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Molohon v. Cashin, 258 Ill. 86, this court, in construing section 76, said (p. 91): "It is only in cases where the complete system of drainage voluntarily constructed consists of artificial ditches constituting a continuous line or line and branches that this section authorizes the formation of a drainage district. A stream or water-course still in a state of nature cannot be described or considered as a ditch constructed by the voluntary action of adjoining land owners," and it was there held that the question whether the main ditch was artificial was jurisdictional. The fact that the district in that case was organized under said section 76 of the Farm Drainage act by the county court and this district was organized by highway commissioners does not in any way alter the situation as to the jurisdictional requirement of the main ditch being artificial and not natural.

Counsel for appellants further contend that even though this question can be raised in quo warranto proceedings, under the averments of the pleas it should have been held, in the ruling on the demurrer, that the main ditch was of artificial construction. On this point there is merit in the argument of counsel for appellees that the pleas merely set up the various steps taken in the organization of the drainage district without any independent averments of fact; that they allege only that the commissioners found that said main ditch was constructed by the voluntary action of the land owners; that appellees could not deny that the commissioners made such finding; that the pleas, in order to be replied to, should have unequivocally averred, in positive terms, that said main ditch (Long creek) was constructed by the voluntary acts of the land owners; that the findings of the commissioners on this question set out in the pleas are mere conclusions. In quo warranto proceedings to question the validity of the organization of drainage districts the people are not required to show anything. The entire onus is on the defendants, and they must show by their pleas that they have a valid title to the office. They

cannot do it by giving in evidence their own findings and conclusions on that issue. People v. City of Peoria, supra; People v. O'Connor, 239 Ill. 272; People v. Karr, supra.

If, however, it be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that the pleas satisfactorily averred that the main ditch was of artificial construction, the averments of the pleas as to branch ditches are so faulty that the demurrer was properly sustained. In People v. Karr, supra, it was said (p. 382): "A petition to organize a district of this character should, either in specific words or by reference to a map, set out the description of the ditch and its branches and a description of the lands proposed to be included in the district, so that from such description the location of the ditch and branches, whether they are continuous, whether they connect with the lands proposed to be taken into the district, and whether they are located in one or more towns, can be readily ascertained from the petition." The petition of the land owners asking for the organization of this district, after describing in a general way the main ditch and certain branches and the land to be drained, continued as follows: "Extending from said main ditch and from said several branches there are other ditches and laterals extending to or into each tract of land in said proposed drainage ditch." No attempt is made, other than by the words just quoted, to describe or locate said lateral ditches. It would be impossible from this description to locate them. In People v. Karr, supra, the description as to lateral ditches which was held insufficient read (p. 380): "That emptying into said open ditch are innumerable branch drains, both open and covered, which connect all such lands and which were constructed by the voluntary action of the owners of such lands and lots; that all such lands and lots belong to and require one system of drainage." The description in this petition as to said lateral ditches is as faulty as the attempted description of the lateral ditches in People v. Karr, supra. The same indefinite description was found

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in People v. Strandstra, supra. The decisions of this court in those cases must control here, and the description as to the lateral ditches must be held insufficient to comply with the law.

Counsel for appellants argue that such holding will render impossible, in most instances, the organization of a drainage district under said section 76 of the Farm Drainage act; that drains, especially covered drains, cannot be easily located on farm lands. The principal purpose of the Farm Drainage act is to permit the organization of drainage districts on a petition of the majority of the owners owning more than one-third of the lands or one-third or more of the owners owning a major part of the land. The purpose, as was held in People v. Karr, supra, of said section 76 was to permit the organization of districts thereunder only as to lands connected by ditches built by the voluntary action of the land owners. If such ditches can not be definitely located or described in the petition then the lands upon which they are located cannot be organized into a drainage district under said section 76. There is nothing, however, to prevent the organization of such drainage district, under the principal provisions of said Farm Drainage act, by the united action of at least one-third of the land owners owning a major part of the land or the majority of the land owners owning more than one-third of the land. Section 76 was not enacted for the purpose of authorizing a few land owners to organize a large drainage district against the wishes of the other owners unless the provisions of section 76 are strictly followed.

