where such sale is made and results in clouding the title of the homestead the legal remedies have generally been regarded as inadequate for the prevention of such a wrong, and equity has very freely extended its preventive jurisdiction to stop the illegal sale, under execution, of premises in the actual occupancy of the debtor as a homestead and which are protected from levy and sale under the exemption laws of the State. (High on Injunctions, sec. 438, and cases there cited.)

Under the averments of the bill in the case at bar it appears that the sheriff, by virtue of an execution, has levied upon the homestead of plaintiff in error and is about to offer the same for sale without having summoned three householders, as commissioners, to appraise the premises and set off the homestead in case the same was found to be susceptible of division. In short, the bill alleges that the officer is proceeding to sell the homestead of plaintiff in error without any attempt to comply with section 10 of the Exemption statute. The bill alleges that the value of the two lots does not exceed $1200 and that the interest of plaintiff in error in the entire premises is worth not to exceed one-half of that amount. Under these averments of the bill we are unable to discover any legal theory upon which defendants in error can justify this proceeding.

Some argument is submitted in support of the contention that the homestead cannot embrace more than one lot. This contention cannot be sustained under the averments of this bill. The bill shows that the two lots are owned jointly by plaintiff in error and his wife and are both used and occupied as one parcel of property. The house is upon one lot, and the other is used as a garden, for hanging clothes lines and for other purposes in connection with the occupancy of the lot upon which the house stands. The one lot is as much in the possession and occupancy of the homesteader as the other. Where two lots are thus situated and are in the actual possession of the homesteader

as his home the exemption may extend to both lots, where the one upon which the house stands is worth less than $1000. This court, in Sever v. Lyons, 170 Ill. 395, decided that it was competent to show by parol evidence that the homestead covered two or more separate, legal lots or blocks. True, where the lot or legal subdivision upon which the residence stands is worth the statutory exemption the homestead cannot be extended to take in other lands; but this would be true if there were an excess of value in a single lot.

Some criticism is made of the averments of the bill in respect to its allegations regarding the possession. In our opinion the allegations of the bill are sufficiently specific in this regard to require an answer. Upon the coming in of an answer it will then become a question of proof as to the extent and value of the homestead, and if it can be shown that the interest of plaintiff in error in the lot on which the house stands is worth $1000, the court can protect the interests of both parties by dismissing the bill as to the vacant lot and enjoining the sale as to the one having the residence thereon. The execution having been levied upon both lots, we think it is clear that the sale should be enjoined until the statute is complied with. The fact that the title is held jointly by plaintiff in error and his wife does not affect the right of plaintiff in error to a homestead. Where a husband and wife are joint tenants of premises upon which they reside as a homestead, they are jointly seized of an estate of homestead in the land. Lininger v. Helpenstell, 229 Ill. 369.

The decree of the superior court of Cook county is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer and require defendants in error to answer the bill. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Chicago Bar Association, Relator, vs. A. HALE VOLLINTINE, Respondent.

Opinion filed October 16, 1914.

I. DISBARMENT—what constitutes unprofessional conduct. An attorney who advises a woman client, who is inexperienced in business affairs, to loan a large sum of money to a manufacturing concern which he knows is in an experimental stage and is already experiencing financial troubles, with the result that most of the money was lost to the client, is guilty of a violation of his duty to his client, notwithstanding the attorney invested and lost his own money in the transaction.

2. SAME-when unauthorized use of funds is ground fór suspension. An attorney who receives from his client a large sum of money belonging to an estate, which sum, with his client's knowledge and consent, he deposits in his own account but within less than two months withdraws it for his personal use, except a small amount, is guilty of unprofessional conduct and will be suspended, notwithstanding he thereafter informed his client of the facts and several years later accounted for the money so used.

FARMER, J., dissenting.

INFORMATION to disbar.

JOHN L. FOGLE, for relator.

JOHN H. BATTEN, (S. S. GREGORY, of counsel,) for respondent.

Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a proceeding instituted in this court for the disbarment of A. Hale Vollintine, an attorney residing in Chicago and practicing law under a license issued to him by this court on June 10, 1890. The information was filed by the Chicago Bar Association, and as grounds for disbarment charges respondent with a series of alleged fraudulent acts and unprofessional conduct while acting as attorney for Minnie P. Cleveland in the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband. Mrs. Cleveland was shortly after the

death of her husband, on February 8, 1904, appointed executrix of his will, and during the month of October, 1904, turned over to respondent, as her attorney, $10,795 of the funds received by her as executrix, which respondent deposited in his individual bank account.

The specific charges made against respondent in the information are, (1) that after obtaining authority from Mrs. Cleveland to loan $5000 of this money upon the representation that the loan was to be secured by real estate worth $20,000, he loaned $7500 thereof to the Search Light Manufacturing Company, an insolvent corporation in which his father-in-law was interested as a stockholder and officer, and took as security for said loan bonds issued by said corporation of the par value of $7500 but which had but little real value, the loan being evidenced by two promissory notes executed by said company, one for $2500, due three months after date, and the other for $5000, due one year after date; (2) that the $2500 note was not paid when due, and that shortly after the $5000 note became due the respondent, without consulting Mrs. Cleveland, canceled and surrendered to said company the two notes above mentioned and accepted in satisfaction of the indebtedness evidenced thereby the bonds which had been given as security for said notes and which respondent well knew were not worth par; (3) that thereafter, on June 20, 1906, respondent fraudulently advised and induced Mrs. Cleveland to make a further loan of $1500 to said company, well knowing that said company was in straitened circumstances and that any loan to or investment in the business of said company was a dangerous and hazardous loan or investment, and that in order to procure the money to make this loan respondent induced Mrs. Cleveland to borrow $1500 from a bank and to execute her note therefor; that subsequently the property of the company was sold upon foreclosure of the bonds which had been issued by it, and respondent received out of the proceeds of sale, on account of the bonds taken by him in

satisfaction of the original $7500 loan, the sum of $1500, which he used in paying the $1500 note above mentioned which Mrs. Cleveland had given to the bank on June 20, 1906; that by reason of the transactions above mentioned Mrs. Cleveland lost $7500 of the funds belonging to the estate of her deceased husband; (4) that within a short time after Mrs. Cleveland turned over to respondent the $10,795 above mentioned, and after respondent had loaned to said company $7500 thereof, he withdrew from the bank and used the balance of said money in payment of his personal obligations, thereby fraudulently converting such balance to his own use without the consent or knowledge of Mrs. Cleveland; (5) that respondent delayed the settlement of the estate of Mrs. Cleveland's husband for a period of almost five years, although Mrs. Cleveland from time to time called upon him to attend to his duties in said matter; (6) that respondent failed and refused to account for the money turned over to him by Mrs. Cleveland, and she was compelled to, and did, employ other attorneys to take up the matter with him, and was compelled to, and finally did, file with the grievance committee of the Chicago Bar Association a complaint against him, and that soon thereafter respondent made an accounting of the disposition of the funds placed in his hands.

In his answer the respondent admits his employment by Mrs. Cleveland and the receipt of the $10,795 by him. He admits loaning $7500 of this money to the Search Light Manufacturing Company and taking bonds of the company of the par value of $7500 as security therefor, but denies that he told Mrs. Cleveland that the loan was to be $5000 or that it was to be secured by $20,000 worth of real estate. He denies that he fraudulently used the balance of the money, or any part thereof, for his own use, but alleges that while he did make some drafts upon this balance for his own use, this was done with the consent and acquiescence of Mrs. Cleveland, and that he has fully accounted for all