authoritics, under th same circumstances as those now referred to, per Rochambeau; but my information of the fact, which is not official, did not reach me until the 13th inst., when too late to take action, and they are now in our midst, to add to the crime and destitution which are surrounding me on all sides.

The Commissioners of Immigration thereupon adopted the following preamble and resolution :

Whereas, Lately, more ships bringing immigrant paupers, or other mproper persons, to this city, have arrived from Antwerp than any other port, therefore,

Resolved, That Henry W. T. Mali, the Belgian Consul at this port, be requested to inform his government-1. Of the above fact. 2. That there are persons, known to this Commission, doing business at Antwerp, who are especially instrumental in forwarding all persons dangerous and injurious to society. 3. That the Commissioners will hereafter investigate, especially, all passengers arriving in ships coming from Antwerp.

On the 28th of March, 1855, Mr. Redfield, Collector of the Port of New York, forwarded the following to Mayor Wood, which he received from the United States Consul, at Zurich, Switzerland. It speaks for itself:

U. S. Consulate, Zurich, Switzerland, March 3d, 1855.

DEAR SIR-I have just been informed that the Commune of Niederwyl (Zofingen), in the Canton of Argovia, in Switzerland, have been forwarding 320 of their poorest people to the United States. They left a few days since for Havre, with the intention of sailing for New York.

Enclosed is an extract from a paper which is published in the same Canton, and which fully endorses it. It says:

"A few days since the Commune of Niederwyl, District Zofingen in the Canton of Argovia, sent 320 of their poorest people to the United States, in spite of all admonition."

I wrote to our Consul at Havre, giving him the information, and requesting him to ascertain the name or names of the vessels in which they were to sail,- -or had sailed,and to give you the information, so that you, or the city officials, could be on the lookout, and judge for yourselves.

I am told that in a short time another large company is to follow from a neighboring district, and that all are provided with legal passports. I shall feel it my duty, whenever any thing of this kind comes to my notice, to give either the Collector, or the Mayor of the city information of it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. H. GOUNDIE.

In addition to the multitude of facts already adduced, showing the extent of the immigration of foreign convicts and paupers, the following letter from the State Department at Washington, recently published in the New Orleans papers, shows the means resorted to by those engaged in transporting them hither to avoid detection:

Department of State, Washington, Sept. 3d, 1855. Sin-I have the honor to transmit to you for your information the following extract from a despatch dated August 4, ult., received at this Department from Mr. A. D. Gall, United States Consul at Bremen:

"The circulars issued by the immigration agents in the interior of Germany caution immigrants who are deformed, crippled, or maimed, &c., against taking passage to New York, and advise them to go by way of Baltimore, New Orleans, or Quebec, where the laws prohibiting the landing of immigrants of the above classes do not apply." I am, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

To the Mayor of New Orleans, Louisiana.

W. HUNTER, Assistant Secretary.

CHAPTER XI.

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER IMMIGRATION.

How far Congress has the power, under the ninth section of the first article of the United States Constitution, to regulate, restrain, or prohibit the immigration of foreigners, or whether it has any power over the subject, is not very well settled. That section provides that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States, now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person:" and it was undoubtedly understood by its framers to apply altogether to slaves. See Elliott's Debales, vol. v. 457 to '77. And it was so construed in The Federalist, the forty-second number of which, written by Mr. Madison, than whom no one better understood its object and intention, contains the following in relation to it:

"It were doubtless to be wished that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had not been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account either for this restriction on the General Government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy." Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial immigration from Europe to America I mention these misconstructions not with a view to give them an answer-for they deserve none--but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government."

The language used in the Constitution is, however, such as may well justify the question, whether it cannot clearly and fairly be applied to the importation of foreign convicts and paupers, and there are many who contend that it applies to all immigrants, conferring upon Congress the power to prohibit the admission of all "such persons," and necessarily including the power to admit them on such conditions as it may think proper to impose, which would, of course, carry with it the right of taxing them. It was certainly deemed broad enough at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, notwithstanding the cavalier manner in which Mr. Madison dismissed the objections urged against it, to cover immigrants generally, (See Madison State Papers, vol. iii., p. 1429,) while some supposed it might cover convicts. See Madison State Papers, vol. iii., p. 1430. Luther Martin, in his celebrated letter to the Maryland Legislature, explanatory of the course pursued by him in the Convention which framed the Constitution, alludes to this provision as follows:

"The design of this clause is to prevent the General Government from prohibiting the importation of slaves; but the same reasons which caused them to strike out the word national,' and not admit the word stamps,' influenced them here to guard against the word slaves.' They anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expres sions which might be odious in the ears of Americans, although they were willing to admit into their system those things which the expressions signified; and hence it is that the clause is so worded as really to authorize the General Government to impose a duty of ten dollars on every foreigner who comes into a State to become a citizen, whether he comes absolutely free, or qualified so as a servant; although this is contrary to the design of the framers, and the duty was only meant to extend to the importation of slaves." See Elliott's Debates, vol. i., p. 372.

