On July 18th, the Democratic party of the State of Ohio, assembled in convention at Columbus, nominated for the office of Governor Mr. John W. Bookwalter, a prominent business man and manufacturer of Springfield, Ohio. His portrait is given on this page. The father of John W. Bookwalter emigrated from Pennsylvania to Indiana, in which State the son was born, in 1839. The father was a plain, hardworking farmer, and a devout Methodist. Such facilities for getting an education as a country district school could afford in those days, he thought quite enough for his son, and discouraged his tastes for reading and study outside of the three r's. When he found that John had got hold of "Comstock's Natural Philosophy," he threatened to burn the book. John stuck to his books, however, studying nights after his day's work on the farm. His older brother Frank seconded him in his plans, and when John was about eighteen they two constructed a reflecting telescope from the description given in "Comstock's Philosophy." They ground the lenses and cast the reflector themselves. John had a genius for mechanics. He and his brother made over a sawmill on the farm into a gristmill, one of the first erected in that part of the country. The brothers operated this mill for many years and made money. Then they bought a gristmill at Springfield, O. Here John became acquainted with James Leffel, the inventor of the turbine wheel, bought an interest in the wheel, perfected the manufacture, fought through a multitude of lawsuits, and greatly extended the business. In 1865 he married Miss Eliza Leffel, the inventor's daughter, and three years ago, Mr. Leffel having died, became sole proprietor of the wheel. The firm name, James Leffel & Co., has, however, never been changed. The machine works are among the largest in the west, employing about 150 men, and Mr. Bookwalter has amassed a very large fortune. The bent of Mr. Bookwalter's mind is towards industrial enterprise, He has never put any money in bonds save that he once advanced $5,000 on bonds issued to build a school house at Urbana. He owns the largest hotel in Springfield, O., and is about finishing a large opera house there. One of the finest business blocks in the place was built by him. He is a large landowner in illinois and Nebraska, and his great sheep ranch at Mission Creek, in the latter State, is well known throughout the west. In 1871 he founded a scientific and mechanical journal called the Mechanical News. He took great interest in the improvement of the Mississippi, and last spring took an artist down with him to the mouth of the river, and wrote a series of illustrated articles on the jetty system. He is said to own the finest picture gallery west of the Alleghenies, valued at $50,000. When the collection of John Taylor Johnston was sold in New York city, he bought fourteen of the best paintings in it. He has traveled in Europe and visited Cuba and the Sandwich Islands. Mr. Bookwalter was originally an ardent Republican and remained so until 1872, when he joined in the Greeley movement. He has since been a Democrat, but has not been active in politics, and is not a stump speaker. When reports were current last fall that the Republican manufacturers of Springfield were bringing to bear pressure to make their workmen vote the Republican ticket, Mr. Bookwalter called his men together and told them that, while he himself was a Democrat, he did not wish to have that fact influence the vote of any man employed by him. He is a good talker, but somewhat retiring in disposition. He is abstemious in his personal habits, but does not concern himself about his neighbors' tastes. He retains the friends he makes, and will be ardently supported during the coming campaign.-Exchange. sure. Through all the convalescing days of the President, the LAW JOURNAL resolutely set itself like a flint against the intense inclination of the press militant, to bid high for post-offices by pub WITH this number we conclude our first volume of the ОнIO LAW JOURNAL. Next week will usher in the second year of our paper. We have only a word to say to our readers upon this occasion. We have made an honest effort to ful-lishing the most searching details of that con fill all our promises made at the beginning of the year. If we have failed in anything, that failure has been involuntary and deeply regretted. We must say, however, that no complaints have reached us and no dissatisfaction has been expressed. Only generous consideration and appreciation have been extended us by the bench and bar of the State. While we thank our patrons most sincerely for the patronage without which we would have been compelled to write failure instead of success against our venture, we must indulge in the reflection that we have supplied to those patrons much valuable matter, in the law, which would have been otherwise long delayed, if not altogether withheld, up to this time. No. 35 of the O. S. Reports was issued after we began the publication of the LAW JOURNAL. It contained no report of any case decided after August 19th, the date of our first number. No. 36 O. S. R. is not yet published. We have published all the cases of importance that will appear in 36 Ohio State Reports and several to appear in 37. Only a few (ten sets) advance sheets of No. 36 were allowed to be distributed, and