tives of temporary convenience, but on solid grounds of public' œconomy, and as perfectly consistent with the original principles of Mr. Pitt's institution of the sinking fund.

It must be confessed, that whatever mode of defraying the public expences least interferes with private property, and produces the least sudden and violent changes in the employment of capital and the occupations of individuals, will be the best; as least obstructing the progress of national wealth, and least deranging the habitual and regular order of society. On these grounds alone can the contracting of a national debt, by which the expences of present exertion are in part at least thrown upon futurity, be justified. In the progress of its formation great, though gradual, changes take place in the distribution of property and the employments and habits of the people. When a plan is to be established for checking the progress of public debt, which must otherwise either end in bankruptcy or by degrees absorb every other species of property, the means by which this accumulated capital is to be returned into other channels of occupation, are, at least, as important as those by which it was in the first instance taken from them. This is (as Mr. Vansittart justly observed in first stating his plan to the committee of the whole House) an experiment of great nicety, and one which has never been tried on a great scale.

From these principles it will follow, that it is highly important that the total amount of income appropriated to the purposes of the public debt, that is, to the interest of the debt and the redeeming fund taken together, should be confined within the smallest compass possible; and not less so that the redemption should proceed as equably as possible, and without great changes or sudden fluctuations, in order that the capital set free may be readily and quietly absorbed into other employments. We are of course speaking of a time of peace, and when no loan is contracted, for in war and whenever the loan exceeds the sinking fund, no real reduction of debt can be said to take place, but only that the debt contracted is so much less than it would other wise have been.

In peace, however, and in a nation active and industrious as this is, the accumulation of capital is so rapid that it frequently surpasses the ordinary means of employment, and is either di verted into new and doubtful speculations, or forced into foreign occupations, in which it is sometimes worse than lost to the country. These evils were particularly exemplified in Holland, Genoa, and Geneva, where the accumulation of property exceeding the opportunities of profitable employment, it was in great part invested in the public securities of foreign countries, whereby

not only multitudes of families were ultimately ruined, but foreign factions were supported in the heart of the state by the interests of those concerned.

It cannot be denied, that a very rapid repayment of public debt, by throwing large sums continually into the money market, has a strong tendency to produce this danger, or to augment it where it may already exist. It would be, therefore, something worse than useless to increase the sinking fund in time of peace to such an extent, as to furnish an amount of capital beyond the means of employment, of which a judgment may always be formed by the current rate of interest. As to the amount of the sum which could in time of peace be safely applied to the reduction of public debt, experience furnishes but little guidance, and many collateral circumstances must influence the result.

We know that between 1786 and 1793, when the sinking fund never much exceeded one million per annum, the reduction of the rate of interest was at least as rapid as can be consistent with just views of public economy. But a variety of other circumstances concurred at that period, to produce an extraordinary accumulation of public wealth. But though no nice or exact criterion can be formed by which to estimate the possible extent of sinking fund, which can be advantageously employed in time of peace, we may safely assume that its present amount of about thirteen millions is as large as either reasoning or experience will justify us in supposing capable of such application.

Applying these observations to the subject immediately before us, they will be found highly favourable to Mr. Vansittart's system. The extreme amount of annual charge, that is, of income taken from other employments, and diverted to the purposes of the national debt, is within the period of 17 years to be diminished to a great extent, when compared with the system established by the act of 1802, in some cases not less than fourteen millions, and the amount of sinking fund applicable in each year, which, according to that system, would vary no less than twenty millions in one year, will proceed with a gradual and equable course, either in its diminution or augmentation. We have, indeed, met with few persons of much information on subjects of this nature, who have not been ready to admit that Mr. Vansittart's plan of redemption, if orrginally proposed, would have been preferable to that which preceded it. It has also been generally admitted, that at some time or other the act of 1802 must have been revised, for that an attempt to carry it into literal execution to the last period would have been productive of extreme inconvenience. On

these accounts we are not disposed to consider the objections made to the present limitation of the sinking fund as at all equivalent to its advantages. It is true, that so long as the war may continue at its present rate of expence, the sinking fund might be suffered to accumulate, not only without inconvenience but with advantage, But the practical question to be decided by parliament was, whether this advantage was so important, that it could be advisable to subject the nation to an immense load of additional taxation, for the sake of raising the sinking fund in time of war, to an amount which it was admitted would be not only useless but mischievous in time of peace; and those who, allowing that a change would be necessary in future, yet contend against it at present, ought to show that the inconveniences of persisting in the established system would be less than those of the proposed alteration.

We have observed, that the principles of the new system correspond with those of Mr. Pitt's acts of 1786 and 1792. All the leading features of those acts are preserved; and it is remarkable, that in the resolutions lately sanctioned by the House of Commors, as the foundation of the new act, it was unnecessary to propose the repeal of either of them. Mr. Pitt was aware of the inconveniences of an unlimited accumulation of sinking fund; and, therefore, in 1786, limited its amount to four millions and the leading principle of the act of 1792, which was the redemption of all future debt within 45 years, is strictly adhered to in the new arrangement.

