deductive process of our reasoning faculties, that we discover and relish the beauties of a poem or a prospect. Both the foregoing characters belong evidently to consciousness and to the external senses. All the three are, therefore, considered, with equal propriety, as distinct and original sources of information and evidence.

That it is fruitless to dispute concerning matters of taste has been so often said, that it has now acquired the authority and notoriety of a proverb; and its suggestions are consequently supposed, by some, to be dictated only by whim and caprice. Nothing, however, can be farther from the truth. The first and general principles of taste are not less uniform, nor less permanent, than are the first and general principles of science and morality. The writings of Cicero present him to us in two very different characters-as a philosopher, and as a man of taste. His philosophical performances are read, and ought to be read, with very considerable grains of allowance; the beauties of his oratory have been the subjects of universal and uninterrupted admiration. The fame of Homer has obtained an undisputed establishment of near three thousand years. Has a reputation equally uniform attended the philosophical doctrines of Aristotle or Plato? The writings of Moses have been admired for their sublimity by those, who never received them as the vehicles of sacred and eternal truth.

The first and most general principles of taste are universal as well as permanent: it is a faculty, in some degree, common to all. With youth, with ignorance, with savageness, its rudiments are found to dwell. It seems not less essential to man to have some discernment

son.

of the beauties both of art and nature, than it is to possess, in some measure, the faculties of speech and rea"Let no one," says Cicero, in his excellent book de oratore," be surprised that the most uncultivated mind can mark and discern these things: since, in every thing, the energy of nature is great and incredible. Without education or information, every one, by a certain tacit sense, is enabled to judge and decide concerning what is right or wrong in the arts. If this observation is true with regard to pictures, statues, and other performances, in the knowledge of which they have less assistance from nature; it becomes much more evident and striking with regard to the judgments, which they form concerning words, harmony, and pronunciation for concerning these there is a common sense implanted in all, of which Nature intended that no one should be entirely devoid."

IV. As a fourth source of evidence, I mentioned the moral sense, or that faculty of the mind, by which we have the original conceptions that there is a right and a wrong in conduct; and that some particular actions are right, and others wrong. Without this last power of applying our conceptions to particular actions, and of determining concerning their moral qualities, our general and abstract notions of moral good and evil would be of no service to us in directing the conduct and affairs of human life.

The moral sense is a distinct and original power of the human mind. By this power, and by this power solely, we receive information and evidence of the first

principles of right and wrong, of merit and demerit. He, who would know the colour of any particular object, must consult his eye: in vain will he consult every other faculty upon the point. In the same manner, he, who would learn the moral qualities of any particular action, must consult his moral sense: no other faculty of the mind can give him the necessary information.

The evidence given by our moral sense, like that given by our external senses, is the evidence of nature; and, in both cases, we have the same grounds for relying on that evidence. The truths given in evidence by the external senses are the first principles from which we reason concerning matter, and from which all our knowledge of the material world is drawn. In the same manner, the truths given in evidence by our moral faculty are the first principles, from which we reason concerning moral subjects, and from which all our knowledge of morality is deduced. The powers, which Nature has kindly bestowed upon us, are the only channels, through which the evidence of truth and knowledge can flow in upon our minds.

Virtuous demeanour is the duty, and should be the aim, of every man: the knowledge and evidence of moral truth is, therefore, placed within the reach of all.

Of right and wrong there are many different degrees; and there are also many different kinds. By the moral faculty we distinguish those kinds and degrees. By the same faculty we compare the different kinds together, and discover numerous moral relations between them.

Our knowledge of moral philosophy, of natural jurisprudence, of the law of nations, must ultimately de-`

pend, for its first principles, on the evidence and information of the moral sense. This power furnishes to us the first principles of our most important knowledge. In dignity, it is far superiour to every other power of the human mind.

V. The fifth kind of evidence, of which I took notice, is that, which arises from natural signs. By these, we gain information and knowledge of the minds, and of the thoughts, and qualities, and affections of the minds of men. This kind of evidence is of very great and extensive importance.

We have no immediate perception of what passes in the minds of one another. Nature has not thought it proper to gratify the wish of the philosopher, by placing a window in every bosom, that all interiour transactions may become visible to every spectator. But, although the thoughts, and dispositions, and talents of men are not perceivable by direct and immediate inspection; there are certain external signs, by which those thoughts, and dispositions, and talents are naturally and certainly disclosed and communicated.

The signs, which naturally denote our thoughts, are the different motions of the hand, the different modula. tions or tones of the voice, the different gestures and attitudes of the body, and the different looks and features of the countenance, especially what is termed, with singular force and propriety, the expression of the eye. By means of these natural signs, two persons, who

P To this the evidence arising from the similitude of hands may be referred.

never saw one another before, and who possess no knowledge of one common artificial language, can, in some tolerable degree, communicate their thoughts and even their present dispositions to one another: they can ask and give information: they can affirm and deny they can mutually supplicate and engage fidelity and protection. Of all these we have very picturesque and interesting representations, in the first interviews between Robinson Crusoe and his man Friday; they are interesting, because we immediately perceive them to be natural. Two dumb persons, in their intercourse together, carry the use of these natural signs to a wonderful degree of variety and minuteness.

We acquire information, not only of the thoughts and present dispositions and affections, but also of the qualities, moral and intellectual, of the minds of others, by the means of natural signs. The eloquence or skill of another man cannot, themselves, become the objects of any of our senses, either external or internal. His skill is suggested to us by the signs of it, which appear in his conduct his eloquence, by those which appear in his speech. In the same manner, and by the same means, we receive evidence concerning his benevolence, his fortitude, and all his other talents and virtues.

This evidence, however, of the thoughts, and dispositions, and passions, and talents, and characters of other men, conveyed to us by natural signs, is neither less satisfactory, nor less decisive upon our conduct in the business and affairs of life, than the evidence of external objects, which we receive by the means of our senses. It is no less a part, nor is it a less important part, of our constitution, that we are enabled and determined to