these were all bespoken; hence the profession could only obtain the opinion in these cases by paying losing rates -in many cases twice the cost of the LAW JOURNAL for an entire year. We, therefore, flatter ourselves that we are, fairly, at least, subserving the interests of the profession while advancing our own. The experience of the past year will very materially aid us in our endeavors to make a better journal during the year before us. valescence. We gave no rigor to our readers for a breakfast morsel; we did not regale them with a dinner dissertation upon the appearance and odor of things discovered by the five doctors in the sick room; we did not ask them to sup on prognostications for the night, signed by half a dozen medical gentlemen; and yet our poor little innocent, sly and covert sarcastic poke at Colonel Cork-Mountain, brings down the above anathema and financial disaster. We cannot please everybody. We don't mean to try. We remember the fable of the man who, to please his neighbors, even tried to carry on his shoulders his poor innocent ass; but it broke his neck. Kind sirs, you can't ride. We bid you adieu with pain, but, candidly, we have no use for gentlemen whose perceptives were so utterly forgotten by kind nature. INVESTING IN WHEAT OPTIONS. The Supreme Courts of Michigan and Wisconsin have both sat down heavily on the business of gambling in wheat "options." In the case of Raymond and others v. Leavitt, decided at the June term of the Michigan Supreme Court, the complainant had supplied $10,000 with which to force the price in Detroit and also cause a "corner," thus compelling parties who had contracts to fill, or who must purchase wheat for legitimate consumption, to pay more 'han would naturally be required. Having lost seventy per cent, of the amount in this speculation, the complainant brought suit to recover his money, but the Court decided that dealers who manipulate the market in order to bring about unnatural fluctuations in price, are engaged in the plainest and worst kind of produce gambling, and come under the censure of the law of the land. Such contracts cannot be enforced, and if parties see fit to invest their money in "options," they must get it back by other than legal measures. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the famous case of Barnard v. Backers, held that speculation in grain, where there is no intention to deliver on the one hand, or to receive and pay on the other, is unlawful, and falls outside the protection of the statutes, the same as other kinds of gambling and betting. The business methods practiced in the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, and other Exchanges are but hazards upon prospective changes in the market. The sales are not bona fide, no grain being actually delivered with the full price paid. Therefore, any suits at law growing out of such What a cold and unfeeling world this is to be transactions will not be sustained in the courts. We desire to add new features and certain improvements that will be noted as they appear. We ask a continuation of the kind favor of our friends. REGRETS. "CANTON, OHIO, AUG. 6, 1881. Proprietors Ohio Law Journal: Sirg: You will discontinue sending us your LAW JOURNAL.-The regular press has given us an intolerable amount of besh & slush & gush in reference to the Giteau crime, more than is endurable-now you have to nauseate your readers with the same trash-For any journal professing to be a Law journal, that will advocate judicial murder, or that will seek in times of excitement to engraft in our system & principle of despotism we certainly have no use. MEYER & PIERO." SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. JOHN MCLANDSBOROUGH. Where public money in custody of a public officer of this state, and with the disbursement of which money he is charged by law, is stolen or otherwise lost without his fault, and the legislature pass an act exonerating such officer and his sureties from the payment of such money, and direct that a tax be levied in the territory upon which the loss must fall to meet the deficit, such act is not forbidden by the constitution, state or federal. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Harrison County: Reserved in the District Court. John McLandsborough, on May 21, 1877, brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Harrison County, averring that he was then a citizen of said county, and a resident land-owner and taxpayer in Scio special school district in North township in said county; that Joseph McElveen, about March 29, 1877, was the duly elected and qualified treasurer of said school district, and had given bond with sureties for the performance of his duties as such treasurer, and then had in his possession as such treasurer, belonging to said school district, $525.00, school funds which had been assessed and collected from the taxpayers of such district, including said McLandsborough, for school purposes; that said McElveen claims to have been robbed of said funds, on or about March 29, 1877; that said McElveen's term as such officer expired in April, 1877, and his successor has been elected and qualified; that it was the duty of said McElveen to pay over to his successor said sum of money, and upon his refusing to do so, his sureties became liable to pay the same, except $36 thereof; that