insurance of this State, to take the necessary steps to authorize the incorporation of a company to be known as the Chicago Mortgage Guaranty Company. Appellee answered the petition, stating his willingness to permit the incorporation of said company under another act than that under which it was requested to be incorporated but denying the right of the relators to incorporate as petitioned by them. A demurrer filed to this answer having been overruled by the court, relators elected to stand by the demurrer, whereupon the prayer of the petition was denied and the petition dismissed at relators' cost. This appeal followed.

The relators stated in the petition for mandamus that they were desirous of incorporating under "An act to provide for the organization, management and regulation of surety companies," approved and in force April 17, 1899. (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 602.) Section 1 of that act provides that not less than three nor more than seven may organize a corporation "for the purpose of guaranteeing the fidelity of persons holding public or private places of trust, and the performance by persons, firms and corporations of contracts, bonds, recognizances and undertakings of every kind, and of becoming surety on bonds required by law, and on every kind of contract, obligation and undertaking of persons, firms and corporations." It is conceded that the relators, if they are entitled to incorporate under this act, have complied with the preliminary provisions necessary to authorize such incorporation by the authorities of the State, except that some question is raised as to the contents of their declaration, which will be referred to later. The declaration upon which they ask for a charter under the Surety act stated the purposes as follows: "To guarantee and secure the payment and satisfaction of notes, bonds, coupons and other evidences of indebtedness secured by mortgage or deed of trust conveying real estate, and to guarantee the performance, by persons, firms and corporations, of all other contracts, bonds, recognizances and un

dertakings of every kind, and to become surety on bonds required by law, and on every kind of contract, obligation and undertaking of persons, firms and corporations."

It is argued by counsel for appellee that under a proper construction of the Surety act the State would not be authorized to issue a charter thereunder for the purposes set forth in said declaration; that a corporation for those purposes must be organized, if at all, under "An act to incorporate and to govern casualty insurance companies and to control such companies of this State and of other States doing business in the State of Illinois," etc., approved April 21, 1899, and in force July 1, 1899. (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 1466.) Section 1 of that act states that any number of persons, not less than thirteen, may form a corporation for the purpose of issuing policies for any of the following "kinds of insurance business," then setting out in detail, under seven separate paragraphs, various kinds of insurance business. The seventh paragraph of this section, under which counsel for appellee claims that this charter should be issued, reads as follows:

"Seventh-Against any other casualty or insurance risk specified in the article of organization, which may lawfully be the subject of insurance and the formation of corporation for insuring against which is not otherwise provided for by these statutes."

Relators contend that the Surety act clearly authorizes them to be incorporated under it, and therefore the incorporation is not authorized under said paragraph 7 of the Casualty act, as its organization is "otherwise provided for by these statutes."

Counsel, in their briefs, have argued exhaustively as to the meaning of “casualty insurance," "guaranty insurance,' and other insurance terms. Appellee contends that the term "casualty insurance" covers all kinds of insurance; that under the definition given of "casualty" by standard authorities it may have the same meaning as "happening" or

"event." An examination of the authorities on this question shows there is a great diversity of meaning as to the various words used in defining the different kinds of insurance. In a case frequently cited, (Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation v. Merrill, 155 Mass. 404,) it was held that so far as casualty insurance was developed under the law of that State it had reference to boilers, plate glass, and perhaps to domestic animals and injuries to property by street cars, but not to accidents to persons.