It is true that the question as to whether jurisdictional facts existed could be raised, as contended by counsel for appellants, under replications filed to the pleas. Under such replications not only the records of the organization could be offered but evidence dehors the record would be admissible. (People v. Gary, 196 Ill. 310; People v. City of Peoria, supra; Mason and Tazewell Drainage District v.

Griffin, supra.) If the facts averred in the pleas of justification show that jurisdictional facts are lacking as to the organization of the district, that question can also be raised by demurrer. Indeed, in People v. Karr, supra, the only proof in support of the pleas after replications filed was the record of the county court as to the organization of the district.

Counsel for appellants contend in their original brief that the court refused to allow them to amend their pleas after demurrer was sustained thereto. We find nothing in the record showing that they asked leave to file such additional pleas or the court's refusal.

This action was against appellants as individuals. The court did not err, therefore, in taxing costs against them. People v. Strandstra, supra.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Arthur Gosling et al. Appellants, vs. RUFUS M. POTTS, Insurance Superintendent, Appellee.

Opinion filed October 16, 1914.

I. INSURANCE―guaranty insurance defined. Guaranty insurance is a contract whereby one, for a consideration, agrees to indemnify another against loss arising from the want of integrity, fidelity or insolvency of employees and persons holding positions of trust, against insolvency of debtors, losses in trade, losses from nonpayment of notes and other evidences of indebtedness, or against breaches of contract.

2. SAME―a corporation to guarantee notes and mortgages may organize under the Surety act. A corporation having for its object guaranteeing the payment of notes, bonds, coupons and other evidences of indebtedness secured by mortgage or deed of trust conveying real estate, may organize, in Illinois, under the Surety act of 1899, (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 602,) authorizing the formation. of corporations to guarantee the performance, by persons, firms and corporations, of contracts, bonds and undertakings of any kind.

3. SAME-Section 1 of the Casualty act does not apply to mortgage guaranty insurance. The organization of a corporation to guarantee the payment of notes, bonds and other evidences of indebtedness secured by real estate mortgage or deed of trust is not authorized by paragraph 7 of section I of the Casualty act, (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 1466,) providing for the organization of corporations to insure against "any other casualty or insurance risk specified in the article of organization, which may lawfully be the subject of insurance and the formation of corporations for insuring against which is not otherwise provided for by these statutes."

4. SAME-object of corporation not limited to words of Surety act. It is no objection to the oragnization of a corporation under the Surety act that the statement of the purposes of the corporation specifies the particular kind of contracts which the corporation intends to guarantee, even though the statement contains more than the exact language of the statute, provided such contracts are within the general language of the statute.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-title to Surety act is broad enough to cover guaranty insurance. The title of the Surety act of 1899 (Hurd's Stat. 1913. p. 602,) is broad enough to cover guaranty insurance, and the act is therefore not unconstitutional on the ground that the title does not cover the subject matter of the act.

6. MANDAMUS-when mandamus will lie to compel insurance superintendent to act. Where a dispute arises between proposed incorporators and the insurance superintendent as to which of two statutes shall govern the organization of the corporation, the case is not one which merely involves the discretion of a public officer but it involves also the construction of the statutes, and in such case mandamus will lie to determine whether the insurance superintendent has correctly construed them.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. JAMES A. CREIGHTON, Judge, presiding.

MAYER, MEYER, AUSTRIAN & PLATT, JOHN T. EVANS, and LEO J. DOYLE, for appellants.

ARCHIBALD A. MCKINLEY, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: This was a petition for mandamus filed in the circuit. court of Sangamon county in behalf of the relators, (appellants here,) to compel appellee, the superintendent of

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