McElveen and his sureties desire to have the property of said school district again assessed to raise said deficit, so that they may be released from their obligation; that the board of education is about to have a meeting for the purpose of assessing and certifying a tax upon the property of said district to make up said sum, which tax is to be levied and collected this year, and in part from said McLandsborough's property, and to release McElveen and his sureties from their liabilities, and they have fixed May 23, 1877, as the day upon which to perform said illegal act; that the act will be unconstitutional, oppressive, and will produce irreparable injury to the rights of said McLandsborough, unless restrained. McLandsborough therefore asked that the said board of education be enjoined and restrained from making or certifying such levy of tax, or releasing said McElveen and his sureties. On June 2, 1877, the board of education of said district filed an answer, of which the following is, substantially, a copy: 1. Now comes E. S. Woodborne, Wm. Herron and John Voorhees, who compose the said board of education of Scio special school district, and for answer, say they deny that they have done or contemplate doing any illegal or unconstitutional act in regard to levying taxes, as claimed in the petition, and say all the taxes they have levied or contemplate levying, as said board of education, for this year, are necessary and proper for carrying on the schools of said district, and they deny plaintiff's right to have an injunction issued against them, as prayed for in the petition. 2. They further say, regarding the contemplated releasing of the said Joseph McElveen and his sureties from liability on said McElveen's bond as treasurer of said school district, that it is true they contemplate such action, but not in an illegal or unconstitutional manner. In justification of their said proposed action they say that the general assembly of the state of Ohio, on April 24, 1877, passed a law providing, among other things, that the board of education of said special school district are hereby authorized to settle with said treasurer, and release him and his sureties on his official bond as treasurer of said special school district, from the payment of said sum of $525, as aforesaid; and that said treasurer and his sureties shall not hereafter be held liable for the payment of said money; provided that before such release shall be had, the board of education shall submit the question to the qualified electors of said school district, at a special election, of which ten days' notice shall be given by posting up written or printed notices in five of the most public places in said district, and that a majority voting shall favor the release, the election to be held and conducted by the board of education. Said defendants say said law was passed with special reference to the contemplated release of said Joseph McElveen and his sureties as aforesaid, and they further say that they duly gave the required notice of said election, and on May 19, 1877, submitted the said question, as provided in said law, to the qualified voters of said district, a majority of whom then and there voted in favor of releasing said McElveen and his sureties from further liability for or on account of said bond, and in favor of a tax to supply the deficiency in the school funds of said district, made by reason thereof. Said defendants therefore say their action and their contemplated action in reference to releasing said Joseph McElveen and his sureties, as aforesaid, is in accordance with the laws of the State of Ohio, and they deny plaintiff's right to enjoin them from thus acting, and they asked to be dismissed with their costs, and for such other order as may be proper. The act of the legislature, above referred to, is as follows: "An act for the relief of Joseph McIlveen, treasurer of Scio special school district, North township, Harrison county, Ohio, and his sureties. "Whereas, Joseph McIlveen, treasurer of said Scio special school district, was, on the evening of the 29th day of March, A. D. 1877, assaulted by two unknown men, knocked down and robbed, on the railroad track, between his residence and the village of Scio, Harrison county, Ohio, whither he was going for the purpose of paying out money to teachers and others, of the sum of five hundred and twenty-five dollars of the public money belonging to said special school district, in the hands of said treasurer; and, "Whereas, said robbery was not due to any fault or negligence on the part of said Joseph McIlveen; and, "Whereas, said Joseph McIlveen is wholly unable to pay said amount, and has no property out of which any part thereof can be made; therefore, "Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, that the board of education of Scio special school district are hereby authorized to assess a tax upon all the taxable property of said special school district in addition to the tax now authorized by law sufficient to raise the sum of five hundred and twenty-five dollars, for the purpose of supplying the deficiency in said school fund. "Sec. 2. The board of education of said special school district are hereby authorized to settle with said treasurer, and release him and his sureties on his official bond as treasurer of said special school district, from the payment of said sum of five hundred and twenty-five dollars, stolen as aforesaid; and that said treasurer and his sureties shall not hereafter be held liable for the payment of said money; provided, that before such release shall be had, the board of education shall submit the question to the qualified electors of said school district, at a special election, of which ten days' notice shall be given,by posting up written or printed notices in five of the most public places in said district, and that a majority voting shall favor the release, the election to be held and conducted by the board of education. "Sec. 3. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage." The following journal entry is a part of the record: "And afterward, to wit: July 7, 1877, being term time, this cause came on to be heard upon plaintiff's demurrers to the second defense in said answer as alleged, which was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof the court sustain said demurrer, to which the defendant excepts; and on motion of plaintiff it is ordered and adjudged by the court that said defendant be, and it is hereby enjoined and restrained from releasing or taking any steps to release said McElveen or his sureties from their obligation under said bond, to which defendant excepts, and said exception is here noted. It is thereupon considered by the court that said plaintiff recover of said defendant his costs herein expended, and that defendant pay its own costs." The board of education prosecuted error to the district court, which court reserved the cause to this court for decision. Cunningham & Hollingsworth, for plaintiff in error. J. M. Estep, for defendant in error, OKEY, J. In State v. Harper (6 Ohio St. 607), it was settled, that the felonious taking and carrying away the public moneys in the custody of a county treasurer, without any fault or negligence on his part, does not discharge him and his sureties, and cannot be set up as a defense to an action on his official bond. The bond involved in the consideration of this case is not different in legal effect from the bond in Harper's case. In Harper's case, however, the question presented in this case was in no way involved-that is, whether, where such an officer has lost public funds without any fault on his part, it is within the power of the general assembly to provide that the loss thus sustained shall be made to rest on the people to whom the money belonged, and not on an unfortunate but blameless officer. That the taxing power is a legislative power admits of no doubt. Lima v. McBride, 34 Ohio St. 338-350. And any limit to this power must be found in the constitution itself. Without undertaking to enumerate or define those limitations, we are clear that the act in question in this case does not fall within any of them, nor. does the act violate a provision common to both state and federal constitutions against impairing the obligations of contracts. Bonds like this, where the deficit is of the same character as in this case, are prosecuted in the name of the state (Hunter v. Mercer Co., 10 Ohio St. 515), and the legislature undoubtedly has authority to release obligations which could only be thus prosecuted. Indeed, it is difficult to fix any limit to the power of the general assembly in this respect, where the funds so lost were raised by taxation, which, as we have said, is clearly a legislative power. Counsel have cited no case in which such power, under a constitution like ours, has been denied, and we have found no such case. People v. Supervisor, 16 Mich. 254, and Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123, were placed entirely on a provision in the constitution of that state which is not contained in our constitution, and which provision, it was held, forbids such release by the legislature. And the rule referred to in the beginning of this opinion as to civil actions against the officer, where the funds in his hands have been lost without his fault, is stated by Judge Dillon in the same way, but he adds that such officer will not be liable if he has been "relieved from this responsibility by statute." 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp. 296. Judgment reversed. REMOTENESS OF CONSEQUENTIAL Under the above caption, The Irish Law Times, (Dublin) is publishing a series of most interesting and ably-written articles, and for the information of the readers of this journal, as opportunity affords, we intend to re-publish the articles. The following is the first of the series: Perhaps the best executed portion of Mayne on damages (3d ed.) is that relating to the inquiry, what grounds of damage will in no case be admissible. The discussion of principle is all that could be desired, and the collation of cases is unsurpassed by any text-writer whom we have consulted. Yet, there are some additional authorities that might have been cited with advantage, among which it is only necessary to mention, for our present purpose, Williams v. Raggett, 37 L. T. N. S., 96, and Collier and wife v.D. W. & W. Ry. Co., 8 Ir. L. T. Rep., 24; Ir. R.. 8 C. L., 21; while there have been some subsequent decisions on the subject, the most recent of which we propose to examine. As accurately stated by Mr. Mayne, the first, and in fact the only inquiry, in all these cases is, whether the damage