(See, also,

6 Cyc. 701; 1 id. 308; 3 Joyce on Insurance, sec. 2862.) The phrase "casualty insurance" is frequently used with a much broader meaning, not only by writers but by legislative bodies. (14 Ency. Britannica,—11th ed.-659; 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,-2d ed.-3; People v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 153 Ill. 25.) Neither is the phrase "guaranty insurance" used with any hard and fast meaning. The term may include all insurance as being synonymous therewith, for insurance has for its purpose to guarantee against all forms of loss or pecuniary injury. (2 May on Insurance,-4th ed.-sec. 540.) It has been stated to be generic in its scope and signification, embracing within it "those subsidiary species of insurance contracts known as 'fidelity,' 'commercial' and ‘judicial' insurance." (Frost on Guaranty Insurance,-2d ed.-sec. I.) Guaranty insurance, as ordinarily used and understood, is a guaranty or insurance against loss in case a person named shall make a designated default or be guilty of a specified misconduct. "It is usually against the dishonesty of an employee or officer, though sometimes against the breach of a contract." (15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,—2d ed.— note I, p. 1; People v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, supra.) "Guaranty insurance is a contract whereby one, for a consideration, agrees to indemnify another against loss arising from the want of integrity, fidelity or insolvency of employees and persons holding positions of trust, against insolvency of debtors, losses in trade, losses from

non-payment of notes and other evidences of indebtedness, or against other breaches of contract. It includes other

forms of insurance which are specially classified, such as 'fidelity guaranty,' 'credit guaranty,'" etc. (1 Joyce on Insurance, sec. 12.) This definition was quoted with approval by this court in People v. Rose, 174 Ill. 310. See, also, McCornack on Insurance, sec. 235; I Cooley's Briefs on the Law of Insurance, 236, 635; 17 Laws of England, (Halsbury,) 572.

Manifestly, under these authorities the purposes for which the relators desire to incorporate might be classed either as guaranty insurance or casualty insurance. An examination of the insurance laws of the various States authorizing the incorporation of companies shows that in some States the class of insurance business proposed to be done by relators may be carried on by guaranty insurance companies, in others by casualty insurance companies, and in still others by either class of companies. In this State companies incorporated under different acts can do, in part, the same kind of business. Under whatever name they are known such contracts are regarded as insurance contracts, and, as such, subject to the rules of construction applicable to insurance policies generally, and not to the rules applied to ordinary guaranty or surety contracts for accommodation. United States Fidelity Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 233 Ill. 475; Frost on Guaranty Insurance, (2d ed.) sec. 3.

Definitions of insurance obviously are not decisive on the question here under consideration as to which one of these acts relators are entitled to incorporate under. The intent of the legislature in passing these acts can be best sought from their wording. Under the Casualty act companies may be incorporated for insuring persons against bodily injury or death resulting from accident; against loss or damage resulting from injury suffered by an employee or other person, for which accident the person insured is liable; to indemnify merchants and traders against loss or

damage on account of credit given; against loss by burglary or theft; against loss by breakage of glass; against loss from accidents or explosions of boilers and engines, elevators, or machinery connected therewith; and, in addition, they may be incorporated under the seventh paragraph heretofore quoted. We see nothing in any of the first six of these purposes that is at all similar to that for which relators desire to incorporate the company here in question. The provision which comes nearest being so is the indemnifying of merchants and traders as to the credit of their customers. On the other hand, the purpose for which relators desire to incorporate is included specifically in the wording of the Surety act, that is, "for the purpose of guaranteeing * * *the performance by persons, firms and corporations of contracts, bonds, recognizances and indebtedness of every kind," etc. The non-payment of a note or the non-performance of any of the provisions of a mortgage or deed of trust, without question is a breach of a contract or undertaking the performance of which can be guaranteed. In one of the earliest cases in this country involving guaranty insurance it was practically so held. (Ellicott v. United States Ins. Co. 8 Gill & Johns. 166.) The right to form a corporation for such purposes is clearly within both the letter and spirit of the Surety act. No authority called to our attention would prevent classifying under the term "guaranty insurance" the guaranteeing of loss for the non-payment of notes or other contracts of like nature.

It is argued by counsel for appellee that the Casualty act was copied very largely from an act in relation to insurance corporations passed in New York in 1892. That act appears to have authorized the formation of companies to insure against practically all the losses that are covered either by the Surety act or the Casualty act in this State. If there be any argument to be derived from a comparison of the two laws, it would tend to uphold the argument of