James Wilson, who was himself a leading and influential member of the Convention which framed the Constitution, and also the prominent champion of it in the Pennsylvania Convention, which was convened to ratify or reject it, referred in a speech, in the last named body, in reply to some of the objections urged by Mr. Findley to the adoption of the Constitution, to this particular provision of it, as follows:

"The gentleman says that it is unfortunate in another point of view; it means to prohibit the introduction of white people from Europe, as this tax may deter them from coming amongst us. A little impartiality and attention will discover the care that the Convention took in selecting their language. The words are the migration or importation of such persons, &c., shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation.' It is observable here that the term migration is dropped, when a tax or duty is mentioned, so that Congress have power to impose the tax only on those imported." See Elliott's Debates, vol. ii., p 453. In the North Carolina Convention, Mr. Galloway made a similar objection to that urged by Mr. Findley, in the Pennsylvania Convention. He did not wish to see the tax on the importation extended to all per

sons whatsoever," and gave as his reasons there for, that the situation of the South was different from the North, saying "we want citizens, they do not." Mr. Iredell, afterwards one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, replied to Mr. Galloway's remarks, as follows:

"Mr. Chairman, the worthy gentleman I believe has misunderstood this clause, which runs in the following words: The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.' Now, Sir, observe that the Eastern States, who long ago have abolished slaves, did not approve of the expression slaves; they therefore used another that answered the same purpose. The committee will observe the distinction between the two words migration and importation. The first part of the clause will extend to persons who come into this country as free people, or as slaves bought. But the last part extends towards slaves only. The word migration refers to free persons; but the word importation refers to slaves, because free people cannot be said to be imported. The tax, therefore, is only to be laid on slaves who are imported, and not free persons who migrate." See Elliott's Debates, vol. iv., p. 101.

It will be observed that both Judges Wilson and Iredell seemed to concede the power to Congress, under this provision of the Constitution, to prohibit, after 1808, the migration of foreigners as well as the importation of slaves, and only contended that the right of taxation was confined to the importation of slaves. Mr. Harper admits that such was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, but contends that it confers the power to tax voluntary immigrants as well as slaves. According to the views of these gentlemen, the General Government has power dver the subject of immigration as well as the importation of slaves: and this view seems to be sustained by various judicial opinions. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton Rep. 216, in which case the court decided that the power to regulate commerce, so far as it extends, is exclusively vested in Congress, and that no part of it can be exercised by a State, held the following language in relation to the ninth section of the first article of the Constitution :

"The section which restrains Congress from prohibiting the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States may think proper to admit until 1808, has always been considered as an exception from the power to regulate commerce; and certainly seems to class migration with importation. Migration applies as appropriately to voluntary, as importation does to involuntary, arrivals; and, so far as an exception from a power proves its existence, this section proves that the power to regulate commerce applies equally to the regulation of vessels employed in transporting men, who pass from place to place voluntarily, and to those who pass involuntarily."

And in the same case, Justice Johnson, who oncurred in the decision of the court, but delivered a separate opinion, gave his views on this point as follows:

"Commerce, in its simplest signification, means an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care, and various mediums of exchange, become commodities, and enter into commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various operations, become the objects of commercial regulation. That such was the understanding of the framers of the Constitution, is conspicuous from provisions contained in that instrument. The first clause of the ninth section, not only considers the right of controlling personal ingress or migration, as implied in the powers previously vested in Congress over commerce, but acknowledges it as a subject of revenue. And, although the leading object of this section undoubtedly was the importation of slaves, yet the words are obviously calculated to comprise persons of all descriptions, and to recognize in Congress a power to prohibit, when the States permit, although they cannot permit when the States prohibit. The treaty-making power undoubtedly goes further. So the fifth clause of the same section furnishes an exposition of the sense of the Convention as to the power of Congress over navigation nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another."

So in the cases of Smith v. Turner and Norris v. City of Boston, in which the constitutionality of the passenger laws of New York and Massachusetts, came under consideration, and were declared void. Justice McKinley delivered the following opinion, as embodying his views in relation to the section in question, which seems to accord with those of Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Johnson :

The first clause of the ninth section and first article of the Constitution provides, “that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importations, not exceeding $10 for each person." On the last argument of this clause no reference was made to this clause of the Constitution; nor have I ever heard a full and satisfactory argument on the subject. Yet, on a full examination of this clause, connected with other provisions of the Constitution, it has had a controlling influence on my mind in the determination of the case before us. Some of my brethren have insisted that the clause here quoted applies exclusively to the importation of slaves. If the phrase "the migration or importation of such persons" was intended by the Convention to mean slaves only, why, in the assertion of the taxing power, did they, in the same clause, separate migration from importation, and use the following language?" But a tax or duty may be imposed on such persons, not exceeding $10 for each person." All will admit, that if the word migration were excluded from the clause, it would apply to slaves only. An unsuccessful attempt was made in the Convention to amend this clause, by striking out the word migration, and thereby to make it apply to slaves exclusively. In the face of this fact, the debates in the Convention, certain numbers of the Federalist, together with Mr. Madison's report to the Legislature of Virginia in 1799-eleven years after the adoption of the Constitution-are relied on to prove that the words migration and importation are synonymous, within the true intent and meaning of this clause. The acknowledged accuracy of language and clearness of diction in the Constitution would seem to forbid the imputation of so gross an error to the distinguished authors of that instrument. I have been unable to find any thing in the debates of the Convention, in the Federalist, or the report of Mr. Madison, incon