To those objections to any change which arise out of an alleged contract with the stockholders for the continuance of the system before established, we have not thought it necessary to advert in this summary statement, because we conceive that on this question the public opinion is completely at rest. It is sufficient to remark, that not only not a single petition was offered against the measure during the six weeks that it remained under the consideration of parliament, but that it did not, except for part of a single day, produce the slightest impression on the price of the funds; and though this objection was not wholly abandoned in argument, it could not be much relied on by those who used it, since Mr. Huskisson, who, in the speech before us, dwells at some length on this part of the subject, himself concludes his speech with suggesting a plan, as a substitute for Mr. Vansittart's, which equally includes an alteration of the sinking fund.

We shall here for the present close our remarks on this important subject, wishing to make this article rather introductory to a more extensive view of it, which we hope to lay before our readers in the next number. For this we shall have an oppor

tunity in reviewing the interesting work of Professor Hamilton on the national debt.

It will be curious to combine the principles discussed by the Professor with the practical propositions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Huskisson, and with this view we shall now refrain from any more detailed examination of those propositions.

With respect to the style and manner of the publications before us we have only to remark, that with that variety which arises from the difference of the circumstances under which they were composed, they both are such as might be expected from men of sense and information.

The Outlines partake necessarily of the dryness of an official statement, of which the principal object is to convey exact information in the narrowest compass. We have heard them complained of as obscure, but we are disposed to think the observation arose more from the want of the necessary previous information in the objector, than from any real defect in the work. It is incredible to what a degree many men, even of high education and general knowledge, are uninformed upon subjects of this kind; and we even think it possible that to some of our readers (we hope very few) the present article will on the first perusal appear obscure. If this should be the case, we can only humbly suggest a second reading, in which we hope the difficulties will disappear.

Mr. Huskisson's speech has naturally the advantage of a more popular manner and easier style, and is composed with an urbanity which does him credit as a gentleman, and in general a correctness not unworthy of a scholar. That we differ much from him as to the merits of the question will have been seen from what has gone before; but for a more particular examination of such points as are chiefly worthy of remark we must reserve ourselves, as we have already observed, for the opportunity which our next number will afford: we consider the foregoing remarks as only preparatory to a more detailed discussion of a subject which appears to us involved in much unnecessary obscurity, and on which the prevalence of erroneous opinions might lead to consequences highly injurious to the most inportant interests of the public.

ART XXVII-Colonial Ecclesiastical Establishment, being a brief View of the State of the Colonies of Great Britain and of the Asiatic Empire, in respect to religious Instruction; prefaced by some Considerations on the national Duty of affording it. To which is added, A Sketch of an Ecclesiastical Establishment for British India, humbly submitted to the Consideration of the Imperial Parliament. By the Rev. Claudius Buchanan, D. D. late Vice-Provost of the College of Fort William, in Bengal, and Member of the Asiatic Society. Second Edition. London: Printed for Cadell and Davies, in the Strand. 1813.

IN

a preceding article we have had occasion to deplore the defective state of religious instruction, and the want of sufficient places of worship in this metropolis, but in the work before us the country is called upon to consider the same important subjects on a larger scale, and, if possible, under circumstances of still more pressing emergency. Few of our readers, we conceive, are unacquainted with the former productions of the Rev. Dr. Buchanan, whose labours have justly attracted so large a portion of public attention, and we think we may, with some confidence, predict, that the regard which the "Star in the East" and the "Christian Researches in Asia," have won for this good man in every feeling heart, will not be lessened by the present publication. With a hope of inducing our readers to peruse, with the attention it deserves, this important and seasonable publication, we shall here present them with a brief account of its contents.

To those who, forgetting that as "freely they have received," it is their bounden duty freely to impart; who, forgetting that it is to the generous exertions of the first Christians that this island was so early rescued from the pollution of human sacrifices, and the other atrocities and impurities of the druidical and heathen worship, can frigidly ask, whether it is the duty of Englishmen, professing the Christian faith, to labour for its exten

Before the preaching of the Gospel of Christ in this kingdom, no church existed but the temple of a hideous idol, who, like the Moloch of the east, had his regular libations of human blood. To the cruel rites of the Druidical superstition succeeded the Roman idolatry. In Cornwall, stood the Temple of Mercury; in Bangor, the Temple of Minerva; at Malden, the Temple of Victoria; at Leicester, the Temple of Janus; at York, where St. Peter's now stands, the Temple of Bellona; in London, on the site of St. Paul's, the Temple of Diana; and at Westminster, where the abbey rears its venerable pile, a Temple of Apollo.-See A Survey of ancient British Idolatry, in a Sermon of Dr. Plaifere, preached in 1573, before the University of Cambridge.