND PHRASES-precise import of words "goods and chattels" depends upon the subject matter and context. The ex

pression "goods and chattels" is a term of very extensive meaning, and the precise import to be given such expression, as to whether it is intended to include personal property of every kind, including both tangible and intangible, or is used in a more limited sense, depends upon the subject matter and the context.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Perry county; the Hon. GEORGE A. CROW, Judge, presiding.

RALPH E. SPRIGG, H. L. BROWNING, L. O. WHITNEL, and J. FRED GILSTER, for plaintiff in error.

B. W. POPE, for defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Perry county dismissed a creditor's bill for want of equity, and the Appellate Court for the Fourth District having affirmed the decree, the record has been brought here by certiorari for review.

The complainant having recovered a judgment in November, 1910, against E. R. Hincke and become the assignee of two other judgments against him, caused executions to be issued, which were returned no property found. Thereupon this bill was filed, charging that E. R. Hincke had real estate, or some interest therein, and money, stocks, bonds, notes and life insurance policies which he kept concealed or the title to which was held by his mother, Mary Hincke, which property the complainant had been unable to reach by execution; that E. R. Hincke, since January 1, 1907, and after all the debts upon which the judgments in question were rendered were contracted, had put out of his name and possession, by some pretended sale or otherwise, divers bonds, stocks and promissory notes owned by him, with intent to hinder and delay his creditors, all of which property was held in secret trust by his mother, Mary

Hincke, and other persons to whom the same had been transferred, with the private understanding that the same should be held for the benefit of E. R. Hincke. E. R. Hincke and Mary Hincke answered the bill under oath, and a hearing upon the evidence resulted in the decree dismissing the bill.

The material facts appearing in the record are, that Mary Hincke, who in the fall of 1911 was seventy-six years old, was possessed of an estate of about $150,000, and for many years before that time had transacted no business except through the agency of her son, E. R. Hincke. He was a man actively engaged in business of various kinds. but was not a man of wealth. In 1901 he made a loan to W. S. Wilson, and continued to lend him money, renewing and increasing the loans, until in 1909 they amounted to $22,000, when three new notes were given, one for $2000 and two for $10,000 each, payable one year after date and secured by the pledge of certain stocks and bonds. These three notes were all payable to Mary Hincke though all the notes previously given by Wilson had been payable to E. R. Hincke. Wilson knew nothing about whose money was loaned to him, except that Hincke had often told him, when giving him checks signed "Mary Hincke, by E. R. Hincke," that he (Hincke) was handling his mother's money, and Wilson so understood it. Wilson wrote the notes as they were renewed, and Hincke never gave him any directions as to how they should be drawn until the last time, when he directed them to be put in his mother's name. Some of the enterprises in which E. R. Hincke was interested were unsuccessful, and before April, 1909, he was embarrassed financially. He was indebted to his mother in a large sum, and in March and in August, 1910, he gave to her several other notes, which were secured by the pledge of certain stocks and bonds which he owned.

There is no dispute in the testimony that E. R. Hincke was justly indebted to his mother in the full amount of

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