complained of, is the natural and reasonable result of the defendant's act; and it will assume this character if it can be shown to be such a consequence as, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from the act, or, in cases of contract, if it appears to have been contemplated by both parties (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 23 L. J. Ex., 179). But simple and intelligible as is the rule, difficult indeed is its application under particular conditions; while, as observed by Pollock, C. B., in Hamlin v. G. N. Ry, Co., 1 H. & N., 408, "each case of this description must be decided with reference to the circumstances peculiar to each." In Williams v. Raggett (ubi supra) the defendant had trespassed on the plaintiff's coal mine and worked part of the coal, in doing which he had left large pillars of coal standing; and the result of taking away the coal that surrounded those pillars was to draw away the water from the coal of which they were formed, so as to render it practically worthless. "I have had considerable doubt whether I am at liberty to give damages with respect to the coal so left in an injured state," said Fry. J.; "but, upon the whole, I am of opinion that I am so at liberty, and upon this ground, that the defendant has here caused a physical change, which, taken in connection with other changes made by him, renders the property of the plaintiff less valuable than it would otherwise have been. Damage of this kind I do not consider too remote." Here the injury was the immediate necessary effect of the defendant's act; and so it would seem to be if a husband were deprived of his wife's service and society, by reason of her having been detained all night at a railway station, in consequence of the defendant's breach of contract to carry her as a passenger, though Mr. Collier failed to recover under such circumstances, because he had been himself absent from home on the occasion. Collier and wife v. D. W. & W. Ry. Co. (ubi supra). It was fortunate that Mrs. Collier contracted no illness on this occasion, and "sustained no personal injury beyond the fact," as the reporter puts it, "that she had to lie in bed for a time in consequence of having sat so long upon a hard seat. No medical advice was applied for." But had she caught cold, the court would, doubtless, have cruelly remarked; Here it cannot be said the catching cold by the plaintiff's wife is the immediate and necessary effect of the breach of contract, or was one which could fairly be said to have been in the contemplation of the parties. It is an effect of the breach of contract in a certain sense, but removed one stage; it is not the primary, but the secondary consequence of it." So said Cockburn, C. J., in Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 10, Q. B., 111, which is thus referred to by Mr. R. Vashon Rogers, in his unique little book on "The Law of the Road." "One Hobbs, and Betsy his wife, with two juveniles, once took a midnight train homeward bound; they were landed, however, at another village, some miles off from the house; it was so late that they could neither get a conveyance nor get accommodations at an inn, and so had to walk home through a drizzling rain. Betsy took cold, and was laid up for some time, and the jury gave a verdict of £28 in their favor-£8 for the personal inconvenience, the balance for the wife's illness and its consequences. The court considered that Hobbs was entitled to the £8, but not to the rest, the sickness being too remote a consequence of the breach of contract. This was in England; but in Mississippi, where a man, subject to rheumatism, got carried past his station and had to walk back in the rain, whereupon his old enemy attacked him, it was decided that he might get satisfaction out of the company. Mobile, &c., Ry. Co. v. M'Arthur, 43 Miss., 180. In Illinois the courts followed the English decision in a case where, the train not stopping, a man walked a long distance unnecessarily, and became sick. Indianapolis, &c., Ry. Co. v. Birney, 71 Ill., 391." In the latter case, we may add, the plaintiff had the option to remain five or six hours and take the next train, or procure a horse or a horse and carriage; and so the voluntariness of the plaintiff's act distinguishes that case from the Hobbs case, where the plaintiffs had no other alternative-it was a case of "Hobbs' choice" Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co. was applied in another recent American case, Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Col., 344, where, in consequence of the defendant's negligence, their sleeping car, in which a woman was a passenger, caught fire, and she was compelled to leave the car, half clad, and took cold, which resulted in suppression of her menses and a long illness; and it appearing that she had been menstruating at the time of the accident and that the illness was traceable to that condition, it was held that the defendants were not liable in damages therefor. Adopting the rule laid down in Milwaukee, &c., Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 4 Otto, 475, that "the question always is, was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury -a continuous operation? Did the fact constitute a continuous succession of events so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury? The court |